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ABSTRACT 
This study originates from the search of the author, who himself is a main Agent, as 
per the Principal-Agent Model developed in the study, for proper Management 
Accountability in his public sector organization. The problem of low level of 
Management Accountability in the public sector of the UAE has been pervasive in 
the sector and raised many questions, the cardinal ones being: why has the situation 
arisen and what might be done to improve it? These are the main questions 
addressed in this study. The major objective of the study, therefore, is to identify 
and evaluate the factors that account for the observed low level of Management 
Accountability in the public sector of the UAE with the aim of finding an 
appropriate solution to improve the situation. 
To achieve this objective, both secondary and primary data/information were used 
extensively and intensively with a much heavier reliance on primary data because of 
the highly qualitative nature of the topic and the lack of appropriate secondary data. 
Apart from the general questionnaire survey of the public sector, two representative 
public sector organizations - Etisalat and Ministry of Health - were selected for in- 
depth study of the subject-matter. Both quantitative and qualitative data were used; 
the latter was obtained- largely through questionnaire survey and personal interviews 
spread over a period of two years using purposively selected samples (purposive 
sampling method) from the general public and the case study organizations. 
Various testing techniques, including Z-test, ANOVA, Correlation and Regression 
analysis, were employed to test for the validity and reliability of findings of the 
research. We are confident of the validity and reliability of our results but we do 
also recognize the limitations of the study, for example, the coverage of the study in 
terms of the number of organizations researched, for the purpose of generalization. 
The main findings of the study are summarized as follows: 
" The general public questionnaire survey results confirm that the level 
of Management Accountability in the public sector of the UAE is 
lower than the average of similar sectors, for example, in the UK. 
V 
" The general performance of the public sector in terms of achieving 
objectives is below average. 
" The performance of the case-study, Etisalat, in terms of posted 
financial statements is encouraging but this is against the background 
of very weak competition because of the legislative monopolist status 
the corporation enjoys in the market. However, the level of 
Management Accountability in the corporation is less than average. 
" Both the general performance in terms of achieving objectives and the 
level of Management Accountability in the Ministry of Health are 
below average. 
" The causal factors are grouped into three categories: Social-cultural, 
Organisational and Personal factors. Each group has sub-factors that 
have differential effects on the confirmed low level of Management 
Accountability in the sector. 
The main recommendation made was that the Principal-Agent Model developed 
in the study should be adopted to streamline and formalize the five relationships 
involved in the model. The pillars of the recommendation are the legalisation, 
formalisation and control of the relationships in the model to achieve a higher level 
of Management Accountability in the sector. The implementation of our 
recommendation would require a change in attitude, perception and other social- 
cultural as well as organizational factors. 
It would require some will-power and commitment to introduce the changes that 
might lead to the improvements that are projected in the study. Recent 
developments in the country, such as the call of the Minister for Information and 
Culture, for constructive criticism of the activities and performance of government 
organizations indicates a burgeoning recognition of the problem of accountability in 
the public sector and the need to address it effectively. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The 1970s and 1980s saw the Public Sector and its enterprises and organisations returned 
to the centre stage of economic policy debate in both developed and developing countries 
(Ramanadham, 1984; Kaletsky, 1985; Heald, 1986; Killick, 1986; ). The debate is 
particularly poignant in the developing countries where the Public Sector still dominates 
the economic activity of those countries. In these economies, the sector provides the 
highest number of jobs, performs both economic and social welfare functions; contributes 
significantly to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and, of course, consumes the highest 
proportion of the annual budgets. It is not surprising therefore that the sector continues to 
attract much attention. 
The focus of attention has always been on the performance of the Public Sector 
enterprises and organizations. The resultant debate has two main groups of contenders. 
One group looks pre-dominantly at the economic performance of the Public Sector 
enterprises and organizations (Heald, 1986) while the other group emphasizes the social 
welfare functions of the enterprises (Jones, 1982; Killick, 1986). While the latter group 
recognizes the economic under-performance of the enterprises compared to the private 
sector, they argue that the social welfare functions of the sector are satisfactory and 
compensatory for its economic failures (Kaletsky, 1985). The other group, on the other 
hand, concentrates on the economic performance of the sector and argues that there is 
gross inefficiency in the economic performance of the sector, the social welfare functions 
notwithstanding. This group argues further that the economic development of a country 
depends more on the economic performance rather than the social welfare functions of its 
enterprises and organisations particularly at the early stages of economic development 
(see Rostow, 1954; Lewis, 1970; Meier & Seers, 1984). They contend that this being the 
case, the poor economic performance of the dominant sector of the economy (ie. the 
Public Sector) will have an inevitable net adverse effect on the overall development of the 
economy. They maintain that Public Sector enterprises have notorious track record of 
poor performance, ineffectiveness, inefficiency and poor management accountability 
compared to private sector enterprises. 
Despite the intensity of the debate, the fact still remains that sufficient and conclusive 
data-base has not been compiled to indicate categorically that Public Sector enterprises in 
all countries and circumstances are inefficient and poor economic performers. More 
importantly, even if the case of poor performance was established, hard facts on why this 
is the case seen to be scarce especially in the newly emerging monolithic and 
homogenous economies such as those of the Arab countries in the region of the Arabian 
Gulf. This study will consequently focus on the Public Sector enterprises and 
organisations in one of the countries of the region - the United Arab Emirates (UAE). 
1.2 BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH 
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is located in the Arabian Peninsula, North of the Equator. 
It is bordered on the North by the Arabian Gulf and on the West by the State of Qatar and 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; on the South by the Sultanate of Oman and on the East by 
the Gulf of Oman. The UAE has a total land area of 83,600 sq. kms with a population of 
2.6million inhabitants in 1996. (Department of Planning, 1999) 
The United Arab Emirates is a Federation of seven member states - Abu Dhabi, Dubai, 
Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain, Ras al-Khaimah and Fajairah. The Federation was 
formally established in December 1971 by the Federation Law 1971 but was not completed 
until February 1972, when the joining of the seventh member, Ras al-Khaimah, took place 
(Simon, 1992). The Law established the political structure of the Federation and set up five 
federal institutions to administer the country. 
The first institution is the Constitution, which provides the Legal system of the UAE. A 
provisional constitution was set up in 1971 when the Federation was formed but after due 
consultations, the Constitution was ratified and adopted as a permanent Constitution of the 
UAE in 1996. One of such issues is the imbalance in the contribution of member units to 
the constitution, even though they are dependent on its resources for development. After 
much debate, a permanent constitution was approved and established in 1996. 
4 
The Presidency is the second federal institution and it constitutes the Government. It 
consists of the President of the UAE, His Highness Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahyan, 
the prime minister and vice-president, Sheikh Maktoum bin Rashid aI-Maktoum, and the 
deputy prime minister, Sheikh Sultan bin Zayid al"Nahayan, among others. The position of 
president is determined by the Supreme Council of Rulers, which consists of hereditary 
rulers from the seven states. The election process of the president and his deputy takes 
place every five years. 
The National government is represented by the Council of Ministers, and it constitutes the 
third federal institution of the UAE. Its main roles involve the drafting of federal laws, 
which include the budget and regulations for implementing the various federal laws. At 
least one minister represents each state, but senior posts are allocated to the larger Emirates. 
The separate Emirates are represented by a national legislature - Federal National Council 
(FNC) - consisting of 40 appointed members. This is the fourth federal body and its role is 
purely of a consulting nature. The issues that the FNC can debate are determined by the 
Council of Ministers. 
The Federal Supreme Court is the fifth body to contribute to the political structure of the 
UAE. On a formal basis, the five judges that make up the Supreme Court presides over any 
dispute between member Emirates and the federal government, or between member 
Emirates themselves. The Supreme Court acts as the judicial custodian of federal laws and 
an interpreter of the provisions made in the constitution. 
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The UAE economy depended very heavily on Oil revenue and trade activities in the 1970s 
and 1980s. Since 1991 the heavy dependence upon Oil revenue has, on average, declined 
as a result not only of the decline in oil prices but also the policy of diversification of the 
sources of income of the country away from Oil exports. In fact, in 1991 Oil revenue 
accounted for only 35% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) compared to 65% in the 
1970s (Dept. of Research & Studies, 1996). A similar downward trend is evident in the 
contribution of oil revenue to total government revenue and public expenditure. In 1994, 
for example, oil revenue represented 77% of the total government revenue and 55% of total 
public expenditure but this declined to 75% and 53% respectively in 1995 (Central Bank of 
UAE, 1996). The policy of diversification of sources of income seems, therefore, to be 
working successfully. 
The end of the Gulf War in early 1991 paved the way for economic recovery in the UAE. 
Business confidence was boosted by the Government's determination to press ahead with 
several large-scale energy-related projects. The Government also announced a plan to 
spend some Dh 25 billion in the 1991-94 period not only on Oil projects but also on non- 
Oil infrastructural development. 
The Gulf crisis (from August 1990 to February 1991) resulted in minimal adverse effects. 
Like other Gulf States, the UAE suffered from a temporary capital outflow and a sudden 
drop in tourist arrival; but both sectors have since recovered. A number of public sector 
projects were suspended, signalling a marked downturn in the construction industry which 
6 
experienced a boom before the crisis. The Oil industry, however, benefited from the crisis: 
revenue rose by about 50% in 1990 compared with the previous year. This is the result of 
higher prices and increased output. Despite the disruption caused by the war, the UAE 
gross domestic product (GDP) in 1990 was estimated by the International Monetary Fund 
to have grown by 23.5% in nominal terms. The outlook of the future of the UAE economy 
is thus optimistic. 
The UAE is an active player on the international scene and is very keen on keeping its 
relations with friends in the Gulf, the Arab world and elsewhere strong. This has been 
reinforced through past experience concerning its relationship with other oil producing 
Kations and the conflicts that can occur in the production of oil. As a member of the Gulf 
Co-operation Council (GCC), the Arab league, the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OAPEC) and the non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the UAE is committed not 
only to developing its economy but also to supporting the course of the various 
organisations in which it remains a member. Its oil wealth provides the means for 
Supporting such a huge expenditure programme while the public sector provides the 
'channels through which the country meets most of its obligations to internal and external 
demands. 
1-2.1 The Public Sector 
Until 2 December 1971 when the Federation of the UAE was established, there was no 
fOrmally structured or defined public versus private sector divide in the country. There was 
rather a fusion of both sectors with the Oil industry, which was owned and controlled by a 
7 
Western Consortium led by British Petroleum and Shell, dominating the economic 
landscape of the country. A burgeoning utilities industry including Water, Telephone, 
Electricity and Wireless, which were themselves owned by either national businessmen or 
foreigners (mainly British firms) intermingled with the private enterprises 
After the formation of the Federation in December 1971, the government set out to 
restructure the foundation of the economy and thus established the formal divide between a 
public sector dominated by government ownership and control and a private sector 
dominated by private enterprise. This was done within the comprehensive economic 
development plan of the government that was formulated in 1973. (Economist Intelligence 
Unit, 1993) 
However, in 1968, the then government of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi had set up the first 
joint stock company, the National Bank of Abu Dhabi, to operate as a partially State owned 
enterprise followed by the acquisition of 25% in Gulf Aviation Company that became Gulf 
Air in 1974. In 1976 the Federal government established the Emirates Telecommunications 
- ETISALAT - as partially State owned enterprise. These acquisitions were made within 
the government strategy of enhancing the establishment and development of the public 
sector to serve development projects in the country. In the late 1970s and 1980s, the 
number of public sector enterprises increased substantially along with private sector firms. 
The rapid growth in the number of enterprises in both the public and private sectors was the 
logical consequence of the fast and massive economic development progress that took 
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place within the period and up to the early 1990s. This rapid growth resulted mainly from 
the intervention of the government in the economic welfare of the nation in order to 
promote faster socio-economic development programmes to satisfy increasing demand for 
public goods and services as well as modernising and expanding the productive capacity of 
the economy. 
The public sector in the UAE comprises mainly of government Ministries/Departments, 
state part-owned companies and public enterprises (trading units). The public sector is 
dominant in the economy of the UAE and contributes substantially to the socio-economic 
welfare of the country. For example, the Government Departments within the sector 
employed about 215,000 persons out of a total national labour force of 955,100 at the end 
of 1995, representing 22.5% of the labour force in that year. In comparative terms, the 
number employed by the Departments increased from 168,471 persons in 1985 to 215,000 
in 1995; an increase of 28% over the ten year period (Central Bank, 1997). Foreign 
expatriates and migrant workers dominate the labour force in the public sector and, indeed, 
the private sector. In recent years, however, the number of UAE nationals in the labour 
force has increased respectably largely because of better education, increase in the number 
of school leavers and change in the attitude of women toward working in state run 
establishments. In 1985, for example, 33,700 UAE nationals were employed in 
Government Departments out of a total employment of 168,471 compared with 43,000 out 
of 215,000 in 1995; an increase of 28% over the period (Dept. of Research & Studies, 
1996). Similarly, the public sector contributes substantial amount of income to the coffers 
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of the Treasury annually. In the fiscal year of 1996, for instance, the revenue generated by 
the public sector amounted to 31 % of the total government receipts in that year. 
Thus, despite its modest start, the public sector in the UAE has assumed, within a short 
period of time, the traditional dominance of the socio-economic activity of the country, as 
is the case in other countries particularly the developing countries. The sector has been 
very important in financing and supporting various economic activities particularly those 
activities that are considered as providing the infrastructure of the economy such as roads, 
power, water and schools. 
Despite its contribution in the economy, the public sector and its dominance of the socio- 
economic activities of the UAE has raised increasing concern among the consumers of the 
goods and services of the sector, academics and even government officials about 
accountability, performance and efficiency of the sector. It is generally argued that the 
performance of the sector in terms of set and realized objectives often diverge in spite of 
the availability of financial resources. The enterprises in the sector are seen as ineffective 
in the achievement of objectives and inefficient in the use of resources. The public has 
placed these failures and shortcomings at the doorstep of poor management performance in 
the public sector especially poor management accountability for the use of the vast amount 
of resources put in the sector. 
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13 THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
While the concern and criticism of the public is understandable, the question still remains 
as to prevalence of poor performance and management accountability in the public sector. 
As an Executive Accountor' in one of the public sector organizations in the Emirate of Abu 
Dhabi, one has encountered the concerns of the public in the sector and has no reason to 
suggest that accountability in the sector is anything to write home. It is an existing and real 
problem in the public sector. However, the researcher's observation is not sufficient 
enough to conclude a -priori that poor performance as well as poor management 
accountability is prevalent in the UAE public sector. We decided to conduct an exploratory 
research to establish a basis to justify the observation of the researcher and the concerns of 
the public. The results of the research conducted through personal interviews in early 1998 
using a structured grading scale (column 1) are reported in Table 1.1. 
As can be seen in the Table, we chose seven main public services organizations and asked a 
randomly selected twenty (sixteen co-operated fully) members of the public to assess the 
performance of the organizations in terms of their (respondents') level of satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction with the level of management accountability in the organizations. 
1 The researcher is currently the Under-Secretary of the Abu Dhabi Finance Department, an equivalent of Permanent 
Secretary in the British Civil Service. 
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Table 1.1 
Exploratory Research Results: Level of Satisfaction with Public Sector Performance 
Level of 
Satisfaction 
Min. 
of 
Labour 
Telecom. 
Etisalat 
Min. of 
Education 
Immig 
ration 
Min. of 
Health 
Water 
& 
Electricity 
Munici 
pality 
Very satisfied 0 3 0 1 1 _ 1 0 
Satisfied 4 7 4 4 3 4 4 
Indifferent 5 3 6 5 4 5 6 
Dissatisfied 5 3 5 5 6 5 4 
Very 
dissatisfied 2 0 1 1 2 1 2 
Total Sample 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
The clear message from the results is that the satisfaction level of the public with the 
performance of the public services organizations surveyed is well below average except the 
Telecommunication monopolist, ETISALAT, whose performance rating is well above 
average. 
Taking the "Indifferent" rating (i. e. average rating) as the divide between satisfied and 
dissatisfied, it can be seen that the ratings below average are 7 respondents for Ministry of 
Labour, only 3 for Etisalat, 6 for Education, 6 for Immigration, 8 for Health, 6 for Water & 
Electricity and 6 for Municipality. In contrast, the number of respondents who rated the 
performance above average is less than 6 in each case except Etisalat, which had a 
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staggering 10 respondents. The conclusion of our exploration research is that the concerns 
of the public and the observation of the researcher are real. 
This result in support of the concerns and criticisms of the public has triggered the desire 
to carry out a thorough research to determine why there is poor management accountability 
in the public sector of the UAE. Other complementary questions that emerge from this are: 
a) What are the factors that account for the low level of management 
accountability? 
b) What is the degree of influence of each of these factors upon the observed 
situation? 
C) What can be done to make the Public Sector enterprises in the UAE more 
accountable and efficient? 
d) How can this be done given the resource constraints of the country? 
These questions provide the main thrust of the research. Two of the public sector 
organisations in our exploratory research - Etisalat and Ministry of Health - have been 
selected for use as the cases for the study. The main justification for this choice can be 
seen in the results in Table I. I. While our sample respondents rated Etisalat as the best 
performer among the seven organisations, the Ministry of Health was similarly rated as the 
worst performer by the same sample. It is logical, therefore, to use these two organisations 
as our case study enterprises not only because of the ratings but also because of the 
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constraint on the number of cases to study deriving from financial, time and other resources 
limitations. Chapter 4 will touch on this issue later. 
It is also worth noting that though there is a considerable amount of work done with regard 
to the performance of public sector enterprises in both developed and developing countries, 
no specific research on management accountability and performance of public sector 
enterprises in the UAE has been undertaken. The need to carry out this research is thus 
evident and justified. 
1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The main objectives of this study, therefore, is to identify and assess the factors that 
account for poor management accountability and inefficiency in the public sector 
enterprises in the UAE with the aim of recommending appropriate solutions. This 
objective is disaggregated into the following more specific sub-objectives. The study 
intends: 
a) To examine the performance, particularly in terms of management accountability, 
of public sector enterprises in the UAE using case studies; 
b) To identify the factors that are largely responsible for the low level of management 
accountability in the public sector of the UAE. 
c) To assess the degree of influence of the factors contributing to the low level of 
management accountability in the sector; and, 
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d) To develop an appropriate model for improving management accountability in the 
UAE and, indeed, in other countries with similar environment and problems. 
1.5 USEFULNESS OF THE STUDY 
The outcome of the study will help the government of the UAE to formulate the right 
policies in connection with the performance and accountability of public sector 
enterprises. The model developed will provide a practical approach to ensuring a much 
higher level of management, and, indeed, other forms accountability in the sector. This 
helps to reduce the current high level of resource misuse and wastage as a result of poor 
accountability. Besides the government, investors and the public generally will benefit 
from the outcome of this study especially those stakeholders who have direct interest in 
the target companies - Etisalat and the Ministry of Health. However stakeholders will 
also use the finding to correct any adverse variances that have caused unsatisfactory 
results. 
On the other hand students and academics will use the outcome of the study, particularly 
the model that is developed, for further research. Both Accountors and Accountees will 
derive much benefit from this study to improve their performance and accountability. 
Thus, the nation will be better off from the results of this study if implemented 
conscientiously. 
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1.6 DEFINITION OF TERMS 
Often terms mean different things to different people and terminological ambiguity 
produces protracted arguments that lead to a waste of time and other resources. It is 
necessary therefore to define some of the main terms that are used in this study. The 
following terms are thus defined for the purpose of clarity in this study. 
1.6.1 Accountability 
Paul, as quoted in Levaggi (1995), defined accountability as "Holding individuals and 
organisations responsible for performance measured as objectively as possible". On the 
other hand, Jackson (1982) focused his definition on how to be accountable. "Basically 
accountability involves explaining or justifying what has been done, what is currently 
being done and what has been planned. Accountability arises from a set of established 
procedures and relationships of varying formality. Thus, one part is accountable to the 
other part in the sense that one of the parties has the right to call upon the other to give an 
account of his activities. Accountability therefore involves the giving of information" 
(Jackson, 1982). Based on these definitions, there are two key elements in the concept of 
accountability: the need for information and judgment concerning decision-making. 
Accountability thus requires that managers/officials of public sector enterprises to be 
responsible and accountable for their decisions and actions. 
Politicians and civil servants are supposed to be accountable for policy decisions they 
make much as the management of the enterprises are accountable for their action. 
However these sets of accountabilities need ways of measuring performance. Because 
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the ultimate goal of accountability is to secure a technical and allocative efficiency as 
conditions for the economy to reach Pareto - optimal point - accountability structure is 
needed in the absence of or due to failure of perfect market structure, which is the case 
for public sector monopolies. This topic of "Accountability Concept" is elaborated in 
chapter 3. 
1.6.2 Efficiency': 
This concept has been defined by the Australian Accounting Research Foundation as 
"The use of financial, human and physical resource such that output is maximised for any 
given set of resources inputs or input is minimised for any given quantity and quality of 
output" (see, McCrae and Vada, 1997). Generally, efficiency may be classified into two 
types: productive and allocative efficiency. Productive efficiency is measured by the 
average cost of producing goods and services whereas allocative efficiency is measured 
by the extent to which the economic system produces that mix of goods and services that 
reflects the preference of consumers as expressed by their consumption decision. 
Efficiency and economy seen as concepts compliment each other in operation. In a free 
market both types of efficiency exist. Competition forces producers to reduce prices 
while consumers' choice influences producers and their decision about what to produce 
and sell. When there is a market for the goods and services of public sector enterprises, 
economic and productive efficiency is taken care of. Competition would force producers 
whose costs are high to reduce them or they would be squeezed out of the markets. There 
may therefore be no need for independent measures or analysis of such costs, but there 
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may be a need for a target measurement for the use of resources such as return on capital 
employed. However where there are no markets for the products, public accountability 
for the use of resources would be required of those who have been entrusted with the 
stewardship of public money. The management of the enterprises must demonstrate how 
well the money is spent hence measurement and reporting efficiency and effectiveness 
are essential part of public accountability which is needed to be independently validated 
and monitored. 
1.6.3 Effectiveness: 
Following the Australian Accounting Research Foundation, we define effectiveness as 
"The achievement of the objectives or other intended effect of progress, operations or 
activities" (see, Ibid.. As stated by Pendlebury and Schreim (1990, p. 117), for many 
public enterprises effectiveness is difficult to determine, as objectives are often imprecise 
and ambiguous. They state that, "The effectiveness of many public services is, of course, 
difficult to determine. Objectives are often imprecise and ambiguous, and even if they 
were not, their achievement will frequently be impossible to measure. Under such 
circumstances the evaluation of effectiveness is an inherently subjective process and the 
appropriateness of involving auditors has always been a matter for concern"(Pendlebury 
and Schreim, 1990, p. 117). 
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1.7 LAYOUT OF THE STUDY. 
Chanter 1: Introduction: The Research Problem 
Chapter 1 identifies the research problem, sets the objectives to direct the study 
and gives a summary layout of the study. 
Chapter 2: Theoretical Issues on Public Sector Economics 
This chapter reviews the literature that is relevant to our research topic in order to develop 
an appropriate theoretical framework for the research project. The concentration here, 
however, is on public sector economics and its contribution to an understanding of the 
operation of public sector enterprises. The literature reviewed includes market structures, 
the Bureaucracy Model, Public Choice Theory and the Principal-Agent Relationship 
Theory. 
Chapter 3 Theoretical Issues in Accountability 
This chapter focuses on discussing the concept of accountability and its various 
dimensions. Definition of the concept is discussed in greater details in this chapter. The 
nature of accountability in public sector organizations is explored leading to a discussion 
of the Generalised Theory of Accountability. The framework of analysis for the study is 
discussed in this chapter. 
Chanter 4 Research Methodology 
This chapter discusses the methods used in conducting the research. We employed 
exploratory, secondary and primary research methods to investigate the problem and 
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obtain the required data for our work. Problems encountered during the research and the 
ways these were resolved are also be explained. 
Chapter 5 The Politico-Economic Structure of the UAE 
This chapter provides general overview of the UAE economy with an emphasis on the 
Emirate of Abu Dhabi so that a full picture of the macro background to the study may be 
given. 
Chapter 6 The Public Services Sector of the UAE 
This Chapter gives an overview of the public sector in the UAE, particularly that of the 
Emirate of Abu Dhabi. This provides a background to the case-studies. Using mainly 
survey research findings, an assessment of the general level of performance and 
management accountability in the sector is made and discussed. 
Chapter 7 Case Study 1: The Telecommunications Corporation (Etisalat) 
This chapter gives details of the background of Etisalat and the services it provides. 
Other relevant operational details are discussed and an assessment of the operational 
effectiveness and the level of management accountability in the Corporation are made, 
discussed and analyzed using mainly primary research results. Some comparisons with 
British Telecommunication (BT) are made. 
Chapter 8 Case Study 2: The Ministry of Health 
This chapter discusses the operation of the Ministry of Health. Again the objective here 
is to show whether the Ministry as a public sector organization has been efficient in terms 
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of its general performance and management accountability. Comparisons with the British 
National Health Services are made and discussed. 
Chapter 9 Factors Constraining Management Accountability 
This chapter will highlight the comparative results Etisalat and the Ministry of Health as a 
prelude to identifying the factors responsible for the level of Management Accountability 
established through our research results. International comparisons particularly from the 
UK are made and discussed. 
Chanter 10 Analysis of Effects of the Constraining Factors 
This chapter analyzes the factors identified as the main constraints on the level of 
management accountability in order to establish their differential influences. Various 
techniques of analysis are employed to get best results. 
Chapter 11 Recommendations 
In chapter 11 a model is developed and recommended for resolving the problem of low 
level of management accountability in the UAE public sector. How to implement the 
recommendations are explained here. Other recommendations obtained from our 
empirical research results are also discussed. 
Chapter 12 Conclusion. 
The work is summarized; the main findings briefly restated with a concluding remark. 
Areas for further research are identified. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL ISSUES. ON PUBLIQ SECTOR 
ECONOMICS 
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2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter reviews some of the main theoretical issues in public sector economics. It 
focuses on the development and failure of market-based competition in the sector and the 
alternative provisions of Bureaucratic structure, Public choice framework and the 
Principal/Agent theory as means of ensuring accountability in the sector. Market-based 
competition provides a mechanism for allocating resources. Perfectly competitive 
markets, according to neo-classical economics, provide the most efficient means of 
resource distribution, but internally public sector organisations are subject to substantial 
state intervention and thus the neo-classical style competition does not apply (Turner and 
Hulme, 1997). The reasons often given for such extensive intervention relate to market 
failure in relation to the neo-classical model and equity considerations (McGuire et al., 
1988; Donaldson and Gerard, 1993). Such a failure provides an incentive to search for 
an effective alternative model that provides an efficient method of accountability in the 
allocation of resources in the system. Thus, as Levaggi (1995) argues, an accountability 
structure is needed in the absence of or due to a failure of a perfect market structure in a 
neo-classical definition. The ultimate goal of accountability is, in fact, to secure technical 
and allocative efficiency, a necessary condition for the economy to reach a Pareto-optimal 
point. This is the view espoused in this review of theoretical issues and we begin with 
looking at the market-based competition models. 
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2.2 FORMS OF ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 
There are various forms of economic systems and each has its distinct characteristics. 
Generally, countries are free to choose an economic system that they find suitable to their 
social and political needs. The main economic system can be grouped into three: 
a) Market economy where consumer demands determine the patterns and volume of 
supply and market forces - the interaction of demand and supply of goods and 
services, which in turn determine price of goods/services within the market. The 
U. S. economic institutions actively pursue this type of system. 
b) Mixed economy where private and public sector industry co exist as partners and 
the government intervenes in the economic system when it feels politically 
appropriate to do so. This type of system is practised in European countries and 
some developing countries. 
c) Centrally planned economy where the state owns all the means of production and 
distribution and the government decides what to produce; and at what price and for 
whom. This type of economic system is still operative in Cuba and North Korea 
even though the old communist bloc had abandoned it wholly or partially. 
(Trotman - Dicknson, 1996) 
Within a chosen economic system there will be either one single market or many kinds of 
markets and each market system has different market structures and operates under 
different conditions. For example, free market economy and mixed economy as a forms 
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economic system behave differently from centrally planned economic system. The 
former system distinguishes between firms operating in the markets depending on their 
competitive power and influence but the latter does not provide for competition. 
Whatever economic system a country chooses, the basic elements of the neo-classical 
economic models still apply in various forms. 
2.3 MODELS OF MARKET STRUCTURE 
There are mainly four models of market structure - perfect competition, monopolistic 
competition, oligopoly and monopoly - and these are reviewed briefly here. 
2.3.1 Perfect Competition %todel: 
In the perfect competition market structure, it is price, reflecting supply costs and demand 
values that motivate suppliers and consumers to allocate and utilize resources efficiently. 
In this market, the manager has no power over price, being compelled to accept the 
prevailing one, since price is determined by the interaction of all buyers and sellers. The 
typical industry demand curve and that of the firm in a perfectly competitive market 
structure are very distinct. In fact, a major distinction between firms operating in a 
perfectly competitive market and those operating in any other type of market is in the shape 
of the firm's on demand curve. 
A diagrammatic representation of the demand situation described above is given in Figure 
2.1: 
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As can be seen in Figure 2.1, the industry's demand curve is negatively sloped while the 
firm's demand curve is virtually horizontal (perfectly elastic). The competitive industry 
has output of 200 million units when the price is $8 while the individual firm takes that 
market price as given and considers producing up to, say, 50,000 units. The firm is thus a 
price-taker in the perfectly competitive market structure. Furthermore, the horizontal 
demand curve of the firm means that variations in the firm's output over the range that it 
needs to consider have no noticeable effect on price. The implication of this is that for a 
firm in perfect competition market, price equals marginal revenue equals marginal cost. In 
this situation, both technical and allocative efficiency are attained through the market 
mechanisms and there would be no need absolutely for further accountability for the 
allocation and use of resources. 
The perfect competition model is built on some conditions. The major conditions 
(assumptions) include those that relate to certainty, the absence of externalities, perfect 
knowledge on the part of consumers, no barriers to entry to or exit from the market and a 
clear definition of the output (Levaggi, 1996; Lipsey, 1995). Although these conditions are 
hardly attained in any real world situation, this theoretical market structure provides the 
standards on which performance are evaluated (price equals marginal costs); sanctions for 
those who are inefficient (they are forced out of the market) and a standard of quality for all 
to achieve. 
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These standards, however, have hardly been attained anywhere and certainly not in the 
highly competitive market situations in the world. As stated earlier, the failure of the 
perfect market structure in a neo-classical definition or the absence of it has led to the 
emergence of other market structures that attempt to provide some sort of accountability for 
the allocation and utilization of resources in the market. 
2.3.2 The Nlononoly Market Structure 
In contrast to the perfectly competitive market, the monopoly market structure is 
characterised by the existence of only a single firm in the industry which is able to raise 
price above the competitive level and thus earn monopoly (super normal) profits (Sloman, 
1997; Lipsey, 1995; Ellwood, 1996). However, Baumol and Blinder (1997) think there two 
distinct types of monopoly: 
a) Pure monopoly which they defined as "an industry in which 
there is only one supplier of a product for which there are no 
close substitutes and which is very hard or impossible for another 
firm to co-exist " (p. 256); and 
b) Natural monopoly, defined as "an industry in which advantages 
of large scale production make it possible for a single firm to 
produce the entire output of the market at lower average cost 
than of number of firms each producing small quantity " (p. 258). 
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A pure monopoly does not exist in the real world (even in the telecommunication sector) 
whereas natural monopoly does exist in most economies often through the support of 
government of the country as in the case of public sector enterprises. 
The demand curve of the monopoly firm has a negative slope unlike the firm in a perfect 
competition market. As a result, the monopoly firm's marginal revenue is less than the 
price at which it sells its product (see, Figure 2.2). That is, the monopolist must lower its 
price in order to sell an extra unit. 
Figure 2.2 shows that in a monopoly market structure, when total revenue (TR) is rising, 
marginal revenue (MR) is positive and demand is elastic. When TR is falling, MR is 
negative and demand is inelastic. It also shows that TR is highest at the point of unit 
elasticity and MR equals zero. 
The profit-maximizing monopolist produces at the point where marginal cost equals 
marginal revenue: 
MC=MR ..................................... 2.1 
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Figure 2.2 
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MONOPOLY FIRM DEMAND CURVE 
Figure 2.3 demonstrates the profit maximization equilibrium position of the monopoly 
firm applying condition (equation 2.1) above. 
Figure 2.3 
THE EQUILIBRIUM OF A MONOPOLY 
Of course, the profit maximization condition (equation 2.1) is true also for the other 
market structures, be it perfect competition or imperfect market structure. However, as 
Figure 2.3 shows, the monopoly produces the output qo for which marginal revenue 
equals marginal cost. At this output, the price of po - which is determined by the demand 
curve - exceeds the average variable cost. 
Profits per unit are the difference between the 
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average revenue of po and the average total cost of co. Total profits are the profits per unit 
of po- comultiplied by the output of qo, which is the light turquoise area. 
Thus, when the monopoly firm equates marginal cost with marginal revenue, it reaches 
the equilibrium shown in Figure 2.3. That is, the output for which marginal cost equals 
marginal revenue (MC = MR) and the corresponding price to that output. Notice that, 
because marginal revenue is always less than price for the monopoly firm, when it 
equates marginal revenue to marginal cost, both are less than price. Therefore, when a 
monopoly firm is in profit-maximizing equilibrium, its marginal cost is always less than 
the price it charges for its output in contrast to the situation under the perfect competition 
model as we will discuss later. 
The monopoly model is based upon a host of assumptions (see, Lipsey, 1995; Sloman, 
1997) including: 
a) the demand curve of the monopolist is the average revenue curve 
and that the marginal revenue curve is always below the demand 
curve meaning that marginal revenue is less than price. 
b) Monopoly maximises its profits by setting the output where 
MR = MC and the price is higher than MR and AC. 
C) Under monopoly the firm and the industry are the same entity. 
d) Monopoly does not have a supply curve. 
e) The demand curve of a monopoly has a negative slope. 
f) Monopol), always wishes to maximise profits. 
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These assumptions contrast with those of perfect competition and thus raise questions about 
the efficiency of the monopoly model as an alternative mechanism for accountability in the 
allocation and utilization of scarce resources. 
In addition to the assumptions, various privileges and barriers sustain monopoly power. 
These include among others (see, Ibid. ): 
i) Legal protection provided by government which might restrict 
entry into the market, e. g. in the Postal Services and Telecommunications; 
ii) Patent grant by governments, which provide exclusive rights 
of productions of a product for a period of time to investors, 
e. g. pharmaceutical companies to produce innovative medical products; 
iii) Control of scarce resources or inputs, e. g. diamonds in South 
Africa: 
iv) Self erected barriers to entry through, for example, aggressive 
advertising campaign for their products through spending a vast 
amount of money thus making it very difficult and hard for new 
companies to establish themselves in the market; 
v) Large sunk investment costs in the business operations and 
technical superiority deriving from the possession of 
technological expertise, which is well ahead of competitors in the 
short run; 
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vi) Economies of scale deriving from cost and operational 
advantages. 
In many situations these barriers have not only sustained monopoly but also enabled the 
firms to earn super abnormal profits (Turner and Hulme, 1997). For an economy to 
secure technical and allocative efficiency in order to reach a Pareto-optimality (a 
condition for effective accountability), these legal and artificial barriers must be 
dismantled. 
2.4 OTHER MARKET STRUCTURES. 
Some other market structures, which are classified as imperfect competition, fall between 
the ideal-types - perfect competition and monopoly. The markets include monopolistic 
competition (developed by Edward Chamberlin in the 1930s) and oligopoly market 
structure. 
2.4.1 Monopolistic Competition: 
Monopolistic competition is a situation where there are many firms competing in the 
market but where each firm does have some degree of market power in terms of being 
able to determine what price to charge for its product. 
The monopolistic competition model is based on the following assumptions: 
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a) There are quite a large number of firms and, as a result, each firm has an 
insignificant small share of the market; and its actions will not affect its 
rival to any great extent; 
b) There is freedom of entry of new firms into the industry; 
c) Unlike perfect competition each firm produces or provides 
products/services in the some way different from its rival. As a result of 
such differentiation the firm can raise its prices without loosing all its 
customers; 
d) Even though there are many firms in the industry there is only one firm in a 
particular location under monopolistic competition. 
Given these assumptions, the firm in a monopolistic competition has a demand curve with 
negative slope (see Figures 2.4A & 2.4B). 
The negative slope of the demand curve suggests deviation from the horizontal demand 
curve facing the firm in perfect competition. This is because of the nature of the 
monopolistic market which allows some differentiation of product/service to influence 
the market and hence the technical and allocative efficiency of the market. Given this, 
monopolistic competition is itself not an efficient accountability model. 
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Figure 2.4A 
SHORT-RUN EQUILIBRIUM IN MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 
Figure 2.4B 
LONG-RUN EQUILIBRIUM IN MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 
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2.4.2 Oligopoly Competition 
Oligopoly occurs when just a few firms between them share a large proportion of industry 
output. Firms within the industry may produce identical products (e. g. sugar, petrol) but 
most firms produce differentiated products (e. g. cars, soap powders and soft drinks) and 
most of the competition between oligopolist firms is based on marketing a particular 
brand. 
2.4.2.1 Features of Oligopoly Competition 
The features, which distinguish Oligopoly from other market structures, are: 
f Barriers to entry: 
Under Oligopoly model there are various barriers of entry to new fums and these barriers 
vary from industry to industry. In certain cases they are flexible whereas in others they 
are rigidly erected. 
f Interdependence of firms: 
Because there are only a few firms under oligopoly competition, firms in the industry 
depend on the actions of other firms/rivals in the industry. Any change in price 
specification of products or advertising will invite other firms to change their prices and 
strategies. 
f Oligopolists want to maximise their joint profit and to achieve that they 
collude to keep prices higher. 
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Oligopoly competition, like the other non-perfectly competitive markets (i. e. monopoly 
and monopolistic markets), is an abrasion from the benchmark market structure - perfect 
competition - that is capable of achieving technical as well as allocative efficiency in the 
market. To this extent, oligopoly market structure is not an efficient accountability 
model. 
2.5 COMPARISON OF MONOPOLY WITH PERFECT COMPETITION 
In order to identify a benchmark market model that will achieve Pareto-optimality in the 
allocation and utilization of society's scarce resources and provide an effective basis for 
efficient accountability, a comparison of Monopoly and Perfect Competition models is in 
order. By making such a comparison it would be clear why economists (since Adam Smith) 
have condemned private and public sector monopolies as inefficient. 
The main objections to the existence of monopoly market structure as a model for 
accounting for the technical and allocative efficiency in the market are: 
a) Due to legal protection provided to the monopoly higher profit can be 
earned at the expense of their consumers but when perfect competition is 
introduced/allowed that earned profit would only be sufficient to cover the 
firm's costs, including the owner's opportunities cost of capital; 
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b) Due to their ability to restrict output, monopoly could raise its short-run 
prices, where as perfect competition cannot take such an action because 
under perfect competition a firm's output is a tiny portion of the industry; 
c) Similarly in the long run, monopoly can restrict output to charge higher 
prices since monopoly output is determined by the profit maximization 
requirement of MR = MC but in the perfectly competitive industry this 
practice would be impossible; 
d) The concept of efficiency and resources allocation requires that marginal 
utility of each commodity is equal to its marginal cost; this condition can be 
attained only in perfect competition market where MU =P and MC =P so 
MU = MC, where as the monopoly would produce less than the competitive 
industry. In such a case MU =P and MC = MR <P so that MC < MU. 
Since MU exceed MC small portion of the society's resources is used to 
produce monopoly firm's commodity. In a sense monopoly leads to 
inefficiency in the resources allocation by producing little output and 
charging higher prices. 
Others (see, Sloman, 1997) argue that monopoly as a form of market structure has 
credible advantages that might lead to efficient accountability in the market. 
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They argue that: 
i) 
ii) 
iii) 
iv) 
V) 
Monopoly may achieve substantial economies of scale because of large capital 
investment in plants, synergies, arising from centralized administration and 
avoidance of duplication of services e. g. telecommunication services in a country. 
If the synergies achieved with the result of marginal cost curve substantially below 
that of the same industry under perfect competition, monopoly will produce higher 
output at lower prices; 
Monopoly may have a lower cost curve due to more research and development and 
more investment. By using part of its supernormal profits for investments and 
research and development programme monopoly may realize higher rate of 
efficiency than that achieved by small firm with limited funds. 
Monopoly with potentially low cost and inefficiently run operation could be 
subject to take over bid by other firms thus forcing monopoly to be efficient to 
avoid such corporate raid. 
With a possibility of supernormal profits when protected by patents monopoly may 
be encouraged to be more innovative to avoid new firms producing new products. 
In the case of public sector monopoly such as Water and Electricity Corporation 
which is established to provide services to all citizens at a reasonable price 
regardless of its profit maximization principle. This type of monopoly is 
encouraged and subsidized by the government for social and political reasons. 
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In many cases, public sector monopolies are established and encouraged to develop 
because of two main reasons: 
a) For national security reasons the corporation cannot be left entirely in the hands of 
a private owner to control the supply and prices of the electricity; and, 
b) Because of the heavy subsidy it receives from the government, corporation has to 
remain in the hands of the government even though its existence could be 
considered as a pure monopoly. 
On the other hand, the merits of perfect competition as a benchmark for efficient 
accountability for the allocation and use of resources in the society are summarized as 
follows: 
i) Since price = MC = MU under perfect competition, optimal position for allocation 
of resources may be achieved. 
ii) Competition among firms act as a spur of efficiency therefore firms under perfect 
competition structure could be more efficient compared to monopoly. 
iii) Perfect competition encourages development of technology due to the competition 
among firms operating within the industry so that their business could survive. 
iv) Under perfect competition there is no need for advertising thus avoiding 
substantial expenditure, which could avoid average cost increase thus making an 
economic use of the nation's scare resources. 
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v) Under perfect competition producers respond to consumers' change of taste so the 
resources will be moved in accordance with the customer utility. 
vi) Competitors restrict bargaining power and individual's economic power and bring 
about order in economic affairs without state intervention or regulations. 
vii) Perfect Competition provides a standard of efficiency by which actual 
performance of economic institution and organization can be appraised. 
viii) Perfect Competition model may help government to formulate policies towards 
industry. 
Even though there are many benefits claimed for Perfect Competition there are also some 
limitations. Under perfect competition there is no guarantee that goods produced will be 
distributed to the member of society in the fairest proportions as a distribution of income 
will lead to different pattern of consumption and hence production. So perfect 
competition may not lead to optimal combination of goods being produced. Perfect 
competition may also lead to production of goods that affect environment so that the 
pö lution inside c of be guaranteed by perfect competition model. Furthermore, Firms 
un er perfect competition may not be able to carry out research and development 
programmes due to the fear of copying by other firms and lack of funds to invest in such 
programmes to improve products/services. Similarly, under perfect competition products 
are undifferentiated so lack of variety of goods could be considered as disadvantage to 
consumers 
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Despite these limitations, the merits of Perfect Competition as a benchmark for technical 
and allocative efficiency in the market and society are overwhelming. It provides the 
`best' standard for accountability in the society, whether in private or public sector. In 
contrast, the other market structures, particularly Monopoly Competition, are abrasions of 
Perfect Competition and because of their different forms of restrictive practices in the 
marketplace. They cannot be presented as `standards' for accountability either in the 
private or public sector. 
Thus, even though the theories of monopoly, perfect competition and imperfect 
competition did serve many purposes since their introduction by the economists, Smith, 
Marshall, Cournot and Edgeworth, unfortunately they remain largely as pieces of 
intellectual work divorced of real life practice. Many companies in both private and 
public sectors do not use the marginal cost, marginal revenue model to derive their profit 
maximisation for the following reasons. First, firms with sole profit maximisation 
objectives may not exist in real life because there are many objective available to these 
firms i. e. firms might set objectives for increasing their share of market size or they might 
have satisficing profit target as Simon (1978) argues. Satisficing hypothesis states, "firm 
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could produce any one of a range of outputs that produce profit at least equal to the 
target level" (Ibid. ). Second, companies especially in public sector do not use profit 
maximisation model to plan their output and market strategy due to social and political 
reasons imposed on them by the owners. 
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Third, sometimes there is disparity between number of sellers and buyers in the market 
and the principle underlying perfect competition state, that the sellers and buyers should 
be aware of the availability of the prices and the opportunities of products and quality. 
This requirement may not be practical or easily obtainable by the producers and the 
consumers in order to comply with perfect competition model. Fourth, many companies, 
possibly due to ignorance, do not use the profit maximisation model at all for either of 
these market structures in their business planning and their profit is as good as the one 
using the market structure model. Finally, the profit maximisation theory is too crude an 
assumption about the motivation of the firm. Normally the firm's decision behaviour, 
which influences its profit result, depends on the organisational structure and decision- 
making process within that structure. 
But considering that the Perfect Competition is only a utopian concept and does not exist 
in the real world and that the Monopoly and other imperfect market structures (i. e. 
Monopolistic and Oligopoly markets) are inefficient accountability models, there is still 
the need to search for practical alternative models. The search takes to consider some 
other models including, the Bureaucratic model, the Public Choice Theory and the 
Principal-Agent Relationship Model. 
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2.6 BUREAUCRATIC MODEL 
Whether the organizations/enterprises are owned publicly or privately, the most important 
aspect of any organization or structure is the way the organization is run and staffed as 
well as the accountability system provided in that structure. The end result of any 
particular style of management will depend on the organizational structure selected. Two 
main types of model are available; the Bureaucratic and the Market-oriented model. Each 
model has its own meaning and characteristics. 
With regard to bureaucracy and its structure, Marc Weber, the scholar of Bureaucracy 
wrote in the late nineteenth century that, "Fully developed bureaucratic mechanism 
compares with other organisations exactly as does the machine with non mechanical 
mood of production" On the other hand, Donahue (1989, p. 46) states that; 
"Bureaucracies like machines are costly to build and keep in operation, prone to break 
down if neglected or misused, but capable, if carefully designed and maintained of 
prodigious efficiency when performing functions for which they are suited ". The growth 
and development of classic model of Bureaucracy had been prominent in the twentieth 
century and the bureaucracy has been ubiquitous. It was present, for example, in the 
OECD countries, former Communist countries and the Third World countries. 
Bureaucracies had been very noticeable in the Third World countries due to their systems 
of government and the reliance on colonial rulers and expatriates and experience in 
establishing public sector organizations. 
45 
Jan-Erik Lane (1987) had identified ten different terms for the usage of bureaucracy. 
Mark Turner and David Hulme (1997) selected four meanings of bureaucracy which are 
commonly used in academic literature on bureaucracy in the developing countries. These 
meanings are as follows: 
a) Rules by the Bureau: 
Beetham (1987, p. 3) referred to this type of bureaucracy as: 
"A system in which ministerial positions were occupied by career officials usually 
answerable to the hereditary monarchy" 
b) Professional Administration: 
This type of bureaucracy is similar to the model of bureaucracy developed by Marc Weber 
(Gerth and Mills, 1948). This model of bureaucracy as analyzed by Weber is 
characterized by "A clearly defined division of labour, an impersonal authority structure, 
a hierarchy of office, dependence on formal rules, employment based on merits, 
availability of career and distinct separation of members' organizational and personal 
lives" (Gerth and Mills, 1948). He also stated that this form of organization represents: 
"The rationalization of collective activities " and was "capable of attaining the highest 
degree of efficiency" This particular type of organization was popular in the late 
nineteenth century both in public and private sector. 
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c) Public Administration 
This type of organization is termed bureaucracy. Beetham (1987) identified the following 
characteristic for this bureaucracy as quoted by Turner and Hulme (1997, p. 83): 
"Its compulsory character, its particular relation to the law [and] the public 
accountability of its operations ". 
d) Negative characteristics 
This bureaucracy is associated with state organisations that have the following 
characteristics: evokes the slowness, ponderousness, the routine, the complication of 
procedures, and the maladapted responses of `bureaucratic' organizations to the needs 
which they should satisfy, and the frustrations which their members, clients, or subjects 
consequently endure (Turner and Hulme, 1997). 
2.6.1 Assumptions of Bureacratic Model 
The model of classic bureaucratic structure assumes that: 
a) Bureaucrats attempt to maximise their own utility (i. e. they aim to increase their 
power, prestige and security and income by using hierarchical structure for their 
own ends instead of furthering the objectives of the organization they work for. ) 
b) Weber's model of bureaucracy relies on the assumptions that most bureaucrats are 
disinterested and motivated by the ideals of being a service to the state. 
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c) the bureaucrat pursues his own ambition which may lead to budget maximisation 
by the agency/organization. Larger budget allocation means more staff, more 
power and higher personnel status within the organisation. 
Niskamen (1973) argues that among the several variables that may enter the bureaucrat's 
motives are : salary, perquisites of the office, public reputation, power, patronage, output 
of the bureau, ease of making changes, and ease of managing the bureau. All except the 
last two are a positive function of the total budget of the bureau during the bureaucrat's 
tenure. It is impossible for a single bureaucrat to act in `the public interest', because of 
the limits on his information and the conflicting interests of others, regardless of his 
personal motivation. This leads even the most selfless bureaucrats to choose some 
feasible, lower-level goal, and this usually leads to developing expertise in some narrow 
field. Thus, a bureaucrat who may not be personally motivated to maximise the budget of 
his bureau is usually driven by internal and external conditions to do just that. The notion 
of maximisation of bureaucrat's utility is challenged by Leavey (1991) who did not find 
empirical evidence to support such arguments. 
2.6.2 Post-Bureaucratic Paradigm 
Some modem public administration scholars and writers like Barzelay and Amejani 
(1995) argue that government bureaucracy in 1920's is shifting away from the centralised 
controlled hierarchical bureaucratic structure which permeated public organisation for 
many years towards the post bureaucratic paradigm (market oriented government 
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organisation) because of the failure of classic bureaucratic structure, which had been 
developed by Max Weber in the theory of social and economic organisation in 1920s. 
The new model of market oriented government organisation had been favoured by those 
public management scholars to improve government operations and accountability. The 
proponents of the new model argue that customer satisfaction, quality services and value 
are the main components of government services and that the government competition for 
work is crucial for providing incentives to public organisations/enterprises to become 
efficient and effective. The new model as explained by Barzelay and Amejani (1995) 
directs government services towards value result, quality and value, production, voluntary 
compliance and accountability set up instead of the traditional bureaucratic paradigm that 
defends and emphasizes the concept of public interest, administrative control, hierarchical 
structure and enforcing responsibility. 
In Table 2.1 the old bureaucratic and post-bureaucratic paradigms are compared to show 
more graphically their differences. The post bureaucratic movement towards market 
oriented government is fuelling various innovations within the public sector in the U. S. 
and the U. K. For example, Osborne and Geabler (1992) discuss the innovative use of 
revolving funds in government as a means for government services to be market driven in 
order to generate profit from their services and finance capital expenditure in the U. S. 
However the momentum to remodel government organisation with market oriented style 
is growing very fast in the U. S. and the U. K. In the U. S. for example, the National 
Performance Review headed by the Vice President Al Gore (1993) recommended putting 
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customers first with emphasis on giving customers a voice and a choice, making services 
organisation to compete, creating market dynamics; and using market mechanism to solve 
the problem. In the U. K. for instance, the government introduced efficiency unit in the 
Prime Minister's office in 1979, followed by Financial Management Initiative and the 
introduction of Citizen Charter to measure the local authorities' performance. 
Table 2.1 
U UI(; 11S 
Bureaucratic Paradigm Post-Bureaucratic Paradigm 
Public Interest 
Efficiency 
Administration 
Control 
Specify functions, authority and 
structure 
Justify costs 
Enforce responsibility 
Follow rules and procedures 
Operate administrative 
systems 
Results citizens' value 
Quality and value 
Production 
Winning adherence to norms 
Identify mission, services, 
customers, and outcomes 
Deliver value 
Build accountability 
Strengthen working relationships 
Understand and apply norms 
Identify and solve problems 
Continuously improve processes 
Separate service from control 
Build support for norms 
Expand customer choice 
Encourage collective action 
Provide incentives 
Measure and analyze results 
Enrich feedback 
Source: Barzelay (1996) 
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2.6.3 Criticisms of Bureaucracy 
Bureaucratic structure has been charged with the following criticisms: 
i) It is reckoned to grow very fast thus absorbing enormous resources with little 
production. 
ii) In Weber's model bureaucracy is assumed to be efficient instrument of policy 
implementation but in the developing countries this model was disappointing due 
to over staffing, lack of skilled labourers and professionals, lack of clear 
operational objectives, poor communication and co-ordination among the various 
governmental departments and organisations as weil as centralisation of decision 
making and distance of public servants from their clients. 
iii) Hierarchical structure may not lead to efficient organisation when comparison of 
output with input is made because the bureaucracy is very slow in moving 
especially toward innovative and adaptation of modern management technique. 
The model of political control in this form of organization (i. e. bureaucracy) may 
not give the assurance of management accountability. 
iv) The theory of bureaucracy is no longer seen as providing efficiency within the 
organisation despite Weber's arguments for such a set up. Moreover the model of 
bureaucracy is thought by many scholars as undemocratic and inefficient 
compared to the market-oriented model. 
v) Wilson's model which advocated the separation between policy makers and 
administrators have not been adhered to rules due to the fluid and complex 
relationship between the political leadership and the bureaucrats. 
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vi) Weber's model of bureaucracy emphasizes the rigid adherence to rules and 
procedures which are good features of control but according to Merton (1968) the 
rigid adherence to rules may result in reduction in efficiency as "Adherence to 
rules, originally conceived as a means, becomes transformed into an end-in-itself, 
there occurs the familiar process of displacement of goals whereby 'an 
instrumental value becomes a terminal value'. Discipline, readily interpreted as 
conformance with regulations, whatever the situation, is seen not as a measure 
designed for specific purposes but becomes an immediate value in the life- 
organisation of the bureaucrat. " 
Despite its shortcomings bureaucracies had played an important role in the Third World 
countries' development and it had contributed to the growth and stability of the 
government system in the late nineteenth and twentieth century but in recent years 
bureaucracy model had been subjected to a considerable debate and criticism due to 
neoclassical thinking which advocated market oriented activities of government. This 
new thinking has created new management structure in public sector organisation thus 
accelerating the privatization programme in Europe and developing countries. However 
the driving force behind post-bureaucratic paradigm is the management accountability 
concern, the value for money principles, the efficiency and effectiveness policy of 
government and the need for public involvement in the daily affairs of the government 
and government policy setting. Compared with classic administration model the post- 
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bureaucratic model benefits may not be as anticipated initially because the new system 
requires more time to adjust and to evaluate its practical use and outcome. 
2.7 PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY 
2.7.1 Introduction 
The most important theory applied to public sector bureaucracy is Public Choice Theory. 
The theory is a sub-branch of economic thoughts concerned with the application of micro 
economic principles to political and social areas of activity (Mueller, 1989). Stretton and 
Orchard (1987) defined Public Choice theory as "the economic study of non market 
decision making or simply the application of economics to political science ". The 
microeconomics implication of the theory is thus evident in its definition and practice. 
2.7.2 Main Postulate of the Theory 
The basic behavioral postulate of the public choice theory, as is the case in economics, is 
that man is an egoistic, rational, utility maximizer. Besides the behaviour predictions, 
public choice theory provides alternatives, the most obvious being to allow competition 
and choice and to return as many activities as possible to the private sector thus 
advocating the maximization of choice by individuals for both individual freedom and 
efficiency reasons. The theory is used also to explain how public goods/services are 
demanded and supplied. 
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Within the public choice theory framework there are many relevant links to performance 
measurement. The most significant ones are: 
" Measuring the elimination of government failure; 
" Measuring cost difference between publicly and privately provided 
services; 
" Measuring the constitutional and pressure group constraints on budget 
maximising bureaucrats. 
The public choice theory postulates the following set of government failures: 
a) Instability - political business cycle; 
b) Inefficiency; 
c) Manipulated agendas; 
d) Bureaucrat budget maximisation; 
e) Rent-seeking and wealth-transferring efforts of interest groups. 
2.7.3 Assumption of the Theory 
Some basic assumptions underpin the public choice theory. These are: 
i) The theory holds a comprehensive view of rationality ac ing. As argued by 
Stigler (1975, p. 171) "A rational man must be guided by the incentive system 
within which he operates. No matter what his own personal desires, he must be 
discouraged from certain activities if they carry penalties and attracted toward 
others if they carry large rewards. The carrot and the stick guide scientists and 
politicians as tit-ell as donkeys " (p. 171) 
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ii) Dun Leavy (1986) states that the 'rational actor' model which is at the centre of 
the public choice theory assumed that people have a set of well-formed 
preferences which they can perceive, rank and compare easily. 
iii) Their preference orderings are logically consistent; 
iv) People seek to maximise their benefits with least costs in their decisions. They act 
rationally when they pursue their preference in an efficient manner and maximise 
benefits net of costs; 
v) People are basically egoistic, self-regarding and instrumental in their behaviour, 
choosing how to act on the basis of consequences for their personal welfare; 
vi) The theory assumes that individual material self-interest sufficiently motivates 
most economic and political behaviour by the use of neoclassical economic theory. 
2.7.4 Critiques of Public Choice Theory 
The public choice theory, like any economic theory, has been subject to some criticisms 
by those who advocate traditional bureaucratic structure and government intervention in 
the social and economic welfare of the citizens (see, Walsh, 1995; SELF, 1993). They 
argue that after 30 years of its development, the public choice theory and attempts to 
apply it to government settings, have earned mixed results. Furthermore, public choice 
theorists favour market solutions even where public sector provisions appear cheap and 
better value for money due to their strong and biased belief that public sector/agency 
intervention is coercive to resources allocation, which may reduce the right of the 
customers/citizens to choose services for them. 
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In addition, the public choice theory postulates that all public intervention will fail to 
some extent. This assumption may not be valid or realistic. 
Even though public choice theory has suffered from the generality of its concept, it has 
provided alternatives to the bureaucratic model, which greatly restricted the freedom of 
individual and his choice as well as failing to provide an equivalent structure of 
incentives and rewards to those of the market. Moreover the public choice theory can be 
applied to various societal settings: rational choice assumptions are applied to political 
parties (Down, 1975) Committee (Black, 1958) and bureaucracies (Down, 1967T. 
Niskamen, 1971,1973,1974). However, because the public choice theory leans more 
towards micro-economic principles, which are underpinned by some restrictive 
assumptions, the theory may not be able to provide efficient accountability of resource 
allocation and utilization. We will therefore turn to the Principal-Agent model for an 
alternative option. 
2.8 PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP THEORY 
2.8.1 Introduction 
One of the powerful and influential economic theories that has direct bearing on 
management accountability model is the Principal-Agent theory. The principal agent 
theory was originally developed as an economic theory to deal with the relationship of the 
principals (the shareholders) and the agents (managers) for a firm in the private sector. It 
was later extended to include public sector organizations because of its very relevance to 
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the public management activities especially when applied to management accountability 
generally 
2.8.2 Assertions of the Theory 
However the theory attempts to find an incentive scheme for Agents to act in the interest 
of Principals and to safeguard the interest of the Principal. The activities of the Agent 
should be monitored by the shareholders through executive and non-executive board of 
directors who may help in "attenuating the discretion of the management" (Vickers and 
Yarrow, 1988, p. 13) within the framework of fiduciary relationship and legal contract 
which specify the agents obligation and rights. 
However the agency principles arising from this legal and fiduciary relationship that 
seeks to establish incentive for agents (or group of agents) to take decision on behalf of 
principal (or group of them) that affect the wealth and objective of the principal. To 
protect his interests, the principal must decide on the size of the optimal incentive scheme 
to be set for the agent. This incentive scheme is constrained by two factors. The first of 
these is that the agent will behave in self-interested way given the incentive scheme 
regardless of its size and structure. The second constraint is that the incentive scheme 
must be attractive and rewarding enough for the agent to induce him to participate 
'faithfully' in a venture with the principal who seeks to maximize his profit/return. Thus, 
the honest participation of the Agent in decision-making on behalf of the principal 
depends on the size and attractiveness of the incentive scheme. 
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2.8.3 Assumntions of the Theory 
The Principal and Agent theory assumes the following behaviour within the privately 
owned firm and publicly incorporated enterprises; 
a) The principals (shareholders) want to maximize the profits or returns on capital 
invested; 
b) The agents (the managers) may want to pursue a policy of growth within the firm 
thus profit maximization is not the objective; 
c) The stakeholders (the principals) in a state owned enterprise wants to maximize 
the economic welfare of the nation; 
d) The agents (firm managers) are assumed to be self-interested parties in the work 
they perform on behalf of the principal. The self-interested behaviour as it relates 
to the public sector enterprises/organization as Arrow (1964) demonstrates, 
happens because the principal cannot fully monitor the agent's behaviour and 
because of information asymmetric. 
The principal - agent theory tries mainly to address the contractual relationship between 
principals and agents that exists within an organizational framework and to determine the 
optimal method to motivate agents to act in the best interests of the principal despite the 
strong self interested behaviour. Since principals do not have full information about the 
agents' performance nor are capable of observing their agents perform their public duties, 
principals often introduce control mechanism to monitor the agents' activities. Incentive 
scheme within government organization may not be adequate to minimize agents' self- 
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interested behaviour (i. e. fixed salary and security may not induce staff to avoid self- 
interested behaviour). 
Jenson and Meckling (1976) urge that private and public organizations do develop 
incentives or implement operating rules to minimize self interested behaviour because the 
divergence of interest between principals and agents is an avoidable cost to be borne by the 
principal. 
2.8.4 Problems of Agency Theory 
Despite its importance to public sector enterprises/organizations especially with regard to 
management accountability aspect, principal-agent theory has many problems associated 
with its application and model. These problem as cited by Vickers and Yarrow (1988, p. 
7) as follows: 
"A situation in which a principal (or group of principals) seeks to establish 
incentives for an agent (or group of agents), who takes decisions that affect the 
principal, to act in ways that contribute maximally to the principal's objectives. 
The difficulties in establishing such an incentive structure arise from two 
factors: (a) the objectives of principals and agents will tvpically diverge, and 
(b) the information available to principals and agents will generally be different 
(for example, the former might not be able to observe some of the decisions of 
the latter). " 
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Besides the inability of the principal to observe precisely the agents' activity, the 
application of principal-agent theory to public sector organization/enterprises, raises 
different questions for accountability from that of privately owned firms because it is 
difficult to determine who are the principals or to find out what they want. Due to the 
wide interest of the principals, being an electorate, control over the agents may not be 
effective. From the agents point of view it is difficult for them to find out what each 
principal might require thus the agency problem is compounded or worse in the public 
sector compared with that of private sector. Contracting out the services may reduce these 
agency problems in the public sector so that the problem becomes of that of private sector. 
Donahue (1989) argues that contracting out public services creates agency problems and 
questions of their own. The concepts of agency illuminate some basic issues involved in 
carrying out the public's business. How fully can the principal - the public - specify 
what is to be accomplished in its name and at its expense? Does competition discipline 
suppliers and thereby ensure the public a fair price? Is the product sufficiently 
measurable to allow for output-based contracts? Or do factors beyond the control of the 
agent affect outcomes too strongly to permit payment by results alone? If measurement 
or risk problems require input-based contracts, are agents tempted to inefficiency or 
deception and, if so, how well can the public discern and control these tendencies? Such 
factors determine how confidently and efficiently public officials can use contracts with 
profit-seeking agents to fulfill common needs. (Ibid. ). When contracting out public 
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services there is a problem of ensuring compliance and any incentive paid for that work 
might lead to resentment from other staff within the organization. 
The critics of profit maximization model which is assumed to be the driving force for the 
relationship between the principal-agent had put forward objections to the concept of 
profit maximization, which relates to agency theory. They state that due to incomplete 
market, different tax requirement of individual and asymmetric information, the interest 
of different shareholders will not coincide, even though they want to maximize their 
profit because there will be lack of consensus with regard to shareholders' ranking of 
alternative managerial policies of public and private organization. (i. e. institutional 
investors may prefer higher dividend pay out compared with an individual investor faced 
with tax requirements and position). Furthermore, shareholders may not want to 
maximize their financial return if they are also consumers of the firm's products because 
of the incidence of higher profit on their consumption of the product; i. e. public utility 
products/services. In addition, because of the limited holdings of individual investors 
(not having very diversified portfolio) in the number of companies, the risk neutrality 
assumption may not hold up. 
Despite these criticisms and the problems associated with its application to public and 
private sector organization, the principal agent theory is still a useful and powerful 
concept for management accountability framework. These criticisms however could not 
be considered to negate assumptions underlying the theory because there is a very strong 
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relationship between the incentive scheme and the activity of the agent when acting on 
behalf of the principal. Even so, a mechanism is needed to balance the incentive scheme 
and the financial reward of the agent to protect principal interest and therefore a 
balancing criteria need to be developed to satisfy both parties. (Principal-agent). These 
balancing criteria might be found in an appropriately designed and efficient 
accountability model that would attain both technical and allocative efficiency in order to 
reach Pareto optimality in the economy. In the next chapter we shall explore the 
possibility of having such an accountability model. 
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= CHAPTER, 13 
THEORETICAL : ISSUES 2IN 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Accountability is one of the fashionable words of our time. Over the years, new 
institutions and new techniques have been developed in the service of accountability, 
ranging from the various Audit Offices to a mess of ombudsmen. Accountability is not 
merely seen as a crucial link in the chain between governors and governed; effective 
democracy demands a system, which ensures that the former are accountable to the latter. 
Equally, accountability is increasingly seen as a means of stretching scarce resources. If 
better value for money is to be achieved in the public sector, it is argued, 
Then 
once 
again an effective system of accountability is needed. 
This preoccupation with the institutions and techniques of accountability mirrors wider 
concerns. The modern Welfare State is also the Service-delivery State. Its development 
has compounded the problems of making those who deliver services answerable both to 
those who finance them and those who use them. Furthermore, as the systems of service 
delivery have become more complex and intractable, so it has become more difficult to 
assign responsibility. 
Accountability is to the organization what breathing is to the body. The concept is 
endemic in our lives and it is as complex as it is confounding. As human beings we are 
continuously engaged in the activity of making sense of the world, including the sense of 
self in the world. by giving and receiving accounts. Accountability begins with 
individuals in simple societies; it ends with institutions in complex societies. It starts 
with telling stories and adding up and ends with justification and explanation. It is as 
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slippery a term as it is ambiguous. Yet, the concept of accountability has not only passed 
through the ages as an important reference of stewardship in civic societies but it has also 
emerged as an indicator of ethical and moral standard in modern organizations. In fact, 
the concept of accountability is as old as discourse about the nature of civic society 
(Levaggi, 1995). The Athenian States and the Egyptian Kingdoms of prehistoric times 
extolled the notion of accountability, particularly political and financial accountability in 
their public affairs (Normanion, 1966). The Athenian Financial State Law, for example, 
required th public officials entrusted with carrying out public duties to report on their 
conduct in office to the Assembly of Citizen ten times a year. The public accountability 
that was set up by the Athenian people was direct, continuous and comprehensive in 
nature in order that their government's performance was assessed at the end of their term 
of office (Roberts, 1982). 
The concept of accountability has two intertwined aspects. One is universal; the other is 
historical. Accountability, in the sense of rendering intelligible some aspect of our lives 
or us, is a distinctive and pervasive feature of what it is to be human. Human beings are 
continuously involved in making and giving accounts to others, and to ourselves, about 
who we are, what we are doing, etc. This universal aspect of accountability is a condition 
of our participation in any social world. The universal aspect of accountability enables 
our experience in the world to be rendered intelligible to others and to us. For example, it 
enables us to produce this `account' of accountability in the UAE public services. 
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However, as human beings, we participate in particular social worlds. Universal 
processes of accountability do not float free of historically and culturally distinctive 
frameworks of accountability. We are inescapably within historically specific, and often 
discordant, frameworks of accountability. It is these frameworks that identify' and 
articulate our sense of who and what we are. 
Frameworks of accountability, however, are not restricted to formal accountability 
systems, such as annual statements of accounts to shareholders (principals) provided by 
corporate executives (agents) or procedures (e. g. regular elections) developed to render 
politicians responsive to electorates. Formal accounting systems are always embedded in 
already established frameworks of accountability that make such systems relevant and 
meaningful. As Mouritsen (1994: p4) argues, formal accounting systems: 
"... may or may not be called forth in svstems of accountability. Their calling forth 
depends on people deploying their potentiality to support or raise issues through 
controlling interpretations of accounting results.... Accounts are thus produced in and 
contextualised bti" systems of accountabilit ." 
To this extent. accountability is a widespread phenomenon that occurs whenever people 
strive to account for their experience in the world. As a result, accountability arises in 
relation to diverse situations that differentiate people in terms of their status, access to 
resources, authority, responsibilities, etc. In work organizations, people are often 
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represented as managers or as workers. In universities, academic staff is differentiated 
from administrative staff and students. Underpinning these divisions are sundry material 
and symbolic means of securing compliance with the particular meanings and values that 
are privileged by these frameworks. In work organizations, workers are charged by 
managers with the responsibility for clocking in on time and are penalized for poor 
timekeeping; and managers are held accountable for the timekeeping of their staff. In 
universities, students are ascribed responsibility for submitting assignments by the due 
date, a responsibility enforced by a variety of rewards and punishments. However, the 
range of human actions that are accountable is extensive. and certainly flows well beyond 
the confines of so-called formal institutions such as universities, factories or government. 
But, interestingly, many writers on accountability are preoccupied with the description, 
classification and analysis of the components and workings of accountability structures 
and systems without giving a serious thought to the need for a common base for 
understanding the term (see, for example, Gray et al., 1987). Some others offer a series 
of reflections upon accountability as a universal and historical property of social 
structures and relations (Willmott, 1996). Yet another group, focuses on comparing 
accountability in public and private sector organizations with a stress on the differences in 
settings and framework as well as objectives and responsibilities (Hague, et al, 1975). 
Underlying these discourses is the lack of a commonly accepted definition of the term 
'accountability'. Often terms mean different thing to different people at different times 
and this provides a fertile ground for endless semantical argument. Thus, a useful point 
67 
of departure for a discussion on the theoretical issues of accountability is a conceptual 
definition. What is accountability? 
3.2 DEFINITION OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
Although the concept of accountability is as old as discourse about the nature of civic 
society, the word itself has passed into the ordinary language of political discussion only 
recently and this explains why accountability, as it is used to day, tends to be such a 
slippery, ambiguous term (Day and Klein, 1987). Its various meanings, reflecting 
changing usages and contexts over time, tend to be conflated in what has become a 
popular and common word, often with confusing results. This underscores the need for 
an operational definition of the term as the basis of the framework of analysis in this 
work. 
In his work, Roberts (1991) defines accountability as: 
"a form of social relation which reflect symbolically upon the practical 
interdependencies of actions: an interdependence that has always both a moral 
and a strategic dimension'. . 
This definition is very general and it fails to identify the type of interdependencies that 
exist between individuals. More importantly, the definition fails to explain the reasons 
why these links arise and the moral dimensions of the links. In a similar general 
perspective, La%Nlon and Rose (1991) define accountability as: 
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"a process where a person or group of people are required to present an account 
of their activities and the ivav in which they have or have not discharged their 
duties " 
But, Ranson and Stewart (1994) introduce the element of control into the general 
definition stating that. 
'Accountability is usually conceived as an institution of control, being held to 
account. This implies formal ties between parties one of whom is answerable to 
another for the quality of their action and performance in stewardship of public 
funds or services " 
These definitions seem to stresses the unique relationship between the accountee 
(principal) and the accountor (agent) and the need for formalization of the relationship to 
make accountability effective. Underlying these definitions, however, is the element of 
control in the exercise of accountability obligations, which Ranson and Stewart introduce 
explicitly. But Simey (1968), quoted in Ranson and Stewart (1994), points out that; 
"4ccountabilitV is not (onl) about control but (also) responsibility for the way in 
which control is exercised The distinction is a fine one but it is of fundamental 
importance. In other words accountability is not an administrative tool but a 
moral principle. Of those to whom responsibility is given, an account of their 
stewardship shall be required. It is a principle whose purpose is to govern the 
relationship between those who delegate authority and those who exercise it ". 
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Shafritz (1992), on the other hand, sees the term in a much broader perspective and 
defines it as; 
"The concept that officials are to be held anstiverable for general notions of 
democracy and morality as well as for specific legal mandates " 
This definition involves the provision of information by those held answerable to those 
seeking answers -a typical principal/agent relationship. Jackson (1982) drives this point 
home by stating that, 
"Basicalh; accountability involves explaining or justying what has been done, 
what is currently being done and what has been planned. Accountability 
arises from a set of established procedures and relationships of varying formality. 
Thus, one part is accountable to the other one in the sense that one of the parties 
has the right to call upon the other to give an account of his activities. 
Accountability therefore involves the giving of information " 
However, Dunsire (1967) points out that the concept of accountability involves not only 
giving information but also an evaluation of the action relating to the activity. 
The view of -evaluation of the action relating to the activity' as an element in the 
definition of accountability is reflected in the definition of Paul (1991) which states that 
accountability is simply; 
"Holding individuals and organizations responsible for performance 
measured as objectiti"eh' as possible ". 
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But, in his definition, Dunsire (1978), as quoted in Ranson and Stewart (1994), brings out 
more directly the role of `evaluation of performance' as a basis for accountable 
relationship: 
"Being accountable may mean... no more than having to answer questions 
about what has happened or is happening within one 's jurisdiction... But most 
usages require an additional implication: the answer when given, or the account 
when rendered, is to be evaluated by the superior or superior body measured 
against some standard or some expectation, and the differences noted: and then 
praise or blame are to be meted out and sanctions applied. It is a coupling of 
information with its evaluation and application of sanctions that gives 
accountabilih' or 'answerability' or 'responsibility' their full sense in ordinary 
usage ". 
Brooks (1995) also defines accountability in a similar perspective; 
"a mechanism to ensure that individuals can be called to account for their 
actions, and that sanctions are incurred if the account is unsatisfactory" 
Dunsire and Brooks recognize not only the need for evaluation of accountability but also 
the need for sanction against the accountor (agent) if the account rendered was seen to be 
unsatisfactory. In a more operational definition, Gary and Jenkins (1993) define the term 
as: 
"an obligation to present an account of and answer for the execution of 
responsibility to those who entrusted those responsibilities" 
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They explain that this obligation depends on the allocation of praise and blame, rewards 
and sanctions that are seen as distinguishing features of accountability in action. 
Therefore to have accountability there must exist principal/agent relationship governed by 
a code of conduct that binds principal/agent in the establishment, execution and 
adjudication of their relationship. 
The key elements of accountability that are common to these definitions are: 
" the need for information, which is basically concerned with giving 
account, and 
" judgment concerned with holding account. 
The full idea of accountability involves both rendering and judging as a basis for action, 
but the implications of each requirement are different. Accounting information is usually 
the result of asymmetry of information and often implies distance. The agent that keeps 
the account has better information than the other party. The account has the role of 
reducing the information asymmetry between the two parties and thereby preventing 
cheating by the better-informed agent. 
Gray, Owen and Adams (1996, p. 38) have encapsulated the information need and 
evaluation requirements of the term with the underlying responsibilities of the concept in 
their broad but operational definition which perceives accountability as: 
"the dun, to provide an account (bv no means necessary a financial account) or 
reckoning of those actions for which one is held responsible. " 
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Thus the information need and evaluation requirement of accountability involves two 
responsibilities or duties: 
" the responsibility to undertake certain actions ( or refrain from taking 
action), and 
" the duty to provide an account of those actions. 
In the simplest example - that of the shareholders (the principal) and the company (the 
agent) - the directors of the company have the responsibility to manage the resources 
(financial and non-financial) entrusted to them by the shareholders and a responsibility to 
provide an account of this management through the annual report and financial statement, 
which may act as a mechanism for discharging accountability. The essential elements of 
this process arise from a relationship between the agents and the principals, a relationship 
defined by the society and which provides the principal with a right to information (Ibid. 
1996). 
Despite the general nature of the definition of accountability, unclear usage of the 
accountability concept and its wide range of implication to public sector 
organizations/enterprises and market-based structure, all or some of these definitions of 
accountability share many common elements. Implicitly or explicitly the definitions of 
accountability include, for example, the need for information, clear mandate, reporting 
system and criteria for performance evaluation. 
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From this definitional complexity, it appears that a useful definition of accountability 
should assume that the locus of higher authority is found in an organizational or 
intergovern mental chain of command, the standards of performance are clear and 
unambiguous and the reporting mechanisms are limited to those specified in operational 
procedures for documentation and record keeping. Accountability may not, therefore, be 
an intrinsic characteristic of a system; it is simply a means towards a specific end. Its 
main role is to ensure that behaviour is consistent with societal norms and values, and that 
such behaviour complies formally or operationally with specific legal mandates. 
Furthermore, from the variations in scope, perspective and focus of the definitions, we 
can deduce that accountability cannot be described by a set of homogenous and fixed 
rules; its content depends on the economic purposes for which the system of accounts is 
designed. If the account and its form have to be chosen according to the objectives 
pursued, it follows that an institution will be accountable only with respect to the 
objectives pursued by keeping the account and within the values, privileges and 
obligations of societal context of operation. Thus, the concept of accountability, 
particularly in the public sector, is flexible in time, scope and place. 
3.3 DIMENSION OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
As we have already discovered, accountability is a complex phenomenon and operates in 
different ways in different circumstances. To understand the concept much better, 
therefore, we need to appreciate it various dimensions and attributes and the way in which 
these dimensions and attributes are applied to public sector organisations. 
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As members of the public, we expect our public servants, whether they are politicians or 
officials, to be accountable for the way in which they discharge the duties of their office. 
In this sense, accountability is linked to the concept of responsibility. As Day and Klein 
(1987) remind us: One cannot be accountable to anyone, unless one also has 
responsibility for doing something'. 
Simon et at. (1950) suggest that responsibility can be viewed in three ways: 
" responsibility as legal authority; 
" responsibility as a moral obligation; 
" responsibility as responsiveness to values. 
Simon et al. state that in the first case it is having responsibility for a job; the second case 
is a matter of fulfilling an obligation towards another person while the third case refers to 
a situation where a public servant is charged with carrying out the wishes of others with 
particular reference to the values that are held by those charging the servant with carrying 
out the function. To this extent, they argue, accountability may be seen as `those 
methods, procedures and forces that determine what values will be reflected in 
administrative decisions. Accountability is (thus) the enforcement of responsibility' 
(Simon et al, 1950, p. 513. ). In other words, the study of accountability in public sector 
organisations concerns itself with establishing how responsive government and 
administration can be achieved. 
This introduces us to two main dimensions of accountability in public sector 
organisations: political and managerial accountability. Early forms of accountability 
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concentrated on the way in which monies were spent and the question of whether the 
activities of organisations were within the law (Lawton and Rose, 1991). In addition, 
there was concern about the misuse of public funds and bribery and thus rules were made 
to ensure the probity of organisations. Thus, the earlier focus of accountability has been 
on probity and legality of transactions. In recent years, however, this focus was found 
inadequate for the increasing complexities of government and business activities and 
therefore the refinement of accountability has been seen the only way out in public and 
private sector organisations to enhance performance and provide the required 
transparency of information to the public and shareholders alike. 
This refinement had touched all aspects of the concept of accountability and extended the 
dimensions of accountability to include: 
" political accountability: 
" management accountability; 
" legal accountability; 
" consumer accountability; 
" professional accountability. 
3.3.1 Political Accountability 
Political accountability is about those with delegated authority being answerable for their 
actions to the people, whether directly as in simple societies or indirectly as in complex 
societies (Day and Klein. 1987). This form of accountability focuses on the political 
dimension and manifests mainly in Central and Local governments where the senior civil 
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servant in the department would be accountable to his minister and the minister, as a 
member of the cabinet, will be accountable, in turn, to parliament for the discharge of 
responsibility. This doctrine is known as 'Ministerial Responsibility'. This accountability 
concept assumes that powers are vested in the appropriate minister with civil servants 
taking decision on his behalf or in his name. 
Such a system of accountability may have been appropriate in a time when the scale of 
the public sector was much smaller than today (Lawton and Rose, 1991). The current 
gro%rih of the state has meant that this model of accountability is no longer sufficient. 
Large government departments will make thousands of operational decisions and it is 
unrealistic to assume that ministers can be held responsible for every bit of decision. We 
have, therefore, a much more complex system of accountability which has a number of 
dimensions that require clear criteria for judging the performance and accounts of those 
with delegated authority. 
The problem here is whether the criteria of judgment are available and, if available. 
whether they are objective -a minefield of contention. Since the criteria of judgment are 
often contestable, officials to whom authority has been delegated are required to provide 
reasons, justification and explanation of their behaviour so that the people can make 
judgment about whether decision-makers have acted honestly and wisely. The main issue 
in complex societies is whether the linkages between action and explanation are in place 
and, if in place, adequate to the task in hand (Day and Klein, 1987). That is, whether the 
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channels of communication are operating and whether the sanctions are sufficient to 
compel a justification if needed. A secondary set of issues involves questions about the 
openness of the process and the existence and availability of the information needed to 
assess actions. 
3.3.2 Management Accountability: 
Management accountability, in contrast to political accountability, is about making those 
with delegated authority answerable for carrying out agreed tasks according to agreed 
criteria of performance (Ibid. ). Perhaps the simplest way to distinguish between the two 
dimensions of accountability is to see political accountability as involving an account 
being presented to an external and public audience while management accountability is 
concerned with the internal processes. Thus, management accountability is concerned 
mainly with internal issues and processes such as cost effectiveness, efficiency, budgetary 
control, monitoring performance and effectiveness. This technical process can, though it 
need not, be carried out by neutral, impartial experts. However, systems of accountable 
management may be introduced to delegate responsibility to those nearest the point of 
service delivery, for example, area office managers. This involves making decisions 
including, for example, delegating powers such as viring money from one budget heading 
to another, promotion of staff, making of local rules and so on, further down the 
hierarchy. This takes place on the assumption that those close to the point of delivery are 
best able to make decisions about service delivery. 
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Management accountability has a number of dimensions. Five dimensions have been 
outlined (Halachmi & Bouckaert, 1966, pp. 115-116; BASB, 1993, p. 11) which include: 
i) Policy accountabilily - selection of policies to be pursued or rejected: 
ii) Program accountability - that is establishment and achievement of goals 
(outcomes and effectiveness); 
iii) Performance accountability - establishment and achievement of objectives 
(efficiency and economy); 
iv) Process accountability - using adequate processes, procedures or measures in 
performing the actions called for (planning, allocating and managing), 
v) Probitv and legality accountability - spending funds in accordance with the 
approved budget being in compliance with law and regulations. 
Day and Klein (1987, p. 27) have grouped the five dimensions into three as follows: 
a) Fiscal/Regularity Accountability - this a about making sure that money has been 
spent as agreed, according to the appropriate rules: legal accountability can be seen 
as a counterpart to this, in so far as it is concerned to make sure that the procedures 
and rules of decision-malting have been observed. 
b) ProcessiEfciency Accountability - this is about making sure that a given course 
of action has been carried out, and that value for money has been achieved in the 
use of resources. 
c) Programme/Effectiveness Accountability - this is about making sure that a given 
course of action or investment of resources has achieved its intended result. 
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These dimensions of managerial accountability can also be conceptualized as being 
concerned with inputs, outputs and outcomes. Thus we have: 
0 fiscal/regularity dimension being concerned with checking that the 
appropriate inputs, whether of resources or administration, have gone 
into the policy or service-delivery machine; 
" process/efficiency dimension being concerned with checking that the 
appropriate outputs have been produced, and that the ratio between inputs and 
outputs (efficiency) is the most favourable possible; 
0 programme/effectiveness dimension being concerned with the ultimate question 
of whether the intended outcomes have been produced, whether the desired 
impact has been made. 
Combining the political and management concepts of accountability in their various 
dimensions might suggest a simple, hierarchical model. At the top is political 
accountability, which sets the policy objectives and generated the criteria used in the 
neutral technical process of management accountability, running from the relatively 
simple fiscal/regularity accountability to the more complex programme/effectiveness 
accountability, from inputs to outcomes. 
This conceptualisation is based on a number of assumptions and it is precisely these 
assumptions that make the whole concept of accountability problematic in the modem 
-world. The first is that the institutional and organizational links between political and 
80 
management accountability exist and are effective; and that the processes do in fact mesh. 
The second is that the political processes do in fact generate precise, clear-cut objectives 
and criteria necessary if management accountability is to a neutral exercise in the 
application of value-free techniques. The third is that the organization structure is such 
that the managers accountable to the politicians can answer for the actions and 
performance of the service deliverers. 
These three assumptions are, however, questionable. First, the links between the political 
and management systems of accountability, forged in the nineteenth century, are ill- 
adapted to the current service delivery state. The result is a perception of `overload' and 
demands for the creation of new links. Second, it is apparent that political processes do 
not necessarily generate the kind of clear-cut objectives and criteria required if audit is to 
be a neutral, value-free exercise. Often the dividing line between political and 
management accountability is blurred as objectives and criteria are generated at all levels 
in the hierarchy. The result is demand for opening up the system as a whole to public 
scrutiny, and creating a more complex, but not necessarily hierarchical, system of 
accountability. Third, and compounding the arguments both for better links and for a 
more complex system of accountability, the organizational structure of many public 
programmes is characterized by the fact that some service-delivers do not fit into a 
vertical or hierarchical model of accountability; they are instances of horizontal 
accountability to their peers (Hague et al, 1975). 
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Lastly, and more generally, the imagery of accountability needs to be elaborated and 
made more sophisticated. To talk of links in the system of accountability and set out 
taxonomy of different kinds of accountability is to risk confining any analysis to a 
mechanistic, verbal straitjacket. This will imply that the effectiveness of a system of 
accountability can be evaluated in terms of the appropriate connections being made and 
the appropriate techniques used. Equally important, our analysis would suggest, is to 
examine the dynamics of the system, which means looking at the quality of the 
information flowing down the various pipes (to vary the imagery) and the associated 
ability to translate nominal control into real control. This will determine the extent to 
which public actions are consequently open to scrutiny by individual citizens. These then 
are the issues that form the basis of our framework of analysis for this study. 
3.3.3 Accountability to the Law: 
This form of accountability exposes the public sector organisation to challenge in the 
court of law if they exceed the power granted to them by the statute so that the public is 
safeguarded against the action of the administration. Central to this is the doctrine of 
infra vires, which limits the powers of public bodies to that which the law empowers 
them to exercise. Thus, the decisions of local authorities, ministers and so on, come 
under the scrutiny of the courts when such decisions are considered to have exceeded the 
powers conferred under the law. 
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3.3.4 Accountability to the Consumer or Client: 
Due to the pressure exerted on them through public complaints and criticism, public 
sector organisations have established a mechanism for customer's complaints and 
grievances. The customers can appeal against an administrative decision to a tribunal or 
through ombudsmen as well as internal systems of complaint. Besides the complaint 
channels within the organisation, the following elements must be attended by the 
organisation to achieve performance and accountability towards its customers and 
stakeholders: 
i) The organisations must know their client base; 
ii) The firms should be able to measure clients' satisfaction with the 
organisations goods or services; 
ii) The organisations must have a ready responsive and measurable 
reaction when clients' satisfaction declines. 
Thus, the criticisms have forced public sector organizations not only to be customer 
oriented but also to reconsider the way in which they organize and deliver the services 
they provide in order to be more accountable and responsive to their customers. 
3.3.5 Professional Accountability: 
Professional accountability is concerned with issues relating to civil servants whose 
professional experience and knowledge make him vulnerable to `double accountability'. 
On the one hand they are accountable to their professional association and the other to 
their political peers or masters. This may lead to distortions in policy, particularly in 
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local government where professionals tend to assume dominant positions and can 
exercise considerable influence. 
In some other cases the incidence of `double accountability' may lead to a conflict of 
interest and divided loyalty on the part of the professional. It is quite possible that the 
wishes of political masters may be for one set of policy preference while the professional 
group tends to prefer another. The resolution of this conflict may be in favour of the 
trends of the profession rather than those policies of the politicians, particularly when 
professional advancement and career development may be decided by fellow 
professionals in the broad professional community rather than by local politicians. In 
fact, there are areas of work in the public sector from which politicians may not wish to 
exercise direct political control, for example, areas where professionals make scientific 
judgment about a particular issue. The influence of the professional is thus on the 
increase in public sector organizations and does certainly require -some level of 
accountability since their `professional decisions' will affect the welfare of the public. 
All these accountability dimensions would work only when a set of measurable criteria is 
established for the subordinates and the top management level and a system for 
delegation and control of authority is set up. Though confusing and complex, some form 
of suitable accountability structure is needed particularly when, as Levaggi (1995) argues, 
the perfect market structure in neo-classical sense does not exist or cannot work 
efficiently - as in public sector organizations. 
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3.4 ACCOUNTABILITY IN PUBLIC SECTOR ORGANIZATIONS 
Accountability is, of course, not exclusive to public sector organizations. Private sector 
enterprises attach much importance to accountability as a method of examining how 
people discharge responsibility and the financial performance of the enterprise. However, 
it has been argued that the concept of accountability takes on greater importance in the 
public than the private sector (Gray and Jenkins, 1985: Day and Klein, 1987). The 
reasons for this situation may be summarized as follows: 
i) Since public sector organisations are entrusted with monies collected 
through taxation, management of projects and execution of public policies, 
the public demands that those responsible for public monies and public 
policies present a public account of their activities. 
ii) Due to the responsibility entrusted to civil servants/public managers, 
citizens expect a high standard of conduct from them especially in the way 
they spend the money and the way in which the public policy is determined. 
iii) Unlike private sector goals, public sector organisations are entrusted with 
multiple objectives which may some times conflict with each other so 
monitoring such tasks through accountability could, conceivably, enhance 
the effectiveness and efficiency of the policy as well as the civil servants. 
iv) The diversity of public sector organisations and the huge variations in the 
activities that they undertake mean that differing methods of accountability 
will apply in different situations. It is therefore difficult to generalize about 
the process of accountability in the public sector. Despite this, it is possible 
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to detect some trends such as the increasing role of management 
accountability in all parts of the public sector. 
v) Because of the size of the public sector organisations with their long chain 
of command, it might be difficult to control the activities of those charged 
with execution of policies. 
These reasons have not, however, dampened or improved the argument about the 
effectiveness of accountability in the public sector. Neither have the reasons led to a 
precise and measurable set of standards for evaluating the responsibilities which the 
public have entrusted upon civil servants in the public sector. 
In his definition of accountability as; 
` ... a mechanism 
to ensure that individuals can be called to account for their 
actions, and that sanctions are incurred if the account is unsatisfactory', 
Theo Brooks (1955) identified four words - individuals, sanctions, unsatisfactory and 
mechanism - as the main components of the 
definition. 
He explains that the individuals (that is the civil servants) are generally held accountable 
for the activities of their organizations and so they provide the accounts. If the account 
rendered is found unsatisfactory by the accountee/principal sanctions are imposed upon 
the organization or department, which directly affect the ability of the individuals (the 
civil servants) to carry out the responsibilities of their departments or organizations. For 
the account to be satisfactory in process and procedure (not necessarily in content), it 
86 
must be embodied in a defined mechanism that provides direction on presentation, 
evaluation and control. These four words, he agues, provide the basis and substance of 
accountability in public sector organizations: the most important being 'mechanism 
Brook argues that accountability as a 'nnechanisrn' for providing an account of actions has 
a procedure to follow and an objective to achieve. The achievement of these imperatives 
provides the gateway to a satisfactory accountability. He explains that the accountability 
mechanism has only six components and to identify them the following six questions 
must be answered: 
a) Who is giving the account? 
b) To whom is the account to be given? 
C) For what action or job is the account to be given? 
d) How is the account to be given? 
e) When is the account to be given? 
What happens if the account is unsatisfactory? 
Brook states that if individuals claim that accountability exists in their organizations, they 
must be able to answer all six questions credibly. If just one component is absent, he 
warns, accountability does not exist in that organization. This condition is neutral to 
sector (public or private) and job position held by the individual. 
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Brook (1987, p. 16) reduces these questions to a simple list, which he collectively labeled 
as the Accountability Criteria: 
Table 3.1 
The Accountability Criteria 
Who? 
To? 
For'? 
How? 
When? 
What if? 
Brook states that the criteria lie at the heart of accountability and there are reasons to 
support his view. This is because the criteria provide a simple but comprehensive scheme 
for assessing whether accountability exists in a given situation. It is self explanatory, 
easy to use and extremely directive in procedure and purpose. 
3.4.1 A Generalised Accountability Model 
Gray, Owen and Adams (1996) have proposed a generalised model of accountability 
which emanates from their definition of the term: 
The dun, to provide an account (bv no means necessarily a financial 
account) or reckoning of those actions for which one is held responsible. " 
They state that this definition provides two responsibilities: responsibility to undertake 
certain actions and responsibility to provide an account of those actions. 
88 
The emergent relationship involves two main actors - an Accountee (Principal) and an 
Accountor (Agent) - whose specific relationship is defined by society while their rights 
and obligations are defined by an internal contract. While the Accountee (Principal) has 
a right to information, the Accountor (Agent) has the obligation to provide the 
information based upon a specified set of criteria, for example, Brook's Accountability 
Criteria discussed above. Both parties interact through these provisions of the wider 
societal environment and the internal contractual environment of the organisation. This 
accountability relationship is put into a general model as shown in Figure 3.1. 
Figure 3.1 is a simple model but can be used to explore many complex situations. The 
model hypothesises a simple two-way relationship between an accountee (the principal) 
and accountor (the agent). The terms of the flows between the parties and the actions and 
accountability required will be a function of the relationship (contract) between the 
parties. This, in turn, will reflect the social context of the relationship, for example, the 
value society places on honesty and openness in the discharge of official duties. 
The essence of the model is the relationship between the parties and the role that society 
ascribes to it. It is this relationship that ascribes responsibility and permits right to 
information, and thereby determines the accountability. So the crucial issue is how the 
relationship - that is, the contract - 
is determined. 
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FiLyure 3.1 
A GENERALISED ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL 
Social context 
ACCOU\TEE 
(Principal) 
Instruction- about 
Social Context Actions 
Social Context 
Information about 
actions. (discharge of 
accountability) 
Social Context 
Source: Gray et al, 1996. p. 39 
In the model, society is defined as sets of relationships, for example, between individuals, 
between organisations, between the State and the individual or organisation and between 
individuals and the rest of the natural environment and so on. Thus the "social context' in 
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actions 
Re%%arJ Relationship 
the model refers to a series of individual social contracts between members of society 
and society itself. These contracts may be both legal and non-legal - that is, moral or 
natural contracts: that is, some relationships and parts of some relationship are governed 
by law whereas other relationships - and some part of all relationships - are governed by 
the ruling ethics, value and principles of society. These contracts provide the basis for 
the rights of the parties in that relationship including rights and responsibilities relating to 
information flows. To relate all these to accountability, we must first distinguish between 
legal and non-legal, or moral or natural, rights and responsibilities (Likierman, 1986; 
Likierman and Creasey, 1985). The most obvious rights and responsibilities are those 
established in law. The law lays down the minimum level of responsibilities and rights 
and thus the minimum level of legal accountability at any given time in any given country 
(Tinker et al., 1991) 
While the law frequently identifies responsibility for actions it rarely specifies the 
responsibility to account for those actions - the accountability. On the moral side, the 
society and the value system of the individual determine the moral rights and 
responsibilities that influence accountability in organisations. 
This model is simple but powerful as conceptual guide for understanding the issue of 
accountability in organisations particularly in public sector organisations. The model 
identifies the relevant variables and players in the accountability game that will be found 
useful by researchers. Combined with Brook's accountability criteria, the model has 
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much to offer in understanding and analysing the issues and problems of accountability in 
public sector organisations. While the generalised accountability model provides the 
structure for understanding the relationships in the accountability web, Brook's 
accountability criteria supplies the ingredients for an in-depth study and analysis of the 
accountability concept. 
3.4.2 Assumptions of Accountability concept in the Public Sector 
The concept of Accountability assumes the following links: 
a) In public sector organisations, civil servants are accountable to ministers and 
ministers, in turn, are accountable to the Cabinet, which itself is accountable to the 
legislative body - for example, the Parliament. This assumption no longer 
matches reality because the relationship is more complex than this. The links are 
no longer effective in the current circumstances of complex relationships in 
public sector organisations. 
b) Efficiency and accountability are two sides of the same conceptual coin. This 
assumption is strengthened by the attempts since 1960s to improve and promote 
efficiency and managerial accountability in developing and developed countries. 
c) Accountability should be less concerned with the individual's actions, than with 
over all performance of the group. As quoted in Day and Klien (1988, p. 42), the 
1969 Fulton Committee's report on the Civil Service argues that "Accountable 
management means holding individuals and units responsible for performance 
measured as objectively as possible". 
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d) The services are devised and delivered by people who may differ in their ability to 
define what the objectives or outputs are supposed to be. 
e) The ability to determine who is competent to assess the progress made 
towards the achievements of those aims may also vary. 
f) The ability of the service deliverers to appropriate the currency of 
accountability may also reflect such characteristic of the services as the 
division of labour between the groups of providers. 
g) It is assumed that there is no accountability without responsibility within the 
organisations. 
h) The political processes do in fact generate precise, clear-cut objectives and criteria 
necessary if managerial accountability is to be neutral exercise in the application 
of value-free techniques. 
i) The organisational structure is such that manager accountable to politicians can 
answer for the actions and performance of the service deliverers. 
These assumptions have provided the basis for most of the accountability concepts 
discussed above. However, while some of these assumptions are still valid to a large 
extent, some others need reviewing to be applicable in the current circumstances and 
complexities of relationships in public sector organisations. 
3.4.4 Management Approach to Accountability: 
To facilitate the promotion and implementation of the concept of accountability and 
ethics within public and private sector organisations, relevant managerial approaches may 
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be adopted as alternative options. Among these approaches is the traditional managerial 
approach, which requires that authority and responsibilities are clearly defined while 
overlapping functions are reduced to a minimum so that they do not obscure 
responsibility and frustrate accountability. In the same vein, strict subordination must be 
observed and the subordinate must obey the directive and command of his superior so 
that organisational effectiveness and accountability can be secured. 
Furthermore, there should be appropriate span of control so that subordinate can be 
controlled and their activities monitored by the super-ordinates in order that effective 
management and proper accountability can be harnessed. Subordinates should be 
encouraged to be loyal to the organisation and to their superiors through incentive pay, 
pension scheme and conflict of interest regulation as well as through occupational 
specialization which makes it difficult for employees to find another employment 
elsewhere. Formal disciplinary system should be established to enforce accountability 
and subordination. There should be internal audit within the organisation so that 
employee/civil servant cannot abuse public trust. 
The problem with this approach is that it has a narrow focus. It is concerned more with 
protecting managerial values than protecting the public from betrayal of trust. As an 
alternative option, the Market-based Public Management approach has a different view of 
accountability and ethics. It focuses exclusively on performance and results. The new 
model treats the traditional managerial approach as obstacles to cost effective 
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government. It favours external oversight by legislature that assesses performance. 
Accountability within the Markel-based Public Management framework can be enforced 
through market mechanism and customers' judgement/preference. Even this nerv 
approach operates on the basis of checks and balances that involve a guardian system in 
which the guardians themselves are guarded effectively to ensure appropriate use of 
resources and accountability. The problem is, how can the guardians be guarded? 
3.4.5 Difficulties in Guarding the Guardians 
Despite the establishment of accountability process in public and private sector 
organizations and oversight exercised by legislative and managerial machinery, it is not 
easy to find satisfactory means of establishing standards to guard the guardians of public 
conscience and welfare. This results from various reasons. 
First, due to the special expertise and the access to information, it is difficult for those 
charged with oversight to hold public administrators accountable. Public administrators 
enjoy the advantage of full time status, so outsiders who are charged with oversight of 
their activities may not be able to devote sufficient time to check the routine works. As a 
result of this inability, accountability may become a weak and ineffective method of 
monitoring the public civil servants' performance. 
Second. as a result of job security afforded to public administrators and the protective 
nature of the personnel system, it is difficult to dismiss or discipline an employee without 
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going through cumbersome procedures which tend to be costly and time consuming so 
accountability of civil servants may be impaired. It is reckoned that the greater the effort 
to control the subordinate's behaviour by top level officials the greater the effort made the 
subordinates to counter act such control, the more staff and resources are required from 
both sides to secure accountability. 
Third, the lack of co-ordination among various public organizations could impede the 
effort to hold public administrators accountable. Due to the size and scope of public 
sector organizations' activities it is difficult to hold administrator accountable for 
deviation from the public interest. 
Lastly, fragmentation of agency structure and function could lead to overlapping 
responsibility which may make it difficult to hold public administrator accountable. 
Contracting out government services may result in some difficulties in tracing a third 
party responsibility when there is no precise definition and terms of the job to be 
performed. 
Despite these difficulties, the concept of accountability, if defined appropriately and 
developed efficiently, may contribute enormously to effective and responsible 
management and administration of public and private sector organisations. There are 
clear advantages in having an accountability system firmly in place in an organisation; 
and these outweigh the inevitable limitations such as the employment of amateur 
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accountees (Guber, 1987); lack of co-operation between accountor and accountee; 
vagueness of the concept; the monopolist market power of public sector organisations 
(Pallot, 1992); increasing cost of accountability and monitoring systems; the issue of 
measurement (Holaustrom and Migrom, 1990) and the difficulty in setting precise public 
sector objectives and criteria for evaluating effectiveness of accountability. 
The main advantages of accountability if effectively established and implemented 
include, among others: 
i) Accountability model limits bureaucratic discretion through compliance with 
tightly drawn rules and regulations. Public administration scholar Francis Rourke 
wrote in the late 1970s that; "The reformers of the 1960s and the 1970s seem bent 
not on extending but on curtailing the independence of bureaucratic organi_ations. 
They argue that bureaucracies represent formidable concentrations of power in 
contemporary society, and that executive agencies should be brought back within 
the political system and made more accountable. If traditional efforts at reform 
could be described as an attempt to depolitici_e the administrative process in the 
United States, the reform movement in our day seems rather aimed at re- 
politicising administration-at least in the sense of restoring public control over 
previously independent agencies, " quoted in Light (1993, p. 12). 
Most public administration textbooks define accountability as one of Command-and- 
control so accountability is seen as a product of limit on bureaucratic discretion - limit 
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that flow from clear rules (command) and the formal procedures (monitoring and 
enforcement) that make them stick (control); 
ii) The framework for accountability implies explicit development of performance 
standards and measurement to respond to the need for accountability. Financial 
management control, information and frequent reporting provide quantitative 
information for the understanding of the accountability of an enterprise. 
iii) Accountability concept had facilitated the introduction of Public Indicators, 
Citizen Charter and Financial Management Initiative in some developed countries. 
iv) One of the driving forces for the establishment of accountability model is to 
improve public sector performance and control (financial, legislative, social and 
managerial) for sustained economic and social development. This objective to a 
certain extent had been achieved. 
v) With the availability of the appropriate tool of accountability the public civil 
servants can be held accountable. These tools of accountability can be employed 
simultaneously to achieve the intended results. Table 3.2 shows the tools 
available. 
vi) In certain developing countries like Malaysia there had been close linkage between 
performance improvement and accountability thus strengthening the belief that 
performance improvement of public sector organisation could be the result of the 
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Table 3.2 
CHOOSING THE TOOLS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 
ENDS 
(To facilitate/enhance) 
MEANS 
(Tools) 
Legitimacy of Constitutions; electoral systems for governments 
Decision-makers and decision-making bodies; bureaucratic systems 
of Representation; Royal prerogative, legislation; 
letters of appointment; formal delegation of authority; 
Standing orders 
Moral Conduct Societal values; concepts of social justice and 
public Interest, professional values; training/induction 
Programs 
Responsiveness Public participation and consultation; debates; 
Advisory bodies; public meetings; freedom of 
Speech. 
Openness Parliamentary question times; public 
information Services; freedom of information 
laws; public Hearings; green and while 
papers; annual reports 
Optimal resource Budgets; financial procedures; rules of virement; 
utilization Parliamentary public accounts committees; 
auditing; Public enquiries and participation; formal 
planning Systems 
Improving Information systems; value for money audits; 
Efficiency and setting objectives and standards; program effectiveness 
guidelines; appraisal; feedback from public 
Source: Turner and Hui me (1997, p. 124) 
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public accountability, which had the focus of the public rather than the politicians and 
bureaucratic superiors, as has been the case in the past. 
vii) With a market-based forms of accountability consumers' power is strengthened 
thus making public sector organisation more responsive. 
3.5 FRA11EWVORK OF ANALYSIS 
We have adopted the Generalised Accountability Model in co junction with Brook's 
Accountability Criteria as the framework of analysis in this study. As stated above, when 
combined with Brook's Accountability Criteria, the Generalised Accountability Model 
has much to offer in understanding and analyzing the issues and problems of 
accountability in public sector organisations. The model provides the structure for 
understanding the relationships in the accountability web and the Brook's Accountability 
Criteria supplies the ingredients for an in-depth study and analysis of the accountability 
concept within the structure. 
The generalised model will enable us identify the structure, actors, relationships (both 
legal and non-legal) and the associated actions taken in the accountability process in the 
UAE public sector organisations using our case-study organisations. Brook's criteria will 
enable us carry out an in-depth study and analysis of the accountability concept, 
procedure and evaluation in the UAE public sector organisations. 
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The main research approach is primary survey involving the use of questionnaires and 
personal interviews. Secondary data/information will provide most of the background 
materials. A detail discussion of the research method used in this study is given in 
chapter 4. 
3.6 S1TM\IARl' 
In the last 20 years there had been many attempts by various governments in 
industrialised nations to strengthen and to clarify accountability concept and its 
mechanism in both public and private sector settings. In the U. S., the government 
introduced three reforms through a statute in 1978. The first reform is the Civil Service 
Act which contained a clear commitment to performance pay, merit bonuses and greater 
stewardship of the government's human capital. The second reform is the ethics in 
Government Act, which created financial disclosure processes that, although heavily 
tilted towards compliance measure, envisioned an appointment of senior civil servants 
with a greater incentive and drive to perform in the public interest. 
To enhance efficiency and accountability in public sector organisation many reforms also 
had been introduced at state and local level in the U. K. during this period. These reforms 
include efficiency scrutinises, value for money audits, performance indicators, resource 
management initiatives, cash limits, computerised financial information system, delegated 
budget and internal market. In addition the general process of reshaping public sector 
organisation is being encouraged by the transformation of regulatory model towards the 
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inclusion of commercialized public sector operation. Moreover in public choice theory, 
politicians and bureaucrats are seen as self-interested individuals whose personal aim for 
wealth, status, influence and security can be satisfied only through a process of 
competition. In order to control these self-interested individuals, public sector accounting 
and accountability systems need to be transparent. Information about decisions should be 
freely available, decision-making process should involve the full range of interested 
parties or stake- holders and appropriate market-based incentives are needed to ensure 
that bureaucrats and politicians are accountable for their actions. Accountability 
therefore should be seen as an important element in helping the stakeholders to harness 
the self-interests of politicians and bureaucrats. 
Even though there had been some obstacles in the way of accountability concept, the 
efforts, which have made in the developed countries, had been somehow successful in 
removing the element that impedes the progress and growth of accountability concept. 
However the accountability concept will continue to attract researchers and professionals 
in and outside government circles despite the recent public sector restructuring which 
impacted adversely on the role of accountability as means of evaluating and directing 
civil servants' performance. 
This chapter has discussed some of the major theoretical issues relating to the 
accountability concept and debate. There is clear evidence that the debate will continue 
because of the dynamics not only of the 'concept but also of the institutions and the 
surrounding social environment. For this study, we have adopted the Generalised 
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Accountability Model of Gray et al (1996) for the framework of analysis to carry out our 
study of accountability in the UAE public sector organisations. 
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4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the method of research employed in this study. The discussion 
covers mainly the following areas: 
(a) Research strategy: 
(b) Description of the variables to be measured; 
(c) Sampling; 
(d) Method of data collection 
(e) Method of data analysis 
The chapter concludes with the limitations imposed on the study by circumstances 
beyond our control. 
4.2 RESEARCH STRATEGY 
Sometimes, terms mean different things to different people; it is thus necessary to define 
what "research strateg' means before we proceed further. Here, research strategy may be 
defined as the way in which the research objectives may be achieved or questioned. 
There are two types of research strategies, namely, "quantitative research and qualitative 
research". The decision on which type of research strategy to adopt depends on the 
purpose of the study and the type and availability of the information that is required to 
answer the research question and achieve the objectives of the study. The configuration of 
the span of the method of data collection and the relative significance of the research 
strategy are shown in figure 4.1 
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Figure 4.1 
The 'Van of Data Collection Method 
Objective measurement 
Quantitative research 
Placement of theonv 
Exploratory research 
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of theory 
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__j 
Performance 
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Documents 
Sour c: Ures« ell, 1994 
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From the figure, it can be inferred that there is the need to identify the research strategy 
suitable for the study at hand before proceeding to other stages of the study. In a way, the 
research strategy defines the type of secondary source information required and the 
method of fieldwork (primary) research to be undertaken. 
4.2.1 Quantitative Research 
Quantitative research is `objective' in nature. It is defined as an inquiry into a social or 
human problem based on testing a hypothesis or a theory composed of variables, measured 
with numbers, and analysed with statistical procedures, in order to determine whether the 
hypothesis or the theory holds true (Creswell, 1994). Quantitative data are, therefore, not 
abstract information, they are hard and, to a large extent, expected to be reliable; they are 
measurements of tangible, countable, sensate features of the world (Bouma and Atkinson, 
1995) 
Quantitative research method may be selected under two main circumstances, which are 
as follows: 
a) When we want to find facts about a concept, a question or an attribute. The 
information sought will be of a quantitative nature. 
b) When we want to collect factual evidence and study the relationship between 
these facts in order to test a particular theory or hypothesis. 
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4.2.1.1 Place of Theory in Quantitative Research 
In `quantitative' study, the hypotheses, research questions and objectives can be better 
understood when they are grounded in a theoretical framework. The concept of a 
theoretical framework is explained in detail in a later section. However, at this point the 
term `theory' will be discussed. A theory is commonly understood to have certain 
characteristics. Kerlinger (1979), cited in Creswell (1994, p. 73), defined a theory as `a set 
of interrelated constructs (variables or questions), that presents systematic view of 
phenomena by specifying relationships among variables, with the purpose of explaining 
natural phenomena Here, the systematic view might be an argument, a discussion, or a 
rationale that helps to explain (or predict) phenomena that occur in the world'. 
In quantitative studies one uses a theory deductively and places it towards the beginning of 
the plan for a study. The main objective is to test or verify a theory, rather than develop it. 
One thus begins the study by advancing a hypothesis or restating a given theory, then data 
is collected to test the hypothesis or theory. The result of the test provides a basis for 
reflection on whether the hypothesis or theory is confirmed or refuted by the facts of the 
study. The theory, if confirmed, thus becomes a framework for the research project and an 
organizing model for the research questions or hypotheses. It also provides a framework 
for the planning and organization of information/data collection procedure (Creswell, 
1994). 
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4.2.2 Qualitative Research 
Qualitative research, on the other hand, is `subjective' in nature. It emphasizes meanings, 
experiences (often verbally described), description and so on. The Information gathered in 
qualitative research can be classified under two categories of research, namely, exploratory 
and attitudinal. 
4.2.2.1 Exploratory Research 
Exploratory research is used when we have a limited amount of knowledge about our topic 
and thus require more information to better define the topic and delimit its boundary for a 
meaningful research. Here, the interview technique is usually selected as a method of data 
collection. The purpose of exploratory research is intertwined with the need for a clear and 
precise statement of the recognized problem. 
Researchers conduct exploratory research for three interrelated purposes: (i) Diagnosing a 
situation, (ii) Screening alternatives and (iii) Discovering new ideas (Zikmund, 1997). For 
instance, Personnel research managers often conduct exploratory research as a diagnostic 
tool to point out issues of employees' concern or to generate possible explanation for 
motivational patterns. For example, preliminary interviews with employees may be utilized 
to learn current `hot' issues, as well as concerns about bread-and-butter issues such as 
wages, working conditions, career opportunities, and the like. In this study we used 
exploratory research to seek better clarity about the main subject matter --- i. e. management 
accountability. We also carried out exploratory research to limit the boundary of the 
research as well as establishing the feasibility of the study in temis of data availability from 
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the case studies chosen. Exploratory research also enabled us to determine the official 
sensitivity of the research issue and the data to be used. 
We obtained much insight into the research problem through exploratory research. The 
method used in the exploratory research was mainly personal interviews with government 
officials and public consumers of the services of the public sector. No structured 
questionnaire was used rather open discussions with respondents were carried out after 
which the respondents were asked to indicate their level of satisfaction with the level of 
accountability in seven major public sector organizations using the following ordinal 
grading scale: 
Very Satisfied 
Satisfied 
Indifferent (average) 
Dissatisfied 
Very Dissatisfied 
The findings of this survey and the resultant analysis have been reported earlier in Table 
1.1 of Chapter 1. The results enabled us to better focus the research problem and, more 
importantly, select the two case study organizations for the study. 
Some secondary sources of information such as files, reports of the case-study 
organizations were also consulted to determine not only availability of data but also the 
quality of data available. These exploratory research exercises were very useful and 
elucidating. 
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4.2.2.2 Attitudinal Research 
Attitudinal research is used to 'subjectively' evaluate the `opinion', `view', or `perception ` 
of a person towards a particular object. The term `object' is used to refer to an 'attribute', a 
`variable', `factor' or `question'. Attitudinal research is entirely qualitative though the 
results can be translated into quantitative explanation and analysis. 
The main research approach in this study is empirical-based survey using questionnaires 
and personal interviews. As will be discussed later, questionnaires were used to obtain 
qualitative data, which was converted to quantitative data for analysis. The information 
collected were mainly opinions, views, impression, evaluation and perspectives of 
individuals about identified objects or situations. All of these are attitudinal data. 
The usefulness of attitudinal information cannot be over-emphasized. The research 
objective is to identify and evaluate the factors responsible for the alleged low level of 
management accountability in public sector organizations in the UAE. While the 
identification aspect of the objective of the study provides quantitative answers to the 
question `-which factors caused the problem? " the evaluation aspect provides qualitative 
largely (attitudinal) answers to the crucial question; "why did the problems occur? " So our 
qualitative (attitudinal) research has been very useful. 
4.2.23 Place of Theory in Qualitative Research 
In qualitative research the use of theory is less clear than in quantitative research because 
there is no standard terminology or rules about placement. A theory may emerge during the 
data collection and analysis phases of the research or be used relatively late in the research 
process as a basis for comparison with other theories. The placement of theory in 
qualitative research tends to be towards the end of the study. Therefore, the product of 
qualitative research will be throwing up hunches and hypothesis that can be tested more 
rigorously by further quantitative research. 
Creswell (1994) identifies some principles to observe about using a theory in the qualitative 
approach. These are: 
(a) employ it in a manner consistent with the type of qualitative design, 
(b) use it inductively so that it does not become something to test but rather to 
develop and be shaped through the process of research, 
(c) create a visual model of the theory as it emerges, and 
(d) if used at the end of the study, compare and contrast it with other 
theories. 
In this study, an adapted theoretical model defining the procedure for establishing 
management accountability in the public sector in a social context and setting such as the 
UAE has been developed. This was done at the end of the research and analysis of findings 
in Chapter 11. It is an appropriate procedure because we had to analyse the findings, 
compare them with existing models of accountability before attempting to develop the 
model. We have compared the model and are confident of its suitability to the social 
setting of the UAE and countries in similar social context and value system. 
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4.3 COMPARING QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
From the above discussion a number of contrasting features of quantitative and qualitative 
research has emerged. The difference between quantitative research and qualitative 
research is rather like the difference between counting the shape and types of design of a 
sample of green houses as against living in them and feeling the environment. Table 4.1 
shows a comparison of the two research approaches. 
Table 4.1 
Some Differences Between Quantitative And Qualitative Research 
Quantitative Qualitative 
I Role Fact-finding based Attitude measurement based on 
on evidence or opinions, views and perceptions 
records measurement 
2 Relationship between Distant Close 
researcher and subject 
Scope of findings Nomothetic Idiographic 
4 Relationship between Testing/confirmation Emergent/development 
theory/concepts and 
research 
5 Nature of data Hard and reliable Rich and deep 
Source: Bryman, 1988. 
The differences between them may be somehow quantifiable but such measurements will 
not convey the importance and the special impact of sonne over others. Bryman (1988) 
provides a useful list of differences between the two research strategies. 
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Table 4.1 includes some of the important dimensions. Naturally, the focal point of any 
research is its outcome. Although Table 4.1 shows distinctive features of the two 
strategies, the relationship between theory/concepts and research strategy in terms of 
verifying the theory/concept to emerge from the data is not as clear-cut as is sometimes 
implied. 
The differences tabulated above (Table 4.1) and their implications are evident in our study 
and results. For example, while we have been able to identity most of the factors that 
account for the low level of management accountability, our knowledge of the factors has 
been enriched and expanded by the qualitative responses from our questionnaires. These 
are very useful sources and forms of information that have enriched our analysis and 
evaluation of the factors. 
4.4 SAMPLING DESIGN 
One of the major sources of questions about the validity and reliability of a piece of 
empirical research is the sampling design with its resultant sample size (McDaniel and 
Gate, 1991). It is therefore necessary to explain the sampling design in some details. 
Furthermore, the application of the methods of research and the associated instruments of 
investigation are based on the availability of a sample while the reliability of the results of 
the empirical research depends on the appropriateness and randomness of the sample. A 
discussion of the sample design before the other aspects of the primary data collection 
process is thus in order. 
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Designing the research sample can take many fomis, each of which is suitable for a 
particular purpose. Listed below are some of the types of sampling methods available: 
(i) Simple random sampling 
(ii) Purposive sampling 
(iii) Convenient sampling 
(iv) Quota sampling 
(v) Systematic random sampling 
(vi) Stratified random sampling 
Because of the nature of this study, the non-random purposive sampling method is adopted 
in selecting the members of the various samples used in the study. The study is largely a 
case study of the problem of management accountability in the public sector hence the 
sampling approach must recognize the need to be biased towards the selection of relevant 
officials, such as the Accountees and Accountors, in flee case study organisations. 
Similarly, within the relevant groups of officials in the organisations, the selection and 
inclusion in the relevant samples of those directly involved in giving accounts of their 
stewardship (accountors) and those to whom they render the account (accountees) is 
necessary for the validation of the study and test of reliability of the results obtained from 
the samples. The purposive sampling technique is one of the most appropriate methods to 
achieve this inevitable bias in sampling. These are some of the reasons for the choice of 
purposive sampling as the sampling method in this study. 
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As explained in chapter 1 (see Table 1.1), the case study public sector organisations used in 
the study are the Emirates Telecommunications Corporation (ETISALAT) and the Ministry 
of Health (MOH). Apart from the significant importance of these organisations in the 
socio-economic life of the nation, they represent, as can be seen in the results of our 
exploratory research reported in chapter 1, Table 1.1, two contrasting cases of perfomlance 
as rated by our sample respondents. Our decision to use these organisations for our study 
has been influenced significantly by these results. In addition, the two organisations 
showed more tendencies to co-operate with the research than other similar organisations 
approached. Finally, we chose only two public sector organisations because of time, 
finance and human resources constraints on the study. 
The limitations, such as bias, reliability etc., in designing a non-random purposive sampling 
are recognized. It is, for example, difficult to engage in generalization from the findings of 
such a sample. However, these deficiencies should be considered against the situational 
circumstances of the study. In this study, the situation with respect to knowledge about 
public sector accountability is not very wide spread to encourage us to increase the sample 
size to include every citizen. Furthermore, the study and research period were very limited 
which made it impossible to adopt a more time consuming research and sampling 
approach. There are also limitations on the study imposed by finance, human and other 
resource constraints. These circumstances and constraints have influenced our sampling 
approach and sample sizes. However, it is not expected that these limitations will have 
significant adverse effect on the findings and analysis in this study. 
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4.4.1 The Sample Size 
One of the main objectives of this study is to find out the views and opinion of the general 
public as well as the relevant accountors and accountees over the issue of low level of 
management accountability in the public sector. To achieve this, the sample(s) to be used 
must not only be appropriate in size but also relevant in type; hence there is need to explain 
the nature of the samples as well as the sample sizes used in the study. 
The main types of samples are used in the study as follows: 
i) the general public sample; 
ii) the individual case study sample; and, 
iii) the combined sample of the two case studies. 
Each sample was selectected in the following way using as stated earlier the pursive 
sampling method which is considered appropriate for this type of research. 
a) The general public sample 
The general public sample of 500 members was selected from a sampling frame 
(population) of 1500 people drawn from the UAE public with a purposive bias towards 
some particular elements (accountees and accountors) in both the federal and Emirate 
public services sectors as shown in Table 4.2. The sampling-frame was selected from lists 
of personnel currently working or retired in the public and private sectors of the economy, 
ministers, chairmen, directors, under-secretaries, managers, businesspersons, professionals 
and the general public available in public records such as telephone directory, postal 
directory, Chambers of Commerce directory, Municipality records and the Diwan of the 
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Emirates. The sampling frame was fairly representative and, partly, on the basis of this, the 
sample of 500 prospective respondents drawn from it was assumed representative. 
Table 4.2 shows the pre-survey distribution of our sample of 500 prospective respondents 
among the relevant categories. The distribution in the Table is arbitrary with respect to the 
general public group and in the ratio of 1: 2 in the case of the accountee/accountor group. 
The ratio of 1: 2 has been used because the civil services of the seven Emirates combined is 
much larger in number of employees than the Federal civil service though not in the exact 
proportion of 2: 1. So there is also some arbitrariness in the distribution of the accountees 
and accountors. 
Table 4.2 
General Public Sample: Distribution of Prospective Respondents by Category 
Category- Federal Ä Public Emirates 
ServiceT Services Total 
General Public 150 200 350 
Accountees 
(Ministers/Chairmen) 20 40 60 
Accountors 
(Under-Secretary/Director/Manager) 30 60 90 
TOTAL 200 300 500 
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We do not expect our arbitrary distribution to affect the outcome of the sample survey 
because we have given some measure of weighting to the relevant groups in our sample. 
In terms of the actual response to the questionnaire administered on the general public 
sample, Table 4.3 presents the number of responses. As can be seen in the Table, a total of 
280 members of the three sample groups actually filled in the questionnaires and returned. 
This represents a response rate of 56%, which is reasonably high considering that mail 
questionnaire surveys typically do not achieve high response rates. 
Table 4.3 
The General Public Sample Survey: Distribution of Actual Respondents 
Category 
Federal 
Public Services 
Emirates 
Public Services TOTAL 
General Public 80 120 200 
Accountee 10 20 30 
Accountor 15 335 50 
TOTAL 105 175 280 
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However, we supplemented the postal survey with hand delivery and collection. This 
method accounted for about sixty percent of the completely filled and returned 
questionnaires. 
b) The Case Study Samples 
In the case of the case study organisations -Etisalat and the Ministry of Health (MOH) - 
the entire work force constituted the population out of which a purposive sample of 40 
members was selected. The distribution of the sample members according to category is 
presented in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4 
The Case Study Sample: Distribution of Respondents 
Category ETISALAT 
Ministry of 
Health 
(MOH) 
TOTAL 
General Employee 10 10 20 
Accountee 5 5 10 
Accountor 
(Including sub-accountors) 
25 25 50 
TOTAL 40 40 80 
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Clearly, the selection in this case is one of equal representation in all the categories and 
from each of the case study organisations. The equal representation enables us to compare 
our survey results fairly. The accountee and accountor categories comprise of the 
following officials: 
" Minister/Chairman/President (Etisalat) 
" SeniorNice Presidents (Etisalat) 
" Under-Secretary/General Manager 
" Assistant Under-secretaries 
" Financial Contollers 
9 Directors 
" Heads of Departments/Senior Managers. 
Specific questionnaires (see Appendices B and C) were sent or delivered to the case study 
sample respondents particularly, the Accountees and Accountors, and effort was 
concentrated on ensuring that the questionnaires were filled and returned. As a result, a 
100% response rate was obtained. The reason for the extra effort expended in ensuring that 
respondents, particularly the accountees and accountors, filled and returned the 
questionnaires was because the case study organisations constitute the focal point of the 
research and, hence, their responses were vital to the study. 
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c) The Combined Case Study Sample 
This sample comprised of a randomly selected 30 accountees and accountors (including 
sub-accountors) from the combined sample of 60 accountees and accountors of the two 
case study organisations (see Table 4.4). Equal number of respondents (15) was selected 
randomly from each of the organisations' samples. The detail distribution of respondents is 
shown in Table 4.5 and the designations of the selected respondents are as follows: 
" Minister/Chairman/Senior Vice President of Etisalat (4) 
" Vice President/Under-Secretary/Asst. Under-Secretary/Financial Controller (10) 
" Directors/Senior Managers/Heads of Departments (16) 
Table 4.5 
Distribution of Combined Etisalat and NIOH Sample for Personal Interview 
Case Study Organisations 
Category of Staff 
Etisalat 
Ministry of 
Health (MOH) Total 
Accountee 2 2 4 
Accountor 5 5 10 
Sub-accountor 8 8 16 
Total 15 15 30 
The combined sample was used mainly during the personal interview stage when the "Tick 
Questionnaire" (see Appendix E) was also administered. 
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4.4.2 Personal Interview Sample 
A focused personal interview was conducted using the combined sample of 30 Accountees 
and Accountors (including Sub-accountors) from the two case study organisations. 
The interviews were conducted over a period of three months from April to June 2000. 
The main rationale underlying the use of a combined sample of the two organisations for 
the personal interviews is as follows: 
" The objective of the study is the same for both organisations; 
" The research findings of each case study have been compiled and analysed in detail 
to identify the commonalities and differences thus a combined sample interview 
provides an additional basis for validation of the individual results; 
" Need for a sample size larger than 30 to enable us use standard tests of validation 
and reliability of the results: 
" There were resource constraints if we were to enlarge the sample for interview. 
It was thus convenient and reasonable to have a combined sample from the two case study 
organisations for the personal interviews. There was no indication that this approach had 
any negative effect on the outcome of the study. 
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4.5 DATA COLLECTION APPROACH 
The qualitative research strategy is adopted in this study mainly because of the nature of the 
study. The main objective of the study, as stated earlier, is to identify and assess the factors 
responsible for the management accountability problems in public sector organizations of 
the UAE. This involves obtaining the views and opinions of various individuals 
inorganizations in the sector particularly in the case-study organizations. To this extent, the 
study is an attitudinal study, which is better conducted through qualitative rather than 
quantitative approach as discussed in section 4.2 above. This does not exclude the use of 
quantitative techniques if and when relevant. Consequently the following research 
techniques and how they have been used in the study are discussed in this section: 
(i) Desk research (secondary data) 
(ii) Fieldwork research (primary data) 
(iii) Questionnaire 
(iv) Sampling 
4.5.1 Desk Research (Secondary Data) 
Data collected using desk research approach is called "secondary' data because the data is 
obtained from documents compiled by others. The most significant advantages of 
secondary data relate to time and cost of the study. In general, it is usually much less 
expensive in terms of money to collect and use secondary than primary data (Steward and 
Kamins, 1993). Furthermore, secondary data are easier to collect and much less time 
consuming than the collection of primary data. 
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Most of the secondary data for this study were collected from the following sources: 
(i) Central Bank Reports and Publications 
(ii) Reports and Publications of Ministry of Finance, Abu Dhabi 
(iii) Chambers of Commerce Documents 
(iv) Government Department Reports and Publications 
(v) Relevant books, academic journals and other literature 
(vi) OECD, IMF, EIU and World Bank documents and publications 
(vii) Newspapers, periodicals. magazines etc. 
(viii) Ministry of Health files and publications 
(ix) Etisalat Reports and Publications 
(r) Files and Publications of Ministry of Economy & Commerce, Abu Dhabi. 
(xi) Other public records and publications 
These sources provided infomiation, which were analysed and critically appraised to write 
the literature review, the background information chapters and some aspects of the findings 
and recommendation chapters. Thus, secondary sources of information/data have been 
crucial to the successful completion of this research project. The advantages of this source 
of data cannot be underestimated. Besides the time saving virtue of secondary sources of 
information and the fact that it is much easier to collect compared with primary sources of 
data, secondary data could be reliable if appropriate control mechanisms were used to 
ensure that much of the potential biases were reduced to a minimum. In this study, we 
achieved this advantage by comparing secondary data from different sources. 
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This does not mean that the disadvantages of secondary, source information are not 
recognized. Indeed, such disadvantages including the question of reliability and accuracy 
of secondary data were taken into account while using the data. For example, data 
collected from one source were compared with similar data from other sources to ascertain 
accuracy, reliability and consistency. Other shortcomings of this source of data such as the 
representatives of data, comparability and biases were also recognized and appropriate 
measures taken to minimize their effects. The secondary information/data used in this 
study, therefore, are reliable and accurate to a significantly high degree. This is 
complemented by the primary data collected through questionnaire and personal interviews 
specifically for the purpose of this study. 
4.5.2 Fieldwork Research (Primary Data Source) 
The collection of primary data through fieldwork research may be undertaken in the 
following ways: 
(i) Observational study 
(ii) Experimental study 
(iii) Case study approach 
(iv) Survey method 
While the observational and experimental studies are useful in their own right, they are not 
relevant in this study. These methods of research usually require long periods in the `field' 
and they tend to emphasize detailed evidence. Furthermore, the methods generally produce 
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quantitative data without qualitative explanation of the information collected. Case-stud}, 
approach, on the other hand, is used when the researcher intends to support his/her 
argument with data from an in-depth analysis of a person, a group of persons, an 
organization or a particular project. This and the survey method of research are the 
appropriate methods for this study. The survey method is particularly relevant in this study 
because it provides the basis and research instrument suitable for obtaining qualitative data, 
such as questionnaire survey and in-depth personal interviews. The case study, on the other 
hand, provides us the opportunity to carry out an in-depth study of relevant organizations 
that may supply information to solve the research problem of this study. 
4.5.2.1 The Survey Ntethod 
The survey method is used to gather data from a relatively large number of respondents 
within a limited time frame. It is thus concerned with a generalized result when data is 
abstracted from a particular population or sample. The survey method may be implemented 
by: 
(i) Postal questionnaire 
(ii) Telephone questionnaire 
(iii) Personal interviews. 
Of these techniques of the survey method, the postal questionnaire and personal interview 
were used in this study. 
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4.5.2.1.1 The Postal Questionnaire 
Three questionnaires (see Appendices A, B and C) were designed for information 
collection. Each questionnaire focussed on each of our three sample groups; the general 
public, Accountees and Accountors (see the section on questionnaire below). The general 
public questionnaires were partly sent by post and partly hand delivery to our sample of 
500 respondents drawn from a population (sampling frame) of 1500 people to fill and 
return. 
The response rate, as stated earlier, was very good. A total of 280 duly completed 
questionnaires were returned or collected within the period representing a satisfactory 56% 
response rate. As mentioned above, the main method used to distribute the questionnaires 
was by post though our research assistants supplemented this with hand delivery and 
collection. 
Postal questionnaires are economical to use, they constitute a quick method of conducting a 
survey and they provide the opportunity for respondents to consult to answer the questions. 
The limitations of this method include inflexibility; lack of control over respondents or 
their answers and the requirement that the questions must be simple and direct. 
Supplementing the postal questionnaire method with personal interviews surmounted some 
of these limitations, as was gladly discovered in our fieldwork. 
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4.5.2.1.2 Personal interview 
This is a face-to-face interpersonal role situation in which respondents are asked questions 
relating to the research. In this study, personal interviews were conducted first during the 
exploratory phase of the study to crystallize the research problem in order to determine the 
relevant research objectives and focus. At this stage, some government officials and 
members of the public were interviewed. The replies and comments of this sample 
population of the actual population from which the research survey samples were drawn 
were very useful in shaping and focussing the topic of study. 
As stated earlier, the actual personal interviews took place over a period of time in late 
1999 and early 2000. In late 1999, preliminary personal interviews were conducted and 
this was followed by further interviews in early 2000 (April to June) after the 
questionnaires have been returned and an initial examination of the results has been 
undertaken. The members of the sample chosen for the interviews were selected randomly 
as discussed in some detail in section 4.4.2 above. The interview questions were semi- 
structured (see Appendix D) with emphasis on specific issues not covered fully in the 
postal questionnaires (Appendices A, B, and C). A supplementary "Tick Questionnaire" 
(see Appendix E) was also administered during the personal interviews. 
The personal interviews were meant to give respondents an open-ended discussion since 
the expected answers were of qualitative nature expressing the views and opinions of the 
respondents. The medium of communication in most of the interview was Arabic so 
respondents were comfortable in discussing the issues and expressing their opinions. 
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However, respondents who were comfortable with the use of the English language as the 
medium of interview were interviewed in English. The main limitation in the use of this 
method is the lack of sufficient time on both the respondents' and the interviewer's sides. 
The answers from these interviews have been very useful in the analysis of the findings of 
the study. 
4.6 THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
The questionnaire is an essential instrument in the survey method of research. It is more so 
in attitudinal research such as the study at hand. The design of a questionnaire is based 
upon the research objectives and theoretical directions derived from the literature review. 
These enabled us to identify the relevant topics and issues, which in turn, determined the 
scope and nature of questions in the questionnaire. This was the procedure adopted to 
design and develop the questionnaires used in this study. 
4.6.1 Structure of the Questionnaire 
The type of information required determined the structure of the questionnaires. This was 
determined mainly by the research objectives as given in chapter 1. The structure was thus 
developed in a logical sequence from general information to specific information as 
represented in Figure 4.2. 
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Figure 4.2 
Structure of Accountability Questionnaire 
Research objectives and Structure determinants Literature review 
Section on General 
General information on information in the 
Respondent Questionnaire 
Section on Background 
Specific information and Information in the 
opinion on performance of questionnaires 
public sector 
Section on specific 
Specific information and views information in the 
on Management Accountability 
10questionnaires 
problems in UAE 
Specific views on how to 
improve Management 
Section on specific views and 
`open-ended' questions in the 
Accountability in the UAE. questionnaires 
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4.6.2 Forms of Questions 
Most of the questions in the questionnaires are closed-ended except the personal interview 
questionnaire, which contained largely "open-ended" questions. This is typical of 
qualitative research strategy where the variables being measured comprise attitude, views 
and opinion. The "open-ended" questions in the questionnaires solicit additional 
information not covered by the "closed-ended" questions. All the questions are mainly 
opinion seeking (subjective measurement). The following formats are used: 
" Likert Scales comprising five grading scales, 
"' Yes'or 'No" response types, 
" Ranking in descending or ascending order. 
These formats encourage respondents to answer the questions and return the questionnaires 
early. Thus, a high response rate is the reward for "closed-ended" questions with opinion 
question format. 
The advantages and disadvantages of using "closed-ended" questions are well documented 
in the literature (Oppenliem, 1996; Moser & Kalton, 1994 Bell, 1996). An additional 
reason for the use of "closed-ended' questions in this study is the situational circumstances 
of the respondents with respect to the English language, limitation on time and the 
sensitivity of the topic and the case-study organizations. The sequence of the structure as 
seen in Figure 4.2 determined the logical flow of the questions in the questionnaires. 
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4.6.3 Pilot-Testing of Questionnaire 
The questionnaires were pilot-tested on a small sample of the actual population on whom 
the final questionnaires were administered. The pilot-test sample was selected by using 
non-random purposive sampling approach because of the diverse nature of the sample 
population. The pilot-test sample included: 
i) l accountees (Policy maker-Chairmen), 
ii) 2 accountors (Public sector executives - Under-Secretary/Director); 
iii) 2 accountors (Private sector executives - CEOs)-. 
iv) 5 members of the general public (both public and private sector 
employees including those of the case-study organizations). 
The feed back from the pilot-test was very useful in developing the questionnaires to its 
current format and content. It enabled us to improve the questionnaires significantly to 
serve the specific purposes for which they were designed. The questionnaires were then 
administered on the study sample population through the post and by hand delivery where 
possible. 
4.7 VARIABLES To %IEASITRE IN STUDY 
As stated earlier, the core information required for the study is mainly qualitative meant to 
identify and assess the views and opinions of producers and users of reports of stewardship 
with respect to resources, responsibilities, trust and authority entrusted to the care of civil 
servants by the government and the general public of the UAE. 
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The following specific attitudinal variables have been identified for assessment and 
measurement through the questions in the questionnaires and the personal interviews 
conducted: 
i) Awareness of problems of Accountability in general in the 
public sector: 
ii) Awareness of low level of Management Accountability in public 
organizations; 
iii) Attitude towards the problem of low level of Management 
Accountability; 
iv) Opinion on the definition of Management Accountability; 
v) Experiences of poor Management Accountability in the public 
sectors; 
vi) Opinion on why the problem developed and seem to have 
persisted in the public sector; 
vii) Views on the social-cultural, personal and organizational factors 
responsible for the low level of Management accountability in 
the UAE public sector; 
viii) Views on appropriate methods for eliminating the problem of 
low level of Management Accountability in the public sector. 
This qualitative information has not only indicated the attitude of the UAE population, as 
represented by our sample, towards the low level of Management Accountability in the 
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public sector but also enabled us to carry out an analysis of the views and opinion with the 
aim of understanding the causal factors and their effects. Such analysis has enabled us to 
develop a framework (model) for solving the problem. 
4.8 HYPOTlHEsIs TESTED IN THE STUDY 
Though hypothesis testing belongs mainly to the quantitative research strategy, an attempt 
is made in this study to test the following "attitudinal hypothesis" which are based upon the 
objectives of the research: 
hypothesis 1: The general public of the UAE believes that the level of 
management accountability in the public sector is less than 
average compared to similar sectors, for example in the UK. 
Hypothesis 2: The UAE public is aware of the adverse effects of the poor 
level of management accountability in the public sector. 
Hypothesis 3: There is a low level of management accountability in the 
Telecommunications Corporation (Etisalat). 
Hypothesis 4: There is a low level of management accountability in the 
Ministry of Health (MOH) of the UAE. 
Hypothesis ä: The general public, the accountees and accountors collectively 
believe that the level of management accountability in the 
public sector of the UAE is low compared to the UK. 
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Hypothesis 6: The general public, the accountees and accountors believe that 
the accountability problem is caused by various social factors. 
Hypothesis 7: The general public, the accountees and accountors believe that 
the accountability problem is caused by various personal 
factors. 
Hypothesis 8: The general public, the accountees and accountors believe that 
the accountability problem is caused by various organizational 
factors. 
Hypothesis 9: The public believes that the general performance of the public 
sector is less than the average of similar sectors in, for 
example, the UK. 
Hypothesis 10: The public believes that the accountability problem has caused 
some distrust of reports from the public sector. 
Findings and analysis in the study have enabled us to test these hypotheses for confirmation 
or refutal of their contentions. 
4.9 SUNINIARY 
This chapter has described and explained the actual research strategy and approach used in 
the study. It explains the research design with particular attention to the techniques used to 
obtain primary data from fieldwork. The design of the questionnaires used in the study is 
carefully explained including the structure, form, sequence and format of the questions. 
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Being a qualitative research, the issues and limitations of the nature of research are 
presented and discussed. The sampling method used and the justifications for its 
application are presented. The sample size and breakdown are also given and explained. 
The main limitations of the study such as time, financial and other resource constraints are 
indicated. These constraints, however, have no significant adverse effects on the findings 
and analyses of the study. 
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5.1 INTRODITCTION 
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) (in Arabic-al-Amaraat-Al-Arabi), a Al Mutahida) is 
the youngest of the states of Arabian Peninsula. Established only in December 1971 after 
British withdrawal from the East of the Suez, the country comprises a Federation of seven 
emirates - Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ras Al Khaimah, Fujairah, Umm Al Quwain and 
Ajman, which were formerly known as the Truicial States (Ministry of Information and 
Culture, 1992). Since establishment, the country has attracted international attention, 
partly because of its extensive oil reserves and partly because of its strategic location. 
The country is situated in the Eastern part of the peninsula of Arabia at the mouth of the 
Arabian Gulf. It is bordered by Oman to the North-East and East; Saudi Arabia to the 
South and West and the Arabian Gulf to the North. The five states of Sharjah, Ajman, 
Umm Al Quwain, Ras Al-Khaimah and Fujairah are often described as the Northern 
emirates. The total area of the UAE, excluding islands, is about 77,700 square kilometers. 
Abu Dhabi and Dubai are the two largest emirates and, while six of the emirates are 
strung out along the southern shore of the Arabian Gulf between the base of the Qatar 
peninsula in the west and Musandarn Peninsula in the east. Fujairah is the only emirate 
without direct access to the Arabian Gulf. Fujairah lies on the eastern coast of the 
Musandam Peninsula. 
The Emirates have 700 kilometer of coastline, of which 100 kilometers are on the Gulf of 
Oman. Along the Arabian Gulf coast are some offshore islands, coral reefs and `sabkha' 
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or slat-marshes. Stretches of gravel plain and barren desert interspersed with oases 
characterize the inland region. 
Much of the impetus for the creation of U. A. E. came from the personal commitment of 
the rulers of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahayan and Dubai, Sheikh Rashid 
Bin Saeed Al Mak--toum. As rulers of the largest and richest Emirates - Abu Dhabi had 
been pumping oil since 1962 and Dubai since 1969 - it was natural that they should take 
the leading role in the nerv federation. As the largest and wealthiest emirate. Abu Dhabi 
has provided the U. A. E. 's only President, Sheikh Zayed, re-elected unanimously every 
five years by the Supreme Council, the body comprising the rulers of the seven Emirates. 
Since 1979, the Ruler of Dubai has held the vice-presidency and prime ministership. 
Ministries are allotted to the seven Emirates on a proportional basis. 
The UAE has a sub-tropical, arid climate, with the hottest period of the year falling 
between May to October and coldest period between December and March. Daytime 
temperatures can vary from 26! C in December to 44iC in September, while nighttime 
temperatures can vary from 121C to 261C respectively. Rainfall is infrequent and 
irregular throughout most of the emirates, occurring mainly during the winter with 
occasional local thunderstorms. Rainfall hardly exceeds 13 centimeters a year in most 
places though higher readings may be obtained in mountain regions (The British Bank of 
the Middle East, 1992). 
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5.2 POLITICAL STRUCTURE 
As a federation, the U. A. E. is guided by a Constitution drawn up in 1971 and ratified as a 
permanent Constitution in 1996 after a 25-year period of 5-yearly renewal. The absence of 
a permanent constitution prior to 1996 allowed for flexibility in the way the state's 
institutions developed and in the informal negotiation between individual emirates on the 
balance of power between federal government and individual emirates. 
The healthy rivalry between Abu Dhabi, whose oil reserves and wealth dwarf those of its 
federal partners, and Dubai, which has carved itself a place as the U. A. E. 's pre-eminent 
commercial centre, has driven much of the measured progress the country has made 
towards more formalised federal union in the last 25 years. Given that it bears the bulk of 
the federal budget, subsidising some of the smaller Emirates completely, Abu Dhabi has 
pushed for greater power for the central government. Dubai, on the other hand, has 
traditionally resisted attempts to formulate unified federal policies on matters such as 
trade policy, in which it has pursued a vigorously independent line. Originally, the bulk 
of decision-making was made in informal meetings of the Supreme Council of Rulers. 
Since Sheikh Maktoum Bin Rashid Al Maktoum became prime minister in 1990, the 
importance of the Council of Ministers has grown considerably in its role of drafting laws 
approving budgets and overseeing the role of federal government. There is no elected 
assembly in the U. A. E.; the Federal National Council consisting of 40 appointed 
members exists as a forum for discussion of government policy, but has no decision- 
making powers. 
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5.3 POPULATION AND EMPLOYMENT 
The population of the UAE reached an estimated 2.58 million in 1997 reflecting an annual 
average rate. of growth of 5% since 1990. Table 5.1 shows the population breakdown by 
Emirates. As can be seen in the table, Abu Dhabi followed by Dubai are the most populous 
Emirates and, of course, they are the two largest in land area. 
Table 5.1 
UAE, - Population by Emirate, 1980 - 1997 (In thousands) 
Emirate 1980 1985 1990 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Abu Dhabi 451 538 772 871 879 942 952 1000 
Dubai 279 336 484 548 605 689 695 737 
Sharjah 160 216 303 342 392 403 412 435 
Ajman 36 51 74 83 96 121 123 133 
Ummal Qaiwan 12 21 26 30 40 36 36 39 
Ras al Khaimah 74 94 125 141 142 144 147 153 
Fujaira 32 44 60 68 76 76 78 83 
TOTAL 1,044 1,300 1,844 2,083 2,230 2,411 2,443 2,580 
Source: Ministry of Planning, Abu Dhabi. 
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The growth in population was due mainly to the inflow of foreign labour. The exact 
proportion of foreign to national labour in the labour-force is not known but some 
estimates put it around the 75% mark. Table 4.2 gives the estimate of population by 
nationality in 1995. It can be seen in the Table that expatriate and foreign migrant 
workers and their dependants dominate the UAE population and labour-force. 
Employment in the UAE expanded at an annual average rate of growth of 7.7 percent 
between 1993 and 1997. This reflected the very rapid growth of non-oil employment, 
particularly in trade and manufacturing (including natural gas and petroleum processing) 
where annual average increases of 13.7 percent and 10 percent, respectively, were 
recorded. Employment in agriculture also rose at an above average rate (8.7 percent) but 
its share in total employment was relatively small at about 7.5 percent. Below average 
employment growth occurred in the crude oil and construction sectors and especially in 
finance, insurance, and government services. 
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Table 5.2 
UAE: Estimate of Population by Nationality in 1995 ('000) 
COUNTRY WORKING EXPATRIATES DEPENDANTS TOTAL % in TOTAL 
ASIAN COUNTRIES 1,215 287 1,502 61.0 
INDIA 587 163 750 30.5 
PAKISTAN 307 83 390 15.9 
BANGLADESH 103 8 111 4.5 
OTHERS 218 33 251 10.2 
ARAB COUNTRIES 170 114 284 11.6 
EGYPT 55 34 89 3.6 
SYRIA 29 14 43 1.8 
JORDAN 22 21 43 1.8 
OTHERS 64 45 109 4.4 
AFRICAN COUNTRIES 30 20 50 2.0 
SUDAN 20 10 30 1.2 
SOMALIA 7 6 13 0.5 
OTHERS 3 4 7 0.3 
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 22 15 37 1.5 
UNITED KINGDOM 12 9 21 0.9 
OTHERS 10 6 16 0.7 
AMERICAN COUNTRIES 5 5 10 0.4 
AUSTRALIA 1 1 2 0.1 
TOTAL EXPATRIATES 1,443 442 1,885 76.6 
UAE NATIONALS 576 23.4 
TOTAL POPULATION 2,461 100.0 
Source: Research & studies Department, Chamber of Commerce & Industry, Dubai. 
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5.4 RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
5.4.1 Introduction 
The UAE is the best performing economy in the Gulf Region though each of its 
constituent emirates retains a considerable degree of autonomy over their individual 
economic, financial and political affairs. The Oil sector continues to provide the main 
source of fiscal revenues and export earnings. The country is also a significant exporter 
of liquefied natural gas (LNG). Over 90% of the UAE's oil and gas resources are in Abu 
Dhabi. 
5.4.1 Oil Sector Development and Prospects 
The UAE's proven reserves of crude oil are officially estimated at 100 billion barrels, the 
third largest after Saudi Arabia and Iraq, and equivalent to about 10 % of world reserves. 
At present levels of output, the ratio of proven reserves to production is estimated to give 
the federation around 120 years of oil supplies. The oil reserves are located mainly in 
Abu Dhabi emirate which acts as the swing producer in maintaining the UAE's total 
production at its OPEC quota. Abu Dhabi's production in recent years has been 1.8 to 1.9 
million barrels per day (mbd), output in the other oil producing emirates - Dubai, Sharja 
and Ras Al-Khaima - amounts to about 0.3 mbd and is declining due to the gradual 
exhaustion of Dubai's wells (see Table 5.3). 
The UAE's policy of crude oil production is to adhere strictly to its OPEC quota which 
remained unchanged at 2.161 mbd between 1993 and 1997. In the light of this policy, the 
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Table 5.3 
11 A V. cmmnn, of [)il anti (-Ti-, Prnrhictinn P nnrt and Prices 1991-97 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
(In millions of barrels per day) 
Crude oil production 2.20 2.20 2.20 2.26 2.39 
Abu Dhabi 1.80 1.80 1.82 1.86 1.91 
Dubai and others 0.36 0.36 0.34 0.30 0.25 
Crude oil Exports 2.10 2.10 2.10 2.04 2.08 
Abu Dhabi 1.71 1.71 1.71 1.65 1.61 
Dubai and others 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.29 0.24 
(In millions of cubic meters) 
Natural gas 
production 
20.06 22.50 24.50 27.50 31.00 
LNG exports 2.83 3.33 4.44 6.34 6.34 
NGL exports 7.57 7.51 7.29 8.11 9.60 
(In millions of US dollars) 
Crude oil exports 12 256 11 934 12J62 14,795 14,273 
Abu Dhabi 9,980 9,718 10,514 11,967 11,048 
Dubai and others 2,043 1,989 2,005 2,103 1,647 
LNG and NGL 
exports 
963 991 1,467 1,932 2,703 
Total hydrocarbon 
exp. 
13,220 12,926 14,230 16,728 16,976 
In millions of UAE dirhams) 
Crude oil exports 44P993 43 811 46 850 54 313 52,396 
LNG and GNL 
exports 
3,536 3,639 5,387 7,094 9,922 
Total Hydrocarbon 
exp. 
(Ln US dollars per barrel) 
Average oil price 15.99 15.57 1 16.65 19.87 18.80 
Source: Abu Dhabi National Oil Company, Abu Dhabi 
authorities have focused on the development of the country's natural gas resources and 
the production of petroleum condensates, which are recovered in association with the 
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production of crude oil and natural gas and are not subject to the OPEC quota. The 
individual emirates retain ownership and control of oil resources in their emirates. 
The Federal Ministry of Petroleum and Minerals has only an advisory and statistical 
function although the Minister represents the UAE at OPEC meetings. In Abu Dhabi, the 
Supreme Petroleum Council formulates policies on the basis of advice provided by the 
government-owined Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC). In the other emirates, 
the Rulers' Offices formulate policies, and operations are carried out by joint ventures 
with majority government ownership. The Dubai Petroleum Company operates the 
offshore fields at Fateh, Falah and Rashid with foreign partners Total, Conoco and 
Wintershall. Crescent Oil is the operator of Sharjah's offshore Mubarak field. 
Although oil is still the mainstay of the economy, its contribution to GDP has declined 
steadily from about 60% in 1980 to around 31% in 1997. Efforts at further diversifying 
the economy are continuing and, in particular, attempts are being made to expand the 
tourism sector, financial services industries and manufacturing as well as gaining market 
share in the entrepot trade. Since 1992, the non-oil economy has grown strongly and the 
value of non-oil exports (largely re-exports) has increased substantially. 
5.4.3 Non-oil Sector Development 
The non-oil sector has expanded rapidly since the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988. The 
three principal factors in this development comprise: sharply expanded trade and trans- 
shipment operations, markedly improved public sector infrastructure, and the emergence 
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of a strong manufacturing sector. The continuing diversification of the UAE's production 
base is evidenced by the steadily increasing share of the non-oil sector in total GDP at 
constant prices in recent years from 63.5 percent to 69.3 percent as shown in Table 5.4. 
It is also reflected in the faster growth of factor inputs into the non-oil sector relative to 
the oil sector. Over the same period, employment in the non-oil sector grew at an annual 
average rate of 7.7 percent compared with 5.1 percent in the oil sector. Similarly, the 
gross fixed capital formation in the non-oil sector grew at an average annual rate of 11.5 
percent compared with 0.9 percent in the oil sector. 
The form of diversification has varied according to the development strategies of the 
emirate governments which take into account the emirates' comparative advantages and 
resource endowments. Abu Dhabi's growth strategy emphasizes the development of 
capital-intensive energy based activities such as petrochemicals and fertilizers. Dubai is 
expanding its role as a commercial and financial hub, building on the entrepot trade, and 
has become an attractive tourist destination for both GCC and European nationals. 
Sharjah has traditionally been the centre of small-scale manufacturing for import 
replacement and textiles for export and has about 45 percent of UAE manufacturing 
industry. 
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Table 5.4 
UAE: Sectoral Origin of GDP at Constant (1990) Prices: 1993-97 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
(in millions of UAE. dirhams) 
Gross domestic product 128,018 134,368 145,283 159,889 163,309 
Crude oil production 46,780 43,416 45,660 52,479 50,150 
Other production 81,238 90,952 99,623 107,410 113,159 
Agriculture 3,032 3,979 4,287 4,793 5,216 
Industry 25,373 28,101 30,667 33,035 35,087 
Mining and quarrying 358 386 509 518 544 
Manufacturing 1/ 11,030 13,742 15,582 17,103 18,043 
Electricity and water 2,668 2,555 2,222 2,359 2,473 
Construction 11,317 11,418 12,354 13,055 14,027 
Services 52,833 58,872 64,669 69,582 72,856 
Trade 14,986 16,210 16,951 18,796 19,963 
Wholesale and retail trade 13,145 14,260 14,925 16,253 17,242 
Restaurants and hotels 1,841 1,950 2,026 2,543 2,721 
Transportation, storage, 
and communication 7,412 7,886 9,459 9,889 10,166 
Finance and insurance 6,234 7,342 8,375 9,228 9,637 
Real estate 9,393 11,884 13,782 14,961 15,355 
Government services 14,932 15,200 15,807 16,624 17,362 
Other services 2,368 3,259 3,445 3,755 4,085 
Less: imputed bank 
service charges -2,492 -2,909 -3,150 -3,670 -3,711 
(In percent of GDP) 
Gross domestic product 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Crude oil production 36.5 32.3 31.4 32.8 30.7 
Other production 63.5 67.7 68.6 67.2 69.3 
Agriculture 2.4 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.2 
Industry 19.8 20.9 21.1 20.7 21.5 
Mining and quarrying 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 
Manufacturing 1/ 8.6 10.2 10.7 10.7 11.0 
Electricity and water 2.1 1.9 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Construction 8.8 8.5 8.5 8.2 8.6 
Services 41.3 43.8 44.5 43.5 44.6 
Trade 11.7 12.1 11.7 11.8 12.2 
Wholesale and retail trade 10.3 10.6 10.3 10.2 10.6 
Restaurants and hotels 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.6 1.7 
Transportation, storage, 
And communication 5.8 5.9 5.8 6.2 6.2 
Finance and insurance 4.9 5.5 9.5 5.8 5.9 
Real estate 7.3 8.8 9.5 9.4 9.4 
Government services 11.7 11.3 10.9 10.4 10.6 
Other services 1.8 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.5 
Less: imputed bank 
Service char-ges -2.2 -2.2 -2.3 -2.3 
Source: Ministry of Planning, Abu Dhabi. 
I/ Includes natural gas and petroleum processing industries. 
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However, it is now promoting large-scale industry in a new trade zone and arts-oriented 
tourism. The northern emirates focus on agriculture, quarrying, cement, and have some 
specialist manufacturing industries (pharmaceuticals) and shipping services. Fujariah is 
also a popular tourist destination because of its monsoonal climate. 
A common core of these development strategies is an expanded role for private sector 
investment and activity. To this end, each emirate government (and the federal 
government in the northern emirates) has provided a modem infrastructure - roads, 
utilities, telecommunications, ports and airports, and hospitals and schools. The UAE has 
spent about $200 billion on infrastructure in the past 25 years. Provision of excellent 
infrastructure - including electricity and water - has been a key incentive for the location 
of manufacturing and services enterprises in the country. The absence of income taxation 
on labour or capita (except for banking profits) has also attracted private investment. In 
addition, the emirate governments have provided direct incentives for private investment 
in industrial zones such as free or low cost land, pre-built factories and warehouses, and 
subsidized water and electricity tariffs. 
Dubai in particular, and the UAE in general, has become a trade centre for a region that 
comprises the Arabian peninsula, Iran, Pakistan, the Indian subcontinent, East Africa, and 
more recently, the Baltic countries, Russia and other countries of the former Soviet union. 
This has spurred to a significant degree the evolution of transportation, storage, financial, 
wholesale infrastructure, and the large number of incoming business travelers has boosted 
retail, hotel, restaurant and other service industries. 
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5.4.3.1 Manufacturing 
Manufacturing in the UAE is represented by 1,500 industrial complexes. The sector is 
characterized by a segmentation between large, capital - intensive establishments in the 
area of chemicals, petrochemicals, plastic, and basic metal products on the one hand, and 
smaller, less capital -intensive establishments in the area of food products, textiles, metal 
products and other manufacturing activities on the other hand. The smaller establishments 
are mostly private sector companies, while the large entries are primarily government 
owned. 
The expansion of the manufacturing sector has benefited from liberal labour market 
regulations highly elastic labour supply at low wage levels, a well-developed 
infrastructure and an abundant supply of cheap energy. During 1991-1994, the 
manufacturing sector recorded an annual average real growth rate of five percent, or 
slightly below the average real rate of the non-oil sector. However, in 1995 the growth of 
the manufacturing sector accelerated to nine percent compared with six percent for the 
non-oil sector. 
The major element in the manufacturing and enterpot activities base of the emirates in the 
Jebel Ali Free Zone (JAFZ) in Dubai. The free zone includes the world's largest man 
made port, and was established in 1985. It offers the possibility of 100 percent foreign 
ownership: guarantees exemption from corporate taxes for 15 years allows companies to 
repatriate all profits; and provides various ware housing office, and accommodation 
facilities 
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The JAFZ is primarily a warehousing and distribution hub, but has also become an 
important industrial zone in Dubai. During 1994-98 the number of companies in the free 
zone more than doubled from 735 to 1500 establishments. 
5.4.3.2 Construction 
Construction, which accounts for around 10 percent of economic activity did quite well in 
the past few years, recording annual average growth rate of 5.5 percent during 1993-97 
which was below the growth of real non-oil GDP. Nonetheless, the construction sector is 
an important contributor to GDP growth: in 1997 it accounted for 0.6 percentage points of 
the 3.6 percent growth in real non-oil GDP, which was the same contribution as the 
manufacturing and wholesale and retail sectors. This contribution largely reflects labour 
input as employment in construction averaged over 19 percent of total civilian 
employment over 1993-97, the highest share of any sector. 
Developments in the construction sector are closely linked to government development 
expenditure (of which the provision of infrastructure is an important component) and net 
lending (in large part for the construction of commercial properties and private 
residences). However, the importance of additional infrastructure in total construction 
has declined as many large infrastructure projectsespecially the road network, have been 
largely completed. 
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5.4.3.3 Agriculture 
The agriculture and fisheries sector expanded in real terms at an average annual rate of 
14.5 percent between 1993 and 1997, and its share in total GDP at constant prices 
increased from 2.4 percent to 3.2 percent over the same period. The rapid growth of the 
sector reflects both an increase in the labour force (which averaged almost 9 percent per 
year) and investments in dams and irrigation equipment to bring more land under 
cultivation. Land reclaimed from the desert amounts to over 250,000 acres, including 
agricultural land and green areas. Among the various products, the output of vegetables 
rose at an annual average rate of 27 percent over 1993-97, poultry at 15 percent and meat 
at 6 percent. More modest growth of 2 percent per year was recorded for dates and fish 
products. 
5.4.3.4 Se 
The services sector as a whole was responsible for 55-65 percent of the growth of real 
non-oil GDP over 1993-97 (see, Table 4.5). Within the sector, the largest contributor to 
gromh in 1993-95 was real estate, but the profitability of this sector declined in 1996-97 
owing to an excess supply of low-cost residential properties after the rationalization of the 
expatriate labour market in 1996 and an oversupply of commercial buildings in Abu 
Dhabi in 1997. 
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The finance and insurance subsector also expanded strongly in 1993-96 in response to the 
need for trade and business financing construction loans and consumer banking services. 
Data for 1997 indicate that the growth in profitability of the subsector slowed in 1997; 
however, many banks achieved record profits. 
The largest contribution to growth in 1996-97 came from the wholesale and retail trade 
sector which benefited from the expanding tourism industry and from successful trade 
promotions including the annual Dubai Shopping Festival. In addition, trade in Dubai 
and Sharjah was boosted in 1995-96 by purchases of consumer goods by residents of the 
former Soviet Union for export to their countries. 
The government subsector (excluding the Armed Forces) also made significant 
contributions to real GDP growth during 1993-97. However, the relative share of the 
subsector in total GDP declined from 11.7 percent to 10.6 percent over the same period. 
The decline reflects largely a slow down in employment in the subsector as both the 
Federal and Emirates governments started to recognize that they could not afford to be 
the employer of last resort in all situations. Consequently, employment in government 
services rose at an annual average rate of only 2.5 percent over 1993-97, well below the 
rates of previous years. 
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Table 5.5 
UAE: Real Growth by Sectors, 1993-97 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
(Change in percent ) 
Gross domestic product -0.4 5.0 8.1 10.1 2.1 
Crude oil production -12.4 -7.2 5.2 14.9 4.4 
Other production 8.1 12.0 9.5 7.8 5.4 
Agriculture 9.8 31.2 7.7 11.8 8.8 
Industry 4.9 10.8 9.1 7.7 6.2 
Mining and quarrying 7.6 7.8 31.9 1.9 4.9 
Manufacturing 1/ 5.6 24.6 13.4 9.8 5.5 
Electricity and water -7.3 -4.2 -13.0 6.1 4.8 
Construction 7.5 0.9 8.2 5.7 7.4 
Services 9.7 11.4 9.8 7.6 4.7 
Trade 14.2 8.2 4.6 10.9 6.2 
Wholesale and retail trade 15.7 8.5 4.7 8.9 6.1 
Restaurants and hotels 4.2 5.9 3.9 25.5 7.0 
Transport, storage & communication 6.4 6.4 19.9 10.2 2.8 
Finance and insurance 19.6 17.8 14.1 10.2 4.4 
Real estate 22.3 26.5 16.0 8.6 2.6 
Government services 6.0 1.8 4.0 5.2 4.4 
Other services -30.2 37.6 5.7 9.0 8.8 
Less : imputed bank 
Service charges 8.7 16.7 8.3 16.5 1.1 
(Change in percent of GDP of previous peri od ) 
Gross domestic product -0.4 5.0 8.1 10.1 2.1 
Crude oil production -5.2 -2.6 1.7 4.7 -1.5 Other production 4.8 7.6 6.5 5.4 3.6 
Agriculture 0.2 0.7 0.2 0.3 0.3 
Industry 0.9 2.1 1.9 1.6 1.3 
Mining and quarrying 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Manufacturing 0.5 2.1 1.4 1.0 0.6 
Electricity and water -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 0.1 0.1 
Construction 0.6 0.1 0.7 0.5 0.6 
Services 3.6 4.7 4.3 3.4 2.0 
Trade 1.4 1.0 0.6 1.3 0.7 
Wholesale and retail trade ... 0.9 0.5 0.9 0.6 
Restaurants and hotels ... 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.1 
Transportationf storage, 
And communication 0.3 0.4 1.2 0.6 0.2 
Finance and insurance 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.3 
Real estate 1.3 1.9 1.4 0.8 0.2 
Government services 0.7 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.5 
Other services -0.8 0.7 0.1 0.2 0.2 
Less: imputed bank 
Service charges -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.4 0.0 
Source: Ministry of Planning, Abu Dhabi 
1/ Includes natural gas and petroleum processing industries. 
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5.5 FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS 
There has been a significant improvement in the public finances since 1994 reflecting 
favorable oil prices and policies of fiscal restraint (see, Table 5.6). Recognizing the need to 
diversify the revenue base and to address the deteriorating fiscal balance, the federal 
government and the emirates introduced non-oil revenue measures and took steps to further 
contain expenditures. Aided by favorable oil and gas export prices, total expenditure 
declined as a share of GDP to 36.7 percent in 1997 (compared with 41.2 percent in 1994). 
The bulk of the fiscal retrenchment fell on capital spending, which declined in nominal 
terms and was significantly lower than budgeted. These measures resulted in narrowing of 
the overall deficit (excluding investment income) from 14.6 percent of GDP in 1994 to 5.2 
percent in 1997. 
In 1996, as a result of an average increase in oil export prices of 19 percent, total 
hydrocarbon revenues rose by about 16 percent to Dh 37 billion (or 21 percent of GDP). 
Non hydrocarbon revenues also rose sharply by 37 percent to Dh. 14.4 billion. Among 
these revenues, profit transfers increased by about 50 percent, while income tax receipts 
rose from Dh 1.9 to 3.2 billion. Fees and charges also rose due to higher water and 
electricity consumption. Consequently, total revenue, excluding investment income, 
increased by about Dh 9 billion. 
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Table 5.6. 
U. A. F.: Consolidated Government Finances, 1993-97 
Total revenue 
Hydrocarbon 
Nonhydrocarbon of which: 
Customs 
Profit transfer 
Income tax 
Fees and charges 
Total expenditure 
Current 
Federal 
Of which : Foreign grants 
Development 
Federal 
Abu Dhabi 
Dubai 
Sharjah 
Ras Al-Khaimah 
Loans and equity 
Domestic 
Foreign 
Overall deficit (-) 
Financing 
Domestic bank 
Exceptional financing 1/ 
Memorandum items: 
Total revenue (excluding 
Investment income) 
Hydrocarbon 
Nonhydrocarbon 
Investment income 
Total expenditure 
Current 
Development 
Loans and equity 
Overall surplus (+ydeficit (-) 
Domestic bank financing 
Exceptional financing 1/ 
Nominal GDP in millions of Dh. 
1993 1994 1995 
(In millions of U. A. E. dirhams) 
40,019 37,464 42,533 
32,044 28,694 32,033 
7,975 8,770 10,500 
323 606 1,335 
1,202 1,422 1,311 
1,688 1,121 1,895 
2,280 2,980 3,909 
55,068 57,946 63,443 
42,048 42,204 45,758 
14,973 15,236 15,645 
38 288 274 
11,362 11,745 12,022 
595 738 543 
7,801 8,813 8,114 
2,413 1,510 2,483 
554 685 850 
".. ... 31 1,657 3,997 5,663 
1,725 4,067 5,713 
-68 -70 -50 
-15,049 -20,482 -20,909 
15,049 20,482 20,909 
-2,702 2,195 -3,042 17,751 18,287 23,951 
(In percent of GDP) 
56,999 
41,138 
15,861 
1,676 
2,302 
2,799 
5,037 
66,461 
51,008 
17,591 
220 
10,913 
529 
7,609 
1,849 
856 
70 
4,540 
4,752 
-212 
-9,462 
9,462 
597 
8,865 
30.5 26.7 27.1 29.3 31.5 
24.4 20.4 20.4 21.1 22.7 
6.1 6.2 6.7 8.2 8.8 
3.7 5.3 6.3 6.1 5.7 
42.0 41.2 40.4 43.6 36.7 
32.0 30.0 29.1 35.5 28.2 
8.7 8.4 7.7 5.8 6.0 
1.3 2.8 3,6 2.3 2.5 
-11.5 -14.6 -13.3 -9.7 -5.2 
-2.1 1.6 -2.1 1.3 0.3 5.3 5.8 8.7 3.0 4.9 
131,221 140,482 157,144 175,781 181.012 
1996 
51,425 
37,007 
14,418 
1,427 
1,989 
3,212 
4,649 
76,648 
62,353 
16,456 
38 
10,260 
497 
7,450 
1,395 
850 
68 
4,035 
4,141 
-106 
-25,223 
25,223 
2,148 
23,075 
1997 
Sources: Federal and Emirate governments, Ministry of Planning. 
1/ Includes use of investment income and transfers from AADIA's foreign asset 
rose from 26.7 percent of GDP in 1994 to 31.5 percent in 1997 
Total expenditure, excluding a one-time transfer of Dh 7 billion to settle government 
obligations arising from the liquidation of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International 
(BCCI), declined as a share of GDP to 39 percent (compared with 40.4 percent in 1995), 
reflecting the authorities' continued efforts to restrain spending. The bulk of fiscal 
retrenchment fell on capital spending, which declined by 16 percent over the previous year 
and was substantially lower than budgeted. 
The outcome for 1997 was significantly better than expected in the federal and emirate 
budgets. The consolidated government deficit narrowed to the equivalent of 5 percent of 
GDP, an improvement of four percentage points over the 1996 outturn. This improvement 
reflected a combination of factors - most importantly, the Dh 4.1 billion increase in 
hydrocarbon revenues arising from a sharp increase in condensates exports and from a 
retroactive payment of US$400 million for past deliveries of LNG to Japan, which more 
than offset a 5.5 percent decline in the average crude oil export price. Non-hydrocarbon 
revenue continue to rise, but at a much slower rate than in the previous year because of a 
Dh. 0.4 billion decline in oil-related income tax receipts from foreign partners. Receipts 
from fees and charges continued to rise, reflecting higher fees including those related to the 
issuance and renewal of passports and expatriate labor permits, as well as increased 
consumption of water and electricity and upward adjustments to electricity and water 
charges in Dubai toward the end of the year. 
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Growth in spending was constrained in most categories (see, Table 5.7). The growth in 
wages and salaries decelerated from 8 percent in 1995 to about 4 percent in 1997. 
During the same period growth in spending on goods and services decelerated from 12 
percent to less than 1 percent. However, the annual growth in subsidies and transfers 
remained about 16 percent because of the absence of fees and charges for public education 
and health services for nationals, and unchanged tariffs on the consumption of electricity 
and water for nationals. Foreign grants, after declining during 1994-96, were raised in 
1997 to their 1993 level of Dh 1.4 billion. 
Table 5.7 
Consolidated Government Current Expenditures by Economic Category, 1993-97 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
(In millions of U. A. E. dirhams) 
Wages and salaries 10,646 10,914 11,814 12,579 13,115 
Goods and services 15,175 15,648 17,570 18,295 18,359 
Subsidies and transfers 4,822 4,172 5,364 18,634 6,887 
Total 30,643 30,734 34,747 49,508 38,361 
Federal 14,935 14,948 15,370 15,743 16,866 
Abu Dhabi 10,537 10,680 13,168 27,507 14,379 
Dubai 5,171 5,106 5,849 5,839 6,654 
Sharjah 360 419 462 
(In percent of total) 
Wages and salaries 34.7 35.5 34.0 25.4 34.2 
Goods and services 49.5 50.9 50.6 37.0 47.9 
Subsidies and transfers 15.7 13.6 15.4 37.6 18.0 
Sources: Federal and Emirate governments, Ministry of planning. 
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Development expenditure declined from 8.7 percent of GDP in 1993 to 6.0 percent in 1997 
as a result of a sharp reduction in outlays on water and electricity (Table 8) net lending 
(loans and equity) peaked in 1995 at 3.6 percent of GDP and then declined to 2.5 percent of 
GDP in 1997, reflecting the development of excess capacity in commercial construction in 
Abu Dhabi. 
5.6 THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
I 
Until 2 December 1971 when the Federation of the UAE was established, there was no 
formally structured or defined public versus private sector divide in the country. There 
was rather a fusion of both sectors with the Oil industry, which was owned and controlled 
by a Western Consortium led by British Petroleum and Shell, dominating the economic 
landscape of the country. A burgeoning utilities industry including Water, Telephone, 
Electricity and Wireless, which were themselves owned by either national 
businesspersons or foreigners (mainly British firms) intermingled with the private 
enterpnses 
After the formation of the Federation in 1971, the government set out to restructure the 
foundation of the economy and thus established the formal divide between a public sector 
dominated by government ownership and control and a private sector dominated by 
private enterprise. This was done within the comprehensive economic development plan 
of the government that was formulated in 1973. 
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The public sector in the UAE comprises mainly of 23 federal government ministries and 
departments; 22 federal enterprises; 7 Emirate governments; 5 independent and 
autonomous federal agencies; and 8 local authorities. On a gross basis, the federal budget 
covers the operations of all the federal ministries and departments and the federal 
independent and autonomous agencies. It also includes the financial flows to and from 
the federal public enterprises. During the 1977-80, jurisdiction over functions pertaining 
to justice, police, health, education and information were transferred to the federal 
government. Since 1981, thee federal government has also been partly responsible for 
administering the UAE's foreign aid programme. 
The public sector is dominant in the economy of the UAE and contributes substantially to 
the socio-economic welfare of the country. For example, the Government Departments 
within the sector, employed about 215,000 persons out of a total national labour force of 
955,100 at the end of 1995, representing 22.5% of the labour force in that year. In 
comparative terms, the number employed by the Departments increased from 168,471 
persons in 1985 to 215,000 in 1995; an increase of 28% over the ten year period (Central 
Bank, 1997). 
Foreign expatriates and migrant workers dominate the labour force in the public sector 
and, indeed, the private sector. In recent years, however, the number of UAE indigenes 
in the labour force has increased respectably largely because of better education, increase 
in the number of school leavers and change in the attitude of women toward working in 
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state run establishments. In 1985, for example, 33,700 UAE indigenes were employed in 
Government Departments out of a total employment of 168,471 compared with 43,000 
out of 215,000 in 1995; an increase of 28% over the period (Dept. of Research & Studies, 
1996). Similarly, the public sector contributes substantial amount of income to the 
coffers of the Treasury annually. In the fiscal year of 1996, for instance, the revenue 
generated by the public sector amounted to 31% of the total government receipts in that 
year. 
Thus, despite its modest start, the public sector in the UAE has assumed, within a short 
period, the traditional dominance of the socio-economic activity of the country as is the 
case in other countries particularly the developing countries. The sector has been very 
important in financing and supporting various economic activities particularly those 
activities that are considered as providing the infrastructure of the economy such as 
roads, power, water and schools. 
Despite its contribution in the economy, the public sector and its dominance of the socio- 
economic activities of the UAE has raised increasing concern among the consumers of 
the goods and services of the sector. academics and even government officials about 
accountability, performance and efficiency of the sector. 
The Public Sector in developing countries has a notorious track record of poor 
performance, ineffectiveness, inefficiency and poor management accountability 
compared to the private sector. It is not surprising that most of the developing countries 
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have embarked upon deregulation of their economies in the form of privatization to 
reduce the adverse impact of the public sector enterprises. 
It is a common knowledge among the consumers of public service goods and services in 
the UAE such as Water and Electricity that the performance of the sector in terns of set 
and realised objectives often diverge in spite of the availability of financial resources. 
The enterprises in the sector are seen as ineffective in the achievement of objectives and 
inefficient in the use of resources. These failures and shortcomings have been placed at 
the doorstep of poor management performance, inefficiency, poor accountability and 
ineffective use of the vast amount of resources put in the trust of these enterprises by the 
public. This, it may be argued, has prompted the government of the UAE to opt for 
privatization as a means of making the public sector enterprises more effective and 
efficient. More detail discussion of the performance of the sector in terms of 
accountability, especially Management Accountability, is presented in the next chapter. 
5.7 S[ilIMiARY 
The UAE has had the best performing economy in the Gulf over the past five years and 
the medium-term outlook remains quite positive. The achievements of low inflation and 
strong growth in the non-oil sector have been facilitated by prudent government policies. 
These policies include: a liberal exchange and trade system; and outward-oriented 
economic strategy that stresses private sector initiative within a framework of effective 
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regulation; extensive infrastructure investment by the government; and improved 
confidence in domestic financial institutions. 
The main drawback of the recent buoyant economic performance is that it raises 
expectations even higher and increases the country's dependence on foreign labour. 
In the future, development policies will strike a balance between attaining faster 
economic growth fuelled by labour intensive sectors - such as construction, textiles, and 
tourism - and encouraging a more self-sustained growth with a greater participation of 
nationals in private sector activities. This will involve essentially further deregulation or 
liberalization of the economy through rolling back of the frontiers of the public sector. 
This is expected to improve not only general performance but also the level of 
accountability, especially Management Accountability, in the sector. The next chapter 
takes up this issue. 
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THE PUBLIC SERVICE SECTOR IN THE UAE 
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6.1 INTRODUCTION 
It is difficult to talk about the public sector without mentioning the private sector as the 
two sectors complement each other within any country. Public and private sectors vary 
with time within countries and between countries. However, the users or employees of 
the public services sector in any country are concerned with the level, quality and 
accessibility of those services as well as income and job security for their effort and 
productivity. They are also concerned with proper accountability for the public funds and 
resources entrusted into the care of the civil servants and politicians of the nation. 
In the developed and developing countries public institutions (public sector organizations) 
are set up and financed by the State for the benefits of the State and its citizens through 
taxation and other miscellaneous government revenues, and their objectives are normally 
determined by political consideration in the State. The organizations are controlled or 
regulated by the State and their management is accountable to the State through the 
appropriate civil servants in the hierarchy. Public sector organizations are usually formed 
by and operated within extensive rules and regulations, which are mostly concerned with 
the proper use of public funds and resources. 
6.2 GENERAL CONCEPT OF PUBLIC SECTOR 
Any generalization about the public sector in terns of its scope, definition, role, 
performance, accountability, etc. is bound to be an exercise fraught with much difficulty. 
The concept of public sector has raised much debate and the end of the debate seems 
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distant (Deakin, 1994; Common, et al., 1992; Leach and Davies, 1996; Fynn. 1997; 
Ranson and Stewart, 1994; Chapman and Cowdel, 1998). 
Defining the public sector, Chapman and Cowdel (1998), quoting from Adam Smith 
(1796), state that the public sector consists of 
those public institutions and those public works, which though they 
may be in the highest degree advantageous to a great society, are, 
however, of such a nature, that the profit could never repay the 
expense to any individual, or small number of individuals; and 
which it, therefore, cannot be expected that any individual, or 
small number of individuals, should erect or maintain (p. 2). 
By implication, Chapman and Cowdel argue that only a government can establish a 
public sector operation. This suggests the enormity of scope and resource requirements 
of a public sector and its ramifications. Underscoring the scope and complexity of the 
operations of the public sector, Flynn (1997) makes some distinction between public and 
private sector management by stating that. Public services are not usually sold to people 
at a price which yields a profit and are not withheld front people who cannot afford them. 
Here Flynn introduces another of the complexity of the operation of the public service - 
the equity principle - which expects all users of public services to be treated equally and, 
«'here price is available, the public organization/enterprise should not aim at maximizing 
profit. 
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During 1980s and 1990s the issue of public and private sector efficiency had been a 
subject of intense debate. One side of the debate argues that private sector businesses are 
more efficient in the use of resources than public sector organizations that regard the 
issue of efficient use of resources as a secondary matter (Deakin, 1994; Dunleavy, 1991). 
The other side presents the case that private management and public administration are 
similar in respect of business activities and that private sector managerial practices are 
wholly transferable (Self, 1965). In the 1980s a third view of public sector administration 
emerged - the "new public management" concept. The proponents of this view, whose 
inspiration derives from the market-oriented ideology of Margaret Thatcher of Britain, 
argue that there is much difference between traditional public administration and private 
business management practices (see, Green, 1987; King, 1987; Deakin, 1994; Fynn, 
1997). However, Perry and Kreamer (1983) argue that the "new public management" 
concept is a mere combination of traditional public administration and some 
characteristic of private business management. Like Farnham and Horton (1999), they 
state that organizations are divided into two types: private and public. Private 
organizations are those created by individual or groups for mainly economic purposes 
while governments for mainly political and social purposes create public organizations. 
In practice the dividing line between public and private sectors is blur and, it is difficult 
to determine where public organizations end and private ones begin. 
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The principle of the welfare state has led governments to be deeply involved in the 
economic, social and political affairs of their citizens with the assumption that civil 
servants know more about the needs of the citizens (Lowe, 1993). The implication of this 
is that the civil servants are entrusted with not only an enormous amount of public 
resources to provide goods and services but also the confidence of the public in doing so. 
It is thus absolutely necessary that a credible account of the use of the public resources and 
confidence be rendered periodically. It can easily be argued that accountability 
mechanisms are institutionalized in all public sector organizations through the institution of 
the Auditor General or other watchdogs such as the Ombudsman in the UK. However, the 
question may be asked whether the accounts rendered by civil servants in various countries 
are credible and satisfactory in all cases? This question applies to other countries as it does 
apply to the UAE hence this study. 
6.3 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF t1AE PUBLIC SERVICE SECTOR 
Until 2 December 1971 when the Federation of the UAE was established, there was no 
formally structured or defined public versus private sector divide in the country. 
Shaikhdoms or Rulers' Courts existed in each of the seven Emirates and these handled 
public, and private enterprises as well as the affairs of the Emirates. There was thus a 
fusion of both sectors with the Oil industry, which was owned and controlled by a 
Western Consortium led by British Petroleum and Shell, dominating the economic 
landscape of the country. A burgeoning utilities industry including Water, Electricity and 
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Wireless, which were owned by either national businessmen or foreigners (mainly British 
firms) intermingled with the private enterprises. 
6.3.1 Development of Federal Public Service System 
After the formation of the Federation in December 1971, a new federal public service 
structure, which differed from the pre-federation structure, was established. With the 
new structure, the government set out to reorganize the foundation of the economy and 
thus established the formal divide between a public sector dominated by government 
ownership and control and a private sector dominated by private enterprise. This was 
done within the comprehensive economic development plan of the government that was 
formulated in 1973 (Economist Intelligence Unit, 1993). 
However, in 1971 the Federal government had set up the currency board as a wholly 
owned state financial institution to issue local currency and to supervise the banks 
followed by the establishment of the Emirates Telecommunications (ETISALAT) in 1976 
as partially State owned enterprise. These acquisitions were made within the government 
strategy of enhancing the establishment and development of the public sector to serve 
development projects in the country. In the late 1970s and 1980s, the number of public 
sector enterprises increased substantially along with private sector firms. The rapid 
growth in the number of enterprises in both the public and private sectors was the logical 
consequence of the fast and massive economic development progress that took place 
within the period and up to the early 1990s. This rapid growth resulted mainly from the 
intervention of the government in the economic welfare of the nation in order to promote 
170 
faster socio-economic development programmes to satisfy increasing demand for public 
goods and services as well as modernising and expanding the productive capacity of the 
economy. 
The federal public service sector comprises mainly of government ministries, wholly 
owned parasatals and public enterprises (wholly and partially owned trading units). The 
public sector plays a major role in the economy of the UAE and contributes substantially 
to the socio-economic welfare of the country. For example, in 1972 the federal public 
expenditure (both current and development) amounted to Dh. 164 million and by 1976 the 
spending on government organizations and development programme went up to Dh. 4.2 
billion and the revenue was Dh. 201 million and Dh. 4.2 billion in 1972 and 1976 
respectively. However the development expenditure in the budget up to 1975 was very 
modest ranging from Dh 15 million in 1972 to Dh 303 million in 1975 but in 1976 this 
expenditure went up to Dh. 2 billion due to the government policy of promoting more 
economic gromh in the Northern Emirates through construction of road networks and 
low cost houses (Ministry of Planning, 1977). The growth in the federal public sector 
continues and by the end of 1996 the total expenditure were Dh16.9 billion rising to 
Dh. 18 billion and Dh. 21.3 billion for the year of 1997 and 1998 respectively whereas the 
revenue for the same period was Dh. 18 billion, Dh. 19.6 billion and Dh. 19.8 billion. With 
the exception of public enterprises, the federal public sector organisations employed 
about 5,433 employees in 1971,18,654 persons in 1975 and 56,415 persons out of a total 
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labour force of 1.3 million at the end of 1996 representing 4.3% of the labour force in 
that year (Ministry of Planning, 1997). 
Besides the public sector organization, the federal government owns and operates few 
public enterprises/agencies. These enterprises/agencies include Etisalat, Central Bank, 
Industrial Bank of UAE, Real Estate Bank, ARBIFT (Arab Bank for Investment and 
Foreign Trade), Marriage Fund, and the Post Office. A majority of these 
enterprises/agencies are run on commercial basis using private sector style of 
management and accounting; and their federal ownership reflects the nature of their 
activities and functions in the whole country. Unlike other locally incorporated public 
enterprises, a majority of the federal agencies were set up and granted monopolist power 
over certain services such as telecommunications. Even though the federal public sector 
organizations had been established since 1971-72 some of the activities of the ministries 
had been transferred from the Emirates public sector especially health, education, 
information and defence during the last 25 years. 
6.3.2 Development of Emirate Public Service System 
Due to the individual Emirate's unique requirements of certain public services, each 
Emirate had retained some public service for the benefit of that Emirate's user/consumer. 
These public services had been chosen on the basis of each Emirate's ability to finance and 
run these services. Furthermore, the decision to have separate Emirate public services was 
based on the premise that these public services would not overlap or interfere with federal 
activities (locally and internationally); contradict the constitution or restrict the powers of 
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the legislative or executive bodies. Since some of these public services organizations had 
been set up by the governments of the Emirates well before the UAE federation, it was 
further thought that these organizations could remain within the public sector of the 
Emirates provided they continue to serve the citizens on equal basis and to compliment the 
federal government's organization. This means that the objectives of the Emirate public 
services are not in conflict with the objectives of the federal public service sector. 
Essentially, the Emirate public services were established to provide those services, which 
may not be provided adequately by the federal public services because of the special nature 
or characteristic of such services. Prior to the UAE federation, the public service within 
the individual Emirates varied with the needs and wants of their publics as well as with the 
availability of resources to support such public organizations. For example, Chart 1 in 
appendix H shows the different levels of operation and activities of the Emirates pre- 
federation. The Chart shows that the scope of operation and type of organization of the 
Emirates of Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Ras al Khaimah, for instance, are very different. 
Similar differences are evident in the other Emirates. 
However, the emergence of modem public services in the Emirates of Abu Dhabi, Dubai 
and Sharjah dates back to 1960s and early 1970s whereas in the Emirates of Ajman, Umm 
al Quwain, Ras al Khaimah and Fujairah, similar public sectors emerged in the late 1970s. 
The modem public sector in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi commenced with the 1961 
development budget of about Dh. 43 million for capital projects such as civil airport, jetty, 
power station, road network, houses and seaports. In addition to this, a current budget of 
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Dh. 1,820 million was set up for the Ruler's court expenditure, police force, guards and 
civil list beneficiaries. As far as the other Emirates are concerned, development projects 
and some of the current expenditure were met from the Trucial States Development 
Scheme and internal receipts from ports and custom levies as well as miscellaneous 
revenues. All these receipts and payments were effected through the Rulers' personal 
accounts. In the mid 1960s and 1970s the public service sectors in the seven Emirates were 
restructured in a better organized manner particularly in the Emirates of Abu Dhabi and 
Sharjah. The Emirate of Dubai also restructured its system but to a much lesser extent than 
both Abu Dhabi and Sharjah. 
Public sectors in the Northern Emirates were at their evolutionary stage for both the 
periods immediately prior to the federation and thereafter up to 1973. Therefore 
information covering the size or contribution of the sectors was not available to measure 
and to trace their historical development with some precision. In 1973 the IMF mission 
estimated that the total oil revenue of Dubai Emirate was Dh. 550 million compared with 
Dh. 152 million in 1972, in addition to other departmental revenue totaling Dh. 55m in 
1973 and Dh. 49m in 19722. However the total government expenditure for the Emirate of 
Dubai amounted to Dh. 110 million in 1972 and Dh. 172 million in 1973 thus recording a 
surplus of about Dh. 91 million and Dh. 400 million in 1972 and 1973 respectively. All the 
income and expenditure of the Emirate of Dubai are directly under the control of the 
Ruler because there is no strict separation between the financial operations of the Ruler 
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and those of the Emirate. The Ruler supervised all the activities of the departments and 
allocated the necessary funds for projects in the Emirate (IMF, 1973). 
6.3.3 Current Position of Federal Public Service Sector 
Despite its modest start in 1971/72 the public sector in the UAE had assumed within a 
short period of time, the traditional dominance of the socio-economic activity of the 
country, as is the case in other countries particularly the developing countries. The sector 
has been very important in financing and supporting various activities particularly those 
activities that are considered as providing the infrastructure of the economy such as roads, 
power, water and schools. However the public sector had contributed roughly 55% of 
GDP in 1998; (GDP in 1998 was Dh. 170 billion) and accounted for about 59.6% of the 
total investments, both private and public as at the end of 1998 (excluding oil sector 
investments). The investments were made in the following areas: Public Service 
Organization Dh. 13.5 billion, Public Enterprises Dh. 15.8 billion and Private Sector 
Enterprises Dh. 19.8 billion thus representing 27.5%, 32.1% and 40.4% respectively at the 
end of 1998. Moreover, the contribution of the public sector organizations (without public 
enterprises) was Dh. 20 billion at the end of 1998 and since 1972 this sector has grown by 
17.6% until the end of 1998. In 1972 the contribution of the Public Sector Organizations to 
the GDP was Dh. 289 million representing 4.5% whereas in 1998, it was Dh. 20 billion 
representing 12% of GDP approximately (Ministry of Planning, 1998). 
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Besides its contribution, the public service sector has created 140,000 job opportunities 
for nationals and expatriates up to 1996 (excluding defence and police force). In addition 
to the 140,000 government employees, the public enterprises sector, which is part of 
public sector, was estimated to have employed between 15,000-20,000 persons by the 
end of 1996 (Ibid. ). 
6.4 STRt1CTt1RE OF UAE PUBLIC SERVICE SECTOR 
6.4.1 The Government and Civil service: 
In the UAE, the public administrative structure is divided into two parts: Federal and 
Emirate government systems as shown in Figure 6.1. 
At the top of the governmental/administrative hierarchy is the Supreme Council made up 
of the Rulers of the seven Emirates: it nominates and appoints the President. There are 
the federal and Emirate administrative systems with the President at the head of the 
federal system and the Rulers at the head of the Emirate systems. The Emirate system 
has the Municipality; the federal structure has no similar set up. Compared with the 
structure of the American system of administration, the Federal - Emirate - Municipality 
structure of the UAE may be likened to the Federal-State-Local government structure of 
the American system. 
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Figure 6.1 
In greater details and as shown in Figure 6.2, the Federal government system is composed 
of the President, the cabinet and departmental ministers, non departmental ministers and 
Ministers of state. The President appoints all ministers (including the Prime Minister). 
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The L'AE: Structure of Public Administration 
The Government is organized into the following Ministries: Defence, Petroleum and 
Mineral Resources, Foreign Affairs, Interior, Agriculture and Fisheries, Public Works, 
Economy and Trade, Planning, Education, Health, Information and culture, Labour and 
social security, Finance and Industry, Cabinet office, Water and Electricity, Transport, 
Telecommunications and Justice. Besides the Ministries, there are non-departmental 
public bodies (agencies and public enterprises), which are managed by Boards of 
Directors appointed by the relevant ministers after consultation with the Cabinet 
Members. 
However the Memorandum and Articles of Association/Charter of that particular body 
and the private sector shareholding govern the government members on the board of 
these enterprises. Most of these bodies carry out public service functions with 
Government funded share capital from public money through the treasury. Though few 
in numbers, the capital and reserve of these Federal public enterprises and agencies was 
slightly above Dh. 9.7 billion in 1998, representing 5.7% of GDP with a contribution of 
Dh. 2.3 billion to Federal Government revenue in the same year. The profits of these 
enterprises represented 12% of the total revenue of the Federal Government and 1.4% of 
GDP in 1998 (Ministry of Planning, 1999). 
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Even if we combined the public enterprises in both federal and Emirate public sectors, 
the total number of the enterprises is just about thirty-nine as Table 6.1 shows. 
Table 6.1 
Public Enterprises in the UAE Public Sector 
Name of the Comnanv Capital and Reserve (Dh. ) 
National Bank of Abu Dhabi 2,519,410,000 
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank 2,862,200,000 
Union National Bank 1,035,948,000 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank 1,103,650,000 
Abu Dhabi National Insurance Company 922,630,000 
Al Ain Ahlia Insurance Company 230,180,000 
Emirates Industrial Company 177,510,000 
Abu Dhabi National Hotel Company 861,500,000 
National Company for Hotel and Tourism 100,000 000 
Abu Dhabi Aviation 480,360 000 
National Dredging Company 610,570 000 
Abu Dhabi National Food Staff Company 75,740,000 
Abu Dhabi Compost Plant 153,265 114 
Al Ain Compost Plant 113,099,385 
Vegetable Canning and Processing Factory 54,052,857 
Al Mirfa Dates and Vegetable Canning Factory 121,485 861 
General Industry Corporation 1,477,869 000 
GAMCO 200,000,000 
Emirates International Bank 2,822,620,000 
Dubai Commercial Bank 997 120,000 
Dubai Islamic Bank 1,003 820 000 
National Bank of Sharjah 339,940,000 
Bank of Sharjah 307,660,000 
National Bank of Ras Al Khaimah 465,590,000 
National Bank of Fujairah 448,040,000 
Commercial International Bank 222,260,000 
Fujairah National Bank 52,826,227 
Al Fujairah Insurance Company 52,826,227 
Etisalat 6,654,790,000 
Julfar 494,198,204 
Dubai Investment Company 773,920,000 
Ammar 17,468,510,000 
Gypsum Company 14,450,979 
Fujairah Cement Factory 439,168,344 
Fujairah Commercial Center 68,123,288 
Union Cement Factory 478,375 000 
Ras Al Khaimah Poultry Farm 151,369,305 
Ras Al Khaimah Cement Factory 440 463,798 
Arabian Heavy Industries 68,412,804 
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With respect to the Agencies owned by the federal government, these are also few in 
numbers as Table 6.2 shows. 
Table 6.2 
l=nvprnmpnt Acpnriec in the Pnhlic Cprtnr 
Agency Sector of Activity 
Abu Dhabi Fund for Economic Development Economics 
Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) Oil Sector 
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority Economics and Finance 
Marriage Fund Social Affairs 
UAE Real Estate Bank Bank and Real Estate 
Housing Authority Accommodation and Property 
Source: Ministry of Planning, 1999. 
The Government of Abu Dhabi owns a majority of the companies and agencies in Tables 
1 and 2 mainly because of the greater wealth of the Emirate compared with the others. 
The agencies perform different economic and social functions, which aim at improving 
the socio-economic welfare of the nation and its people. The capital and reserves of both 
the enterprises and the agencies as at December 1998 was put at about Dh. 47 billion 
which represented 28% of the GDP in that year. However most of the enterprises are 
incorporated jointly with private sector investment in the form of joint stock companies. 
At the Emirate level, each Emirate has its public administration system with the Ruler on 
top of the hierarchy. Below the Ruler is the administrative apparatus and the 
municipality where necessary. The Emirate administrative system, which is generally 
designed on the basis of the social and political needs of the people of the Emirate, range 
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from simple and centrally controlled administrative systems such as exist in Dubai, 
Sharjah, Ras al Khaimah, Umm Al Quivain and Ajman to a fairly modem system as exist 
in the Emirates of Abu Dhabi and Sharjah to a certain extent. 
6.4.2 Abu Dhabi Emirate Public Administration System 
Before the UAE Federation and after H. H. Shaikh Zayed Bin Sultan came to power as the 
Ruler of Abu Dhabi (6 August 1966), the Emirate of Abu Dhabi witnessed a rapid 
expansion in its public administrative system. By mid- 1970, the number of Departments 
in the administration reached twenty-eight, and, in July of the following year a new 
administrative reform was introduced in the Emirate. The new structure is presented in 
Figure 6.3. 
By December 1968, the Emirate's public sector organisations employed about 7,458 
persons while the total current and development expenditure for the same period was 
Dh. 730 million of which Dh. 305 million was allocated for development programme. In 
1971, the number of government employees (both monthly and daily paid) in die Emirate 
decreased to about 4,734 persons - about 49.9% (3,724 persons) reduction - due to the 
transfer of some of the Emirate's public services to the UAE federal government (Ministry 
of Planing, 1999). Despite the reduction in the number of persons employed by 
government organisations, the total expenditure of the Emirate in 1971 amounted to about 
Dh. 1.0 billion of which Dh. 391 million was spent on development programmes such as 
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roads, water and electricity, port and public buildings and housing and grants to friendly 
nations. However, the government revenue during 1971 amounted to Dh. 1.6 billion. 
Prior to 1968, the financial operations of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi government were 
integrated with the Ruler's financial affairs. But in 1968, with the re-organization of the 
government of Abu Dhabi, the fiscal and financial arrangements of the government were 
re-structured in a way that permitted the separation of the Ruler's private finance from that 
of the government. This enabled proper planning and budgetary controls to be established 
and the responsibility for the delivery and implementation of the Emirate's public policy to 
be entrusted with the Executive Council. The structural re-organization of the system was 
undertaken in anticipation of an imminent union and in response to a large number of 
governmental bodies. 
The new structure. as presented in Figure 6.3, has the Ruler at the apex of the hierarchy. 
Because the Ruler of the Abu Dhabi Emirate is the current President of the country, the 
Crown Prince and Deputy Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, His Highness 
Shaikh Khalifa bin Zayed bin Sultan Nahyan presides over the affairs of the Emirate. As 
can be seen in the Figure, the Ruler's Representatives assist the Ruler in the Eastern and 
Western Regions. A Council of Ministers with a Cabinet combine with the Ruler's 
Representatives to complete the upper echelon of the ruling Structure. 
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There are 14 ministries under the Council of Ministers and these include, among others, 
Finance & Customs, Justice, education, Information, Economy & Trade. Petroleum, Water 
& Electricity and Municipality & agriculture. The ministries provided the main stream 
support for the administration in the , vay of raising revenue, budgeting for government 
expenditure, providing security, education, housing, health care and other social services. 
These services are provided in trust for the citizens of the Emirate and more importantly, 
the funds and resources used are ommed and provided by the public. It is therefore 
necessary that the civil servants produce reliable, detail and accurate account (report) of the 
use of the public funds and resources entrusted in their care. Management accountability is 
thus an essential part of their function and responsibility. 
The Council of Ministers and the Cabinet of the Emirate continued to run government 
businesses until they were disbanded in December 1973 when a unified and larger Federal 
Council of Ministers and a federal Cabinet were established. 
6.4.3 Shariah Emirate Public Administration System 
The Emirate of Sharjah adopted a similar administrative structure as Abu Dhabi until the 
creation of the Union in 1971. Before then, the departments of the Emirate of Sharjah 
were: Emiri Diwan, Municipality. air and seaport authority, water and electricity, labour 
and social affairs, Petroleum and mineral affairs, police, postal authority, education, 
finance, custom and justice. 
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As in the other Emirates before the federation, the Ruler and his Court directed and 
dominated the administration of the Emirate of Sharjah. The Ruler held the trust of his 
citizens ensured that their expectations and aspirations are met through a natural co- 
operation between the Ruler and the people. 
After the formation of the federation, Sharjah adopted a more modem administrative 
structure. Figure 6.4 shows the new structure and its component elements. Like Abu 
Dhabi, the new structure in the Emirate of Sharjah has the Ruler and his Court at the top 
of the hierarchy of administration. The Deputy Ruler, The Crown Prince, the Executive 
Council, the Consultative Council and the Auditor General Bureau who together form the 
second echelon in the administrative hierarchy assist the Ruler in the governance of the 
Emirate. Unlike the Emirate of Abu Dhabi, there are no regional representatives of the 
Ruler. Regional representative structure is peculiar to Abu Dhabi because of its much 
larger size compared with the other Emirates. 
There are II departments under the Executive Council and these include, among others, 
Finance, Islamic Affairs, Customs & Seaport, Organization & Management, Social 
Security, Petroleum, Economy and Infomiation & Culture. The departments provide the 
administrative support in the way of raising revenue, budgeting for government 
expenditure, providing security, education, housing, health care and other social services. 
The services are provided with public funds and resources and this makes it necessary that 
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the civil servants produce reliable, detail and accurate account (report) of the use of public 
funds and resources entrusted in their care 
On the other hand, the Emirate of Dubai Public Administrative set up was geared towards 
commercially oriented structure because of the attitude of the late Ruler of Dubai H. H. 
Shaikh Rashid towards the government system in the Emirate. By mid 1970 the public 
organizations in Dubai were very few and modestly staffed in order to avoid bureaucratic 
system and to give the government organizations a private sector's style of business. The 
Government Departments were Diwan, Municipality, Land and Property, Customs, Oil 
Affairs, Finance, Police and Passport and Immigration. In the other four northern 
Emirates - Ajman, Umm Al Quwain, Ras-Al-Khaimah and Fujairah - the public 
administrative structure was in its rudimentary form because of the lack of financial 
resources and the tribal culture of these Shaikhdoms. 
The activities of public enterprises/organizations in the UAE are wide ranging. In the 
area of public services, the state provides nursery, primary and secondary education to all 
citizens free of charge followed by higher education for those students who are willing to 
pursue their university studies both locally and abroad through the relevant ministry and 
department. 
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In the field of medical treatment the Ministry of Health provides all citizens and 
expatriates with the necessary health care, which covers diagnosis, treatment of all types 
of illnesses, in and outside the country free of charge except where the law specifies such 
charges. Other activities covered by various enterprises/organizations are: the provision 
of law and order, the enforcement of the law through judicial system, the provision of 
telecommunications services both locally and internationally and the supplies of various 
consumer products such as dairy and poultry farm products at a reasonable price through 
the market mechanism. Besides these activities some public bodies carry out the 
planning and control of government income and expenditure through the general budget 
programme as well as overseeing the whole economy in consultation with the monetary 
authority to ensure proper allocation of money for project development. On the other 
hand, some departments/organizations like Public Works carry out minor and major 
maintenance of state buildings and roads as well as the implementation of government 
policy towards housing and urban development project. 
6.5. SIZE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
The last two decades of the last century saw heated debate over the size of the public 
sector and the role of the sector in the economy (Common, et al., 1992; Deakin, 1994; 
Leach and Davies, 1996; Fynn, 1997; Chapman and Cowdel, 1998). The public sector 
affects the entire economy and society because it is a large purchaser of goods and 
services from the private sector. This makes the size of the sector a major issue in the 
debate on how to roll back the expanding boundaries of the sector (Hughes, 1998). 
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The determinants of the boundary includes, among others, the extent of government 
activities and operations, the contribution of the sector to the GDP, the number of people 
employed in the sector at any time, the output produced and distributed by the sector and 
the kind of economic system prevalent in the country,, (Hughes, 1998). 
Besides government operations, the size of the public sector depends on government 
policy towards infrastructure projects, budget allocation and availability of fund to 
finance the size required. Most of the size of the public sector in the UAE had been 
determined by the need for law and order in the country, socio-economic infrastructural 
development and modem amenities which cannot be provided by the private sector due to 
the high investment capital required and the potentially low rate of return expected. 
6.5.1 Federal Public Sector: Size of Operation 
Despite the fact that the Federal public sector had a modest start in 1971, the Civil Service 
started with twenty-eight member federal Cabinet to run the country. However, by the end 
of 1976, the ministerial posts had increased to 30 members by establishing more ministries 
for the expansion of services in all regions. Currently, the position of the sector is 30 
ministries, one cabinet affairs office, 4 agencies, 5 enterprises and 8 educational institutes, 
2 universities and 6 higher colleges of technologies. 
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The Federal Civil Service has thus witnessed a rapid growth. The number of Civil servants 
increased from 4,000 in 1971/72 to over 24,000 by the end of 1976. By the end of 1996, 
the Federal public service employed 56,415 out of a total labour force of 1.3 million 
(excluding the Armed Forces) and spent a wage bill of Dh. 16.9 billion in the year 1996 
rising to Dh. 18 billion and Dh. 21.3 billion in 1997 and 1998 respectively. Most of the 
growth in civil service took place in education, health and other service organizations 
(Ministry of Planning, 1997 & 1999). 
Such a rapid growth may easily be interpreted as signs of rapid economic transfornlation in 
the economy. Clearly, there has been much socio-economic activities in the economy in 
the last decade. The petroleum sector has been expanding with all the auxiliary activities 
expanding in dictum. The Construction sector, particularly, has shown an enormous 
expansion in the last ten years and in 1998 was declared the second fasting growing 
Construction sector in the World (Gulf News. 16 April. 1999). The consumer goods sector 
has also expanded enormously recently. All these expansions require similar development 
and growth in infrastructural and other support services provided only by the government. 
We asked our general public sample respondents the question: How would you consider 
the current size of the U. A. E. public service in relation to the population of the country, 
which is only 2.6 million people (1997 figures)? Table 6.3 presents the answers while 
Figure 6.5 gives a graphic presentation of the same.. As can be seen in the Table, a clear 
majority of our respondents think that the current size of the federal public services sector 
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is on the large side relative to the population of the country. The mean percentage response 
shows that an overwhelming 62.4% of the sample respondents think that the public 
services sector is large (or too large; 11.7%) for the country's 2.6 million population and 
1.3 million workforce. The Pie chart (Figure 6.5) gives an even more graphic perception of 
the relative size of the majority. 
Table 6.3 
Relative Size of UAE Public Services Sector 
RELATIVE The Public Accountors Accountees 
SIZE 
ýa oloý oil0 
Mean 
Response 
% 
Too Large 18 9% 8 16% 3 10% 11.7% 
Large 102 51% 24 48% 16 53% 50.7% 
Average Size 75 38% 17 34% 11 37% 36.3% 
Small 4 2% 1 2% - - 1.3% 
Too Small - - - - - - - 
TOTAL 200 100% 50 100% 30 100% 100% 
The consistency of response across the respondent categories is interesting. It can be 
seen in the Table that there is a consistent majority in all the three categories of 
respondents who think that the size of the public services sector is large relative to the 
population of the country. 
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Figure 6.5 
Relative Size of UAE Public Sector 
Q Too Large 
Q Large 
QAverage Size 
® Small 
QToo Small 
Such an oversize could cause inefficiency and lapses in managerial accountability and 
performance. This finding tends to support, by implication, the government's current 
policy of privatization of some of the public sector utilities such as Water & electricity. 
6.5.2 Emirate Public Services Sector: Size 
Among the Emirate public sectors, the Abu Dhabi government organizations and 
enterprises are the largest in size and numbers. Figure 6.6 shows the structure and 
organization of the government of Abu Dhabi Emirate. As can be seen in the Figure, 
there are 12 Departments, 3 Diwan, 6 agencies and 17 enterprises. 
The public sector organizations in Abu Dhabi employed 54,224 persons on a monthly 
basis and 34411 workers for daily paid for 1997 and 56,931 employees and 35,243 daily 
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workers for 1998 with a budget of Dh51 billion for 1997 and Dh56 billion in 1998. Abu 
Dhabi Public service sector contributed 53% of the total UAE sectors, (Dh. 18.6 billion) 
and 5.5% of GDP at the end of 1997. The Emirate of Dubai ranks second after Abu 
Dhabi. Its public service sector comprises 15 departments and 11 enterprises with total 
government expenditure of Dh10 billion in 1997 and Dh8.6 billion for 1998. However 
Dubai public service sector contributed 26% of the total UAE public service sector in 
1997 and 2.7% of GDP for the same period. 
The Emirate of Sharjah public service sector comes third and Ras Al Khaimah ranks the 
fourth among the Emirates' sectors. Sharjah's public service sector comprises II 
departments where as Ras Al Khaimah's Public sector consists of 10 departments. The 
total expenditure of of these Emirates are respectively Dhl. 3 billion and Dh254 million 
for 1997; and DhI. 2 billion and Dh250 million for 1998. On the other hand, the Emirate 
of Sharjah and Ras Al Khaimah public service sectors contributed 11 % and 1.3% of the 
total government public service for the year 1997 making 1.1% and 0.14% of GDP 
respectively for the same period. The public service sectors of the remaining Emirates 
are very small and their contributions to the GDP are also insignificant. 
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6.5.3 Size of Sector: Comparison with other Countries 
Although our finding in this research as reported in Table 6.3 indicates that the public 
think that the size of the UAE public services sector is large relative to its population. 
its scale of operation. compared to other countries particularly the Gulf Co-operation 
Council (GCC) countries. may be small. Table 6.4 shows a comparative scale of 
operation of the public services sectors of the six GCC countries. 
Table 6.4 
Comparative Size of Public Sector in GCC (1997) 
Emirate GDP 
($Million) 
Population 
(Million) 
Public Sector as proportion of GDP 
% Of 
GDP 
Absolute 
amount of 
GDP ($m) 
Per Capita 
figure ($) 
Kuwait 30.367 1.8 12.0% 3,644.0 2,024.4 
Oman 15.756 2.3 16.9% 2,662.8 1,157.7 
Qatar 9.311 0.47 20.0% 1,862.2 3,961.7 
Saudi Arabia 146,172 19.3 17.8% 26,018.6 1,348.1 
Bahrain 5,602 0.6 19.2% 1.075.6 1,792.7 
UAE 49.205 2.6 10.3% 5,068.1 1,949.3 
Source: Central Bank of UAE. 1999. 
Comparing the proportion of GDP accounted for by the public services sectors of the 
six countries, we see that the UAE public sector accounted for only 10.3% of the GDP 
of the country as against 20% for the State of Qatar; 17.8% for Saudi Arabia; 19.2% 
for Bahrain: 12% for Kuwait: and 16.9% for Oman. Clearly, the UAE public services 
sector has the smallest scale of operation among the GCC countries. However, in 
terms of absolute amount and relative per capita figures (see the Table) this contention 
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may not be correct. This is one of the problems of using relative (%) measures in 
comparison and analysis - the effect of absolute values is generally hidden. 
Compared with other developed countries such as the UK. the size and scale of 
operation of the UAE public services sector is very small. The public sector in Britain 
and other countries consume a large percentage of GDP. Lord Skidelsky (1996) 
estimates that public sector spending in Britain accounted for 42.5% of GDP in 1995 
despite the privatization and deregulation of the 1980s and early 1990s by the radical 
Conservative governments of Margaret Thatcher and John Major. The trend is similar 
in other countries of the world. and the reasons for such rapid growth in the public 
sector is well documented in various studies (Jackson and Price, 1994; Midwinter, 
1994; Timmins, 1995, Horton and Farnham, 1999). But the question of accountability 
in the public sector has received relatively much less attention (Day and Klein, 1987). 
Even though the public sector in the UAE plays an important role in the economic 
activity of the country. there are some differences between what is offered by the 
industrialized nations like UK and the current practice in UAE. These differences 
stem from various factors including differences in the social needs and wants of the 
citizens as well as the ideological perspectives of the UAE and other nations. 
In the UAE. for instance, there is no specific policy towards full employment because 
nationals who are eligible to work constitute the minority of the labour force. The 
UAE need of foreign labour force is estimated to be within the range of 70-80% in 
certain sectors of the economy hence employment of nationals is not a problem in the 
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country to give it an urgent attention. In 1998. the labour force was estimated at 1.3 
million of which 1.5% was reckoned to be unemployed among expatriates and retired 
individuals (Ministry of Planning, 1999). However this low level of unemployment is 
considered essential for the functioning of a free labour market so that salaries and 
wages would not come under labour market pressure. Similarly, there is no officially 
declared and formal welfare state in the UAE even though education and health 
services are available free to all citizens as well as social security benefits for the 
needy people. 
Furthermore, with the exception of Water and Electricity supplies and land transport, 
all public enterprises make some profit towards capital invested like any private sector 
firms. And, the UAE the government finances its budget through oil revenue, income 
from investments both locally and internationally and through domestic charges and 
levies, so the budgets of public sector organizations are not constrained by the 
resources government would raise for the extension of state activity unlike other 
countries where taxation and borrowing are the main revenue sources. Public sector 
enterprises borrowing are very small and therefore -the state is not under pressure of 
debt services in the UAE to ration resources among alternative competing 
opportunities. 
The public sector's objectives in the UAE are based on 'a need driven' approach rather 
than the social and political approach that characterized the system of some of the 
industrialized nations in the 19`h and 20th Century. In the UAE, the government has 
never allocated resources through direct control such as setting up public sector/bodies 
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in order to counter act market imperfections or to secure supply of public goods at a 
certain level or even to ensure the fair distribution of resources between public and 
private sector. Also, the few privatized firms are not regulated as in the UK or other 
industrialized countries. In the UAE, there is the feeling that such regulation and 
restriction are simply indictment of the very privatization policy that was thought to 
eliminate public sector restrictive practices. All privatized firms in the UAE ar thus 
left to operate freely in the market without any restriction. 
6.6 THE ROLE OF PUBLIC SECTOR IN UAE 
6.6.1 Structural Role 
Public service sector in UAE played an important role at a time when the private 
sector was unable to participate in the economic activities in the early 1970s because 
of the large finance requirements for investment in infrastructure projects such as 
roads. water and electricity and other public utilities. Most of the government 
organizations/ enterprises were established by the state directly or jointly with very 
few businessmen who were financially capable of contributing to the share capital of 
joint stock companies with some of the Emirate governments. Due to the reluctance of 
the private sector to invest in the public sector services, the State assumed the sole 
responsibility to provide the services in addition to other social services such as 
health. education and the provision of law and order. By undertaking to carry out all 
the country's needs for modern services, the government extended its role and 
involvement in the socio-economic activities of the nation. As a result, the State 
institutions and enterprises out-stripped the private sector firms by 3 to I by the end of 
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the 1970s. Without public service sector expansion in 1970s the private sector may 
not have been encouraged to invest in parallel with public sector organizations or to 
commit itself to the promotion of the country's economic growth and prosperit)". 
However the public service sector was the driving force for the development and 
evolution of the private sector management and productivity of the 1990s. With the 
result that the private sector has overtaken the public sector in terms of percentage 
contribution of fixed capital formation to GDP in 1997. 
6.6.2 Economic Role 
The UAE government had followed, to a large extent, a market-based policy since the 
inception of the UAE public sector. Most of the public enterprises had a mixed 
ownership and the state shareholdings range from 10% to 70% in certain companies 
depending on the capitalization requirement. The basic principle of the government 
is; 'the more the capital intensive the industry or the sector, the higher the level of 
government involvement in term of Capital investment'. Since 1980s the government 
had undertaken to reduce the state involvement in the economic life of the nation 
through privatization of management and ownership as well as contracting out some 
public services to improve efficiency and effectiveness of the use of public resources. 
In the same spirit. the government has set up a mechanism for competitive tendering 
to reduce cost and to give opportunities to private sector participation. In 1993, the 
total public expenditure (Federal and local spending) was Dh. 55 billion where as in 
1996 that spending rose to Dh77 billion before it declined to Dh72 billion in 1998: 
This represents 40% increase between 1993 and 1996 and an average annual increase 
of 3.4% over the six year period 1993 - 1998. However the total government revenue 
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has been growing at a rate less than that of total public spending for the same period. 
Total government receipts amounted to Dh40 billion in 1993 whereas in 1996 it was 
Dh51 billion, which represents a rise of 28% for the period. The bulk of the 
government spending went to education, health. defence. police and the administration 
of law and order. 
In the UAE, the public sector is entrusted with the responsibility of delivering goods 
and services to all citizens and expatriates at a reasonable price. Some of the prices of 
the goods and services cover costs plus small margin of profit for public enterprises. 
However in case of the public organizations such as Education and Health the whole 
cost or approximately 95% of it is borne by the state in the form of direct subsidy. 
6.6.3 Social Role 
Public service organizations owe their existence to the social policy goals of the 
government. Since 1975 the local and Federal governments had undertaken to provide 
the necessary social services to all citizens and expatriates. These services range from 
education and health services to various social benefits such as social security payments 
to needy citizens and pension schemes and other assistance (financial and non financial) 
which are provided by the public service sector. The social service sector had grown 
very rapidly in the last 20 years and the focus of the government, in particular, was on 
education and health due to their importance to the economy and to the social needs of 
the country. In 1975 the social services sector employed 12,128 persons and in 1996 
the number of people employed rose to 45,465 thus recording an increase of 275% 
(Ministry of Planning. 1999). The government current expenditure for this sector has 
201 
risen from Dh504 million in 1975 to Dh6.38 billion in 1996. As a result of the 
government social policy that brought about a fast growth in education, health services 
and other welfare benefits. the public schools had recorded a substantial increase in both 
the number of schools and number of students. In 1975 the number of schools was 185 
and the number of students was 161.803 but by 1996 these figures went up to 639 
schools and 300,337 students. However, the social service sector had contributed 
12.4% and 12.8% to GDP in 1996 and 1997 respectively. 
6.7 PERFORMANCE OF THE PUBLIC SERVICES SECTOR 
Measurement of the performance of public service sector has been a major problem in 
both developed and developing countries. The issue has been how to measure 
performance; what standards to use and what to measure. Measures which exist are 
ad hoc standards and far from systematic. Carter. Klein and Day argue (1992 quoted 
in Hughes, 1998 p. 181) that different indicators can be developed for different 
purposes: "Given different policy objectives. different kinds of performance indicator 
systems will emerge. So. for example. if the prime concern is with the efficient use of 
public resources. the emphasis will be on trying to devise output (and, if possible, 
outcome) measures: the approach of the economist.... If the prime concern is with 
accountability, their timeliness may be more relevant. If the focus of attention is on 
managerial competence, then the stress may be on setting targets for the performance 
of individual units or branches. These objectives may, of course, co-exist within the 
same branch". (Hughes. 1998, p. 183) 
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There is no identifiable and specific performance standard in most of the public 
service sector organizations of the UAE. The implicit understanding is that the sector 
is meant to provide efficient services to the public but what is an efficient' service is 
not defined anywhere. Given this situation, we adopted an empirical survey of the 
views and opinion of the consumers and producers of public goods and services to 
assess the performance of the sector. The basic argument underlying this approach is 
the marketing concept of 'customer orientation'. The marketing concept assumes. 
rightfully, that the Consumer is king and supreme. That is to say all producers of 
goods and services do so to satisfy the needs of the consumer and they remain in 
business only so long as the consumer is satisfied with their goods and services. This 
applies even to a monopolist in the public sector since there is no absolute monopoly 
anywhere. The consumer of public goods and services in the UAE thus constitutes the 
best option to evaluate the performance of the public services sector. 
6.7.1 Objectives of the Public Services Sector 
We asked our general public sample respondents to identify and rank the areas that 
should constitute the main objectives of the Public Services organizations in the UAE. 
Table 6.5 shows the mean score of the answers and the associated ranking of the 
results. As can be seen in the Table. while the provision of social services, education 
services and houses services top the list in ranking (Ist. and 2nd. ), the provision of 
performances evaluation and statistical reformation (accountability) rank third in the 
assessment of the public above socio-economic development and employment of 
nationals as the main objectives. 
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Table - 6.5 
Main Objectives Of Organizations In The Public Sector 
OBJECTIVES Mean Score Ranking 
To provide good Social Services 5 1 
To provide comprehensive annual evaluation of 
Performance the sector 
3 5 
To provide Employment for all nationals 3 5 
To provide good Health and Housing Services 4.4 2 
To provide a full and accurate account of the use of 
funds & resources allocated to it by the public 
4 3 
To provide Security to all in the country 4 
To provide good Education Services 4.5 2 
To provide accurate information/data to the public 4 3 
To encourage socio-economic development of UAE 3.4 5 
This suggests the importance to the public of the need not only to provide social 
services but also to render full and accurate account of the use of funds and resources 
allocated to public service organization (Management Accountability). By 
implication, this finding indicates that managerial accountability, among other goals, 
is an important objective that the UAE public services will have to achieve. 
We followed up this result and asked the respondents the following question: On 
average. what score would you give to the UAE public services for the performance of 
each of the following services? Table 6.6 presents the results, which have been 
calculated on the basis of mean score for each category of respondents. An overall 
mean score has been calculated and, on this basis, an overall ranking has been derived. 
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As can be seen in the Table. the overall ranking of the mean scores of the three 
categories of respondents shows consistently the lowest ranking for all the 
accountability related services such as annual evaluation of performance, annual 
account of the use of funds and resources, and provision of information/data to the 
public. These services also scored lowest consistently across the three category of 
respondents. Provision of security, housing, health and social services top the ranking 
in that order but there seems to be poor accountability for the funds and resources 
used to provide these services. 
It is particularly interesting to note that both the accountees and accountors do agree 
that the services that provide a basis for accountability in the public services sector of 
the UAE are poorly supplied. None of the two groups of respondents had a mean 
score of more than 3. which was the mean score for annual evaluation of performance 
derived from the scores of the Accountors. 
Our findings here is collaborated by the results of another question posed to our 
respondents: 'On average. what score would you give to the UAE public service for 
the provision of statistical information in each of the following areas? ' The results 
show that the respondents scored the public services lowest in the provision of 
statistical information that relate to accountability such as resource allocation and 
utilization information, objective of Ministries and financial information. 
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Table - 6.6 
Service Performance Senre for FAR Pnhlir Cnrvi-P Qpotnr 
Service Provided Mean Score 
Overall Overall 
Mean Ranking 
Score 
Public Accountor Accountee 
Provision of Social Services 4 4 4 4 4 
Annual evaluation of 1.5 3 2 2 7 
Performance 
Provision of 3 4 4 3.7 5 
Employment 
Provision of Health 3.5 4 5 4.2 3 
Services 
Annual account of the 1 3 2 7 
use of funds & 2 
resources 
Provision of Housing 4 4.5 5 4.5 2 
Services 
Provision of Education 4 4 4 4 4 
Services 
Provision of Security 5 5 5 5 1 
Provision of 1.5 2 2 8 
Information/Data to the 1.8 
public 
Annual account of 2 3.5 3 6 
income and expenditure 
2.6 
In fact, examining closely the results in Tables 6.5 and 6.6, we see that while our 
respondents indicate in Table 6.5 that accountability related services should be 
considered top objectives of the public services sector, the results in Table 6.6 suggest 
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that these services are not efficiently and satisfactorily provided. There is thus 
accountability problem in the sector. 
6.7.2 Availability of Performance Standards in the Sector 
In order to assess the performance standards available in the public services 
organizations, we extracted the answers of the 80 Accountee and Accountor 
respondents in. the general public sample to the following question: "Does your 
Ministry or Company set performance standards for the services or products it 
provides to ensure value-for-money? " Table 6.7 presents our results. 
Table - 6.7 
Availability of Performance standard in Public Service Sector 
Response Type Response % of Response 
Yes 21 26.0% 
No 59 74.0% 
TOTAL 80 100.0% 
An overwhelming majority - 74% - indicated that their organizations have no 
performance standards while only 26% indicated that they do have some form of 
performance standards. 
A supplementary question was put to the respondents who answered "yes" to indicate 
the types of performance standards available in their organizations or companies The 
result is shown in Table 6.8. Out of the 21 respondents who answered "yes", 18 or 
86% of them stated that they have 'internal performance standards'; 2 or 9.6% of them 
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indicated that they use `Quality Assurance Procedures'; and 1 or 4.4% said they use 
`Customer Requirement'. A follow-up question on the types of performance 
standards used in public services organizations led to the results presented in Table 
6.8. The Table shows that only 21 members of the 80 accountee and accountor group 
in the general public sample responded. It can be seen that internal performance 
standards are virtually, the only evaluation measures used in the organizations of the 
few respondents. 
Table - 6.8 
Types of performance Standard used in the Public Service Sector 
Type of performance 
Standard 
Response % of Response 
ISO 9000 performance 
standards 
- - 
Internal performance standards 18 86.0% 
Quality assurance Procedures 2 9.6% 
Consumer Requirement 1 4.4% 
Other (please specify) - - 
TOTAL 21 100.0% 
This result leads us to conclude that there is hardly any clearly defined set of 
performance standards in almost all the public services organizations in the UAE. 
Management performance is measured informally and often on personal criteria. 
6.7.3 Use of External Performance Evaluators 
Since the administrative structures of the various levels of government in the UAE 
have an institution called "Auditor General Bureau", a question in our questionnaire 
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requested the respondents to indicate if their organizations use external performance 
evaluators such as Accountants, Consultants or Auditors to assess performance. We 
extracted the answers of the relevant respondents and these are reported in Table 6.9 
and presented graphically in Figure 6.7. 
Table - 6.9 
Does Your Organizations use External Performance Evaluators? 
Response Type Response % of Response 
Yes - always 20 25.0% 
Yes - sometimes 51 63.0% 
No 9 12.0% 
TOTAL 80 100% 
Figure 6.7 
Does Your Organization use External Performance Evaluators? 
100.00% 
80.00% 
60.00% i Yes - always 
QYes - sometimes 
40.00% : rte Q No 
°  TOTAL 
'n nnoi 
0.00% % of Response 
It can be seen in the Table that 63% of the respondents indicate that they use external 
evaluators `sometimes'; 25% state that they use external evaluators `always' while 
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only 12% do not use such evaluators. Figure 6.7 presents a graphic view of the 
responses showing the dominance of those who use external evaluators some of the 
time. The other responses are also colourfully presented and contrasted against the 
total. A complementary question requests the respondents to indicate the type of 
professional bodies their organizations use. About 63% of the respondents stated that 
their organizations use Auditors to assess the performance of their institutions: 24% 
use Accountants while 11% do not use any external professional bodies. 
A follow up personal interview involving five of the respondents who indicated that 
they use external Auditors and two of those who use Accountants revealed interesting 
practice. It is correct that external Auditors and accountants are used by some of the 
public services organizations but it seems that no meaningful use is made of the 
reports submitted by these external professional bodies. Perhaps more importantly. 
these external professional bodies concentrate on 'financial accountability' rather than 
management accountability, which is the concern of this research. The internal 
Auditor General Bureaus that are available in the federal and Emirate administrative 
structures also concentrate on 'financial accountability' at the expense of the more 
comprehensive management accountability. It is interesting to note that the internal 
Auditor General Bureaus are as 'harmless' as a dove in their evaluation. This is 
mainly because of the politico-cultural system within which the organizations 
operation. 
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6.8 IS THE PERFORMANCE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR SATISFACTORY? 
Our findings so far indicate that the UAE public services sector has much to be 
desired from the setting of specific objectives, provision of management 
accountability related information to the design of identifiable and specific 
performance standards. Despite this, some public sector enterprises have made 
contributions to the GDP. For example, the enterprises contributed Dh2.2 billion in 
1997 and Dh3 billion in 1998 towards government budget. These income 
contributions amounted to 4% and 7% of the total government revenue for 1997 and 
1998 respectively. However some of the public organizations like defence, education 
and health services did not bring very much in the form of cash to the treasury but 
contributed indirectly to the national economy in the form of healthy and better 
educated citizens. 
To assess the level of satisfaction with the performance of the public sector the 
following question was asked: In general. to what extent are you satisfied with the 
performance of the public sector departments and organizations in the UAE? " Table 
6.10 shows the result while Figure 6.8 presents the graphic picture. 
It can be seen in the Table that a clear majority (59%) of the respondents indicated 
'dissatisfied/very dissatisfied' with the general level of performance in the public 
services of the UAE; 25% were indifferent while only 16% were satisfied. These 
percentages are also shown graphically in Figure 6.8. 
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Table-6.10 
Level of satisfaction with Performance in Public Service Sector 
Level of Satisfaction 
Lirading 
Scale Response °0 Of Response 
Very satisfied - - 
Satisfied 4 45 16.0° (, 
Indifferent (Average) 3 70 25.0° 
Dissatisfied 2 112 40.0° c 
Very dissatisfied 1 53 19.00() 
TOTAL 280 100.000 
Descriptive Statistic 
Mean 2.3821 
Std Error 0.1671 
Std Deviation 0.9140 
Sample 
Variance 
0.8354 
Sum 667 
Count N 280 
Given the results in Table 6.10. we decided to test the hypothesis that the level of 
satisfaction with the general performance in the public services sector in terms of 
achieving objectives is less than the average in similar sectors. We formulated the 
null hypothesis: 
Ho: M<_3 
and the alternative hypothesis: 
Ill: M>_3 
where: 
"3 is the average score on the Likert grading scale; and 
"M is the mean of the sample survey results. 
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Figure 6.8 
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The Z test about one mean with sampling error (a = 0.05) is used and this gives a table 
value of Z (critical) = 1.64. We then calculated the test statistic as: 
2.382 - 3.00 
z= ----------------- 0.167 
_ -3.704 
The null hypothesis is thus accepted and the more important alternative hypothesis 
rejected because the calculated Z-value (-3.704) is less than the critical Z-value (1.64). 
Thus, with 95% confidence, we infer that the performance rating given to the public 
sector by our sample respondents is significantly lower than the average performance 
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of Response 
rate of 3 on the Likert grading scale. This means that the general performance of the 
public services sector in the UAE is significantly lower than the average performance 
expected from the sector. This test result supports the findings and the analysis made 
above. We are aware, however, of the limitations of the one-tail test but these have 
not affected our test result adversely mainly because of the relatively large sample size 
and the efficient way that the research has been conducted. 
This finding confirms the trail of evidence from this study that the performance of the 
public services sector in respect of achieving expected objectives is not satisfactory. 
Many organizations in the sector have no clearly defined objectives, performance 
evaluation standards. control mechanisms and hardly use external performance 
evaluating professional bodies. All these raise question mark over the issue of 
management accountability in the sector. Do the relevant accountors in the UAE 
public services sector provide a high level of management accountability? Do they 
provide management accountability at all? The next section investigates these 
questions. 
6.9 STRUCTURE OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UAE PUBLIC SECTOR 
As discussed earlier, the UAE has three levels of government - Federal, Emirate and 
Municipality - out of which both the Federal and the Emirates have their public 
services. Accordingly. each of the public services has its structure of management 
accountability, which. for all intents and purposes, is similar to one another except in a 
few minor areas (cf Figures 6.9 and 6.10 below). 
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6.9.1 What is Management Accountability? 
Any system of government, whether democratic or not, requires some form and level 
of accountability that ensures that the government acts in ways which are broadly 
approved by the community. Accountability is thus absolutely fundamental to any 
society and the UAE is no exception. In a western democratic society. the 
management of public organizations is accountable to political representatives and the 
general public for achieving the objectives set for them. In the UAE, the 
accountability of similar public organizations depends upon the statute that set them 
up - that is whether Federal Law or Emirate Ruler's decree. This notwithstanding, a 
major problem in the discussion of accountability is the question: what do we mean by 
accountability? 
We asked our sample respondents to choose from a list of definitions the definition 
that is closest to their view of management accountability. Table 6.11 shows the 
results. As can be seen in the Table, the mean percentage response of our respondents 
indicates that a clear majority of 53.3% defines management accountability as: 
"the provision of detail account of the performance 
and use of resources allocated to the Auinistry/organi_ation ". 
The choice of our respondents is interesting partly because it shows their concern for 
comprehensive and detail performance reports and partly because it shows their 
awareness of the concept of management accountability as distinct from other forms 
of accountability such as political or financial accountability. It is also interesting to 
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note that the chosen definition (B) is the preferred choice of all the three categories of 
respondents. Apart from the general public who chose the definition by a score of 
43%, the choice score of the Accountors and Accountees are both well above 55%. 
We intend to use this definition (B) as our operational definition in this study. 
Table 6.11 
Definition of Accountability in the UAE 
The Public Accountors Accountees 
DEFINITION OF 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
ok 
plp 
I 0 pp 
pp Ix 
mean % 
Response 
Provision of general annual 
account of the performance of 36 18.0% 5 10.0° 0 5 16.0° 14.7% 
the Ministry (A) 
Provision of detail account of 86 43.0% 30 60.0% 17 57.0% 53.3% 
the performance and use of 
resources allocated to the 
Ministry (B) 
Provision of detail annual 
budget of income and 14 7.0% 5 10.0% - - 5.7% 
expenditure of the Ministry (C) 
Provision of detail annual 
account of the use of resources 64 32.0% 10 20.0% 8 27.0% 26.3% 
allocated to the Ministry (D) 
TOTAL 200 100% 50 100% 30 1001 ö 100.0% 
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6.9.2 The Federal Public Sector Structure of Accountabilihv 
The President, through Presidential Decree in accordance with the Federal 
Constitution, creates Federal public service organizations. The relationship between 
the UAE citizens and the government could be considered as a principal/agent 
relationship because the citizens are assumed to have given their consent indirectly to 
the President/Ruler to appoint a government to join with him to run the country on 
their behalf. The President must therefore bear the ultimate responsibility of ensuring 
that the interests and aspirations of the citizens are satisfied and upheld. According to 
Day and Klein (1987, p. 6); "Political accountability begins when individuals are given 
responsibility for carrying out tasks on behalf of their fellow citizens. The division of 
civic labour, the delegation of particular roles to individual citizens, creates the 
demand for political as distinct from personal accountability" 
A simplified federal public service structure of accountability is shown in Figure 6.9. 
Given that the UAE Federal Law created the relevant public service organizations, 
then accountability follows a hierarchical structure with the President as the ultimate 
Accountee as indicated by the thick arrows in Figure 6.9. 
The structure shows the Civil Servants, represented by the Under Secretary, as 
Accountor and directly responsible to the Minister (first level Accountee), who in turn 
is responsible directly to the President (the ultimate Accountee). Unlike the structure 
of the UK where the ultimate Accounlee is the Electorate (the Public), the President in 
the UAE structure represents the interests and aspirations of the entire UAE people 
and hence is the ultimate Accountee. In this responsibility, the Supreme Council of 
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Figure 6.9 
Accountability Structure in UAE Federal Public Sector 
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Rulers, composed of the Rulers of the individual Emirates who, at Emirate level. 
represent the interests and aspirations of their people. assists the President In other 
words, the President has a dotted line responsibility to the Supreme Council as 
representatives of their respective Emirates. 
To follow up the issue of identifying the Accountee in the UAE public services. we 
asked the following question: In your view, who should an Under-Secretary in a 
Ministry be directly accountable to for his/her duties and responsibilities? Table 6.12 
shows the mean response and the derived ranking. 
Table 6.12 
Whom Should an tinder-Secretary be Accountable in the Public Service? 
ACCOUNTEE 
MEAN 
RESPONSE RANKING 
The Prime Minister 2 4 
The Supreme Council 1 
The UAE general public 2 4 
The Minister 4.5 
The National Council 3 
The Chairman 4 2 
The Director 2 4 
Others (please specify) - 
The findings show that the Minister, with a mean score of 4.5 and ranking of 1, tops the 
list while the Chairman, with a mean score of 4 and ranking of 2, comes second as the 
direct Accountee of the Under-secretary. The National Council comes third in ranking 
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while the Supreme Council is considered very distant from being direct Accountees of 
Under-secretaries. 
This result has some good degree of independence in it because each of our 200 general 
public respondents scored according to the particular public service sector (federal or 
Emirate) he/she was associated with. From this result, we may state that the direct 
accountees in the public services sectors in the UAE are the Ministers at the federal 
level and the Chairmen at the Emirate level. Interestingly, unlike the UK where the 
ultimate Accountee is the electorate. in the UAE this is not the case as the results in the 
Table indicate - the 'UAE general public' has a very low ranking of 4. This is because 
the public entrusts the President and the Rulers with their welfare and aspirations and 
thus sees them as the ultimate Accountees for the nation. 
Our findings in Table 6.12 are supported by answers to a supplementary question, 
which required our 50 Accountor respondents to indicate their direct line of 
accountability. Overwhelmingly, the Minister (18 out of 50 respondents) and the 
Chairman (24 out of 50 respondents) are indicated as the direct line of Accountability. 
However, the Civil servants also report to the Federal Audit Bureau who is directly 
responsible to the Minister in reporting its assessment of performance and use of 
resources in the Ministries and other public sector organizations. As indicated earlier, it 
is questionable whether the official responsibilities of the Audit Bureau have significant 
effect upon the level of performance in the. public services sector. The Minister, though 
not responsible directly. reports to the Consultative Council, which also has a dotted 
line responsibility to the President 
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In the UAE federal system, the civil servant is accountable through the hierarchy of 
the system to the minister who is then accountable to the cabinet and the President. 
Every act of every public servant is therefore the act of the Minister and the President, 
who actually chose the Minister. A Minister is in charge of a ministry and, within that 
ministry, the hierarchical structure determines normal bureaucratic and management 
accountability procedures through the various levels. By this process any act of 
administration is an act of collective will of Ministers and the President. 
6.9.3 Dimension of Accountability 
As it is apparent from Figure 6.9, the system of accountability forms the main link 
between the administration of the government and the political system. Within this 
constitutional structure. the Supreme Council of the Federation represents the highest 
authority in the land due to its composition and constitutional power. The Supreme 
Council's power is reflected in the following constitutional acts and responsibilities: 
0 The Council's approval is required when calling on the Union troops to 
move in case of need; 
" Amalgamation of two or more states within the union or outside it; 
0 Entering into agreement with any neighbouring countries; 
0 Ratifying international treaties; 
0 Declaration of war; 
" Appointment of the Prime Minister; 
" Imposing Martial Law; 
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" Introducing Draft Law, which affects the internal and external affairs of 
the Emirates. 
In the case of executive duties, the President and Vice President are authorized by the 
Supreme Council of the Federation to sign and issue all Federal Laws and Decrees; 
and to appoint the President and judges of the Supreme Court. In addition to these 
duties, the President is empowered to supervise the execution of all federal laws 
through the Council of Ministers as a group or on individual basis. The President, on 
the advice of the cabinet, appoints all senior civil servants including senior military 
personnel. 
As far as the Council of Ministers is concerned, the President had delegated to them 
the duties and responsibilities to supervise the execution of all federal laws, 
performance of various federal ministries, agencies and departments; and empowered 
them to reward and discipline federal employees. Because of these duties and 
responsibilities, the council of ministers is collectively and individually accountable to 
the President and through him to the Supreme Council for the discharge of their 
duties. The individual minister submits his report periodically to the Cabinet on the 
activities of his ministry/agency especially in the area of staffing, financing 
requirements, imposition of levies and charges and performance of the 
organ ization/agency annually. Interestingly, such accountability may be rendered 
verbally and informally to the Cabinet and would be accepted - no formal records 
would thus be available. This constitutes a concrete case of improper accountability 
procedure that may lead to a poor level of management accountability in the system. 
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The lack of formal records of accounts of services rendered in trust for the public, 
particularly records of the use of public funds and other resources, is a major breech of 
basic management accountability principles. Our research findings so far suggest 
strongly that there is a serious problem of management accountability in the UAE 
public services sector. 
6.9.4 The Accountor and Accountabilithy 
To assess the awareness of the role that the Accountors are expected to play in the 
accountability expectations of the UAE public, we asked the question: What are the 
topics you would expect to find in the annual report of Under-Secretaries in the 
Ministries? We present our findings in Table 6.13. 
From the mean scores and the related ranking in the Table, we see that our 
respondents feel that the content of the annual report of an Under-secretary to his 
Accountee should reflect the order (ranking) in the Table. That is to say that emphasis 
should be placed on; 
" The objectives of the Ministry 
0 Performance measurement and control mechanisms; 
. The utilization of funds and other resources; 
0 Evaluating performance of the Ministry. 
This finding is very instructive in the sense that it indicates not only the expected 
contents of the Report of the Under-secretary but also the relative importance 
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(ranking) of each issue. It also shows the awareness of the public regarding 
management accountability matters in the system. 
Table 6.13 
Tonics Expected in Annual Report of an Under-Secretary in NNTinistrv 
EXPECTED ISSUES MEAN 
RESPONSE 
RANKING 
Policy & Objectives of the Ministry 5 
Funds and other resources allocated to Ministry 4 2 
Utilization of funds and other resources 4 2 
Evaluation of performance of the Ministry 5 
Strategy of operation of the Ministry 3 3 
Limitations of the Ministry 3 3 
Performance measurement & control mechanisms 5 1 
Projections for the future 5 1 
Other matters (please specify) 
Employment statistics (National/Foreign) 3 3 
Following the question on content of Report was a question on the level of 
responsibility of the Accountors in their various organizations. The answers are 
reported in Table 6.14. It can be seen in the Table that the Accountors see their main 
responsibilities in the areas of planning, budgeting and resource allocation, as well as 
evaluation of performance and resource utilization. Their responsibilities, therefore, 
put them in a position to render detail and accurate account of their functions - that is 
management accountability. 
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This finding supports not only the need for proper accountability in the public services 
but also the desirability of having a meaningful and accurate management 
accountability 
Table 6.14 
Accountor Involvement in Accountable Functions 
RESPONSIBILITY Mean Response Rankin; 
Policy Making 2.5 4 
Strategic Planning 4 2 
Annual Planning 5 
Budgeting and allocation of Resources 5 
Executive Implementation of Plans 3 3 
Evaluation of Performance & resource use 5 
Others (Please specify) - - 
Senior civil servants have been entrusted with the responsibility of planning, 
budgeting and employment of public funds and resources, they also owe the public the 
responsibility of rendering a reliable management account of the performance and use 
of the resources. 
6.9.5 accountability Structure at Emirate Level 
Similarly, if reference is made to the public sectors of the individual Emirates, the 
accountability structure will reflect the Emirate's `constitutional set up' - internal 
procedures - as sho%ti, n in Figure 6.10. However, comparing Figures 6.9 and 6.10 we 
can see that the public sector accountability structure at the Emirate level is a mirror 
image of that of the federal structure. The main difference is not in the basic concept 
of accountability underlying the structure but in the designation of the main 
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Accountees - that is the Ruler instead of the President; and the Chairman instead of 
the Minister. The Accountors are Emirate civil servants and the institutions of Audit 
Bureau and Consultative Council do exist and perform similar functions at the Emirate 
level as they do at the federal level. 
Figure 6.10 
Accountability Structure in Emirate Public Sector 
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The significant difference between the two levels of public sector accountability in the 
UAE is that while the federal structure has the Supreme Council nominally at the top 
of the accountability hierarchy. the Emirate structure has no comparable institution 
above the Ruler. In terms of Accountee-Accountor relationship our findings are 
relevant here because. while the federal services have the Minister as the direct 
Accountee for the federal Under-secretary, the Chairman assumes the Accountee 
position for the Under-secretary at the Emirate level. 
6.10 Level of Management Accountability in UAE Public Service Sector 
In any structure of government there is the presumption that a line of accountability 
runs from the administrators of the public services through the political system, to the 
ultimate Accountee. Traditional public administration had its own form of 
bureaucratic accountability. In this system, bureaucracy merely advises the political 
leadership on policy and manages its resources on behalf of the political leadership. 
However, the public servant is essentially accountable (Management Accountability) 
through the hierarchical structure of the department to the political leader (Political 
Accountability). This study. we may emphasize. is about Management Accountability 
and not Political Accountability though both are closely related. 
6.10.1 Indicators of Management Accountability Problem in the UAE 
In our continual search for clear indicator of management accountability problems, we 
asked our respondents the following question: Which of the following have you 
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encountered in your dealings with Ministries or organizations in the UAE Public 
Service? In Table 6.15 we report the findings. 
Table 6.15 
Problems of Accountability Encountered in the Public Service Sector 
NATURE OF PROBLEM Public Response 
(Out of 200) 
% Response 
out of 200 
Response 
Ranking 
Poor knowledge of responsibility 120 60.0% 5 
Limited Information disclosure 101 50.0% 6 
Poor Management annual report 75 37.0% 9 
Lack of accountability Ombudsman 185 92.0% 3 
Poor annual accounts report 130 65.0% 4 
Lack of accountability guidelines 187 93.0% 2 
Exaggeration of success 95 47.0% 8 
Lack of report-writing guidelines 98 49.0% 7 
Poor definition of accountability 195 97.0% 1 
Others (Specify) - - - 
It can be seen from the ranking in the Table that the lack of a clear and precise 
definition of accountability is the most encountered problem in dealings with the 
public services organisations. Lack of accountability guidelines came second in 
ranking; lack of accountability ombudsman was third; poor annual accounts report 
came fourth; lack of knowledge of responsibility was ranked fifth while poor 
management annual report was seen as the least problem. That poor management 
annual report came last is not out of place; it is a clear indication of management 
accountability problem. If all other aspects of management accountability were 
carried out efficiently in content and procedure, then there would not be any case of 
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poor managerial annual report. This finding thus confirms further that there is 
management accountability problem in the public services of the UAE. 
6.10.2 Level of Satisfaction with Management Accountability 
Considering all the answers our respondents have volunteered, we put to them the 
definitive question: To what extent are you satisfied with the level of management 
accountability in the Public Services Sector of the UAE? In Table 6.16 we report the 
findings which are also presented graphically in Figure 6.11. 
Table 6.16 
Level of Satisfaction with Accountability in UAE Public Service Sector 
The Public Accountors Accountees 
OIO° 
ie 
/ý 
Iý 0'1 
10 
010 
oý 
Mean % 
Response 
Very satisfied 2 1.0'0 - - - - 0.3% 
Satisfied 20 10-0`0 3 6.0% 2 6.0% 7.3% 
Indifferent 53 27.011° 9 18.0% 7 23.0% 22.7% 
Dissatisfied 95 47.01)o 28 56.0% 15 50.0% 51% 
Very dissatisfied 30 1 ý. 0° ° 10 20.0% 6 21.0% 18.7% 
TOTAL 200 l00 50 100% 30 100% 100.0% 
Descriptive Statistic of the Three Sample Groups 
General Public Accountors Accountees 
Mean 2.345 2.100 2.167 
Std Error 0.081 0.173 0.176 
Std Deviation 1.147 1.213 0.963 
Sum 469 105 65 
Count (N) 200 50 30 
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The profile of response in the Table shows an overwhelming majority in each sample 
group that indicate "dissatisfied or very dissatisfied" with the level of management 
accountability in the public services of the UAE. A total of 62% in the general public 
sample group; 76% in the accountor group and 71% in the Accountee category are 
dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the level of management accountability in the 
public services sector. It is interesting to note that about 70% of both Accountors and 
Accountees sample groups - insiders of the system - are dissatisfied with the level of 
management accountability in the system. On the other hand, only 11% of the Public; 
6% of the Accountors and another 6% of the Accountees indicated satisfaction with 
accountability in the system. 
Figure 6.11 
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Mean Response 
El 
Looking at the mean percentage response of all the categories, a more reliable result 
emerges in terms of numbers. It can be seen that a mean response of about 70% of all 
the categories indicate "dissatisfied/very dissatisfied"; 22.7% indicate "indifference" 
while only 7.6% are satisfied. Figure 6.11 shows a graphic representation of the mean 
percentage response for each category. 
Given the descriptive statistics of the three sample groups, we decided to test the 
hypothesis that the level of management accountability in the public services sector of 
the UAE is less than the average level expected. We formulated the null hypothesis: 
Ho: M 
_< 
3 
and the alternative hypothesis: 
H,: M>_3 
where: 
"3 is the average score on the Likert grading scale; and 
0M is the mean of the sample survey results. 
Using the Z test about a single mean with sampling error (a = 0.05) which gives a 
table value of Z (critical) = 1.64, we calculated the test statistic for each sample group 
and obtained the following results: 
i) Z-value calculated for the general public sample = -8.086. 
ii) Z-value calculated for the Accountor sample = -5.217. 
iii) Z-value calculated for the Accountee sample = -4.730. 
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The test results indicate that the null hypothesis in each case should be accepted and 
the corresponding alternative hypothesis be rejected because the calculated Z-values 
of the samples are individually less than the critical Z-value (1.64). Thus, with 95% 
confidence. we can infer that the level of management accountability, as rated by the 
three sample groups, is significantly lower than the average level expected. 
This test result and the host of other research findings reported in this chapter lead us 
to conclude that there is sufficient evidence indicating that there is a serious 
management accountability problem in the sector. We may conclude, therefore, that 
the findings and results so far suggest that the level of management accountability in 
the public sector of the UAE is less than the average expected and, definitely, less 
than the average level in the public sector of a country such as the UK. This 
conclusion provides the basis to proceed with finding out why the system has such a 
serious management accountability problem but first we must investigate the problem 
and test our findings with a focussed research of the two case studies. This is done in 
the next two chapters. 
6.11 SUMM1ARV 
This chapter has explored the development of the public services sector in the UAE 
before and after the federation of the once independent and autonomous Emirates in 
December 1971. The three levels of public administrative systems: Federal - Emirate 
- Municipality - were discussed within the context of a general pattern of 
development of public services sector in a young country. 
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The contention underlying the study is that there are management accountability 
problems in the UAE public services sector. The basic hypothesis therefore is that the 
level of management accountability in the public sector is lower than the average 
expected particularly when compared with other countries, for example the UK. 
While subsequent chapters will investigate the causal factors and their relative impact. 
this chapter has focussed on confinning or refuting the basic hypothesis. 
Various findings in our research have been produced in this chapter to assess the 
validity of the hypothesis. The chapter has presented the following: 
" An assessment of the performance of the public services sector in terms 
of the level of achievement made with respect to the expected objectives 
of the sector; 
*An analysis of what accountability means to the public and the actors in 
the sector; 
"An analysis of the objectives of management accountability and the 
lines of accountability in the UAE public services sector; 
"The structure of accountability both at federal and Emirate level and 
their accountor-accountee relationships; 
"accountability problems encountered by the public in dealings with the 
public services organizations; 
" the level of satisfaction with level of management accountability in the 
sector. 
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All the research findings so far confirm the basic hypothesis that the level of 
management accountability in the UAE public services sector is low. In the next two 
chapters, we investigate this hypothesis further using specific case-studies from the 
sector. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CASE I: IllE E\IIRATES TELECOMMUNICATION CORPORATION 
(ETISALAT) 
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7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter focuses on the Emirates Telecommunication Corporation - ETISALAT - 
which constitutes one of the two cases from the public sector organizations studied in 
this work. The main objective of the case-study is to provide more specific results (in 
addition to the findings in the survey of the general public as reported in chapter 6) to 
further confirm or refute the main hypothesis of the study that the level of 
management accountability in the UAE public sector organizations is not as high as 
the public expects. The case-study will also provide clearer evidence of the factors 
that have close relationship with the level of management accountability identified by 
the case findings. 
The chapter is divided into six main sections as follows: 
a) the historical development of the case organization - ETISALAT: 
b) the general performance of the company; 
c) the structure and operation of management accountability in the company; 
d) assessment of the level of management accountability in the company; 
e) identification of factors with close relationship with the level of 
accountability obtained from the findings of the research; and, 
f) a comparison of management accountability in the British Telecom 
Corporation (BT) and the case company - ETISALAT. 
However, emphasis will be placed on the later sections, which are directly focused on 
the overall objective of the study. The data/information provided and used in this 
chapter are obtained from secondary and primary research carried out in the case 
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study organisation. Intensive primary research involving questionnaire survey and 
personal interviews was conducted in the organisation from which most of the 
findings reported in the chapter originate. Appropriate statistical analyses have been 
carried out to make a meaning of the findings. 
7.2 DEVELOPMENT OF ETISALAT 
The historical development of the Telecommunication System in the seven Emirates 
(then referred to as 'Telephone and Wireless' in each of Emirates) dates back to 1959 
when some British firms and local investors formed a partnership to establish and 
operate the System as a private joint venture. The management of the System was 
entrusted to the British companies, International Air-radio Limited and Cable & 
Wireless for both internal and external communication links. 
After the federation of the seven Emirates into the current United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) in 1971, the legal and operational status of the private joint venture was 
reconsidered. The result of this was the formation of the Emirates Telecommunication 
Corporation - ETISALAT - in 1976 as a Public Enterprise, which was jointly owned, 
by the Federal Government and Cable & Wireless Company. In 1983, the ownership 
of ETISALAT was transferred to the UAE Government and National Investors in a 
form of share capital divided between the government and UAE citizens. The 
shareholding structure was 60% government and 40% UAE nationals with the latter 
shares allowed to be traded over the counter by nationals only. ETISALAT thus 
became a quasi-government public enterprise. The Company was granted the 
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responsibility and authority by the government to take over all communication 
facilities of the seven Emirates including five operating companies with an installed 
capacity of 400,000 telephone lines. 
7.3 ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF ETISALAT 
From a simple entrepreneurial organizational structure, ETISALAT developed a much 
broader corporate organization structure. Figure 7.1 presents the general 
organizational structure of the relevant higher management cadre who constitutes the 
Accountee and Accountor categories in the organization. 
As can be seen in the Figure, the highest cadre in the organization comprises the 
Board of Directors and the Executive Committee who constitute the direct Accountees 
in ETISALAT. In accordance with Clause 15 of the Memorandum and Article of 
Association of Etisalat, the Board of Directors is composed of nine members in 
addition to the Chairman, the Minister of Transport and Telecommunication, who is 
appointed by the Federal Government (Etisalat, 1976). In addition to the Chairman, 
the government also appoints five Board members on advice of the concerned minister 
after consultation with the Finance Minister. The shareholders at the general annual 
meeting elect the remaining four members. With the exception of the Chairman, the 
board is elected for a period of three years. During the election of the four members, 
the government refrains from supporting or voting for any candidate. The Board of 
Directors is authorized to appoint a Chief Executive of the Corporation as well as to 
set up an Executive Committee whose members are chosen from the board. The board 
defines duties and functions of the committee. 
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Clause 16 of the Memorandum and Article of Association gives the board the power 
and responsibilities to run the corporation with the aim of achieving its goals as 
stipulated in the Memorandum and Article of Association. In addition to the power to 
run the corporation, the board is authorized to borrow and to issue a debt instrument 
and to give mortgage and other securities on behalf of the corporation with the 
exception of mortgaging the entire assets of the corporation or borrowing in excess of 
the capital of the company. To raise capital in excess of the capitalisation of the 
corporation, the Board requires a two-third majority vote at the Annual General 
Assembly (AGM) upon the approval of the Chairman. 
Figure 7.1 also shows the Accountor category in the company comprising the 
President and Chief Executive Officer, Senior Executive Vice Presidents, Vice 
Presidents, Executive Vice Presidents and Managers supervising 13 departments and 
divisions. To facilitate the functioning of the daily business of the corporate 
organization, the top management decentralized some of the corporate activities in 
accordance with the regional divisions of the corporation. 
Figure 7.2 shows the Regional organizational structure of the corporation. The 
regional divisions report directly to President and Chief Executive Officer who is 
aided by relevant senior management officers from the head office. Any matters 
referred by the regional divisions are discussed with the concerned director/manager 
before decisions are taken. 
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The duties and functions of these Departments and Divisions include, among others, 
manpower planning and appraisal; salary and benefits review; setting maintenance 
standards for efficient functioning of Telecommunication system; Developing and 
installing a financial and Management accounting system; planning and organizing 
purchases and administrative matters; providing information technology services such 
as billing and management information system; formulating marketing policies with 
regard to new products, providing switching and data services for both Fixed and 
Mobile telephone lines and carrying out Research and Development (R&D) in the 
field of telecommunications. Furthermore, the departments and divisions implement 
the corporate policies and guidelines with regards to Public relation, legal and 
business matters (see, Etisalat, 1999; pp. 1-48). 
7.4 OBJECTIVES OF ETISALAT 
Etisalat is a quasi-governmental organization with a central objective that spans both 
public and private enterprise sectors. Subject to the Laws and Regulations of the 
UAE, the Memorandum and Article of Association of the corporation states the 
following objectives of the corporation: 
1. To acquire the entire public telecommunications undertaking in the 
United Arab Emirates of the following companies: 
" Cable and Wireless Limited, 
9 The Abu Dhabi Telegraph and Telephone Company Limited, 
9 The Dubai State Telephone Company Limited, including its 
undertakings in Ajman and Umm al Quwain; 
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" The Sharjah State Telecommunications Administration including 
business, goodwill and connection, submarine telegraph cables, 
wireless installations, land telegraph lines. lands, buildings, cable 
laying and repairing and other vessels, plant, machinery, equipment, 
appliances. rights, concessions, landing and other licences, patents, 
contracts, agreements, properties, privileges and other traffic assets, 
and all or any of the obligations and liabilities pertaining to the said 
undertakings. 
2. To acquire by purchase or otherwise hold, and turn to account all 
or any part of the undertaking, assets and liabilities of, or any shares, stocks, 
debentures. debenture stocks, or other interests in or securities of any present or 
future company or body, wheresoever or howsoever incorporated or carrying 
on business, having amongst its objects the owning, or operating of telegraph or 
telephone cables or lines. or wireless 
or other installations, or means of or appliances for transmitting, receiving, 
reproducing, or distributing by land, sea, air, or otherwise 
messages, speech, music, sounds, signals, or written, printed or visual or 
pictorial matter of any kind. 
3. To carry on the business of telegraphers, telephonists, proprietors 
and managers of telegraph and telephone systems, stations and exchanges, 
receivers. transmitters, carriers and distributors of telegrams speech, music, 
sounds. signals. printed or visual or pictorial matter of all kinds, and news 
intelligence of all businesses and services connected therewith respectively and 
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with telegraphic, telephonic, wireless and other communications howsoever 
produced, transmitted or received. 
4. To construct, maintain, lay down, carry out, work, sell, let on hire 
and deal in telephones and all kinds of works, machinery, apparatus, 
conveniences, and things capable of being used in connection with any of these 
objects, and in particular any cables, wires, lines, stations and exchanges. 
5. To send and receive signals, messages and communications to and from 
aircraft, dirigibles and all other vehicles propelled in the air and to send and 
receive signals, weather reports, messages and communications of all kinds of 
descriptions and to create, install and operate systems of telecommunications in 
all parts of the world. 
6. To obtain, acquire, exercise, use and turn to account, concessions, inventions, 
patents, monopolies, rights, licences, privileges processes, secret or other 
information, trade marks and copy rights which may seem to the Company to 
be capable of being used for or in connection with any of the objects of the 
Company (Etisalat, 1976). 
These corporate objectives are underlined by the corporate mission statement, which 
declares that Etisalat is "to work together as one team to satisfy customer requirements 
in telecommunication services and technologies in a friendly and efficient manner". 
This is complemented by the Human Resources Policy and objectives, which indicate 
that Etisalat focuses on the following: 
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f Developing today's potential for tomorrow's needs 
f Employees motivation and satisfaction is Etisalat's success 
f To strive for the well-being of employees 
f To recruit the best to achieve the Corporation's objectives 
f To endeavour for employment and professional development of UAE Nationals. 
f To reward performance. 
f To train staff and develop their competencies for tomorrow's challenges. 
f Attract, Recruit and Retain qualified staff, with great emphasis on UAE Nationals. 
f Maintain internal equity among all staff 
f Upgrade, Train and Develop employees to cope with international standards. 
f Provide efficient employees services for all staff. 
f Create healthy working environment, by establishing the sense of belonging 
teamwork, and respectful treatment. 
7.5 OPERATIONAL STRATEGY 
To achieve its objectives, Etisalat adopts a basket of business/marketing strategies 
which include corporate growth and market leadership business strategy supported by 
a combination of product-development, market-development and market-penetration 
marketing strategies (Ansoff, 1966; Kotler, 1999). In pursuant of these strategies, 
Etisalat has diversified its business into various segments and service activities. These 
service activities include, among others, infrastructure development, introduction of 
new services, aggressive promotion of the GSM system and provision of Internet 
services. Besides these business activities, the management recently reviewed and 
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reassessed the operational requirements of the corporation by addressing the key 
issues such as restructuring and streamlining the company's operation in order to 
enhance the competitive position of the corporation within the telecommunications 
industry. Through appropriate strategic positioning in the market, the corporation is 
meeting the turbulent environmental changes such as globalization of businesses, 
liberalization of previously heavily regulated telecommunication services and 
increased competition from new technologies. 
As part of its operational strategy, the corporation prepared for the so-called 
'Millennium Bug' by ensuring that all its computers, exchanges and equipment were 
Y2K compliant. Also, in order to minimize the disruption to computers and 
exchanges that the 'Millennium Bug' was likely to cause, the corporation made a 
comprehensive arrangement by setting up a command center, 'Early Warming Center' 
to meet any Y2K related problem and to help customers to solve any problem arising 
from the 'Millennium Bug'. In the field of customer services the corporation has 
moved very closely to its clients by identifying their business and personal needs 
through an extensive market survey and research. This has led to the introduction of 
more services such as online billing enquiry for GSM and internet account, short 
messaging service on GSM, e-mail on GSM and Al Mersal - the message recording 
service as well as automated public cash payment machines. 
To improve the quality of service Etisalat has established a 'call center' whereby the 
customers can call on a single number to get a variety of telecom services online. 
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Etisalat is planning actively to promote its Internet exchange E-mix in order to make 
UAE an Internet hub for the region. 
7.6 BUSINESS EXPANSION IN ETISALAT 
The growth of Etisalat over the years has been phenomenal due largely to the rapid 
economic development and income growth in the UAE. The national income of the 
country, for example, increased from $42.5 billion in 1995 to $43.7 billion in 1999 
resulting in an increase in per capita income from $15,791 in 1995 to $17,500.00 in 
1999 (Central Bank of UAE, 2000). This trend provided great opportunity for the 
corporation as business and household demands for exchange lines increased 
enormously. The corporation achieved, for example, an average annual growth rate of 
90% over the 19 years from 1976 to 1995 in the number of exchange lines installed 
and operative. With a further 130,000 lines expansion program undertaken in 1995 
which increased the total number of exchange lines to 814,000 by the end of 1995 
compared with 40,000 in 1976, the average annual growth rate over the period 
increased to 101.84%. A more subdued average annual growth rate of 12.5% was 
recorded for the period 1991 to 1995, (see, Figure 7.3), which explains that the 
phenomenal expansion was achieved between the period 1976 and 1990; a period that 
coincided with the rapid growth in the Oil revenue and economic growth in the 
country. 
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During the same period (1976 to 1995), the international traffic expanded from 10 
million paid minutes in 1976 to over 504 million paid minutes in 1995. This amounts 
to a staggering average annual growth rate of 260% over the 19 years period. A 
similar growth trend was recorded in period between 1995 and 1999 as can be seen in 
Figure 7.4. From 504 million paid minutes international calls in 1995. the system 
expanded to 963 million paid minutes in 1999, which represents an overall growth of 
91.1% over the period. The IDD services of the corporation also expanded in tandem 
with the growth of international traffic. Currently, IDD services are available to over 
239 countries and destinations. 
The domestic market also experienced similar growth trend in the period 1976 to 
1995. For example, local telephone calls increased from 25 million paid minutes in 
1976 to about 2 billon paid minutes in 1995. Furthermore, by 1995, the United Arab 
Emirates had more exchange lines per inhabitant than any of the other Arab countries. 
For instance, the exchange lines per 100 inhabitants in the UAE in 1995 were over 28 
exchange lines compared with an average of only 4 lines per 100 inhabitants in the 
other Arab countries. Besides its sophisticated digital PSTN network and increasing 
number of mobile telephone users and telex lines. Etisalat had in the last ten years 
introduced mobile services in the country to cope with the business community and 
individual users' demand. These services range from GSM (Global System for 
Mobiles) to Paging Network. Advanced Voice Mail Services, Emirates Data Network 
for the packet switching network and Electronic messaging services (E-mail) together 
with leased circuits facilities. 
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The aggregate effect of the expansion in the domestic market is reflected in the 
national telephone call figures for the more current period of 1995 to 1999 as can be 
seen in Figure 7.5. It can be seen in the Figure that national calls increased from 
about 2 billion paid minutes in 1995 to over 4.2 billion paid minutes in 1999: a two- 
fold or 200% increase over the four-year period. 
In addition to traditional services. Etisalat offers its customers supplementary services 
such as ISDN facilities, Video Conference Service, ATM Services for banking 
activities, Internet services and other ancillary services such as Value Added Network 
Services, Calling card and Pre-paid calling card services. These expansions in both 
domestic and international markets have taken place in a less than -open competitive 
market situation'. Etisalat is a quasi-governmental corporation and it dominates the 
UAE telecommunication market to a very high degree through government supported 
monopoly concession. 
7.7 FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND ANALYSIS OF ETISALAT 
Clause 2 of the Articles of Association of Etisalat states that the authorized share 
capital of Etisalat is 30 million shares of Dh. 100 each and the paid up capital is Dh. 1.5 
billion with market capitalization of Dh. 33.8 billion. Since inception. the corporation 
has been enjoying an uninterrupted positive growth rate in its turnover and 
profitability. In 1993/94 the net profit rose by 8.91%; the return on shareholders' fund 
was 32% and the earning per share was Dh. 83 with a dividend distribution per share 
of Dh. 50. In 1994/95 and 1995/96 profit rose to 16.39% and 17.66 respectively 
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whereas the returns on capital employed was 33% in each year and earning per share 
of Dh. 91 for the same period. In 1997,1998 and 1999 the profitability growth rate 
had been 9.03%. 8.46°, 6 and (2.04%) respectively whereas the rate of return on capital 
employed was 32%. 30° ö. and 26% respectively; thus recording a decline in the profit 
and rate of return on shareholders' fund despite the corporate monopolist position in 
the domestic market (see Appendix 1). Tables 7.1 to 7.6 present the Profit and Loss 
Account of the Corporation for the years, 1993/4, to 1998/9, which include the three 
years discussed above. As can be seen in the Tables, profit increased by 8.91% in 
1993/4; by 16.39% in 1994/5 and peaked at 17.66% in 1995/6 before tumbling to 
9.03% in 1996/7: 8.46% in 1997/98 and to a negative (2.04%) in 1998/9. Figure 7.6 
depicts the trend of profitability over the period 1994 to 1999. 
Figure 7.6 
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Etisalat Profitability Trend 1994 - 1999 
TABLE: 7.1 
PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT 
FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31 DECEMBER 1994 
INCREASE/ 
1994 DECREASE 1993 
Dh'000 % Dh'000 
Revenue 2,894,588 7.97 2.680.893_ 
Opening Profit 1,140,557 5.24 1,083,709 
Other Income 
PROFIT FOR THE YEAR 
102.107 78.52 57.197 
1.242,664 8.91 1,140,996 
Unappropriated Profit Brought Fonvard 
APPROPRIATIONS: 
Dividends 
Transfer to assets replacement reserve 
6,615 (47.75) 12,660 
1,249,279 8.29 1,153,65 
(747.041) - (747,041) 
x (200,000) 
Transfer to general reserve (500,000) 150.00 (200,000) 
Unappropriated profit carried forward 2,238 (66.17) 6,61. 
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TABLE: 7.2 
PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT 
FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31 DECEMBER 1995 
INCREASE/ 
1995 DECREASE 1994 
Dh'000 % Dh'000 
3,213,313 11.01 289 $ 
PROFIT FOR THE YEAR 
1,269,143 11.27 1,140,557 
177.162 73.51 102.107 
1,446,3 05 16.39 1,242,664 
Unappropriated Profit Brought Forward 2,238 (66.170) 6,615 
11,448,543 15.95 1,249,27 
APPROPRIATIONS: 
Dividends 
Transfer to assets replacement reserve 
(933,819) 25.00 (747,041) 
(150,000) X 
Transfer to general reserve (363,528 (27,29) (500,000) 
Unappropriated profit carried forward 1,19 (46,56) 2,23 
255 
TABLE: 7.3 
PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT 
FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31 DECEMBER 1996 
INCREASE/ 
1996 DECREASE 1995 
Dh'000 % Dh'000 
Revenue 3.785.734 17.31 3.213.31a 
Opening Profit 1,502,665 18.40 1,269,143 
Other Income 199.114 12.39 177.162 
PROFIT FOR THE YEAR 1,701,779 17,66 1,446,305 
Unappropriated Profit Brought Forward 
APPROPRIATIONS: 
Dividends 
Transfer to development reserve 
Transfer to assets replacement reserve 
Transfer to general reserve x 
Unappropriated profit carried forward 9,15 665.55 
1,196 (46.56) 2,238 
1,702,975 17.56 1,448,54 
(933,819) - (933,819) 
(500,000) 233.33 (150,000) 
(260,000) x 
(363,528) 
1,19 
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TABLE: 7.4 
PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT 
FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31 DECEMBER 1997 
INCREASE/ 
1997 DECREASE 1996 
Dh'000 % Dh'000 
4.129.719 12.35 3 675 6Q 
1,617,974 7.67 1.502.665 
PROFIT FOR THE YEAR 
Unappropriated Profit Brought Forward 
APPROPRIATIONS: 
Dividends 
Transfer to development reserve 
Transfer to assets replacement reserve 
Transfer to general reserve 
237.506 19,28 199.114 
1,855,480 9,03 1,701,779 
9,156 665.55 1,196 
1,864,646 9.49 1,702,97. 
(1,167.274) 25.00 (933,819) 
233.33 (500,000) 
(190,000) (26.92) (260,000) 
(400,910) X 
Unappropriated profit carried forward 7,452 (18.61) 9,15 
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TABLE: 7.5 
PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT 
FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31 DECEMBER 1998 
INCREASE/ 
1998 DECREASE 1997 
Dh'000 % Dh'000 
Revenue 5.070.406 22.78 4.129.719 
Opening Profit 1,773,254 9.60 1.617.974 
Other Income 239.212 0.72 237.06 
PROFIT FOR THE YEAR 2,012,466 8.46 1,855,480 
Unappropriated Profit Brought Forward 
APPROPRIATIONS: 
Dividends 
Transfer to development reserve (400,000) 233.33 (500,000) 
Transfer to assets replacement reserve (437.000) (12.58) (499,910) 
Unappropriated profit carried forward 11,0-ý3 48.19 7,452 
EARNINGS PER SHARE AED 85.9 AED 79.5 
7,452 (18.61) 9,156 
2,019,918 8.33 1,864,63 
(1,171,875) 0.39 (1,167,274) 
258 
TABLE: 7.6 
PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT 
FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31 DECEMBER 1999 
INCREASE/ 
1999 DECREASE 1998 
Dh'000 % Dh'000 
Revenue 6,190,462 21 5.108.258 
Opening Profit 1,759,601 (0.77) 1.773,254 
Other Income 211.865 (11.43) 239.212 
PROFIT FOR THE YEAR 
Unappropriated Profit Brought Forward 
APPROPRIATIONS: 
Dividends 
Transfer to general reserve 
1,971,466 (2,04) 2,012,466 
11,043 48.19 7,452 
1,982,509 (1.85) 2,019,91 
(1,406.250) 
Transfer to assets replacement reserve 
((568.750) 
X 
Unappropriated profit carried forward 7,509 
EARNINGS PER SHARE AED 70.01 
20.00 (1,171,875) 
30.15 (437,000) 
(400,000) 
(32.00) 11,043 
AED 71.6 
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However the negative profitability rate in 1999 was due to the provision for the value 
of investment in ICO Global Communications (Holdings) Ltd. (Etisalat, 1999) 
In a similar manner, Etisalat revenue was growing at a fast rate since 1996 even 
though the net profit to revenue for this period had been declining sharply. In 1996. 
for example, revenue increased by 17.8% and in 1998 and 1999 the increase was 22% 
and 21% respectively whereas the net profit to revenue fell from 41% in 1996 to 
25.8% in 1999. This decline. however. was attributed to reduction in rate charges 
because of international competition and the corporate domestic policy to boast 
revenue/sales in order to achieve profit target at the end of each fiscal year. 
In 1998 the corporation tightened its credit policy and debt collection period was 
reduced from 65 days in 1998 to 54 days in 1999. Despite the improvement in credit 
terms. the liquidity of the company deteriorated. In 1998 the liquidity ratio was 1.06: 1 
and in 1999 it was 0.93: 1. The main reason for such deterioration in liquid position 
was the enormous increase in fixed assets within the period. In 1998 the fixed assets 
of the corporation increased by 37.75% and in 1999 by 31.26% (Etisalat. 1999). In 
1998 the approved amount for capital projects and investments totaled Dh. 6 billion 
approximately and in 1999 that commitment decreased to Dh. 4.5 billion. These capital 
projects and investments are meant to enhance the corporation's various network and 
services especially in the high technology field. 
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As far as the contribution of each segment of services is concerned, telephone lines 
contributed the highest with 65% of the total revenue in 1997 followed by mobile 
telephone at 21.8% and data services at 4.8%. In 1998, the contribution of mobile 
telephone jumped to 28.15% and data service to 5.63% while telephone revenue went 
down to 59.31%; this compares with a contribution of 31.8% for mobile telephone. 
4.3% for data service: 2.2% for Internet and 55.4% for telephones in 1999 (Etisalat. 
1999). These distributions of service revenues show that telephones growth rate is 
negative over this period whereas mobile telephones and other newly introduced 
service such as Internet attracted customers/users' preference because of its 
technological appeal and convenience as well as lower operation cost. 
In terms of staff numbers. Etisalat had a total of 2842 workers with 839 senior staff 
members; the corresponding productivity ratio in terms of staff/telephone lines was 5 
staff/1000 lines in 1999. Of the total senior staff members, UAE nationals accounted 
for 87%, which represented a national staff/telephone line ratio of 6 staff/1000 lines. 
At the middle management. supervisory, technical and general labour categories, 
foreign workers dominate overwhelmingly. 
7.8 ASSESSMENT OF PERFORMANCE OF ETISALAT 
The financial success of Etisalat is not surprising considering the monopolist 
privileges of the corporation in the industry as well as the country. This does not, 
however, mean that the corporation would not have survived in a competitive 
situation. Far from it because the corporation is up-to-date in technology, services and 
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marketing oriented. However. there are other non-quantifiable areas of operation that 
require as much assessment and good performance as in the areas of finance and 
technology. Such areas include, among others, human resource management. public 
relations, worker empowerment, quality of services, customer orientation. investment 
and training of staff. Since quantifiable data are not available to assess the general 
performance of the corporation, we decided to test the hypothesis (H0): 
Ho: The general performance of Etisalat is not better than average: 
against an alternative hypothesis (Hi) that: 
HI: The general performance of Etisalat is better than average. 
Using Likert's interval scale (five point scale), we asked our 30 accountee and 
accountor respondents to assess the general performance of Etisalat compared to other 
quasi-government enterprises in the country on a response scale of. 
Response Code 
Much better performance 5 
Better performance 4 
Average performance 3 
Worse performance 2 
Much worse performance I 
The survey results are reported in Table 7.7. 
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Table 7.7 
Acce cment of General Pprfnrmnnt P of Fticalat 
Response Type Score scale 
No. of Response in 
sample 
Response as 
% of sample 
Very satisfied 5 6 20% 
Satisfied 4 12 40% 60% 
Average 3 8 26.67 
Dissatisfied 2 4 13.33 
13.33% 
Very Dissatisfied - - - 
TOTAL 30 100% T 
Descriptive Statistic Value 
Sample Total (N) 30 
Sum of response 89.00 
Mean of response 3.67 
Std. Error of Mean 0.175 
Std. Deviation 0.958 
Minimum Response I 
Maximum Response 5 
Variance 0.920 
Specifying the null and alternative hypotheses, we have: 
Null hypothesis Ho: M<3 
Alternative hypothesis H,: M>3 
where: 3 is the average score on the Likert scale: and 
M is the mean of the sample survey results. 
The Z test about one mean with sampling error (a = 0.05) is used and this gives a table 
value of Z (critical) = 1.64. 
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We then calculated the test statistic as: 
3.67-3 
z= --------------- 0.175 
= J. ÖJ 
The null hypothesis is thus rejected because the calculated Z-value (3.83) is higher 
than the critical Z-value (1.64). Thus, with 95% confidence, we infer that the 
performance rating given to Etisalat by our sample respondents is significantly higher 
than the average performance rate of 3. This means that Etisalat's general 
performance including financial achievements is higher than the average performance 
of similar enterprises in the industry. The financial records and performance of the 
corporation give much credence to this finding and the interpretation of the results. 
7.9 FUTURE DEVELOPMENT 
Further to its strategic infrastructure development, Etisalat is allocating a substantial 
amount of money for Cable Transmission network and Cable TV infrastructure, 
information technology, e-cornmerce and ADSL technology. In addition to such a 
future development, Etisalat is focusing on improving and expanding switching core 
network, broadband network will be developed for multi media service, high speed 
Internet will be introduced on ADSL. Internet dial up connections will be improved 
to cater for 500,000 customers and E-mix as well as expanding the capacity of GSM 
to support 1.4 million customers. Moreover, value added services using the wireless 
application protocol and General Packet Radio Services technology will be enhanced. 
Etisalat, as part of its strategy of human resource development focuses on the training 
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and development programs for UAE nationals so that technically qualified workforce 
can be prepared for the challenge of advanced telecommunication networks. 
However, the corporation was, as a result of such management policy, able to increase 
the number of national staff from 2087 in 1998 to 2842 in 1999 together with 400 well 
structured training programs and courses for those staff during the year of 1999. 
Moving away from the traditional telecommunications services such as fixed voice 
telephony, Etisalat was able to introduce very advanced and cost effective services to 
the market in 1999. The charge rate for roaming service for subscribers traveling 
overseas had been reduced from Dh. 6 per hour coupled with an introduction of an off- 
peak rate of Dh. 1.8 per hour. The monthly rental fee was reduced to flat rate of 
Dh. 20. The Corporation's management had adopted a strategy of providing the best 
quality service with the most competitive price as well as focusing on its customers 
needs and business requirement through the development and introduction of newly 
released services. 
7.10 MANAGEMENT ACCOI'\'TABII. ITV IN ETISALAT 
The term 'accountability' in organizations conjures up the traditional perception that 
the term relates to providing an account of the financial transactions of the 
organization - this is Financial Accountability. Other concepts of Accountability such 
as 'Management Accountability', which has a broader meaning than the other strands 
of accountability including Financial Accountability, often sounds unclear to many 
people. Because of this. we started our survey of both the Accountees and Accountors 
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in Etisalat with a question intended to have a common understanding of the term. It is 
important to state at this point that the information/data used in this and subsequent 
sections of this chapter have been obtained through primary questionnaire survey and 
personal interviews conducted in December 2000 among a purposively selected 
sample of 30 Accountees and Accountors in Etisalat. Appropriate statistical 
techniques from the 'Statistical Package for the Social Sciences' (SPSS) have been 
employed to analyze the data collected and appropriate conclusions have been drawn 
from the analysis. 
As stated above. we needed to establish a common understanding of the term 
'Accountability' particularly. 'management accountability', so we asked our sample 
respondents to select from a list of definitions of 'accountability' a single definition 
that represents their view of the term. Table 7.8 presents the views of our respondents 
on the definition of 'Management Accountability'. 
lt can be seen in the Table that though 56.67% (i. e. 17 out of 30 respondents) of the 
respondents indicate that Management Accountability involves both accounting for 
use of resources and assessment of the performance of the use into which the resource 
was put (this is the operational definition of the term), a considerable proportion of the 
respondents (30%) view the concept in terms of Financial Accountability. That is, the 
provision of detail annual budget of income and expenditure of the Corporation. This 
view of 'Accountability' is the generic impression of many people when they talk 
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about accountability and we encountered it during the personal interviews that 
followed the questionnaire survey. 
Table 7.8 
Definition of INIana2ement Accountability in Etisalat 
Number % Of 
S/n Definition of Response Rankine 
Response in Sample 
I Provision of general annual account of 
the performance of the Corporation 1 3.33% 4th 
2 Provision of detail account of the 
performance and use of resources made 
available to the Corporation by 17 56.67% Ist 
shareholders 
3 Provision of detail annual budget of 
income and expenditure of the 
Corporation 9 30.00% 2nd 
4 Provision of detail annual account of the 
use of resources made available to the 
Corporation by shareholders 3 10.00% 3rd 
TOTAL 30 100% 
To many of interviewees. accountability should relate only to financial transactions 
because the basis of evaluation of the performance of a company is simply the 'profit 
and loss account'. The impression was. however, corrected during the interview. 
This boosted the proportion of our respondents with the desired understanding of the 
central term underlining this study (i. e. 'Management Accountability') to a staggering 
90% with only 10% undecided. The operational definition of the term with respect to 
the case studies may thus be put as the provision of detail account of the performance 
and use of resources made available to the Corporation/Ministry by the 
shareholders/government'. 
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7.10.1 Structure of management Accountability 
Like any partly state owned enterprise, Etisalat has many facets of accountabilities 
which link political, social, managerial and legal duties and responsibilities within the 
corporation. The linkages between action and explanation of individuals/group within 
the organization depend on the duties and the responsibilities given by the 
Memorandum and Article of Association and the management of Etisalat. 
Figure 7.7 demonstrates the basic structure of Management Accountability in the 
Corporation. This structure compares with the organizational structure of the 
Corporation as presented earlier in Figures 7.1 and 7.2. While in the organizational 
structure (Figures 7.1 & 7.2). the Board of Directors comprising ten members, including 
the chairman, constitute the apex of the decision-making hierarchy, in the management 
accountability structure, the ultimate decision makers (Accountees) are the Government 
and the Shareholders (see Figure 7.7). In the Board of Directors, the government 
appoints six members and the remaining four members are elected by the shareholders 
at the Annual General Assembly. This role and authority of the ultimate Accountees 
(the Government and the Shareholders), underscores the difference in both structures. 
Traditionally, within the hierarchical structure of the organization, the government 
appointee will report to the Cabinet of Ministers through the Chairman, the Minister of 
Transport and Telecommunications, on matters such as rates increases/reduction, 
acquisitions and disposal of substantial part of Etisalat's assets as well as on matters 
relating to public policy. Being a commercially oriented enterprise, the Board is also 
collectively accountable to the shareholders for financial affairs and stewardship of the 
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corporations' assets and liabilities. As Accountees, the shareholders are entitled to 
know through their representatives matters relating to 
Figure 7.7 
Structure of Management Accountability in ETISALAT 
Government 
Board of Director 
Executive Committee 
President & Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) 
Senior Executive VPs & 
Vice Presidents (VPs) 
Executive Senior Regic 
VPs Managers Hea 
Accountors 
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management and financial performance, customer satisfaction and types and quality of 
services provided, cost of running such services and future development plans and 
strategies of the corporation. 
Besides the shareholders, the customers and the public in general have vested interest in 
the corporation's activities and services so the Board has, at least in theory, some 
accountability duties and responsibilities towards the customers and the community 
with regards to the service coverage, technology, development, human resource 
management and environmental issues. The extent to which the accountability of the 
Board to the customers and the general public is direct and effective was raised during 
the personal interviews conducted. We asked 3 Accountees and 7 Accountors of the 
company to indicate their views with respect to the level of effectiveness of their 
accountability to their customers and the general public. Table 7.9 presents our 
findings. 
Table 7.9 
Effectiveness of Accountability of Board to Customers & General Public 
Type of RESPONSE 
Interviewee Direct 
Accountability 
Indirect 
Accountability 
Effective 
Accountability 
Ineffective 
Accountability 
Accountees - 3 - 3 
Accountors - 7 - 7 
Total - 10 - 10 
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There is a total agreement between both groups, Accountees and Accountors, that the 
accountability of the Board of Directors to the customers of Etisalat and the general 
public is neither direct nor effective in the sense that the public or customers cannot 
initiate any action that would affect the company adversely. For one thing. the 
company is a government granted and supported monopolist in the industry and for 
another, there is no public or consumer watchdog over the activity of the company as it 
is the case in the United Kingdom. As one of the respondents puts it during the 
personal interviews: 
-'our political-economic system is a paternalistic system where the President and 
his government know what is good for the people and adjusts the system, 
whether in the private or public sector, to achieve the goal of improving the 
welfare of the citizens. There is no need for a British style. formal 'Consumer 
Charter' because our system operates in an informal way and this suits our 
culture and religion". 
Another respondent puts it more bluntly that: 
"The company knows what the customers and the public want and we satisfy 
them; so what is the problem? Why should we have a 'Customers Charter' as in 
Britain? Our people are satisfied and happy with our services so they do not 
need any public watchdog". 
And. yet. a third respondent adds: 
--People are happy with the services and prices of Etisalat - al-hamduralla - so 
ýý by would they care about what goes on with or in the company? We are the 
people's company so they don't need elaborate accounts or extra watchdogs". 
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Despite these sentiments, the fact is that the paternalistic system that operates in the 
country does not encourage open public censorship of government organizations or 
departments. This situation, however, is changing, albeit, slowly and without fanfare. 
For example, the Chairman and managing director of the Corporation, His Execellency, 
Ali Bin Salim Al Owais. has urged subscribers to Etisalat services to express "their 
views through the media and pre-paid announcements to enable the company to 
promptly reveal any defects and arrange necessary remedy" in an interview with the Al 
Bavan news Agency in 1999. Some government ministries and departments are now 
being openly criticized for their ineffectiveness and inefficiency while some top 
management personnel in government departments have actually been arrested for 
inappropriate activities that border on corruption and irresponsibility (Gulf News. 14 
Feb. 2001). 
It is also the case that neither the Minister nor the members of the Board have any 
electoral constituency to face in a general election, as there are no political parties or 
political elections in the country. However, the public interest is expected to be 
protected by the Auditor General's Office, which raises accountability issues in the 
operations of various government and quasi-govenlment organizations but has no 
powers. as is the case in the British system, to implement its recommendations and 
solutions. More of the role and powers of the Audit Office will be discussed in the next 
case-study - the Ministry of Health. 
Thus, the Board of Directors and the Operational 
Management are only indirectly and ineffectively accountable to the customers and the 
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wider public. Moreover, there are no effective public watch-dogs or `whistle-blowers' 
to protect formally and legally the legitimate interest of the public and customers of 
Etisalat services. 
7.10.2 The Accountor-Accountee Relationshin 
The management structure of Etisalat (see, Figures 7.1,7.2 and Figure 7.7) provides 
two main groups of functionaries who report directly to the President and Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO). One group comprises top and middle management level at 
head office and the second group is made up of management personnel in the 
decentralized regional operations with direct reporting line to the President and Chief 
Executive Officer of Etisalat. Within the hierarchical structure, the accountability 
chain flows from bottom to top (bottom up). Each manager in the organization is 
accountable to his immediate line manager within the department concerned and 
managers of these departments/divisions are answerable to their immediate superiors. 
Senior Executive Vice President Special Project (SEVP/SP) and the Vice Presidents 
for administration/international relation/technical and the Senior Management (Audit) 
report directly to the President and Chief Executive Officer who in turn reports to the 
Executive Committee and the Board of Directors. 
All the managerial lines to the Chief Executive Officer are treated as accountors to the 
President and Chief Executive Officer who, in turn, is an accountor to the Executive 
Committee and the Board. Similarly the Board is collectively an accountor to the 
Government and the Shareholders. The actions of each category of accountors are 
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subject to scrutiny, sanctions or reward by the stakeholders or their representatives at 
any time. This remains. however, the theoretical and statutory expectation as put 
down in the instruments that established the Corporation and its organizational and 
management accountability structures. It is one of the central objectives of this piece 
of work to establish whether these statutory requirements and expectations are 
implemented and satisfied in practice. If they are not, the study intends to identify the 
possible causal factors and analyze their effects and recommend solutions. 
In line with our objective in this study, we asked our ten respondents during the 
personal interviews, to discuss and indicate their impression about the effectiveness of 
the management accountability structure and the accountor - accountee relationship in 
the corporation. On the structure of accountability, all the respondents agree 
unreservedly the current structure, as established by the instruments of operation, are 
satisfactory and operationally feasible. However, three of the respondents would want 
to see more decentralization of operations and delegation of responsibility and 
authority. They stated that they are given "responsibilities without the necessary 
authority and power to implement anything". This situation is commonplace in the 
system and leads to what is often identify as a "layback" attitude among the 
management cadre in the UAE. Delegation of responsibility without a commensurate 
delegation of powers to execute the obligations of the responsibility may lead to poor 
management accountability through indifference and self-demotivation. 
With respect to accountor-accountee relationship, our personal interview question and 
the responses are reported here below: 
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Question: Sir, would you consider the accountor-accountee relationship in your 
organization formal, indifferent or informal? 
Answer: Response No. of Respondent out of 10 Percentage 
Formal 2 20% 
Indifferent 3 30% 
Informal 5 50% 
Total 10 100% 
Clearly, 50% of the respondents hold the view that the relationship is more informal 
than formal, 30% are indifferent while only 20%, mainly foreign management staff, 
view it as more formal. The dominance of informal accountor-accountee relationship 
in government organizations in the UAE seems common as the next case-study will 
confirm. This is contrary to the situation in the British system where formal 
relationship dominates informal relationship. According to one of the respondents; 
"our political system is very different from the British system; we are brothers here 
but that is not the case in the UK where you have cut-throat competition among the 
senior management personnel". 
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Question: How would you assess the effectiveness of the accountor- accountee 
relationship in the organization on a scale of, very effective, effective, 
average, ineffective or very ineffective? 
Answer: Response No. of Respondents out of 10 Percentage 
Very effective -- 
Effective 2 20% 
Average 2 20% 
Ineffective 3 30% 
Very Ineffective 3 30% 
Total 10 100% 
An overwhelming proportion of the respondents (60%) hold the view that the 
effectiveness of the accountor-accountee relationship in the organization is less than 
average - that is it is ineffective to achieve the level of management accountability 
required by the instruments that set up the corporation. According to two of our 
accountor respondents and supported by two other accountee respondents, "one of the 
major problems of accountability, whether management, financial or otherwise, in our 
country is the complex web of informal and family relationships. It will be nice to 
solve this problem in our society". 
The incidence of complex informal relationship and its effect in government 
organizations in the UAE is underscored in a paper presented at a Forum organized 
by 
the Emirates Media Corporation. Among the various issues raised in the paper, the 
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author argued that "disrespect of Law" which emanates from "personal relations are 
able to prevent any" disciplinary measures being taken against the violations (Jakka, 
2000). The paper states that: 
`' It is clear to any observer that the administrative procedures and regulations 
in the Government organizations are disregarded by the officials who 
introduced them. Exemptions became the general rule. while respect of law is 
the exception. This negative attitude caused disorder and loss of respect of 
administrative leadership. Lack of will and determination to implement laws 
and regulations resulted in indifference among the employees since those who 
disregard laws are beyond punishment and that personal relations are able to 
prevent any penalty' (Jakka, 2000). 
7.10.3 When are Management Accounts and Retorts Rendered? 
The frequency and the contents of management accounts and reports vary from one 
organization/enterprise to another depending on the requirements of the management, 
the control needed. the nature of the business, the reporting and monitoring system in 
operation as well as the culture and size of the organization. 
In Etisalat. with its diversified activities and decentralized regional units, the reporting 
system in operation caters for the legal and international accounting and reporting 
standard as well as day-to-day management need for information. For performance 
management report. the personnel appraisal is written annually or whenever the 
relevant management contemplates a promotion whereas the work assessment is 
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carried out on a daily basis for each individual staff. In Appendix F the `Performance 
Management Form' is attached, and it can be seen that Etisalat has a well-developed 
personnel appraisal. However. this formal procedure seems to apply to certain grade 
of personnel not necessarily to all employees of the corporation. The current business 
management ethos is based on 'Systems Approach', which requires that staff appraisal 
systems do not discriminate between employee groups. 
As far as information on financial operation is concerned, the corporation prepares its 
results annually but information on business segment traffic turnover/volume and 
manpower report are carried out on a monthly and quarterly basis respectively to 
enable management to monitor results very closely. 
7.10.4 Contents of Management Accounts and Report 
The contents of management accounts and report of any organization depend on the 
management information requirements for running the corporate business and the 
reporting system in existence. Some reporting systems require detailed accounts of 
the activities of the corporation while others need brief and concise details. The latter 
situation applies especially in small to medium enterprises where direct supervision of 
the owner is part of the daily routine of the business while the former belongs to the 
larger organizations with complex formal structures and management systems have 
been institutionalized. 
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In the case of Etisalat, the business operation necessitates a detailed and 
comprehensive reporting system due to the mixed ownership of the corporation and 
the International Accounting Standards requirements as well as the regulatory 
authority code of conducts (Stock Exchange Rules and Regulations). Besides the 
regulatory compliance. Etisalat's reports and accounts contain consolidated statement 
of income, assets and liabilities and source and application of fund (cash flow) 
together with statement of debtors, stocks and workforce broken down into regions 
and country of origin of the workers. Over and above these statements, the 
corporation has to report on segmental turnover distinguishing between various 
business units sales achieved and the planned target. The 'Reporting System' with its 
forms and objectives is presented in Appendix G. 
The Reports in Etisalat, as indeed in many other organizations in the UAE, focus 
overwhelmingly on financial reporting (Financial accountability) rather than the wider 
management reporting (Management accountability). Financial reporting relates to the 
provision of information to management for the purpose of planning, controlling and 
decision-making. The main purposes of financial reporting in Etisalat are: 
a) Internal reporting to management for use in planning and controlling 
routine operations; 
b) Internal reporting to management for use in making non-routine 
decisions and in formulating major plans and policies; and 
c) External reporting to shareholders and Government on the financial 
perfornnance of the Corporation. 
279 
The financial information available to management may be presented in alternative 
formats from those required for external reporting or for the purpose of decision 
making and planning. 
Management reporting is not constrained in any way by legislative requirements or by 
the International Accounting Standards. Management will decide what assumptions, 
concepts and presentation techniques are appropriate for a particular purpose. For 
management appraisal, for example, the report may cover items such as performance 
scores and work assessment, i. e. quality of work, reliability, initiative, supervision and 
safety factors. Management reporting system provides information to management 
for the following purposes: 
a) Formulation of policies and strategies; 
b) Planning and controlling the activities of Etisalat; 
c) Decision taking on alternative course of action; 
d) Safeguarding assets of the corporation. 
To find out the views of our respondents on the content of an annual management 
report of the main accountor (the President & Chief Executive Officer) of the 
corporation. we asked our respondents in the questionnaire survey to indicate, through 
a ranking score process using 5 as most important and 1 as least important, the topics 
they would expect to find in the report. Our finds are presented in Table 7.10. 
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It can be seen in the Table that our respondents consider 'evaluation of the 
performance of Etisalat' (Ranked 1) over the period of the report as the most 
important topic to be included in the main accountor's report to the accountees 
Table 7.10 
Rating of Significance of Topics in Annual Management Report 
Sample Mean Std. 
Expected Topic Size Score Dev. Of Ranking 
Mean 
Policy and Objectives of the 
Organization 30 4.00 0.165 3 
Funds and other resources 
allocated to the Organization 30 3.60 0.725 5 
Evaluation of performance of the 
organization 30 4.75 0.042 1 
Strategy of operation of the 
Organization 30 3.25 0.985 6 
Limitations of the Organization in 
its operations 30 3.60 0.882 5 
Performance measurement and 
control mechanisms 30 3.75 0.785 4 
Projection for future operations of 
the Organization 30 4.00 0.286 3 
Utilization of funds and other 
resources in the organization 30 4.50 0.065 2 
. The -utilization of 
funds and other resources in the organization' is ranked second 
while 'policy and objectives of the organization' and the future direction of the 
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corporation are ranked equal third. The scores and the ranking derived indicate the 
concern of our respondents for the wider 'management accountability' rather than the 
narrower `financial accountability' that is often the main interest of many enterprises 
in both public and private sectors. 
It is also interesting to note the consistently low standard deviations of the individual 
means of the scores. particularly those of the top ranking (i. e. Ranks 1,2 and 3). As 
can be seen in the Table, the standard deviations of the mean scores of the three top- 
ranking topics range from 0.042 to 0.286, which are not only low but also significant. 
The low standard deviations indicate that the individual views of the respondents as 
represented by their individual scores cluster around the means of the scores. This 
indicates a close consensus of opinion among our respondents on the importance of 
the relevant topics in the annual report of the main accountor. Moreover, the ratings 
of our respondents are significantly higher than the average rating of 3 at the 95% 
confidence level. 
Though Etisalat has a well-developed Management and Financial Reporting forms and 
procedures. it is regrettable that the focus of reporting in the recent past has been on 
financial accountability to meet the International Accounting Standards. Not much 
has been achieved in the practical development of management reporting that would 
reflect a concern over management accountability. This is changing, however, as 
indicated in the interview given to Al Bavani news media by the Managing Director of 
Etisalat. His Excellenc% Ali Bin Salim Al Owais, who said that: 
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"... Etisalat will provide to the subscribers the best services and most 
sophiscated telecommunication system at beat competitive prices. He hailed 
the role and contributon of UAE nationals in the progress and development of 
Etisalat and said that the company succeeded in two decades to develop and 
upgrade the telecommunications sector to the level of the most advanced 
countries by providing highly efficient services and adopting latest technology 
in the field of telecommunication services in accordance with the highest 
international standards. ... He encouraged subscribers to express their views 
through the media ... to enable the company to promptly reveal any defect and 
arrange necessary remedy" (Al Bavan, 2000). 
Clearly, the Managing Director was more concerned with providing management 
accountability than financial accountability to the accountees including the customers 
and the general public. 
7.11 ASSESSMENT OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN ETISALAT 
There is hardly a generally accepted set of criteria for assessing the level of 
accountability effectiveness and efficiency in all societies. This derives mainly from 
differences in the economic, political, social and system of government in the relevant 
country. These situations are different, for example, in the more advanced countries 
such as the UK. France and the USA compared to the less advanced ones such as the 
UAE. India, Nigeria and Argentina. However. we cannot escape the fact that there are 
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some basic standards that must exist in an organization to enable investigators to 
assess the level of accountability effectiveness and efficiency. 
Accountability assessment includes a retrospective component. which demands 
evidence and supporting documentation on prior performance in serving the public 
trust. Whether in retrospective auditing or otherwise. the main issue is to establish 
how well the organization has historically performed in meeting accountability 
standards rather than how the organization might mobilize these resources to address 
emerging trends. In some cases, the organization's performance can be measured 
directly. while in others, the assessor will need to look for indirect evidence. In 
general, some basic standards exist against which an organization may be assessed. In 
this section. we will itemize these standards and against them show what obtains in 
Etisalat. This is done in Table 7.11. The management accountability evidence in 
Etisalat. as shown in the Table, do not suggest how well the corporation has 
performed in meeting the general accountability criteria listed. 
Table 7.11 
Comparative Assessment of Accountability in Etisalat 
General Standards Practice at Etisalat 
Financial Resources Audit: Financial information and results as well 
There is evidence that the organization is as statistical data since 1994 to 1999 had 
regularly audited by an independent been used as a guide to the accountability 
professional in accordance with generally practice. The financial performance 
accepted accounting principles, and that achieved since 1994. the added services 
problems or shortcomings raised in and the technological development since 
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management letters from the auditor are that period as well as the growth rate in 
promptly addressed by the administrators sales and revenues set by Etisalat 
and trustees. management were the base for the 
'accountors' commitment to the 
There is evidence that individual services 'accountees' during the period selected. 
and program categories also are audited 
as required by statutory or contractual Auditor General, a government Audit 
agreement. Inspector, reports frequently on 
departmental and public enterprises' 
There is evidence that the organization activities and financial results as well as 
uses its budgeting and accounting the review of the control and procedures 
procedures to assess the relative cost- in operation to ensure that the fiduciary 
effectiveness of its programs, not just a relationship of those managers/civil 
line-item listing of expenditures and servants is not abused. 
i revenues. 
There is evidence that the organization 
manages its finances in accordance with 
generally accepted accounting principles 
and legal requirements. 
There is evidence that the organization 
follows internal procedures, with 
appropriate checks and balances, to 
minimize the risk of fraud, waste, and 
abuse in managing its financial resources. 
The organization plans its resource 
development activities with a view to 
ensuring its long-term solvency. 
There is evidence that the majority of the 
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organization's income is spent on 
programs and activities directly related to 
the mandate and mission. 
Human Resources Audit Examination of the system of sanctions 
There is evidence that the organization and reward and the method of 
employs personnel who are competent, management appraisal within the 
ethical, and qualified to contribute to the corporation. 
mission. 
Study empowerment and encouragement 
There is evidence that the organization system for personal judgment and 
follows personnel policies and procedures decision-making as well as participation 
that promote effective and accountable in budget and operational activities 
performance. setting. 
There is evidence that employees are Inspection of a statement of personal 
trained to follow internal and external promise by manager/staff towards service 
chains of accountability. delivery/result or any contract in this 
regard. 
There is evidence that the organization 
applies appropriate standards of 
accountability to its volunteers and has 
volunteer recruitment and management 
policies to promote effective and 
accountable performance. 
Information Resources Audit Assessing the provision of information by 
There is evidence that the organization's the 'accountor' to the 'accountee' in order 
information system is designed to provide to secure an effective accountability 
readily accessible proof of compliance process. 
with accountability standards. 
There is evidence that the organization's 
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information system is designed to provide 
documented program outputs. outcomes, 
and impacts. 
There is evidence that information on 
program outputs, outcomes, and impact is 
used by decision makers to improve the 
level of efficiency. et 'ectiveness. and 
accountability. 
There is evidence that information is 
regularly shared with relevant 
stakeholders in annual reports, audited 
financial statements, and program 
evaluation reports. 
Where appropriate. the organization has 
taken steps to ensure confidentiality and 
security of its information system. 
Legal Mandate Audit 
There is evidence that appropriate Examination of the organisational 
documentation establishing the structure of Etisalat and the 
organization's legal authority is in place department/divisional functions and 
and up to date. duties, which had been assigned to all 
level of management, was considered as 
There is evidence that appropriate an important factor influencing the 
documentation regarding policies and accountability hierarchical structure and 
procedures is in place and followed by the chain of commend. 
organization. Study of the assignment system of 
authority and responsibility to ensure 
There is evidence that the organization is clear and non-overlapping functions, 
in compliance with relevant legal and which could blur the accountability chain. 
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regulatory requirements. 
There is evidence that the organization is 
in compliance with all contractual 
arrangements with internal and external 
stakeholders. 
Networks Audit 
There is evidence that the organization Etisalat has telephone complaint line in 
maintains contact with relevant order to help customers with service 
professional associations to keep abreast problems. 
of standards of professional practice. In certain public organizations/public 
enterprises there are complaint officers to 
There is evidence that the organization receive customers with grievances and 
regularly utilizes formal methods and complaints as well as suggestion boxes 
procedures to monitor the needs of for those willing to see an improvement 
current and prospective clients. in the services and the accountability 
mechanism. 
Where appropriate, the organization seeks Executive and legislative bodies started to 
ways to work in collaboration with other seek explanation of civil servants and 
organizations to achieve its mission. corporate manager's actions and try to 
expose and enhance the performance of 
these organizations through local media 
comments and criticisms. Press reporters 
visit offices of these organizations where 
public services are delivered and attempt 
to interview the recipients of these 
services in order to solicit their views of 
the quality and cost of these services. 
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Image Audit 
The organization regularly communicates The mission statement and the outcome of 
its mission, its goals, its strategies, and its that mission during 1994 to 1999 in 
actual performance to relevant Etisalat operation. 
constituencies. Consumer Council activity in recent years 
There is evidence of ongoing two-way had highlighted certain public consumers 
communication between the organization concern regarding some public sector 
and relevant constituencies. services and costs. The activity of the 
consumer council had prompted the 
government to set up an enquiry for the 
problem raised thus resulting in a 
corrective action (the case of price rise in 
LPG) 
Procedures Audit 
The organization's mission and operating Study of the assignment system of 
philosophies demonstrate a commitment authority and responsibility to ensure 
to quality and accountability. There is clear and non-overlapping functions, 
evidence that the pursuit of accountability which could blur the accountability chain. 
permeates all levels of the organization. 
The organization and its governing body 
are structured to achieve the mission, and 
these structures are consistent with the 
expressed operating philosophies. 
Program goals are clearly defined, with 
observable outputs. outcomes, and 
impacts. There is evidence that resources 
are allocated and managed so as to 
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achieve goals and desired outputs, 
outcomes, and impacts. 
There is evidence that responsiveness to 
explicit and implicit standards of 
accountability is a focus of the 
organization and is reflected in all of its 
management and governance procedures. 
In theory, the corporation seems to have assembled some of the documentations (see, 
Figures 7.1,7.2 and 7.6; Appendices Fand G), but in practice, the use of these 
documents have not been effective in developing practical management accountability 
in the corporation. It is arguable, however, that since the provision of information to 
the 'accountee' by the accountor is an important aspect in developing practical 
management accountability, the availability of documentations, albeit in theory, 
indicates the intention to encourage the practical development of management 
accountability in the corporation. In the financial accounting and reporting system in 
the corporation. as demonstrated by Tables I-6. there is a strong case to suggest that 
a partial fulfillment of the general standards with respect to 'financial resources audit' 
has been achieved. Other aspects of the general standards are available largely on 
paper but not in practice. The level of management accountability in the corporation, 
therefore. may be questionable as the response to our survey question on the 
assessment of the level of accountability in the next section suggests. 
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7.12 LEVEL OF MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTABILITY 
The previous section ended with an ambivalent conclusion about the level of 
management accountability in the corporation. In this section we present a stronger 
finding about the level of accountability obtained through two sources: 
a) Empirical findings through survey questionnaire and personal 
interviews; and 
b) Comparison against `benchmarks' from British case studies. 
7.12.1 Empirical Findings 
In our questionnaire survey we asked our respondents (30 in number) of accountors 
and accountees to assess the level of management accountability attained in the 
corporation by scoring on a Likert-scale of 'very satisfied (5)', 'satisfied (4)', 'average 
(3)', 'dissatisfied (2)' and 'very dissatisfied (1)'. The result is presented in Table 7.12. 
It can be seen in the Table that 23% of our respondents rate the level of management 
accountability in the corporation above average while 26% rate it below average. A 
total of 50% consider it about average. Mathematically, it may be inferred that the 
level of management accountability in the corporation is below average since 26% is 
higher than 23%. 
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Table 7.12 
Level of Satisfaction with Management Accountability in Etisalat 
Score RESPONSE 
Response Type Scale No. in 
sample 
% of 
Sample 
Very Satisfied 5 1 3% 
Satisfied 4 6 30% 23% 
Average 3 15 50% 50% 
Dissatisfied 2 7 23% 
Very Dissatisfied 1 1 3% 26% 
Total 30 100% 
Descriptive Statistic s 
N 30 
Sum 89 
Mean 2.97 
Std. Error of Mean 0.16 
Std. Deviation 0.85 
Variance 0.72 
Minimum 1.00 
Maximum 5.00 
But the question is whether this difference is statistically significant enough for us to 
conclude that the level of management accountability in the corporation is really low. 
To conclude appropriately and statistically, we formulated an appropriate hypothesis 
about the level of management accountability in the corporation and tested it using 
'descriptive statistics' as presented in the Table. 
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We formulated the test hypothesis (Ho) as follows: 
H,,: The level of Management Accountability in Etisalat is lower than average; 
The alternative hypothesis (H, ) is: 
Hi: The level of Management Accountability in Etisalat is higher than 
average; 
Specifying the null and alternative hypotheses, we have: 
M Null hypothesis Ho: <3 
Alternative hypothesis H, :M>3 
where: 3 is the average score on the Likert scale; and 
M is the mean of the sample survey results. 
The Z test about one mean with sampling error (a = 0.05) is used and this gives a table 
value of Z (critical) = 1.64. We then calculated the Z test statistic as: 
2.97 -3 
Z= --------------- 
0.16 
_ -0.188 
The null hypothesis is thus accepted because the calculated Z-value (-0.188) is lower 
than the critical Z-value (1.64). Thus, with 95% confidence, we infer that the level of 
management accountability in Etisalat, as rated by our sample respondents, is 
significantly lower than the average rate level of 3. This means that, unlike the 
general performance of Etisalat, which is higher than the average performance of 
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similar enterprises in the industry, the level of management accountability in the 
corporation is significantly lower than the average level. 
7.13 BENCI11MARK COMPARISON 
We attempted a benchmark comparison by using some indicators of high management 
accountability extracted from British and Australian cases (Day and Klein, 1987; 
Kearns, 1996. Epstein and Birchard, 2000). We asked our accountor and accountee 
respondents to rate the indicators according to how they perceive their effectiveness in 
encouraging the development of practical and effective management accountability in 
the corporation. The score rating of the respondents are presented in Table 7.13. 
Using the mean calculated for each response-type. it can be seen in the Table that our 
respondents have rated high the theoretical factors which have no real effective even 
in practice. Against this, the respondents have rated low the factors that practically 
encourage the development and effectiveness of management accountability such as 
Judicial Review. Democratic Administration, Transparency in Administration, use of 
external Ombudsman and Mandatory Reporting. These are the hallmarks of effective 
management accountability in public and quasi-public enterprises in the more 
advanced countries such as in British public sector enterprises such as Ministry of 
Education. British Telecommunication, British Rail and other quasi-government 
corporations (Day & Klein, 1987). 
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Table 7.13 
ACCOUNTABILITY FACTORS AND THEIR EFFECTIVENESS IN ETISALAT 
TORS MEANS OF STD. EFFECTIVENESS FAC 
SAMPLE (30) DEVIATION RANKING 
Legal Regulations 3.425 0.9306 1 
Organizational. Objective 3.325 0.9167 2 
Neutrality of civil Servants 3.325 1.5914 2 
Formal Communication Channel 3.225 1.0497 3 
Standard. Operating Procedure 3.200 1.1140 4 
Legal (Law) Standards. 2.725 1.3202 5 
Internal Auditing System 2.625 1.5138 6 
Informal Communication 
Channel 
2.525 1.4674 7 
Company Policy 2.425 1.4302 8 
Decentralization 2.325 1.3085 9 
Delegation of Authority 2.175 1.3754 10 
Poor Performance Sanction 
System 
2.000 1.3587 11 
Transparency/Openness of 
Administration 
1.875 1.5882 12 
External Ombudsman System 1.800 1.4358 13 
Job Description 1.625 1.4266 14 
Democratic Administration 1.425 1.4830 15 
Mandatory Reporting 1.400 1.4465 16 
Judicial Review 1.175 1.3566 17 
Job Appraisal 1.150 1.1886 18 
Reward for good Performance 1.150 1.1094 18 
The effectiveness of these hallmarks of management accountability are rated very low 
in Etisalat by our respondents. This lends support to our earlier conclusion that the 
level of management accountability in Etisalat is lower than the average. 
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7.14 SUNINIARY 
This case-study has attempted to assess the level of management accountability in the 
UAE Telecommunication Corporation - ETISALAT. In doing so. we have examined 
the general as well as specific performance of the corporation over the years. There is 
no doubt that the corporation has experienced very rapid growth over the years in its 
operations, service provision, technology acquisition and revenue increases. These 
achievements may not be attributed only to the business astute of the management of 
the corporation but also to the monopolist privileges that the corporation enjoys in the 
UAE market. It would be interesting to see what would happen if the industry was 
opened up to both domestic and foreign competition. It is only then that a proper 
evaluation of the achievements of the corporation can be made. 
However, on the crucial issue of the level of management accountability, our findings 
show that the level is lower than average. This has not only been indicated by our 
empirical results but also by statistical analysis and interpretation of the results 
obtained through primary research. A comparison with the British situation also 
confirmed the low level of management accountability in the corporation. There are 
efforts being made to improve the situation as evidenced by the increasing awareness 
that the customer needs to be satisfied and the compilation of documents essential for 
developing effective management accountability. 
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CHAPTER 8' 
CASE 2: THE UAE MINISTRY OF HEALTH 
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8.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents findings from our research of the second case-study organization 
- The UAE Ministry of Health (MOH). The chapter aims at achieving the following 
objectives: 
i) a presentation of the development and growth of the Ministry over the 
years; 
ii) an assessment of the performance of the Ministry from secondary 
data. survey questionnaire and personal interview results; 
iii) a presentation of the Management Accountability structure and 
operational procedure in the Ministry; 
iv) an assessment of the level of Management Accountability in the 
Ministry based on survey questionnaire and personal interview 
results: 
v) a comparison of the performance of the UAE Ministry of Health 
with the British National Health Services (NHS). This will be 
undertaken at relevant points in our discussion in the chapter with a 
summary at the end of the chapter. 
Both secondary and primary data/information were used in the discussion, analysis 
and assessment undertaken in the chapter. Emphasis was laid on the use of primary 
data/information collected through survey questionnaires and personal interviews of a 
sample of 30 Accountors and Accountees chosen from the Ministry through 
`'purposive sampling method". The objective of this study and the exclusive nature of 
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the relevant population of study justify the use of the "purposive sampling method" 
(See Chapter 4 for more discussion on the topic of sampling). 
8.2 THE ESTABLISHIIENT OF THE MINISTRY 
In its 1948 classical definition of health, the United Nations World Health 
Organization, commonly referred to as WHO, states that: "Health is trot merely the 
absence of diseases and infirmity; it is a state of complete mental, plrirsical and 
social well-being". Without any doubt, this definition of health is difficult to quantify 
for an objective assessment of health in any one or multiple environments. It is even 
more difficult to use as a basis for measuring changes in health over a period of time 
or differences in health of people in different countries because of variations in value, 
belief and cultural systems. These difficulties notwithstanding, the WHO seems to 
use "infant mortality rate" as a generic indicator for measuring health differences 
and attainment in different countries. For example, Table 8.1 shows the impression of 
the WHO on the progress of the health of peoples around the world from 1960 to 1997 
using the generic indicator of "infant mortality rate". 
As the Table presents, a significant improvement was made in world health as 
suggested by the index of "infant mortality rate". From a high infant mortality rate of 
192 deaths per 1000 live births, the rate dropped to 87 per 1000 live births within a 
period of about 37 years - an average annual decrease of about 1.48%. Encouraging 
as this level of health improvement may indicate, it is difficult to assert that "infant 
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mortality rate" is a comprehensive and sufficient indicator of the state of health of any 
country. 
Table 8.1 
Infant Mortality Rate 1960-97: Industrialized vs. Develonin! Countries 
Infant (under five Mortality 
Rate 
Population in 
1997 
1960 1997 (Million) 
Established Market Economies 37 7 843 
Former Communist countries 
In Europe and Soviet Union 
101 35 476 
Latin America 154 41 487 
East Asia 201 52 1818 
Middle East and North Africa 241 62 326 
South Asia 239 116 1291 
Sub-Saharan Africa 257 170 592 
WORLD 192 87 5833 
Source: Bellamy (1999). 
However, it was against such imprecise definition and indicator of health as given by 
the WHO that the UAE government set out to establish its Health Services sub-sector. 
8.2.1 Establishment of Health Services 
The Health Services sub-sector in the Emirates had a very modest and humble start. In 
the early 1960s health services were provided through either clinics established and 
run by British government through the "Trucial Oman Scouts" or small medical 
centres/hospitals founded by the Kuwaiti government of the period. In the mid 1960s 
more small clinics were established and run by expatriates mainly from the 
neighbouring countries with the exception of the Oasis Hospital in Al Ain, which was 
owned and managed by Canadian Charitable Organisations. One doctor and one 
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nurse in most cases staffed these medical centres. However these hospitals/clinics 
were merely engaged in primary health care with modest medical facilities and 
infrastructure and a capacity not exceeding 80 beds. 
The creation of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as a Federation in December 1971 
gave birth to the UAE Ministry of Health, as it is known today. The establishment of 
the Ministry and the policies that guide and direct its activities are found in the 
Federal Law no. (1) of 1972. and the subsequent organisational changes of the 
Ministry are specified under the Federal laws No. (8) of 1973; No. (7) of 1975; No. 
(4) of 1983; No. (1) of 1986; No. (11) of 1989 and Council of Ministers resolution No. 
(3) of 1973. The Constitution established the Public Health Authority and specified 
that it is a public organisation responsible for the provision of health services 
including preventive services, curative services and control of diseases and epidemics. 
In 1986 some major changes were introduced and this was followed a Cabinet Decree 
No. 11 of 1989. which provided for a complete restructuring and reshaping of the 
organisational structure of the Ministry of Health as well as other changes in the 
Health Services. The factors that led to the rapid changes in the Health Services and 
the subsequent reforms of 1986 and 1989 include among others: 
a) High growth rate in population: 
b) Illiteracy rate. 
c) The Economy and its rapid growth rate: 
d) Nutrition levels. 
e) Existing Health system; 
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f) Manpower requirement; 
g) Imported disease; and 
h) Problems associated with environmental pollution. 
The need to eliminate the factors that inhibited the development of vibrant health 
services and to take advantage of those that encouraged the process led to the 
formulation of a National Health Plan in 1986 with the objective of providing 
"Health for all by the year 2000". This plan called for the provision of equality of 
entitlement to health services; provision of a broad range of services to a high 
standard; provision of service free at the time of use (later amended to charge service 
fees to avoid abuse of health facilities); satisfying the reasonable expectation of users 
and responsiveness of the service to local needs. 
The plan was approved by a Cabinet Decree No. 139, which also re-stated the 
commitment of the government to achieving the following health objectives: 
i) Provision of comprehensive health care to all residents of the UAE; 
ii) Adoption of regulation for prevention and control of communicable 
diseases mainly among infants and school children; 
iii) Early detection and treatment of chronic diseases especially cancer, 
diabetes and cardiovascular problems: 
iv) Ensure the provision of occupational health safety: 
v) Support and improve health care for the elderly and the disabled; and 
vi) Prevention and treatment of victims of accidents and injuries. 
We asked the respondents in our survey to assess the level of achievement of the 
stated health objectives of the Ministry through a five-point rating system. Their 
responses are reported in Table 8.2. which shows that 14 or 46.67% of our 
respondents rate the level of achievement of the health objectives of the Ministry 
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above average while only 6 or 20% of them rate it below average. If we add the 10 or 
33.33% of the respondents who rated "average" to the rating of those above 
"average", we have a staggering 24 or 80% of the respondents who hold the view that 
the level of achievement of the health objectives of the Ministry is at least average or 
above. 
Table 8.2 
Assessment of Level of Achievement of Health Objectives 
Response Type Grading 
Code 
No. of Response 
in Sample 
% of Response in 
Sample 
Very High Level 5 2 6.67% 
High Level 4 12 40.00% 
Average Level 3 10 33.33% 
Low Level 2 6 20.00% 
Very Low Level 1 - - 
TOTAL 30 100.00% 
Sample Statistic 
Sum = 100 
N =30 
Mean = 3.33 
Std. Error of Mean = 0.1614 
Std. Dev. = 0.884 
Sample Var. = 0.782 
This represents a significant rating as confirmed by our test of the null 
hypothesis: 
H,,: M 
_< 
3 
and the alternative hypothesis: 
H,: M? 3 
where: 
"3 is the average score on the grading scale; and 
0M is the mean of the sample survey results. 
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The one-tail Z-test at 95% Confidence level indicates that the null hypothesis cannot 
be accepted (i. e. it is rejected) because the calculated Z-value of 2.05 is greater than 
the critical Z-value of 1.64. Thus, with 95% confidence. we may infer that the rating 
of the level of achievement of the technical health objectives of the Ministry, as given 
by our sample respondents. is significantly higher than the average rate of 3. This 
result seems to be collaborated by the huge decrease in "infant mortality rate" (the 
WHO index of progress in health services) in the UAE over the years. Between 1960 
and 1997, for example. infant mortality rate dropped from a high 223 deaths per 1000 
live births in 1960 to a mere 10 deaths in 1000 live births in 1997 -a 22-fold decrease 
over a period of 37 years. This compares favourably with any other country or 
regional group as can be seen in Table 8.1 above. The message emerging from these 
findings is that the rating of our respondents may be considered reliable. 
However, when we interviewed face-to-face a few of our respondents, one stated that; 
"... a high level of the health objectives of the Ministry has been achieved at a 
disproportionately high financial and other resource costs. It is not effective 
nor efficient to assess performance without reference to the relative cost of such 
an achievement. " 
Another respondent echoed the same view when lie replied to a question on the 
decrease in infant mortality rate that: 
I- We are a very rich country so we do not bother very much about the 
efficiency of an activity that led to an a desired result; if we were poor, our 
assessment would have been different and our sins lain bare. " 
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Yet another respondent argues that: 
"the end justifies the means, so whatever we spend to achieve the set health 
objectives matters less as long as we achieve our goals". 
This is the mix package of views about the high level of achievement of the health 
objectives of the Ministry as obtained from our research and confirmed by our test 
results. A more comprehensive assessment of the performance of the Ministry is 
presented and discussed in a later section. 
8.2.2 Development in Health Services 
Health services in the UAE have developed remarkably since the establishment of the 
Federation in 1971. The infrastructure of the Health services has grown tremendously 
since 1972/73 when there were only six hospitals with a capacity of 818 beds 
employing 218 doctors. In the same year (1973), the Ministry of Health recurrent 
budget amounted to Dh. 38 million and the development expenditure was Dh. 18 
million (Ministry of Planning, 1972-1976). The progress in the provision of health 
services facilities can be seen in Table 8.3 where the number of government hospitals 
and beds in the UAE is compared with other countries in the GCC. 
As can be seen in the Table, by 1996 the number of hospitals in the UAE had 
increased to 35 (including 6 hospitals not affiliated to Ministry of Health with 1,514 
beds) and the number of beds went up to 5,963. These hospitals employed in 1996, a 
total of 1 3.973 medical staff of whom 2.227 were doctors with recurrent budget of 
D11.1.2 billion and development expenditure of Dh. 294 million. 
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Table 8.3 
Government Hospitals and Beds in the GCC 1994-1996 
1994 1995 1996 
Country 
Hospitals Beds Hospitals Beds Hospitals Beds 
UAE 35 5,750 35 5,845 35 5.963 
Bahrain 9 1.101 9 1.098 9 1.201 
Saudi Arabia 207 35.235 211 35.300 215 35.749 
Oman 51 4,744 53 4,411 54 4,782 
Qatar 4 1.118 4 1,122 4 1.141 
Kuwait 16 4.271 16 4.409 16 4,425 
Source: GCC, 1998: vol. 8. 
These hospital and bed figures compare with the numbers of Bahrain and Kuwait. 
which had only 9 and 16 hospitals with 1202 and 4425 beds respectively in 1996. The 
number of doctors employed by these two countries in the same year was 528 and 
3375 respectively, which compares with the numbers in the UAE (see. Table 8.4). In 
addition to these hospitals there were 98 primary health centres. 77 dental clinics. 546 
school health clinics and 102 MCH. Centres (Ministry of Planning, 1995-97). 
Furthermore, the number of medical practitioners in the Primary health care centres 
increased as well to reach professionalpatient ratios of one doctor per 6,762 persons, 
one dentist per 4.755 persons, one nurse per 3,864 persons and one pharmacist per 
8.236 persons. The high quality and accessibility of health services is reflected by the 
low infant mortality rates of 10 deaths per 1000 live births in 1997; 8.7 per 1000 in 
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1998 and a high life expectancy of 74 years for females and 72 years, for males by 
1998. (Ministry of Health. 2000). 
Table 8.4 
Doctors in Government Hospitals by Sex and Nationality in the GCC 
Particulars of Doctor 
Year Country of Employment in GCC 
Gender Nationality Saudi Bahrain UAE Kuwait Qatar Oman 
Arabia 
1994 Male National 161 490 100 
Non-National 132 1727 463 
21,301 2066 2655 
Female National 117 450 94 
Non-National 78 418 133 
1995 Male National 153 542 111 
Non-National 128 1747 440 
22.015 2159 2622 
Female National 132 472 120 
Non-National 71 436 133 
1996 Male National 3291 177 593 122 
Non-National 13.965 124 1823 446 
2227 2946 
Female National 1802 163 500 139 
Non-National 3003 64 459 143 
Source: GCC, 1998; vol. 8. 
During the year the number of hospitals had also (excluding non-affiliated hospitals) 
risen to 30 with 4.681 beds. These hospitals employed 2.223 doctors, 5,859 nurses, 
2.534 technicians, 216 dentists and 6.230 other staff. Among the 17.062 employees in 
the thirty hospitals. only 3.500 were nationals of UAE; the remaining were 
expatriates. However this total number of staff represented 1.3% of the total labour 
force of the country and 30% of the total federal government employees. To be able to 
deliver the required level of health services. the Ministry of Health actual expenditure 
increased, as can be seen in Table 8.5, from about Dh. 902.59 millions in 1989 to 
Dh. 1.19 billion in 1995 and Dh. 1.42 billion in 1999. 
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Table 8.5 
1ýI nkt. -. of HPalth! Actual FYnpnrlitnre for the year 1989-1999 
Year Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Total 
1989 694,024,189 195,508,160 13,057,616 902.589.965 
1990 720,308.330 220,036,000 14,129,000 954,473.330 
1991 743,953.002 241,290,652 27,522,933 1,012.766.587 
1992 757,595,912 258,271,235 22,800,020 1.038.667.167 
1993 804,153,573 301,717,627 32,769,738 1,138,640.938 
1994 811,737.739 309,998,087 31,876,117 1,153,611,943 
1995 819,537,307 331,998,087 35,714,760 1,187,250,949 
1996 871,364,089 331,998,882 27,454,057 1,241,495.480 
1997 905.665,116 342,677,334 60,968,562 1,351,219,600 
1998 924,168,234 384,585,922 45,789,298 1,375,588,917 
1999 966.848.473 405,631,385 59,569,536 1,415.404.343 
Source: Ministry of-Health. 2000. 
On the other hand, as can be seen in Table 8.6. the Ministry collected revenue of only 
about Dh. 92.1 million in 1989; Dh. 278.23 million in 1995 and Dh. 446.10 in 1998. 
The relatively low revenue collected compared with corresponding expenditure was in 
spite of the fact that the UAE was the first state in the Gulf to introduce health fees 
(previously all public health services were free). 
All UAE residents must now pay for individual cards and for medical treatment with 
exception of emergency and preventive services. It was reckoned that the new fees 
would reduce hospital visits by roughly 30% and put health resources in a better use 
as well as increase revenue by 10%. 
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Table 8.6 
Ministry of Health: Revenue Collected from 1989-1998 
Year Abu Dhabi/A1 Ain Northern Emirates Total 
1989 48,970,735 43,180,086 92,150.821 
1990 77,331,025 43,354,509 120.685.534 
1991 51,198,524 43,187,443 94,385.967 
1992 55,749,977 49,228,078 104,978.055 
1993 60,242.508 53,846.367 114.088.875 
1994 68,560,292 61,060,715 129,621.007 
1995 182,897.941 95,329,736 278,227,677 
1996 181,336.154 182,897,941 364.234.095 
1997 209.595.566 209,977,042 419.572,608 
1998 214,682.127 231,415,212 446.097,339 
Source: Ministry of Health (2000) 
Because of the spending and increase in revenue, the Ministry annual expenditure for 
1998 represented 7% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the country while the 
revenue was 3.4% of the total revenue of the treasury for the same period. 
Due to the rapid progress made in the last three decades in the health service, the UAE 
is considered among the countries where child survival has continued to improve 
steadily since 1960s as represented in Table 8.7. 
It is interesting to note that in 1960, the UAE belonged to the group of countries with 
the highest child mortality rates in the world. Today the health of its population, as 
measured by the child mortality rate is comparable to that of the healthiest one billion 
of the world population. According to Rosling (1999), "... available statistics indicated 
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that the health of the UAE population measured in terms of child survival had 
improved faster than ever before documented elsewhere in human history". 
Table 8.7 
Comparative Infant Mortality Rate in different Countries 
(per 1000 live births) 
Country 1960 1997 Difference 
United Arab Emirates 223 10 213 
Republic of Korea (South) 127 6 121 
Portugal 112 8 104 
Croatia 98 9 89 
Brunei Darussalam 87 10 77 
Greece 64 8 56 
Spain 57 5 52 
Cuba 54 8 46 
Italy, 50 6 44 
Slovenia 45 6 39 
Source: Bellamy. C. (1999). 
In 1990s the GDP Per Capita in the U. A. E. fluctuated between US. $ 15,000-20,000 
due to the changes in oil price during this period. The improvement in child survival 
has taken place at a steady rate over the last 30 years and has brought the UAE into 
the group of high-income countries with very high survival rates. 
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The reasons for the successful reduction of child mortality rate in the UAE are given 
as 
a) a rapid rise in the education level of girls and women. UAE has one of 
the highest proportions of women in higher education in the world with 
more than 70% of students at UAE universities being female: 
b) Equitable provision of housing and safe water and food supplies: 
c) General access to preventive and curative health care with full access to 
an advanced referral services for all. 
Furthermore, the UAE is characterized by a relatively high fertility rate of 3.5 children 
per women. However, this has not increased disproportionately the demand for health 
services largely because of the very high survival rate of children. As Table 8.8 
shows, the performance of the UAE in various areas of demographics with respect to 
health services provision is comparable with general world standard as well as some 
highly developed countries such as Sweden. 
Table 8.8 
The t'AE, Sweden & the World: Comparative demo2raphics 
Birth rate 
per 1000 
Death rate 
per 1000 
Growth rate 
per 1000 
Population 
more than 
65 years 
United Arab Emirates 19 3 16 1% 
Sweden 12 11 1 18% 
World 23 9 14 7% 
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The low infant mortality rate coupled with improvements in the old, sick and dying 
segments of the population. which usually requires the most expensive health services. 
the per capita health services demand in the country is relatively lo«w. 
8.3 ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF MINISTRY OF HEALTH 
In response to the Ministry of Health's proposal to restructure and streamline the 
activities and operation of the health services in the UAE. the Cabinet of Ministers 
passed Resolution No. 11 of 1989 approving the Health Authority organisational 
structure as well as the duties and responsibilities of the associated departments. The 
emergent organisational structure of the Ministry is presented in Figure 8.1. 
As can be seen in the Figure. the 1989 Reforms established a structure with the 
Minister at the top of the hierarchy followed by an Under-Secretary who is directly 
responsible to the Minister. The structure has five Divisions/Departments as follows: 
" Preventive Medicine Affairs Department: 
" Financial and Budget Department. 
" Computer Department; 
" Pharmacist and supply Department: and 
" Medical Treatment Department. 
Each of the Departments is supervised and controlled by an Assistant Undersecretary 
and sub-divided into Divisions and sections. which are managed by Directors or 
Managers as the case may be. The Medical Treatment Department, for example, is 
sub-divided into five divisions - Private Medical Professions Division, Nursing 
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Division, Dentist Division, First Medical Aid Division and Hospital Division - and 
managed by Directors. These Divisions are subsequently divided into Sections. which 
are managed by Section Managers. The Assistant Under Secretaries and their sub- 
ordinates report to the Minister through the Undersecretary. A Follow-Up & Finance 
Inspection Division, which reports directly to the Minister, was also established under 
the 1989 Reforms. 
The organizational structure also includes eight regional Health Zones as follows: 
" Abu Dhabi Health Zone; 
" Al Sharjah Health Zone; 
" Ajman Health Zone; 
" Umm Al Quwian Health Zone; 
" Raa's Al Khaima Health Zone; 
" Al Fujairah Health Zone; 
" Al Ain Health Zone: 
. Western Region Health Zone: 
These Health Zones are managed by Zonal Directors who report directly to the Under- 
Secretary. The establishment of the Regional Health Zones introduced the concept of 
decentralization of health provisions and operations. While the central Departments 
and Divisions formulate and provide the strategic directions, the regional Health 
Zones manage the details including field operations to ensure that health services are 
available to all in all parts of the country. This operational structure has been the 
back-bone of the high level of achievement of the health objectives of the Ministry as 
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discussed above. The UAE organisational structure with respect to the Regional 
Health Zones compares with the British National Health Services (NHS) Regional 
Health authority structure, which was introduced in 1974 and reformed in 1982 under 
the Conservative Government of Mrs. Margaret Thatcher. However, the question of 
how much decision and operational powers the UAE Health Zones possess compared 
to the Health Authorities in the British NHS, particularly after Mrs. Margaret 
Thatcher's deregulation policy of the early 1980s. is a dicey one and will be raised 
later in the work. 
8.4 OPERATIONAL STRATEGY OF THE MINISTRY 
The Resolution of the Council of Ministers also specified the duties and 
responsibilities of the Minister, the Under-Secretary, the Departments. Divisions and 
the Regional Health Zones. These duties and responsibilities provide the operational 
strategy and tactics of the Ministr3" of Health as follows: 
8.4.1. Preventive Service Department 
The development of Preventive health services during the past 25 years was a clear 
indication of tremendous improvement in the health field. The Dept of Preventive 
Medicine of the Ministry of health adopted several approaches to quality of life and 
prevention and control diseases. The Ministry carried out the prevention and control 
of diseases through a series of health programmes designed to protect the community 
from potential and unforeseeable incidences of diseases. 
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The programmes are identified as follows: 
i) The National Immunization Programme. 
Since 1975 the UAE Ministry of Health had been implementing the World Health 
Organization and UNICEF resolutions and directives in respect of immunization of 
children against the six childhood diseases. In 1985 the health authority had reviewed 
its strategies towards the programmes by widening the coverage of diseases targeted 
in the programme with an aim of preventing morbidity and disability of children 
resulting from such diseases. Currently the Ministry of Health programme targets ten 
main diseases and the result is a substantial decrease in the incidence rates per 
100,000 population over the last seventeen years (Ministry of Health. 2000; p. 24). 
Furthermore, the programme has achieved immunization coverage of over 90% of 
children below the age of 2 years compared with the targeted coverage rate of 95% for 
the year of 1998. In the attempt to achieve the 95% immunization coverage target, a 
total of 120 centres for vaccination were established throughout the country and these 
were shared between government. private and voluntary organisations. 
ii) Prevention and control of imported diseases: 
The Federal Law No. 27 of 1981 established a national programme for the prevention 
and Control of Communicable diseases such as HIV/AIDS and viral hepatitis. The 
programme was directed towards investigation and reporting of cases or outbreaks of 
these types of diseases to enable the Ministry of Health to treat and isolate all persons 
affected by the diseases. The programme was successful as demonstrated by the 
decrease in the incidence rate of meningitis from 11.3 per 100,000 in 1986 to 6.5 per 
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100,000 in 1998 while the typhoid rate reduced from 11.3 per 100.000 to 7.4 per 
100,000 within the same period. Moreover, a total of 900,000 persons are seen and 2 
million tests carried out annually in the country since 1998. 
iii) Malaria Control Programme 
The programme of malaria control had been in existence since 1972. In 1976 the total 
number of reported malaria cases reached 28,791 at a rate of 57 cases per 1000 
persons but, by 1998. this rate had dropped to 29 per 1000 persons -a clear indication 
that the programme was effective in preventing the spread of the diseases. Currently, 
most of the cases reported are mainly imported. The effectiveness of control of the 
spread of malaria was due mainly to the availability of information covering all 
medical districts of the UAE and the exchange of information with neighbouring 
countries and the rest of the world at large. 
iv) National HIV/AIDS Control Programme 
National Programme to control AIDS had been set up in September of 1984. The 
Health Service strategy called for a comprehensive nationwide campaign to combat 
the AIDS virus spread through transfusion of blood or its derivatives and donation of 
body organs and tissues. The control tests cover the following categories: 
a) Blood donors 
b) Applicant for work in the UAE 
C) Inpatients in all hospitals 
d) Pregnant women 
e) Prisoners. drug users 
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0 Patients attending clinics for sexually transmitted diseases. 
Besides these tests a national wide programme of health education was carried 
out to inform and warn the population of the dangers of the diseases and the 
methods to avoid its spreads. 
v) Non-Communicable diseases. 
Due to the social and economic development, which led to changes in the pattern and 
habit of eating, the traditional disease mix and environment have changed in the 
country. The emergence of new type of diseases such as cancer, diabetes and 
cardalogical problems had prompted the Ministry of Health to change its priority and 
strategies towards certain diseases and devote more resources and effort to these 
categories of non-communicable diseases. The central department for diseases control 
has thus taken an effective action to find appropriate treatment for the various 
newcomer diseases to the UAE. 
vi) Occupational Safety 
To reduce the safety hazard at wvork-place and create a suitable work environment for 
employees, the Ministry of Health had set up an occupational health programme. The 
main purpose of the programme is to detect early occupational problems and compile 
a databank on occupational diseases according to each work activity in the UAE. This 
is being done with the co-operation of various governmental agencies and 
organizations. It is estimated that more than 7 employees in each industry suffered 
from some foram of occupational hazard or disease, a total of more than 39,000 
workers in all sectors in the UAE, in 1988. 
318 
vii) Maternal and Child Health Service Programme: 
The Ministry of health had set up the maternal and child health care programme to 
provide specialized services to women of child-bearing age (15-44) and children 
below the age of 5 years. These services include routine laboratory tests, check up of 
fetal safety, monitoring children development and growth, providing vaccines to 
children, support and encouragement of breast-feeding and providing nutrition care to 
mother and children. 
viii) School Health Services 
In 1976, the Government entrusted through Cabinet Decree No. 52 the responsibility 
of supervising and administering School Health services to the Ministry of Health. 
The responsibilities include the following activities. 
a) Medical checkup of students 
b) Treatment of emergency cases 
c) Supervisors medical record and school environment 
d) Treatment of dental problems. 
As Table 8.9 shows, the School Health programme and its related services has 
expanded very rapidly since 1972 in both manpower and resources in line with 
increases in student numbers. From a mere 4 doctors, 2 dentists, 30 Nurses, 129 
Schools and 40.193 Students in 1972/73, the programme has expanded to87 Doctors 
18 Dentists, 396 Nurses, 542 Schools and 279,965 Students in 1995/96. These are 
significant increases and indicate the success of the programme. 
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Table 8.9 
School Health Services: Growth of Student Numbers & Professional (1972-1998) 
School 
Year 
Doctors Dentists Nurses Schools Students 
72/73 4 2 30 129 40.193 
76/77 33 12 95 201 71,314 
81/82 67 16 274 313 126.266 
87/88 76 16 317 420 215,156 
91/92 83 17 336 445 228.850 
95/96 87 18 396 542 279,965 
Source: Ministry of Health, 2000; p. 33. 
8.4.2 The Curative Services Department 
This section of the health services had received special attention by the Ministry of 
Health due to its importance to the health of the UAE population. The Ministry has 
formulated strategies to strengthen the infrastructure of these departments by focusing 
on: 
(a) Continuous development and modernization of existing institutions and 
facilities together with an establishment of specialized referral enters to deal 
with different cases; 
(b) Expansion of curative services to be accessible to all residents of the UAE; 
(c) Recruitment of qualified and competent nian power: and 
(d) Provision of advanced diagnostic and therapeutic services as per international 
standards. 
As per its strategies the government through Ministry of Health has built a high 
standard of hospitals and specialized centres equipped with technologically advanced 
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medical supplies and facilities to accommodate the fast and continuous scientific 
development in the fields. 
As can be seen in Table 8.10, the number of hospitals in the country increased from 6 
in 1973 to 30 in 1998 including six hospitals affiliated to Ministries of Interior and 
Defence, Dubai Health and Medical Services and Petroleum companies. These 
hospitals are equipped with modem medical facilities and technology, which are 
crucial to the provision of a high quality health services in the country. 
Table 8.10 
Hospitals and Beds of the MOH for the Years 1973-1998 
Year Number of Hospitals Number of Beds 
1973 6 818 
1980 20 2745 
1985 26 3909 
1994 29 4344 
1998 30 4681 
Source: Ministry of Health. 2000. 
The number of patient beds also increased from 818 in 1973 to 4681 in 1998 as can be 
seen in the Table. The increases in hospitals and beds represent 400% or 4-fold 
increase and 472% or 4.7-fold increase respectively over a 25-year period from 1973 
to 1998. 
This is a significant progress (about 16% annual increase in both cases) in the 
provision of medical facilities for the citizens of UAE. Consequent upon these 
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increases, the number of in-patients and surgeries also increased as can be seen in 
Table 8.11. 
Table 8.11 
No. of In-patients and Surgeries in MOH Hospitals for the Years 1979-1998 
Year No. of In-patients No. of Surgeries 
1979 82.536 42,255 
1985 148.432 47,749 
1987 184.483 53.334 
1994 155,565 67,316 
1998 178.041 66,070 
Source: Ministry of Health. 2000. 
While the number of in-patients increased from 82,536 in 1979 to 178,041 in 1998, 
the number of surgeries performed within the same period increased from 42.255 to 
66,070. Such increases required not only the existence of adequate and appropriate 
physical facilities such as hospitals and beds but also the manpower to support the 
increased level of demand. 
To cope with the increased demand for appropriately qualified manpower 
(Professionals), the Ministry of Health increased the employment of the appropriate 
professionals substantially as can be seen in Table 8.12. 
In 1976. for example, there only 774 doctors and 1427 Nurses but these numbers 
increased to 2223 doctors and 5859 Nurses in 1998 representing 187.2% and 318.6% 
322 
Table 8.12 
Doctors. Nurses. Technicians and Dentists in MOH Employment (1973-1998) 
Year Number of 
Doctors 
Number of 
Nurses 
Number of 
Technicians 
Number of 
Dentists 
1973 218 - - - 
1976 774 1427 - - 
1985 1412 3778 1640 103 
1987 1451 3967 1164 105 
1992 1666 4811 1836 132 
1994 2021 4943 1962 173 
1998 2223 5859 2534 216 
Source: Ministry of Health. 2000. 
increases respectively over a 22-year period. Similar large increases in employment 
of the other professionals can be seen in the Table. The employment of Dentists, for 
example, increased from none at all in 1976 to 216 in 1998 -a clear 216% increase 
over the period. 
Similar expansion of health services and facilities occurred in the Primary Health Care 
sector as evidenced by the increases in the recruitment of relevant professional staff in 
the sector. Table 8.13 presents this evidence. An analysis of the figures in the Table 
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Table 8.13 
Primary Health Care Technical Staff for the Years 1985.1990.1995 
Year General 
Practitioner 
Dentist Nurse Pharmacist or 
Asst Pharmacist 
1985 224 16 225 120 
1990 232 22 347 143 
1995 378 50 558 269 
1998 408 50 714 335 
Source: Ministry of Health, 2000. 
Shows a distribution of the primary health care personnel per population in 1995 and 
1998 as follows: 
"I General Practitioner per 6289 persons in 1995 and 6762 
persons in 1998; 
"I Dentist per 47550 persons in 1995 and 55180 persons in 1998; 
"I Nurse per 4260 persons in 1995 and 3864 persons in 1998; 
91 Pharmacist per 8838 persons in 1995 and 8235 persons in 1998. 
Though there were marginal increases in the doctor and dentist groups in terms of the 
ratio of professional to number of persons in the population, the other groups of 
professionals recorded significant decrease in their ratios. On the other hand, apart 
from the dentist group, the absolute figures of each of the other professional groups 
recorded significant increases over the three-year period. 
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The number of patients benefiting from the various health -enters and facilities 
provided by the MOH registered similar increases in absolute numbers followed by 
corresponding decreases in average visit per person as shown in Table 8.14. 
Table 8.14 
Patient Numbers and Average Visit to Health Centres: 1992-1998 
Year Population Number of 
Patients 
Average No. of 
visits per Person 
1992 2,011,400 3,765,171 1.6 
1993 2,030.700 3,427,580 1.7 
1994 2,230.000 3,966,116 1.8 
1995 2,377,453 3,891,641 1.6 
1998 2,759,000 4,079,295 1.5 
Source: Ministry of Health. 2000. 
The Table shows that the number of patients has increased from 3,765,171 in 1992 to 
4,079.295 patients in 1998 - an increase of 8.34% over the period. Although the 
absolute number of patients visiting Health Centres has increased over the period, the 
average number of visits per person decreased from a high of 1.8 visits in 1994 to 1.5 
visits in 1998 -a 16.67% decrease over the period. This decrease in the average visit 
per person reflects the improvements made in the provision of health services in the 
country. To accommodate the increase in the number of health centers in different 
medical districts and the growth in the number of patients, the Ministry of Health 
established four nursing schools to supplement the supply of nursing personnel. 
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Table 8.15 
Number of Students and Staff Nursing Schools of MOH 
Medical 
District 
Local 
Students 
Foreign 
Students 
Total Number of 
Staff 
Abu Dhabi 4 122 126 28 
Al Ain 4 78 82 7 
Fujairah 46 12 58 10 
Sharjah 23 65 88 8 
Total 77 277 354 53 
Source: Ministry of Health. 2000. 
Table 8.15 shows the progress made in the supply of nurses through the Nursing 
Schools located in each of the Medical Districts. Both nationals and foreign students 
are accepted and trained in the schools as can be seen in the Table. 
Another indicator of the progress being made in the provision of good quality health 
services is the increase in laboratory services provided in hospitals and health - enters 
all over the country as can be seen in Table 8.16. The laboratories are well equipped 
with modern facilities, specialists and technicians. The success of these laboratories 
in providing services may be inferred from the increase in the number of tests carried 
out from 1979 to 1998 as shown in the Table. 
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Table 8.16 
Number of Laboratory Tests Conducted in MOH Laboratories: (1979-1998) 
Year Number of Tests 
1979 2,760,414 
1985 3,620,398 
1987 4,574,656 
1992 7,574.999 
1994 9,282.222 
1998 11,787,937 
Source: Ministry of Health. 2000. 
The number of tests increased from 2,760,414 in 1979 to a staggering total of 
11,787,937 in 1998 - about 4.3-fold increase over the 19-year period. 
8.4.3. Pharmacy and Supply Department 
This department played very important role in providing all hospitals, clinics and 
health centers with medical supplies. Within this departments there are drug control 
sectors; and supply and store section. 
a) Drug control 
This section deals with: 
i) Identification of all medicines allowed for use in the UAE to ensure 
their quality and validity. 
ii) Registration of reputable companies to market their products in the 
country; 
iii) Pricing of all pharmaceutical products used by the private sectors; 
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iv) Control and supervision of local pharmaceutical industries and 
medical supplies 
v) Inspection of private pharmacies and warehouses: 
vi) Control of pricing of medicines; 
vii) Issuing of import license for private companies; 
viii) Analysis of samples of registered medicines; 
ix) Checking imported medicines to ensure their compliance with the 
required technical specifications. 
b) Supply and store section 
This section is responsible for: i) Follow up of local and international tenders; ii) 
Prepare inventory for all pharmaceutical products and supplies in all warehouses to 
ensure their availability on regular basis: iii) store all medicines received by the 
Ministry of Health; iv) Dispense medical supplies to hospitals, primary care enters: 
v) Control medical prescriptions by comparing them with patients' records; vi) 
Supervise annual stock taking. 
8.4.4 Computer Department 
This department is responsible for: i) Follow up of the latest developments in 
computers science; ii) Develop programs for inventory; iii) Maintain and operate 
computers of all users within the departments. 
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8.4.5 Department of Finance 
This department is responsible for the following tasks: 
a) Handles all administrative and personnel matters such as payroll, housing. 
purchasing and payments to suppliers; 
b) Preparation of revenue and expenditures; 
c) Formulation of annual budget; 
d) Controlling the budget expenditures and advising on financial affairs: 
e) Carrying out an audit and check on expenses and revenues and bank 
reconciliation as well as supervising the public relation section. 
8.5 FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS 
In addition to the general strategies adopted, the Ministry of Health has undertaken 
moves to incorporate the involvement of certain government organisation/ministries, 
such as the Ministry of Information and Culture, the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs, the Police and the various Municipalities, in its effort to control the spread of 
malaria and AIDs as well as to promote health education that focus on problems of 
drugs addiction and accidents. In developing this thrust to improve the health of the 
nation, the MOH re-emphasized its commitment to the public health needs in the 
following areas: 
a) The recognition of the importance of primary health care as the basis of health 
care system: 
b) The importance of establishing preventive programme to eliminate childhood 
communicable diseases and improve maternal and child health care; 
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c) Re-emphasis on the needs of school health and early detection of diseases; and 
d) Encouragement of the participation of individuals and communities in health 
service under the slogan of "beneficiaries participation" in order to create a 
sense of awareness about the national use of health services especially 
traditional herbal medicines. 
With the guidance of His Highness, the President, Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al 
Nahyan, the MOH has set up a Centre for the Study of Arabic and Islamic Heritage in 
the health field with the purpose of establishing herbal medicines industry in the UAE 
as strategic diversification/option. Moreover, the MOH has undertaken to provide the 
services at reasonable costs to the government and the users as well as to be efficient 
and effective in the use of its human resources. 
To reduce the dependence on treatment abroad. the Ministry (within its strategies) has 
started to modernize existing hospitals, expand primary health care centres and to 
construct a series of specialized curative centres equipped with highly advanced 
medical hardwares. Other recent developments, which were meant to meet specific 
National Health Service needs include tackling the problems of malnutrition, obesity, 
smoking and pollution. 
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8.6 FUTURE CHALLENGES AND DIRECTION 
In addition to the normal improvement in health services. the MOH is reviewing its 
operational strategies and embarking on various programmes to improve areas of 
inefficiencies and shortages. One of such programmes plans to strengthen human 
resource shortage and management through intensive training courses in the field of 
medical, technical and financial management. The Ministry intends to implement this 
programme through the conduct of in-house courses and external programmes. 
Medical experts and technicians will be invited to organize such programmes as well 
as arrange for the staff of the Ministry to visit manufacturers of medical equipment 
and products around the world to see and learn from `world class' production 
processes. The Ministry is also contemplating to set up the program of tele-medicine 
to enhance the capability and practice of the professional staff including doctors and 
nurses. Through visiting doctors and professionals, the Ministry plans to encourage 
summer training programmes and workshops in the country for those staff who cannot 
travel abroad to update their medical knowledge and skills. 
The Ministry recognizes some challenges it has to deal with in the rapidly changing 
environment of the country, region and the world at large. Some of the challenges 
include the following: 
a) the rapidly changing composition of the population: 
b) the effect of the rapid improvement of life expectancy and living conditions on 
the occurrence of chronic diseases in middle aged people. "the Barker 
hypothesis"; 
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c) the cultural impact on health behaviour; 
d) neighbourhood of several non affluent societies with a history of armed 
conflict. 
To accommodate the effects of the steady growth in the proportion of elderly people 
in the society while maintaining current high quality of health service, the per capita 
cost of providing health services need to be increased. While this is a simple 
rationality, it raises. however, the crucial question of efficiency in the use of the 
resources currently available to the Ministry., It will be recalled that in our face-to- 
face personal interview in the MOH, one of the Accountors commented on the 
achievement of the health objectives of the Ministry by saying that; 
`"... a high level of the health objectives of the Ministry has been achieved at a 
disproportionately high financial and other resource costs. It is not effective 
nor efficient to assess performance without reference to the relative cost of such 
an achievement. " 
There is the suspicion, therefore, that the high level of health objectives achieved by 
the Ministry so far is at the cost of high financial and other resources inputs. Some 
indication of this is the introduction of charges for some health services provided by 
the Ministry in order to reduce unnecessary visits to hospitals and health centers as 
well as request for treatment and prescription. It is worth stating that the UAE. though 
much richer than some of its neighbours, was the first in the GCC to introduce charges 
for medical services provided by government hospitals and health centers to deter 
abuse of free medical provisions. According to one of the Accountors in the Financial 
and Budget Department interviewed in the Ministry: 
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`" our cost of operation is very high and most inefficient; we pay about three 
times the cost of most of the medical equipment. drugs and other items 
because of our mode of operation and the fact that we are a rich nation". 
Evidence of disproportionately high cost of medical services in the country may be 
inferred from the fact that the country imports the bulk of its needs from abroad. 
Almost 90% of the doctors working in the country are expatriates and a number of key 
hospitals throughout the country are managed, staffed and serviced by private foreign 
companies. The cost of such services is very high and has been estimated to be over 
1 /3 of the annual budget of the Health Authority. Furthermore, evidence of 
disproportionately high cost of medical services in the country may be found in the 
cases of over-pricing, over-invoicing and 'loading' of receipts for purchases of 
medical items especially drugs and other medicines. Evidences are also available of 
over-payment of medical staff who claim false qualifications and length of experience 
upon which their individual salary and other remunerations are based. Consultancy 
services as well as design and construction of medical facilities including buildings 
and laboratories are frequently over-priced or over-invoiced. As put by one of the 
respondents during one of our personal interview sessions; 
"the UAE is a 'niilk cow' for many foreign companies and psuedo 
expatriate-professionals, particularly in the field of medical care and 
services where it is very difficult to check under-hand practices if you 
are not a manufacturing nation yourself. The services we provide and 
hence our overall performance cannot be said to be cost effective and 
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efficient - far from it. But we are yet unable to quantify this because of 
both economic and political circumstances beyond our control. " 
Furthermore, the UAE Health service provision concentrates heavily on secondary 
and tertiary care and this has created some problems. The health system is top heavy 
with hospitals at the expense of adequate referral network, and the results are misuse 
and inefficiency. The public has come to associate health care with hospital care and 
with no gatekeepers built into the system, out patient departments are often clogged 
with self-referrals seeking treatment inappropriately. Inadequate patient records have 
led to multiple patient visits and high maintenance cost but this situation might have 
changed now as the new health cards are linked to computerised record system which 
will give an easy access to patient files thus ensuring a continuity of treatment and a 
check in patient visit. 
In the past preventive and primary call units had been under funded and 
overshadowed by the attention given to curative sector thus creating unbalanced 
distribution of health service. However, the health authorities have started to 
restructure their health services away from curative care thus resulting in reversed 
trend. (Kassim and Habib, 1989). 
8.7 ASSESSMENT OF PERFORMANCE OF THE MINISTRY 
An exercise in the assessment of the performance of a public service organization is 
fraught with many problems including the standard of measurement to use, method of 
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assessment to adopt and the test of the validity of the measurement standard or 
approach adopted. As one of our respondents quoted earlier puts it appropriately; 
".... The services we provide and hence our overall performance cannot 
be said to be cost effective and efficient - far from it. But we are yet 
unable to quantify this because of both economic and political 
circumstances beyond our control. " 
The situation in the MOH is worsened by the fact that the budgeting system of the 
public sector does not disaggregate the major budget headings sufficiently enough to 
enable any reasonable performance assessment to take place. For example, at the 
Federal level, apart from Salaries, which is budgeted on departmental basis, all other 
budget headingstitems are lumped together as a single 'all-inclusive budget'. 
Because budgeting is not based upon 'cost-centres', it is difficult if not impossible to 
allocate costs and thus measure or compare the cost effectiveness of any expenditure 
item. As aptly put by one of our personal interview respondents in the Ministry: 
" Our budgeting system makes it absolutely impossible to measure 
performance, cost of services provided and the output of services in any 
useful %%, a,. -*'. 
Another respondent. who has over 10 years experience in the Auditor-General's office 
before being transferred to the Ministry of Health, answered our question on the 
measurement of performance as follows: 
"Our Financial and Audit departments don't evaluate performance but 
how the Law is being adhered to in allocation of expenditure or 
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budgeting. They don't evaluate the use of funds or other resources but 
how the allocation of funds has complied with the Regulations". 
An Accountor respondent, whose frustration over the issue of performance 
measurement was very evident, burst out and summarized the situation; 
"Performance measurement expects target setting in the first instance; 
how do you measure without targets? Targets are not set or known in 
our departments. so what do we measure? " 
These comments indicate the magnitude of the problem of measuring the performance 
of the MOH despite our earlier assertion that some of the health objectives of the 
MOH have been achieved. In order to have a view of the general performance of the 
Ministry, despite the various hindering factors, we carried out a survey of the 
accountees. accountors, staff and general consumers of the services of the MOH to 
solicit their impression on the overall performance of the organisation. In Table 8.17, 
we report the findings of the survey. 
As can be seen in the Table, 53.33% of our survey respondents rate the general 
performance of the Ministry below average as against only 25% who rate it above 
average. This is a clear and significant result vindicating the views of our personal 
interview respondents as quoted above that the general performance of the MOH is 
not satisfactory. 
336 
Table 8.17 
Assessment of the General Performance of the Ministry of Health 
Number of Percentage 
Response Type Grading Response in of Response 
Code Sample (%) 
Very Satisfied 5 3 5.00% 
Satisfied 4 9 15.00% 25.00% 
Average 3 16 26.67% 
Dissatisf ied 2 24 40.00% 
Very Dissatisfied 1 8 13.33% 53.33% 
TOTAL 60 100.00% 
Sample Statistics 
Mean 2.583333 
Standard Error 0.137145 
Standard 1.062323 
Deviation 
Sample Variance 1.128531 
Range 4 
Minimum 1 
Maximum 5 
Sum 155 
N 60 
A statistical test was carried out to confirm or refute the contention of our survey 
results and the personal interview findings. We formulated the null hypothesis: 
Ho: M<3 
and the alternative hypothesis: 
H,: M>3 
where: 
03 is the average score on the grading code; and 
.M is the mean of the sample survey results. 
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The one-tail Z-test at 95% Confidence level indicates that the null hypothesis cannot 
be accepted (i. e. it is rejected) because the calculated Z-value is -3.044, which is far 
less than the critical Z-value of 1.64. Thus, at 95% confidence level, we may confirm 
that the level of performance of the MOH is significantly less than average as rated by 
our survey respondents. 
As stated earlier. we do recognize the criticisms of the one-tail test of the Mean 
(Rowntree, 1987). However, because we have used an unbiased grading code and 
response from survey rather than secondary sources, we are reasonably confident of 
our statistical results and tests. 
8.8 MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTABILITY STRUCTURE IN MOH 
Unlike the organizational structure (see. Figure 8.1), which has a 'top-down' authority 
and command relationship, the management accountability structure has a 'bottom-up' 
chain of responsibility. That is. subordinates are responsible to their superiors in 
accounting for their activities and performance. 
Figure 8.2 presents the derived Management Accountability structure in the MOH. As 
can be seen in the Figure, there are two broad groups of Accountors and Accountees. 
Although the divide between these two groups is largely arbitrary, it reflects the 
structure on the ground. It must be noted, however, that apart from the President who 
is in reality the `Ultimate Accountee' and is not accountable to any higher authority, 
the other Accountee groups are technically also accountors to higher authorities. 
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Figure 8.2 
Derived Management accountability Structure in Ministry of Health 
The President Ultimate/Legislative 
Accountee 
Prime Minister 
& legislative/Executive 
Cabinet of Ministers Accountee 
Operational 
Minister Accountee 
Directors of Health Follow-up & 
Zones Finance Inspection 
IAecuM\ C Office 
A ccounto r 
U nder-Secretary 
Asst. Under- 
Secretary, Strategic 
Accountor 
Directors of 
Div isions 
Tactical 
Managers of Sections Accotii, tor 
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For ease of explanation and identification, we have decided to set up this arbitrary 
boundary between the groups. 
8.8.1 The Accountees 
The Accountee group comprises the Operational, Executive, Legislative and Ultimate 
Accountees. It can be seen in the Figure that the President occupies the dual position 
of `Ultimate and Legislative Accountee"; the Prime Minister and his Cabinet also 
occupy the dual position of 'Legislative and Executive Accountee'. The Minister of 
Health is the `Operational Accountee' because he is the highest Accountee in the 
Ministry and the operational link between the higher Accountees outside his Ministry 
and the Accountors in his Ministry. The Minister is thus responsible for the activities 
of the Ministry and is accountable to the Prime Minister and the President as well as to 
his Cabinet colleagues collectively. He is also answerable to the public when there is 
a reason to explain to the public any emergent crisis that might affect public health 
particularly in the area of preventive and curative health care. Such situations, 
however, do not occur frequently and it is not statutorily obligatory that the Minister 
should explain anything. On the other hand, in the absence of the minister, the Under 
Secretary might be required by the government or the President to give account of the 
activities of his departments/divisions. 
8.8.2 The Accountors 
On the other hand, the Accountor group consists of the Executive, Strategic and 
Tactical Accountors. The Executive Accountors comprise the Under-Secretary, the 
Regional Health Zones and the Follow-Up & Finance Inspection Office; the Strategic 
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Accountors comprise the Assistant Under-Secretaries and the Directors of the 
Divisions while the Tactical Acountor sub-group consists of the Managers of Sections. 
The Executive Accountors are responsible directly to the 'Operational Accountee', the 
Minister, for the activities of their respective areas of authority and responsibility. 
Within hierarchical structure of Ministry of Health there are four assistant Under- 
Secretaries who are directly accountable to the Under-Secretary and indirectly to the 
Minister for the responsibilities of their immediate subordinates - the Directors and 
the Managers. There are 16 directors and 46 managers who report directly to the 
Assistant Under-Secretaries. These directors/managers supervise the work of the 
ministry and are accountable to their superiors within the ministry. However, in 
addition to their immediate superiors some of those professionals are accountable to 
their professional bodies such as British Medical Association for the conduct of their 
professional duties and responsibilities. Those doctors and technicians have dual 
accountabilities and responsibilities, hence, as accountors, they might have a conflict 
of interest between their tasks as doctors/experts who seek to be independent of any 
influence and the rigid bureaucratic organisational structure of the Ministry, which 
advocates financial and legal compliance as a condition for the functioning of 
Principal/agent relationship. 
8.8.3 Management Accountability Structures in UK (NITS) and UAE (MOH) 
In Table 8.18, we have attempted a comparison of the derived Management 
Accountability structures of the British NHS and the UAE Ministry of Health (MOH) 
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and identified some crucial differences that influence some variation in the level and 
effectiveness of Management Accountability in the MOH. The Table is derived from 
the basic structure as presented in Figure 8.2 above. 
Table 8.18 
Comparison of Management Accountability Structures in UK (NHS) & UAE (MOH) 
l ype of 
Accountee': AAecountoir -1 he l 'K (NHS) Structure The UAE (MOH) 
Structure 
Ultimate The UK Public The President 
Accountee 
Legislative Accountee The Parliament The President and the 
Government 
Executive The Prime Minister & the The Prime Minister & 
Accountee Cabinet the Cabinet 
Operational Accountee The Secretary of State for The Minister of 
Health (Minister) Health 
Executive - Permanent Secretary - Under-Secretary 
Accountor - District Health Authority - Regional Health 
- Regional Hospital Board Zones 
Strategic - Asst. Permanent Secretary - Asst. Under- 
Accountor - Directors Secretary 
- Chairmen of Committees - Directors 
Tactical - Secretaries - Managers of 
Accountor - Heads of Departments Sections 
As can be seen in the Table, the two structures are generally similar except in the 
shaded areas where significant differences emerge. While in the UK (NHS), and 
indeed other public service organizations, the Public is the `Ultimate Accountee' with 
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very effective power, for example, voting power at general elections, the UAE (MOH) 
has the President as the 'Ultimate Accountee' who represents his people. The public 
in the UAE has no effective power or influence as in the UK. there are. of course, no 
general or regional or local elections in the country. The effective of the passiveness 
of the public in the UAE is quite significant since there is no recourse open to the 
public to demand accountability from their civil servants. Though recently, the Press 
has criticized some public organizations for poor performance or inefficiency, the 
impact of this unstatutory voice of the public is yet to be felt. A recent criticism of the 
performance and organizational structure of Ministries and other public organizations 
by the Acting Head of the Audit Office, His Excellency Majid Al Khazraji. 
recommended a reform of the accountability system of the organizations and a re- 
structuring of the organizations to infuse a better system of operation and efficiency 
(AI-Atihada 2001). 
Another obvious area of difference between the two structures is the occupants and 
role of the `Legislative Accountee'. In the UK, the parliament performs this role and 
very effectively too through its various Ombudsmen and Parliamentary 'watch-dogs' 
such as the Commission for Health Improvement which started its operation in 1999 
(Corby, 1999). In the UAE, the President, the Prime Minister and his Ministers 
(Cabinet) perform the role of 'Legislative Accountor'. There is no parliament in the 
same sense as in the UK though purely advisory Consultative Council does exist. The 
other Accountee and Accountor positions are very similar in structure and role. 
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8.9 ACCOUNTABILITY PROCEDURE IN THE MOH 
Accountability relationship in any government organisation such as the Ministry of 
Health in the UAE depends on many factors that influence the relationship of the 
accountee with the accountor and the accountor with his subordinates within the 
organization. These factors include the accountability system in operation (i. e. 
political or management or both); performance management system which covers 
organisational objectives, performance indicators, performance appraisal of individual 
employees and the use of performance incentives to reward personal effort towards 
organisational goals. Others include, the linkage of human and financial resources to 
an annual budget and the regular review at the end of each year of the performance 
and achievement and the explanation for under or over performance. Since 
management accountability model is selected for this case study the focus would be 
on 3 dimensions: financial/regularity accountability; process/efficiency accountability 
and program/effectiveness accountability. Even though health service does not fit 
perfectly into a hierarchical model of accountability due to the horizontal relationship 
of the professionals to their respective associations (e. g. British Medical Association), 
an examination of the quality of the information flowing down the various official 
channels and the associated ability to translate theoretical control into real and 
effective control are very important to test whether the arguments about the machinery 
of accountability are valid or not. 
To be effective, the accountee must have power and authority to enforce strategies and 
policy guidelines. This can only be achieved when there is a clear understanding of 
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the tasks to be performed, the procedures for performing the tasks and availability of a 
performance management system within the organisation. We asked our randomly 
selected ten Accountees and Accountors who were interviewed whether there are 
clearly defined job description, task performance procedures, clear authority structure 
and performance appraisal system in the MOH and how effectively these are applied. 
Their responses are presented in Table 8.19. 
Table 8.19 
Acnprtc of Arrniintnhility PrncecIiirP in the AIOH 
Type of Clearly Not Clearly Effectively Not Sample 
Procedure Defined Defined Applied Effectively Total 
Applied 
Job 
Description - 10 - 10 10 
Procedure for 
performing - 10 - 10 10 
Task 
Performance 
appraisal 3 7 3 7 10 
System 
Authority 
Structure 3 7 2 8 10 
Accountability 
Guidelines 3 7 2 8 10 
The Table shows an unequivocal consensus of opinion on all the four areas of 
concern. There is a total agreement among the ten interviewees that Job Description 
is not clearly defined not effectively applied in the MOH; similarly they all stated that 
'procedure for performing task' is not clearly defined nor effectively applied in the 
Ministry. There is also an overwhelming agreement among our respondents that 
'Performance Appraisal System" (70%), 'Authority Structure' (80%), and 
'Accountability Guidelines" (80%) are not clearly defined nor effectively applied in 
345 
the MOH. This contrasts sharply with the situation in the UK National Health 
Services (NHS) where clear definition and effective application of these elements of 
management accountability are not only mandatory but also to be seen to apply visibly 
(Corby, 1999). To this extent it may be argued that the effectiveness of management 
accountability in the Ministry of Health is suspect. 
8.9.1 When are MTana2ement Accounts Rendered? 
Public organisation like Ministry of health follows a bureaucratic organisational 
structure and its rules and procedures as well as its documents framework are 
governed by the resolution establishing the Ministry such as the Federal Law no. (1) 
of 1972 and its subsequent reforms under the Federal laws No. (8) of 1973: No. (7) of 
1975; No. (4) of 1983; No. (1) of 1986; No. (11) of 1989 and Council of Ministers 
Resolution No. (3) of 1973. These laws and regulations had specified the duties and 
responsibilities of the Ministry of Health as well as the fiscal and financial reporting 
systems to ensure that the assets and liabilities of the Ministry are properly recorded 
and documented and a periodical statement of the revenue and expenditure is 
submitted to the Ministry of Finance and Industry. Unlike public enterprises and joint 
stock companies such as Etisalat. the Ministry of Health is not obligated to file annual 
accounts nor hold an annual general meeting for its shareholders/stakeholders to 
discuss its year-end financial results. Ministry of Health is only obligated to submit 
its fiscal budget by September or October of each year to the budget directorate in the 
Ministry of Finance and Industry and to up date its vote book from time to time to 
keep track of its expenses and revenue collection. Internally the Ministry of Health 
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compiles an annual report on staff activities covering personnel details and sanctions 
taken against employees. Besides these personnel appraisals. which are not efficiently 
conducted, the Ministry reports verbally, whenever needed, to the Cabinet of 
Ministers of any imported diseases and other potential or existing health hazards. The 
Ministry, as part of its strategy and plan, makes available from time to time an up date 
of statistical data showing mortality and survival rates, out patients and progress made 
in the field of medicine to the public and World Health Organisation (WHO). These 
requirements are not compulsory on the Ministry but the report is done for public 
relation purpose. 
To assess the type of statistical information made available in the Ministry, we asked 
our survey sample of thirty respondents to score, using a grading scale of 5 to 1, their 
assessment of the type of statistical information they provide the public. We present 
the results in Table 8.20. 
The first interesting thing in the Table is that the low standard errors (SE) of the 
means shows that the sample scores are very close to the sample mean which suggests 
that the views of the respondents are not very divergent. Given this, the ranking 
obtained using the mean scores reflects approximately the correct position with 
respect to the provision of information that would enhance management accountability 
in the Ministry. 
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Table 8.20 
Provision of Statistical Information in the Ministry of Health 
Type of Statistical Mean Std. Error Std. Ranking 
Information score of of the Deviation based on 
Sample of Mean Mean 
30 (x) (SE) score 
Annual Plan & Budget 3.75 0.196 1.075 3rd 
Details 
Financial Statistics 
2.50 0.194 1.064 6th 
Employment Statistics 
4.35 0.173 0.947 1st 
Audit Reports 
2.25 0.162 0.885 7th 
Decision Making structure 
3.00 0.168 0.925 4th 
Resource allocation and 
Utilization 2.75 0.169 0.927 5th 
General Statistics 
4.00 0.193 1.055 2nd 
Objectives of the Ministry 
4.00 0.149 0.815 2nd 
As can be seen in the ranking column and the numbers in red. the statistical 
information made available in the Ministry are largely not useful in terms of effective 
management accountability. Employment statistics, objectives of the Ministry, 
General Statistics, annual Plan and budget information and Decision making statistics 
which are ranked ist to 4th in that order are easily supplied in the Ministry but these 
are not the critical statistical information required to assess the performance of the 
MOH in the use of public resources made available to it. The relevant statistical 
information are ranked low which means that they are not easily made available, if at 
all. This undermines management accountability and suggests that the level of 
management accountability in the Ministry may be low. 
348 
8.9.2 Contents of Management Accounts 
There are no statutory requirements of disclosure of information neither for Ministry 
of Health activities nor for the contents of the accounts and report made to the 
accountees and other government agencies. Government rules and regulations do not 
specify a particular form for the disclosure or the contents of the report. However the 
contents of accounts of the Ministry of Health have been drawn on the basis of best 
practice. For fiscal and financial items the accounts disclosed the budget estimates for 
both recurrent and development expenditures against actual expenses such as staff 
salaries and wages, maintenance costs and medicine and other medical supplies as 
well as expenses incurred for projects payment. 
As far as staff appraisal report is concerned the Ministry of Health applies an 
evaluation system which includes the following attributes: a) personal details, b) 
training courses taken and the results, c) sanction and reward during the year, d) job 
description including duties and responsibilities, e) aunctuality and mistakes 
avoidance during work, f) follow up of work to the end, g) ability to organise and co- 
ordinate tasks, h) self education and development, i) ability to propose new ideas for 
job improvement, j) support changes and job development, k) establish a good 
working relation with other fellow and his/her subordinates, 1) take the initiative and 
bear the responsibility, m) ability to solve problems, n) trustworthy and good 
custodian of the Ministry's assets. 
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The personal assessment report contains an incentive scheme covering promotion, 
training for higher level of management, rotation of job, granting financial reward. 
However the scheme does not seem to be applied effectively as indicated by our 
respondent in Table 8.19. It is nice to have job appraisal procedures on paper but it is 
better to apply them and effectively too to achieve the expectations of the public. This 
does not seem to be the practical situation in the Ministry. 
8.9.3 Criteria of Evaluation of Management Accountability in 11OH 
Due to the nature of the Health service set up within the UAE public administration, 
the criteria for evaluating accountability process and the relationship of the accountor 
to the accountee are tilted toward bureaucratic system of government where the civil 
servant's main obsessions are discipline, enforcement of rules and regulations and 
strict adherence to superior's instructions. The evaluative factors relevant to the 
Ministry of Health accountability mechanism are as follows: 
i) Examination of the goals and the mission of the UAE Health Service to 
see whether these objectives had been achieved at a reasonable cost. 
ii) Duties and responsibilities of individuals within the organisation are 
clearly defined and the employees are given the freedom and the 
authority to carry out duties entrusted to them. 
iii) The accountor's relationship to the accountee is still functioning; and the 
accountor knows to whom he is accountable. 
iv) The accountability relationship within the Ministry of Health has an 
upward and down structure. Instead of being accountable to his sub 
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ordinate for the actions taken. the accountee is under, an obligation to 
issue the right instructions and guidelines to achieve the Ministry's 
public goals. 
v) To ensure that the system of sanctions and reward is operative and up 
dated frequently to accommodate the environmental changes 
vi) To ensure that sufficient authority is given to an employee to perform 
his duties as defined in the Health service organisational chart and the 
council of Ministers resolution No. (11) of 1989. 
vii) Clear standard of performance is set up and followed by the Ministry for 
measuring the staff achievement and progress and sufficient reward is 
granted for such results. 
viii) Interviewing staff to ensure compliance with strategies and plans as 
formulated and disseminated. 
8.9.4 Control Mechanism of Management accountability in MOH 
In government Ministry/department like Ministry of Health the control mechanism for 
safeguarding the public interest against civil servant's abuse of power when he/she is 
carrying out his/her duties is difficult to establish due to the size and diversity of 
services within the ministry of health. Any control mechanism for accountability 
purpose may only be general and less effective despite repeated requests by the public 
for openness and transparency of information in health service. 
In the last ten years. the Ministy of Health had started to publish statistical data on 
services available, type of diseases, outpatients, mortality rates and number of beds 
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and medical staff divided between nationals and expatriates. Such data could be used 
as indicators for performance and control but the vital statistical information for 
management accountability assessment are yet to be published as indicated in Table 
8.20. National Press report on certain medical care issues in recent months had 
brought about many criticisms of the Health Service in the UAE. However these 
comments and criticisms had been considered as . vays and means of exposing the 
Ministry to more control and further service improvement because the Minister and 
the government were made aware of the issues and the needs. On the other hand the 
government through the Minister of Health's verbal and written report on health care 
matters and annual budget impose certain control on the Ministry's activities and 
operation. 
To improve the service of the ministries the Cabinet of Ministers had set up a 
complaint office under direct supervision of the Deputy Prime Minister to receive 
complaints from the Federal ministries/departments' employees regarding their 
employment and related matters so that civil servants can air their views directly to an 
independent body thus achieving certain transparency of the works done within the 
ministries/departments. 
8.10 LEVEL OF MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTABILITY IN TILE ]MINISTRY OF IfEALT11 
Given all the issues raised above, we thought it will be helpful to assess the level of 
management accountability in the Ministry by first comparing certain accountability 
parameters between the UK National Health Services (NHS) and the Ministry of 
Health. Table 8.21 presents the comparison. 
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Table 8.21 
Management Accountability: Comparison of Control Parameters in UK & t1AE 
Control System UK (NHS) UAE (MOH) 
Ombudsman Available & Effective Not available 
Audit Office not effective) 
Performance Appraisal Available & Effective Available but not effective 
System 
League table of Available & Effective Not available 
erformance 
Setting targets to be Available & Effective Not available; Not set 
achieved 
Competitive Market Available & Effective Not Available 
System (Purchaser/Buyer 
System) 
Private Management Style Available & Effective Not available 
& approach 
Decentralization of Available & Effective Available but Not Effective 
Authority 
`Consumer Charter' - Available & Effective Not available 
Customer satisfaction 
measure 
Parliamentary 'Watch Available & Effective Not available as there is no 
dog' elected Parliament 
Auditor-General's Office Available & Effective Available but not effective 
The content of the Table is too clear to merit further analysis or comment. It is 
evident that the systems that encourage effective and a high level of management 
accountability in the UK National Health Services (NHS) are definitely not yet 
available in the Ministry of Health of the UAE. To this extent, it is reasonable to 
argue that the level of management accountability in the Ministry is below average. 
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We decided to test the hypothesis that the level of management accountability in the 
Ministry is less than average. We asked our survey sample respondent of 30 
accountees and accountors to rate their level of satisfaction with management 
accountability in the Ministry using the following neutral grading code: 
Very Satisfied 5 
Satisfied 4 
Average 3 
Dissatisfied 2 
Very Dissatisfied I 
The responses of our sample respondents from the Ministry of Health are presented in 
Table 8.22. 
Table 8.22 
Level of Management accountability in the Ministry of Health 
Response Type Grading 
Scale 
Number of 
Response in 
sample 
% of 
Response 
Very Satisfied 5 - - 
Satisfied 4 5 16.67% 
Average 3 7 23.33% 
Dissatisfied 2 14 45.67% 
Very Dissatisfied 1 4 13.33 
Total 30 100.00% 
Sample Statistic 
Mean 2.433333 
Standard Error 0.170754 
Standard Deviation 0.935261 
Sample Variance 0.874713 
Sum 73 
Count (N) 30 
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We formulated the null hypothesis: 
Ho: M<_3 
and the alternative hypothesis: 
Hi: M>_3 
where: 
"3 is the average score on the grading code; and 
0M is the mean of the sample survey results. 
The one-tail Z-test at 95% Confidence level indicates that the null hypothesis cannot 
be rejected (i. e. it is accepted) because the calculated Z-value of -3.34 is less than the 
critical Z-value of 1.64. At 95% confidence level, therefore, we may state that the 
view of our respondents is that the level of management accountability in the Ministry 
of Health is less than average. This rating seems to be collaborated by all the findings 
in this case-study. 
8.11 S[TIN1IN1ARY 
This case study on the Ministry of Health set off to test the hypothesis that the level of 
management accountability in the public sector of the UAE is below average The 
chapter has explored the performance of the Ministry and discovered that the MOH 
has achieved a high level of its health service objectives but this seems to be at a high 
cost raising the issue of inefficiency in the use of public resources. But, the infant 
mortality rate has been reduced substantially even though at a higher than necessary 
cost. 
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The general performance of the Ministry was investigated and the result was not 
encouraging. The research findings suggest that the general performance of the 
Ministry, unlike the performance of Etisalat, is below the average performance of 
comparable organizations such as the UK national Health Services (NHS). Our 
survey sample respondents support this finding very strongly. 
On the crucial area of management accountability, our research findings and the 
statistical analysis show that the level of management accountability in the Ministry is 
significantly below average. This finding is similar to the conclusion arrived at in the 
study of Etisalat which is a joint venture between the government and private 
enterprise. We conclude, therefore, that our case studies lead us to assert that the level 
of management accountability in the public sector of the UAE is below average and 
does not compare with the standard attained in the British National Health Services. 
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CHAPTER 9 
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9.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the last three chapters (i. e. chapters 6,7 and 8) we presented and discussed the 
case-studies including the general public sector survey findings (chapter 6). This 
chapter synthesizes the three empirical cases to enable us present an overall picture 
and analysis of Management Accountability in the public sector of the UAE. 
Our objective in this chapter is two-fold. First. we synthesize the findings of the case- 
studies and assess the validity and reliability of their conclusions. This has been done 
through a test of the means of the three samples using the ANOVA statistical tool. We 
consider the ANOVA as an appropriate statistical technique because it allows us to test 
the differences among the means of our three independent samples. Though the 
technique can be used to test differences between two means, ANOVA is more 
commonly used for hypothesis tests regarding the differences among the means of 
several (C) independent groups (where C >_ 3). It is a statistical technique that permits 
the researcher to determine whether the variability among or across the C sample means 
is greater than would be expected due to sampling error (McDaniel and Gates, 1991). 
The use of the technique to test whether the variability among our three sample-means 
(i. e. the means of Etisalat. Ministry of Health and the general Public Sector) is thus 
valid and justified. 
The second objective of this chapter is to identify and discuss the factors that are 
responsible for the low level of Management Accountability in the public sector of the 
UAE. This is done by first examining the correlation between the low level of 
Management Accountability and the factors identified in our empirical research as the 
358 
constraining factors. Correlation analysis has been employed to achieve this aspect of 
the objective. This is followed by a regression analysis with a view to establishing a 
cause-effect relationship between the low level of Management Accountability and the 
identified factors. We do recognize that cause-effect relationship is better established 
through experimental research (Cooper and Schindler, 1998; Sekaran. 2000) but it is 
also valid to use survey research results where the survey questions are designed 
appropriately to solicit responses that indicate cause-effect relationship (Hair. Bush and 
Ortinau, 2000). The responses obtained from our questionnaires and personal 
interviews fall into the latter category hence our use of regression analysis to establish 
cause-effect relationship is valid and justified. 
9.2 THE THEORETICAL BASIS 
The theoretical framework underlining this study, as stated earlier, is the "Principal - 
Agent Model" (see Figure 3.1). which defines twO main responsibilities for the actors in 
the system. The responsibilities are: 
" responsibility to undertake certain actions; and 
" responsibility to provide an account of those actions (Gray, Owen and 
Adams, 1996). 
The emergent relationship involves two main actors - an Accountee (Principal) and 
an Accounlor (Agent) - whose specific relationship is defined by society while their 
rights and obligations are defined by an internal 'Contract'. While the Accountee 
(Principal) has a right to information, the Accountor (Agent) has the obligation to 
provide the information based upon a specified set of criteria. Both parties interact 
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through these provisions of the wider societal environment and the internal contractual 
environment of the organisation. 
The model hypothesizes a simple two-way relationship between an Accountee (the 
Principal) and Accountor (the Agent). The terms of the flows between the parties and 
the actions and the level of accountability required are largely a function of the 
'contractual relationship' between the parties. Thus, the essence of the model is the 
relationship between the parties, which ascribes rights and obligations as well as 
responsibility, and thereby determines the nature and level of accountability expected. 
So the crucial issue is not only how the relationship - that is, the contract - is 
determined but also what factors shape its outcome (accountability) in terms of level 
of effectiveness and efficiency. It follows, therefore, that the level of effectiveness 
and efficiency of management accountability in the UAE public services sector is a 
direct function of the level of effect/influence of some mitigating factors in the 
system/society. These factors include, among others, Socio-cultural, Organisational 
and Personal factors. This chapter investigates this relationship. 
9.2.1 Focal Hypothesis 
Given the contention about the relationship between the level of management 
accountability and the mitigating factors, the hypothesis underlining the focus of this 
chapter is formulated as follows: 
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There is a direct and significant relationship between the level of 
Management Accountability in the public sector of the UAE and the 
Socio-cultural, Organisational and Personal factors in the system 
The alternative postulate is that there is no significant relationship between the two 
categories of variables. These contrasting hypotheses will be tested to enable us 
identify the factors that account for the less than average level of Management 
Accountability in the UAE public services sector. 
9.3 SYNTHESIS OF THE CASE-STUDY RESt1LTS 
The central issues. which our sample case-studies and the general public sector survey 
were to identify and confirm are: 
i) that the level of general performance of the public sector in the UAE, as 
estimated by our sample mean, is less than the population mean (µ); 
ii) that the level of Management Accountability, as estimated by our sample 
mean (x ). is less than the population mean (µ); 
iii) identification of the mitigating factors, on the confirmation of (ii) above. 
The synthesis in this section will concentrate on the first two tasks (i & ii) while the 
third task is handled in the following section. 
9.3.1 Is the General Performance of the Public Services Sector Satisfactory? 
The general impression we draw fron the results of the case-studies with respect to 
the question of whether the general performance of the UAE public services sector in 
tenns of achieving its objectives is above average rating is that the sector has not 
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achieved the high expectations of its customers. A summary of our fmdings in the 
three sample case-studies is presented in Table 9.1. 
Table 9.1 
General Performance of UAE Public Sector: Comparison of three Sample Results 
Sample Case-studies 
The General Etisalat Ministry of 
Comparison Unit Public (Telecom. Health Remark 
Co. ) 
Sample Mean 2.28 3.67 2.93 
(x) (SE=0.063) (SE=0.175) (SE=0.197) 
Number of 
Sample (N) 200 30 30 
Standard 0.887 0.959 1.081 
Deviation 
Significance 95% 95% 95% 
Level 
Etisalat 
Is Mean Rating Not Yes, very Not mean rating 
Significant at Significant Significant Significant significant at 
95% 99% level 
Hypothesis Ho: M< 3 Ho: M: 5 3 Ho: M: 5 3 M=Sample 
H1: M 
_3 
H1: M>3 H1: M>3 Mean. 
3=µ 
Test of Ho: Accepted Ho: Rejected Ho: Accepted 
Hypothesis Hi: Rejected H1: Accepted Hl: Rejected 
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The interpretation of the results in the Table is simple and clear. The rating of the 
general performance of the public services sector by the sample of respondents 
representing the general public is significantly below the expected average level of 
performance at the 95% significance level as suggested by our test of the relevant 
hypothesis. A similar result and interpretation is obtained in the case of the Ministry 
of Health as reflected in the rating of our sample respondents. The Ministry's general 
performance in terms of achieving its social and economic objectives is rated ky the 
sample respondents as below the expected average performance. This is an interesting 
outcome of this aspect of the survey research because a similar question directed 
specifically to the performance of the Ministry in terms of some specific health 
objectives. as reported in chapter 8. shows a rating that is significantly higher than the 
average level of performance expected. This may be interpreted as above average 
performance in the technical fields as against below average performance in other 
areas which overshadow the technical achievements. 
On the other hand. the rating of Etisalat. as suggested by our test result, indicates a 
higher than average performance level. The Z-test of the sample mean actually shows 
that the performance of the company being significant even at the 99% significance 
level. As mentioned in chapter 7. the above average performance of Etisalat relates 
more to the company's financial transactions (technical) rather than its management 
accountability. This finding conf inns the trail of evidence from this study that the 
performance of the public services sector particularly in respect of provision of 
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performance evaluation information is not satisfactory. Many organizations in the 
sector have no clearly, defined objectives, performance evaluation standards, control 
mechanisms and hardly use external performance evaluation professional bodies. All 
these have raised question mark over the issue of management accountability in the 
sector. The question is raised whether the relevant accountors in the UAE public 
services sector provide effective and reliable management account to the accountees? 
In other words, do the accountors and accountees understand full}, the concept of 
management accountability and, if they do, what is the level of management 
accountability is attained in the sector? The next section provides the synthesis of the 
answers to these questions as indicated by our sample respondents. 
9.4 LEVEL OF MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
As in the case of assessment of the general performance of the public services sector, 
our sample respondents in the case-studies were asked to assess the level of 
Management Accountability attained in the public services sector. The respondents 
were asked to use a five-point grading scale system to indicate their assessment as 
follows: 
Much higher than average 5 
Higher than average 4 
Average 3 
Lower than average 2 
Much lower than average 1 
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A comparative summary of the results from the three case-samples and the test of the 
significance of the estimates is presented in Table 9.2. 
Table 9.2 
Level of Management Accountability in Public Sector: Synthesis of Three Case-Studies 
Sample Case-studies 
Comparison Unit The General Etisalat Ministry of 
Public (Telecom. Health Remark 
Co. ) 
Sample Mean 2.23 2.97 2.43 
(x) (SE = 0.071) (SE = 0.155) (SE = 0.171) 
Number of Sample 
(N) 200 30 30 
Standard 
Deviation 1.004 0.850 0.935 
Significance 95% 95% 95% 
Level 
is Mean Rating Not Not Not 
Significant at 95% Significant Significant Significant 
Ho: M: 5 3 Ho: M <_ 3 Ho: M <_ 3 M=Sample- 
Hypothesis Hi: M >_ 3 Hl: M>3 Hl: M >_ 3 mean 
3=µ 
Ho: Accepted Ho: Accepted Ho: Accepted 
est of Hypothesis Hl: Rejected HI: Rejected Hl: Rejected 
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In contrast to the results on the assessment of the general performance of the public 
services sector as reported in Table 9.1, the results into the investigation of the level of 
Management Accountability in the public services sector show the following 
summaries: 
a) the individual means of the samples are less than the estimate of the population 
mean (µ ) being 3 in our grading scale; 
b) all the three mean ratings are not significant even at the 95% percent level of 
significance: 
c) unlike in the case of the test of hypothesis regarding the general performance 
of the public services sector as represented by our case-study samples (Table 
9.1), all the relevant hypotheses (i. e. the alternative hypotheses - HI) are 
rejected and the null hypotheses accepted. 
These results indicate that the respondents of the three separate samples rate the level 
of Management Accountability in the public services sector less than the average level 
in similar sectors. This conclusion raises the issue of validity and reliability of the 
results since the conclusion is based upon evidence from three sample means. 
As discussed earlier in this chapter. when there is a need to test the differences among 
the means of two or more independent samples. analysis of variance (ANOVA), is an 
appropriate statistical tool. Though it can be used to test differences between two 
means, ANOVA is more commonly used for hypothesis tests regarding the differences 
among the means of three or more independent groups or samples. It is a statistical 
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method that allows the researcher to determine if the variability among or across the 
several sample means is greater than would be expected due to sampling error. We 
have thus used ANOVA to test the variability among our three case-study sample 
means. The results of the test are presented in Table 9.3. 
Table 9.3 
Level of Management Accountability: Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) of Means 
Source of Sum of Squares Degree of Mean Square F. Statistic 
Variation 
Freedom 
Response 12.686 (SSA 2 (c-1) 6.343 (MSA) 6.917 
(calculated) 
Error 235.713 (SSE) 257 (n-c) 0.917 (MSE) 
Total 248.399 (SST 259 (n-1) 
The results in the Table show that with a numerator (MSA) of 6.343 and the associated 
degree of freedom of 2; and a denominator (MSE) of 0.917 and the associated degree of 
freedom of 257, the calculated F-ratio is 6.917. 
From a Table of F-distribution' which gives the critical ratios for all sample sizes and 
numbers of samples, we can see that at . 05 (5%) level of significance the Table value 
of F-ratio with 2 (numerator) and 257 (denominator) degrees of freedom is 3.00; and 
at 0.1 (1%) level of significance, the corresponding Table value is 4.61. Since our two 
' See Table 5 in the statistical appendix in McDaniel & Gates (1991). 
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estimates of population variance [i. e. the within sample variance (MSA) and the 
between sample variance (MSE)] give an F-ratio (calculated) of about 6.92. which 
clearly exceeds the tabulated F-ratio (critical) of 4.61 at the 0.1 (11/0) level of 
significance, we conclude that the two estimates are significantly different at the 1% 
level - this automatically includes the 5% level as well. 
This result allows us to make certain conclusions and not others. For example. the 
result may not allow us to say that: 
a) our three case-study sample-means are significantly different (i. e. all the 
three samples are from different populations); or 
b) tPvo of our three sample means are the same (i. e. the two samples are 
from the same population ): or 
c) Our three samples are from the same population. 
What the conclusion enables us to say with a high degree of certainty is that the samples 
are not all from the same population. Since the calculated F-ratio of 6.92 is greater than 
the tabulated F-ratio of 4.61 at the 10/'o level of significance, we reject the null 
hypothesis and accept the alternative one. This leads us to the conclusion that the 
variability observed in the three means is greater than would be expected by chance. 
This result gives greater validity and reliability to our conclusion, drawn from the 
results presented in Table 9.1, that the level of Management Accountability in the UAE 
public service sector is less than average (i. e. below the population mean). 
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Our confidence in this conclusion is confirmed by the result of the ANOVA test. which 
shows clearly that our three samples are largely independent and, therefore, the results 
obtained from them are reliable estimates of the population parameters. The result 
constitutes, by implication, a representative assessment of the level of Management 
Accountability in the public services sector by the people of the UAE. 
9.5 FACTORS CONSTRAINING ACCOUNTABILITY 
Having concluded from the rating of our sample respondents that the level of 
Management Accountability in the public services sector is less than average level in 
similar organisations. we investigated the probable constraining factors. To do this, we 
first identified the factors that have significant correlation with the level of Management 
accountability in the public sector. From our exploratory research we identified the 
following groups of factors as the main mitigating factors: 
9.5.1 Social-cultural factors 
These include, among others. the following: 
Culture of trust in the society 
. Low level of public awareness 
Attitude of indifference in the society 
. Tradition of excessive respect for the views of elders 
Lack of interest of the public in public accountability 
Poor knowledge of responsibility 
Low level of political awareness in the society. 
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9.5.2 Organisational factors 
These include, among others, the following: 
  Lack of clear definition of management accountability 
  Lack of accountability culture in the sector 
  Lack of guidelines for presenting management accountability 
  Lack of effective reward/sanction system 
  Layback attitude of the boss 
  Ineffective external auditing body 
  Inappropriate structure of the organisations 
  Lack of precise referral criteria 
  Corrupt ethical environment 
  Lack of equal opportunity for all 
  Lack of effective accountability control mechanisms. 
9.5.3 Personal factors 
These include, among others, the following: 
f Fear of loss of job 
f Inferiority complex 
f Inadequate education 
f Lack of confidence 
f Culture of secrecy 
f Corrupt behaviour 
f Fear of exposure of inadequacies 
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f Fear of blame official arrogance 
f Lack of clear definition of job responsibilities 
f Lack of delegation of authority. 
We asked a randomly selected sample of 30 respondents from the combined sample of 
60 respondents from both Etisalat and the Ministry of Health to rate the level of 
mitigating effect of each of the three groups of factors upon the level of Management 
Accountability using a five-point rating scale as follows: 
Very high negative effect 5 
High negative effect 4 
Average negative effect 3 
Low negative effect 2 
Very low negative effect 1 
In a supplementary question, we requested the respondents to indicate the 
corresponding "effect-level" on management accountability in the sector of their rating 
of the mitigating factors using the following rating scale: 
Much higher than average level 5 
Higher than average level 4 
Average level 3 
Lower than average level 2 
Much lower than average level 1 
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The results of our finding are reported in Table 9.4. The objective here is to establish 
any correlation and the strength of such correlation between the level of Management 
Accountability and each group of mitigating factors 
Table 9.4 
Level of Management Accountability and Effects of Constraining Factors 
Rating of Level of 
Management 
Rating of level of effect of Constraining Factors 
Accountability Social-Cultural 
Factor 
Organisational 
Factor 
Personal Factor 
1.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
2.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 
1.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 
1.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
2.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 
1.00 5.00 4.00 5.00 
1.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
2.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 
2.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 
2.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 
2.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 
3.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 
3.00 4.00 3.00 3.00 
2.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 
2.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 
2.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 
1.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 
1.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
1.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
1.00 5.00 4.00 5.00 
2.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 
3.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 
2.00 4.00 5.00 4.00 
1.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
1.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
1.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
2.00 5.00 4.00 5.00 
2.00 5.00 4.00 4.00 
3.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 
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(i. e. Social-cultural, Organisational and Personal factors). Using the sofhvare 
"statistical package for the social sciences" (SPSS), we derived the descriptive statistics 
as well as Pearson correlation coefficient as presented in Tables 9.4A and 9.4B 
respectively. We chose the Pearson correlation because the data involve interval scale. 
which. of course, include ordinal scale as well (McDaniel and Gates, 1991, Hair and et 
al., 2000). 
Table 9.4A 
Descrintive Statistics of T ihie 9_d 
Std. Sample 
Variable Mean Deviation size 
Level of Management 
Accountability 1.767 0.728 30 
(SE=0.134) 
Social-Cultural Factors 
4.267 0.734 30 
(SE=O. 135) 
Organisational Factors 
4.233 0.626 30 
(SE=O. 115) 
Personal factors 
4.367 0.718 30 
(SE=O. 132) 
It can be seen in the Table that the standard deviations are low which suggest that the 
observations are very close to the sample mean. The interpretation of this is that the 
views of the respondents in each group are very close to each other in terms of 
assessment of the relevant variables. In Table 9.4B we present the derived Pearson 
correlation coefficient for the data in Table 9.4. 
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Table 9.4B 
Pearcnn Cnrrelation Cnefficientc of nata in Tnhle 9.4 
Level of Social-Cultural Organisational Personal 
Management Factors Factors Factors 
Accountability 
Level of 
Management 1.000 -0.841** -0.784** -0.886** 
Accountability 
Social-Cultural 
Factors -0.841** 1.000 0.680** 0.783** 
Organisational 
Factors -0.784** 0.680** 1.000 0.647** 
Personal Factors -0.886** 0.783** 0.647** 1.000 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed) 
Sample size (N) in each group is 30. 
From Table 9.4B we can discern two important results. The first important result 
relates to the Pearson correlation coefficient (r) itself, which is estimated for each 
combination of `level of management accountability' and each of the other factors as 
follows: 
a) r= -0.841 between level of management accountability and Social-Cultural 
factors; 
b) r= -0.784 between level of management accountability and Organisational 
factors; 
C) r= -0.886 behveen level of management accountability and Personal 
factors. 
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Clearly, all the correlation coefficients are negative indicating a negative correlation 
between the level of management accountability and the mitigating effects of the 
Social-Cultural. Organisational and Personal factors. This means that the greater the 
hindering or constraining effects of the social-cultural organisational and personal 
factors in the organisations and enterprises in the public services sector of the UAE. the 
lower will be the level of management accountability. 
More significantly, the values of the correlation coefficients (r) are high. This, coupled 
with the negative relationship. indicates a strong negative correlation between the level 
of management accountability in the - public services sector of the UAE and the 
mitigating effects of each group of factors (social-cultural, organisational and personal 
factors). 
The second important aspect of the results in Table 9.4B is that each of the correlation 
coefficients is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed test). This means a rejection of the 
null hypothesis that r=0 and accepting the alternative hypothesis that r>0. This 
confirms our result and conclusion that there is a strong negative correlation between 
the level of management accountability and the hindering effects of each group of 
social-cultural, organisational and personal factors. This means simply that the greater 
the intensity of the adverse effects of social-cultural, organisational and personal factors 
in organisations in the UAE public services sector, the lower the level of management 
accountability in the sector. 
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It is worth noting, however, that our research finding of a strong negative correlation 
between the level of management accountability and the constraining effects of each of 
the groups of factors does not simultaneously mean a cause-effect relationship between 
the variables. Correlation does not imply causation (Rowntree. 1987; McDaniel and 
Gates. 1991). For example, if variables X and Y are correlated, this may be because X 
causes Y, or because Y causes X, or because some other variable is affecting both X 
and Y, or for a mixture of these reasons; or the whole relationship may be coincidence 
(Rowmtree, 1987, p. 171). To establish causation, therefore, we carried out regression 
analysis using the data in Table 9.4. 
The premise of the regression analysis is our contention that the combined constraining 
effect of the three groups of factors (social-cultural, organisational and personal factors) 
is responsible for the observed low level of management accountability in organisations 
in the public services sector of the UAE. To test this hypothesis. the following model 
was estimated, using regression analysis: 
Y=a+b, Xi+ b2 X, + b3 X3 9.1 
where: 
Y= dependent variable - level of management accountability 
a= constant term. 
bi-,, = regression coefficients to be estimated. 
X, = social-cultural factors. 
X2 = organisational factors. 
X3 = personal factors. 
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The estimated regression equation is as follows: 
Y=6.466-. 248X1-. 336 X, -. 509 X3 
(0.352) (0.114) (0.110) (0.113) 
R=0.940 R' = 0.883 SE = 0.263 D-W =1.77. 
These results show that: 
9_ 
a) All of the regression coefficients (bi_ b2. and b3) have negative signs. 
This indicates that higher rating of the constraining effects of the three 
independent variables are associated with a lower rating on the level of 
management accountability in the public services sector. 
b) The regression coefficients show the estimated effect of one-unit 
increase in the associated independent variable on the dependent 
variable. For example, b3 is equal to 0.509. This means that, 
according to the model, a one-unit increase in the rating of the 
constraining effects of the personal factors will result in a 0.509 
decrease in the rating of the level of management accountability in the 
public sector. 
C) According to the estimates. the constraining effect of the personal 
factors has a larger effect on the level of management accountability in 
the public sector than the effects of the other two independent 
variables. This is based on a comparison of the magnitudes of the 
three regression coefficients. 
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d) The R` value or coefficient of determination of 0.883, indicates the 
percentage of the variation in the rating of the level of management 
accountability in the public sector (Y) explained by the variation in the 
mitigating effects of the three independent variables. In this case, the 
three independent variables explain 88.3% of the variation in the level 
of management accountability in the public sector. 
e) The standard error of the estimate (SE = 0.263) is low which indicates 
that the 'fit' is good and that the observations are close to the mean of 
the sample. 
f) Also, the Durbin-Watson (D-W) statistic obtained (1.775) falls 
between D and (4 - D ), that is, between 1.6 and 2.4 as given in the 
D-W statistic Table. This indicates the absence of serial correlation 
among the independent variables. 
All these evidence lead to the establishment of a cause-effect relationship between the 
level of management accountability in the public sector and the constraining effects of 
the social-cultural, organisational and personal factors. We conclude, therefore, that 
there is a reasonable basis to believe that the hindering effects of the three groups of 
factors account for the observed low level of management accountability in the public 
services sector of the UAE. Our conclusion has been made with a caution because it is 
difficult to establish peremptorily causation between or among variables even when the 
regression analysis results indicate so (McDaniel and Gates, 1991, p. 590). 
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9.6 SUNINIARY 
This chapter addressed three main issues. First it undertook the synthesis of the 
findings and results of the case-studies with a view to confirming the conclusions of 
the cases. This was done through the application of various test methods including 
ANOVA test. We arrived at the conclusion, in support of the findings in the case- 
studies, that the level of management accountability in the sample organisations is less 
than the average expected. Similarly. our public respondents see the general 
performance of organisations in the public sector in terms of achieving objectives. as 
inadequate. This is also the picture with the Ministry of Health while the respondents 
from Etisalat thought the company has performed above average. 
The issue addressed is the establishment of correlation between the rating of the level of 
management accountability and the constraining effects of social-cultural, 
organisational and personal factors. This was established through the use of Pearson 
correlation coefficients. which were not only high in value but also significant at the 
0.01 level (I-tailed test). The coefficients are negative as well leading us to conclude 
that there is a strong negative correlation between the rating of the level of management 
accountability and the rating of the mitigating influences of social-cultural, 
organisational and personal factors. 
The third issue addressed was to attempt to establish a causal relationship between the 
independent variable (level of management accountability) and the independent 
variables (social-cultural, organisational and personal factors). Using regression 
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analysis we arrived at a tentative conclusion that there is some level of causal 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables. The coefficient of 
determination (R2) of 0.883 indicates that about 88% of the variations in the dependent 
variable are explained by variations in the rating of the constraining effects of the 
independent variables. Because the relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables is negative, the implication is that higher constraining effects of 
the independent variables lead to lower rating of the level of management accountability 
in the UAE public sector organisations. However, this conclusion is couched in 
caution, as the establishment of causation is difficult even if regression analysis 
indicates a causal relationship. 
In the next chapter, we will engage in analyzing how the independent variables 
influence the level of the dependent variable. 
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CHAPTER 10 
ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF CONSTRAINING 
FACTORS 
381 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter concentrated on reviewing and analyzing the case study results 
with three main objectives in mind. The first of these was to collate and synthesize the 
empirical case-study results into a composite conclusion. This was done and the 
overall conclusion drawn was that the general level of Management Accountability in 
the public services organizations in the United Arab Emirates was less than the 
average level in similar organizations. 
The second objective was to isolate from the empirical results relevant factors that 
have significant association (correlation) with the less than average level of 
Management Accountability established, through the rating of our case study sample 
respondents, in the public services sector of the UAE. Through the use of Pearson co- 
efficient of correlation (r), we were able to identify the relevant groups of factors that 
have significant correlation with the low level of Management Accountability in the 
public sector. The group of factors includes: 
Social Cultural factors 
Organizational factors 
Personal factors 
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The third objective was to attempt to establish a causal relationship between the low 
level of Management Accountability in the sector (dependent variable) and the groups 
of factors (independent variables) identified as having significant correlation with the 
dependant variable. 
Using regression analysis, we were able to establish a high level of causal 
relationship. The regression results (Table 9.4) enabled us to assert that about 88% of 
the variation in the level of Management Accountability in the UAE public services 
sector was caused by variations in the independent variables. 
Given these conclusions from the previous chapter, the main objective of this chapter 
is to discuss and analyze how the groups of causal factors have mitigated against a 
higher than average level of Management Accountability in the public services sector 
of the UAE. The chapter will also present comparative discussion of factors that have 
been identified as enhancers of a high level of Management Accountability in the UK 
public sector with a view to establishing the effectiveness of the "enhancers" in the 
case of the UAE. 
A combination of discussive and analytical presentation approach is adopted in this 
chapter. We have disaggregated the constituent elements of the mitigating groups of 
factors as shown in the Fish bone diagram in Figure 10.1. This presents a pictorial 
view of the cause-effect relationship between the independent variables, including 
their various sub-factors and the dependent variable (level of accountability). 
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We have discussed the relative effects of each of the elements and carried out 
statistical analysis and tests to support our inferences from the discussion and results. 
We are conscious, however, of the limitations of our approach in establishing 
causation between our dependent and independent variables (see, McDaniel & Gates. 
1991; Rowntree, 1987). Even so, we believe that our results are reasonably valid and 
reliable. 
10.2 EFFECTS OF THE SOCIAL-CULTURAL FACTORS 
As Figure 10.1 shows, this group includes, among others, the following elements: 
Lack of interest of the public in Management Accountability 
Tradition of respect for views of elders 
Culture of trust in the society 
Attitude of indifference in the society 
Low level of public awareness 
From our Regression Analysis results in Table 9.4, we can see that this group accounts 
for -0.248 of the variations in the dependent variable - the level of Management 
Accountability in the UAE public sector. This means, an increase by one unit in the 
rating of the collective effect of the social cultural factors leads to 0.248 decrease in 
the rating of the level of Management Accountability in the public sector. As it is, this 
represents a composite effect of all the elements that constitute the social cultural 
factors. Disaggregating this package enables us to discuss and assess the contribution 
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of each individual element in the group. This gives a better picture of their relative 
effects on the level of Management Accountability. 
In Table 10.1 we present an analysis of our survey results on the relative mitigating 
effects of the individual elements in the social cultural group of factors. Looking at 
the profile of responses across the elements of the group in relation to the Response 
types, we notice a bunching of responses in the top two classes of Response Types. 
Apart from the elements of "attitude of indifference in the society". "poor knowledge 
of responsibility' and "low level of political awareness in the society", none of the 
other elements had ratings in the "Average" or "lower than Average" response types. 
In general, therefore, the profile of responses in our sample of 30 respondents 
indicates that all the elements in this group made robust individual negative 
contribution to the group's collective mitigating effect on the level of Management 
Accountability as suggested by the results of our regression analysis in the previous 
chapter. 
This is confirmed by the profile of mean rating in the "Analytical Statistics". It can be 
seen that the lowest mean rating is 4.30 for the "poor knowledge of responsibility" 
element and the highest is 4.63 for the "lack of interest of the public in management 
accountability". Given that the range of the response rating scale is from I (minimum) 
to 5 (maximum), mean ratings of 4.30 and above shows a top heavy bunching 
reflecting a robust contribution by each of the elements to the collective negative 
effect of this group of factors on the level of Management Accountability. 
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Looking at the ranking of the rating, which is based upon the mean rating, it can be 
seen that the range is from 4.30 as the lowest (6th) to 4.63 as the highest (ist. ). 
Though differences between the mean ratings are not very high, nonetheless, the 
ranking shows the diiferential negative effects of the individual elements of this group 
of constraining factors. As it is, the "lack of interest of the public in such as account" 
is ranked as the element with the most negative effect on management accountability 
in this group of limiting factors; this is followed by the "tradition of respect for the 
views of elders" and "culture of trust in the society" as joint second most limiting 
elements in the group. These are followed by "attitude of indifference in the society" 
as third; "low level of public awareness" as fourth; "low level of political awareness in 
the society" as fifth; and "poor knowledge of responsibility" as the least constraining 
individual element. The implication of this result and the ranking relates to the need 
for prioritizing areas of action to eliminate the constraining elements in view of 
resource limitations. To eliminate the social-cultural factors that encourage poor 
management accountability in the public sector, the government will need to use the 
ranking derived from the results to prioritize its target elements to be eliminated in 
order to maximize results from the use of scarce and limited resources. Furthermore, 
the ranking of the elements in the group enables the government to understand the 
view of the public and the weighting they place on the elements that limit the 
provision of a high level of management accountability. Indeed, these results may 
also provide a clue to understanding the general state of the other types of 
accountability, such as financial or political accountability, in the public services 
sector of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). 
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Supporting the top heavy bunching of the responses (ratings) around the respective 
mean ratings, are the standard errors of the means and the associated standard 
deviations. As can be seen in Table 10.1, the standard errors of the individual mean 
ratings range from 0.089 to 0.121 while the associated standard deviations range from 
0.490 to 0.661. In both cases, the values are low and this confirms the top heavy 
bunching of the individual response ratings of the sample respondents around the 
corresponding individual mean-ratings. This analysis suggests that virtually all our 
sample respondents hold the view that all the individual elements of the social cultural 
factors have strong negative effects on the level of Management Accountability in the 
public sector. 
A test of hypothesis formulated around the average of the rating scale confirms the 
validity and reliability of our analysis. We formulated the null hypothesis as: 
Ho: M<3 
and the alternative as: 
H1: M>3 
where: 
M= the sample mean rating 
3= the average on the rating scale. 
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As can be seen in the Table, the test result shows that the difference between each 
sample mean-rating and the average on the rating scale is significant in all cases at the 
99% level. The null hypothesis was thus rejected and the alternative hypothesis 
accepted. We can thus infer that with 99% confidence that the mean rating of the 
negative effects of each individual element of the group of social-cultural factor was 
significantly higher than the average (3) on the rating scale. This supports our 
conclusion that the negative effect of the individual elements in the level of 
Management Accountability in the UAE public services sector is significant leading, 
similarly, to a significant negative group effect. 
We have also ranked the relative strength of the negative effects of the elements as 
can be seen from the Table (red numbers). At the top of the rank is the negative effect 
of the "'lack of interest of the public in Management Accountability" and at the bottom 
is the moderate influence of the "poor knowledge of responsibility" among staff in the 
public services organization. The influence of other elements is ranked accordingly 
between these two poles. A brief discussion of how these elements affect the level of 
Management Accountability in the public services sector will be useful in elucidating 
the conclusion drawn from the research findings. 
The following explanation indicate how the effects are generated: 
10.2.1 Lack of Interest of the Public in Accountability 
Our respondents feel that this element has the most negative effect on the level of 
Management Accountability within the group. The general public in the UAE take 
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little interest in the amount of resources allocated to organizations (Ministries and 
others) in the public sector and how efficiently such resources are used in the interest 
of the people. They are thus not interested in the accountability of accoutors for the 
use of such public resources as would be expected in Western countries such as the 
UK, USA and other European countries. The public interest and awareness of how 
public resources are used is, arguably, the most potent source of control over the 
activities of public utilities (Day & Klein, 1987). 
The lack of interest of the UAE public derives largely from: 
  The enormous oil revenue wealth of the country which eases financial 
problems experienced by other countries and thus induces a "layback" attitude 
among the public: 
  The lack of political education and awareness which leads to poor knowledge 
about the activities of the public services sector and the need for `*%vatch-dogs" 
over their work; 
  The paternalistic system of government in which the public has great 
confidence and thus entrusts its interests in the system; 
  The nature of the composition of the potentially active population which is 
predominantly migrant labour, and it inability to question openly the 
effectiveness and efficiency of public sector organizations. 
Given these, it is not surprising that the UAE public is not strongly interested in the 
activities of public sector institutions particularly in their Management Accountability 
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-a concept that has yet to be fully developed for the lay public to comprehend. lt 
must be stated, however, that the situation is changing towards a burgeoning public 
interest in the activities and efficiency of public sector Accountees and Accountors. 
The recent criticisms of the work of certain Ministries in local daily newspapers are 
pointers to awakening interest of the public in public sector efficiency (Gulf News, 18 
February 2000). 
10.2.2 Culture of Trust & Tradition of Respect for views of Elders. 
The citizens of the UAE hold dearly to their culture and traditions including trust and 
respect for the views of their elders particularly those in the Ruling Families as well as 
those in strategic policy-making and implementation (Accountee and Accountor) 
class. This tradition is impressed in the migrant labour population who are introduced 
into observing the same culture and tradition. It is a situation of "when in Rome; do 
as the Romans dom. The effect of this is that Accountees and Accountors in the public 
sector are trusted and their views respected as the "custodians" of the interests and 
welfare of the people. To this extent, it is hardly expected that Accountors will feel 
obliged to give a full account of their use of public resources let alone being called to 
present such an account for public scrutiny. Clearly, this impacts negatively on the 
expected level of Management Accountability in the public sector. 
10.2.3 Poor Knowledge of Responsibility 
In most of the organizations in the public sector, particularly the Ministries, there are 
neither hardly formal job description nor clear lines of responsibility between officers 
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or staff. Confusion is rife in such a situation in respect of what precise jobs individual 
staff does and their lines of responsibility and authority. 
Such fused state of responsibility lead to inadequate lines of reporting while 
encouraging informal communication and reporting channels. The effect shows in the 
development of more informal rather than formal methods of accountability within the 
organization. This does not encourage a high level of management accountability. 
The other elements of the group exert negative effect on the level of accountability in 
similar manner. The "attitude of indifference in the society", for example, stems 
partly from the subservient nature of the dominant migrant labour and partly from the 
paternalistic system of government, which provides almost all the requirements of the 
citizens with little financial strain. In such an environment, accountors are hardly 
required to render any elaborate account of their stewardship resulting in. 
10.3 EFFECTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL FACTOR 
The aggregate effect of the organizational factors, as estimated by our regression 
equation in Chapter 9, is -0.336. This suggests that a one-unit increase in the rating of 
the constraining effects of the organizational factors will lead to a 0.336 decrease in 
the rating of the level of Management Accountability. We disaggregated the package 
to enable us analyze the individual effects of the constituent elements. Table 10.2 
presents our research results with respect to the relative effects of the elements of the 
Organizational factor. 
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Compared with the profile of response in Table 10.1, the profile in Table 10.2 is more 
spread. It can be seen that the four top ranking elements of the organizational factor, 
as presented in the Table, show a top-heavy bunching of response as against the 
remaining seven which have a fair spread around the average of the rating scale 
(i. e. 3). This indicates a diverse view about the effects of the individual elements. 
The mean-ratings provide a further evidence of the diverse view of the respondents. 
For example, the mean-ratings of seven of the eleven elements are above the average 
of the rating scale (that is 3) while the remaining four are below the average. The 
standard errors of the means-ratings and their associated standard deviations are low 
suggesting a fair clustering of the responses of our sample respondents around the 
relevant mean- rating. This may be interpreted as a low variation in opinion within 
the sample members on the effect of each element of the group on the level of 
Management Accountability in the Public Sector. 
A test of significance of the difference between the mean rating of the individual 
elements and the average of the rating scale at the 99% level shows, as presented in 
Table 10.2, that all the elements except four are significant at that level. This 
underscores the impression of our sample respondents that most of the elements in this 
group are rated as having significant negative effect on the level of Management 
Accountability in the public sector. 
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From the ranking based on the mean-ratings of the samples, the view of our 
respondents on the relative effects of the elements can be discerned. Our respondents 
view the lack of an appropriate and fair reward system in public services organizations 
as the most significant element in this group that mitigate against a higher level of 
Management Accountability. This is quite understandable in the sense that without an 
appropriate and fair re%vard/sanction system in an organization, staff morale may be 
affected adversely leading to lower performance as the staff reacts to the situation. 
This contrasts with reward/sanction systems in the British public services sector where 
staff career path and reward/sanction systems are not only seen to be fair but also seen 
to be based upon appropriate staff appraisal systems (Ibid. ). In the UAE public 
services sector, there is hardly an appropriate staff appraisal system upon which staff 
promotion, remunerations and sanctions are based. This has the effect of discouraging 
public services personnel from performing optimally to render a reasonably efficient 
and high level of account of their work and responsibilities. 
The second and third elements in the ranking relate to the lack of any guideline or 
standard to direct the various levels of accountors on how to present or deliver 
accounts of their responsibilities and the employment of public resources entrusted in 
their care. Without specific guidelines on what, how. why and when to account for 
their responsibilities, accountors will not be able to prepare and present a reasonable 
account of their work and responsibilities. Clearly, this impacts negatively upon the 
level of accountability as accountors wonder on what exactly to present. In a similar 
way the lack of referral standards leads to a lack of direction on what and how to 
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account for the use of public resources. This is hardly the case in the UK public 
services where precise guidelines and referral standards are provided not only 
internally but also externally by parliament and, recently. by the various "Citizen 
Charters". The level of Management Accountability in the UK public services sector 
is consequently higher than in the UAE public sector where such guidelines and 
referral standards such as the "Citizen Charter'', do not exist as yet. 
The fourth element in the ranking, the lack of specific definition of Management 
Accountability", has a direct negative effect on the level of Management 
Accountability in the sector. Of course. without a clear idea of what the concept is all 
about, it is difficult to see how it can be applied effectively let alone efficiently. 
Neither the Accountors nor the Accountees have an agreed definition, formally or 
informally, of the concept hence their application of the concept has been sub- 
standard leading to a low level of accountability. The fifth element in the ranking may 
be seen as a natural extension of the effect of the lack of a general definition of 
management accountability. However, there is also an element of a wider lack of 
accountability culture in the society. which derives from various other factors 
including the culture. tradition and religion. The commonly used term "ennsha-Allah' 
- translated as "God Willing" - 
has embedded in it an implication of a surrender to the 
"Divine power and will of Allah" and thus the absolution of the individual from 
accounting for his/her actions and responsibility. To this extent, the lack of a formal 
accountability culture in the society affects adversely the level of Management 
Accountability in the public services sector in the UAE. Compared with the UK, the 
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opposite is the case. Effective and efficient management accountability is demanded 
from all in position of decision making not only in their official duties but also in their 
private lives. The numerous cases of Ministers and civil servants in the UK who have 
been forced to resign their positions because of improper behaviour or poor 
accountability in public or private lives are examples of the wide spread culture of 
accountability in the British society. 
The policy of setting up incident investigation committees as soon as an unacceptable 
incident, for example. the current "Foot and Mouth Disease", occurs reflects a society 
with formal and institutionalized accountability culture which is not the case in the 
UAE. However, it is worth recognizing that there is a strong informal tradition of 
accountability, which applies more of informal (including verbal) methods of 
accountability rather than the formal methods of the Western Countries. This 
approach derives from the nature of the Arab Culture. which is a "high context 
culture" in contrast to the "high content culture" of the Western Countries. Arguably, 
this tradition has served the society reasonably satisfactorily. But the increasing 
import of modern technology. western education and the increasing complexity of the 
responsibilities of the public services organizations require a review of the informal 
accountability system in order to achieve a higher level of Management 
Accountability (in the modern sense) in the UAE public sector. 
The sixth and seventh elements in the ranking constitute major issues in the UK public 
services sector but, apparently, this is not the case in the UAE. The role of external 
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auditing bodies, such as Ombudsmen, the Auditor-General's Office and Parliamentary 
Committees, in ensuring a high level of accountability in the UK public sector is not 
only significant but also mandatory. In the UAE public sector, the situation is 
different. There are figments of internal auditing system in the Ministries and an 
Auditor-General's Office that is expected to ensure proper and a high level of 
accountability in the public sector. 
However, these institutions are not as effective as was expected as confirmed by our 
sample respondents in Table 10.2. Furthermore, there are no Ombudsmen or 
Parliamentary "watch dogs" similar in effectiveness and function as those in the UK 
System. The National Consultative Council which was expected to perform some sort 
of "watch-dog" role is not effective partly because of cultural nationalism and partly 
because of the patronage system through which members are nominated into the 
council. The summary effect of the lack of effective external auditing bodies is poor 
account of the responsibilities and resources entrusted into the care of public services 
managers in the UAE. The "lack of equal opportunity for all" is a derivative of the 
socio-political and economic constitution and complexity of the population. About 
85% of the general work force is made up of foreign migrant labour but about 60% of 
the top-level policy and decision-making personnel in the public sector are citizens of 
the UAE. The current Emiratization Policy of the government intends to increase the 
percentage of citizens in the general workforce to about 40% in the next five years and 
to push the percentage of policy and decision makers much higher to about 90% in the 
same period. By the nature of the divide between foreign and indigenous workers, 
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there is an institutionalized lack of equal opportunity between the two groups, which 
favours the indigenous personnel. Associated with this are the rewards, remuneration, 
promotion etc. systems that also favour the indigenous staff even though the support 
of the foreign personnel in various level of work is unavoidably crucial. Such 
inequality of opportunity, sometimes even among the indigenous personnel based on 
internal standards such as Emirate of origin, impact adversely on the public services. 
According to a respondent in the Ministry of Health during our personal interviews: 
'`... there is no chance of rising above my current position through promotion 
because of the grade/link I am in. I have the relevant qualifications, attitude, 
good work record, short course attendance and over 20 years of experience in 
relevant positions but that's it. " 
In the UK, such inequality of opportunity is formally outlawed and the "watch-dog" - 
"Equal Opportunity Commission" - ensures that equality of opportunity is seen to be 
practiced every where in the public sector. Clearly, the availability of equal 
opportunity for all will encourage higher levels of performance while the lack of it, as 
in the UAE, leads to frustration and hence poor individual and collective performance. 
The eighth, ninth and tenth elements in the ranking are not seen to generate much 
negative effects on the level of Management Accountability. This is largely because 
the structure of the organizations in the public sector is fairly well designed and 
established along the British system. With respect to 'corrupt ethical environment', it 
may be argued that the fundamental imperatives of Islam do not encourage corrupt 
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ethics and this may have influenced the rating of our sample respondents. However. 
in his recent report. the Acting Head of the Government Audit Office His Excellency. 
Majid Al Khazraji, urged the government to strengthen the legal measures and 
procedures of investigation in corruption cases including prevention from leaving the 
country, attachment, suspension from work and preventive detention and the courts 
should seek the help of the Audit Office stag to present evidence of corruption. He 
referred to the many corruption cases in the government sector revealed by the Audit 
Office, which were not disclosed because of the confidentiality regulations of the 
system. He added that the absence of rules and regulations and budgets in some 
government institutions encourage corruption and he stressed the need for new laws 
under which ministers would be accountable and appear before the National Council 
for questioning. He suggested that members of the Executive Council should be 
subjected to close control of the legislative power in view of the corruption reports 
submitted by the Audit Office, and that a new law should be introduced for 
accountability of ministers, in addition to formation of a permanent disciplinary board 
for corrupt officials (Ittihad Netivspaper. 14 Feb. 2000). These views from the Audit 
Office suggest that our respondents' view that corrupt ethical environment is not a 
major issue in the low level of management accountability in the UAE is not only 
questionable but also very subjective. In fact. the Acting Head of the Audit Office 
revealed that since 1976 his Office has exposed "many corruption cases among which 
were the cases of the Currency Board General Trading Company; the Emirates 
Development Bank and some ministries and embassies as well as investments made 
without feasibility studies and funds retained by some institutions by exaggerating 
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their reserves and not transferring same to the Treasury' (Ibid. ). He called for more 
effective ways of combating and exposing corruption in government circles and 
suggested allowing the Press to criticize public sector organizations as one of the 
credible ways of achieving a higher level of performance and accountability in the 
public sector (Ibid. ) The current situation in the UAE, however, does not seem to 
encourage a high level of Management Accountability in the public sector. 
1 
10.4 EFFECTS OF PERSONAL FACTORS 
Table 10.3 presents the findings and analysis of the relative effects of the elements of 
the group of Personal factors. The spread of response among the 'response types' is 
higher in this group than in the other groups of factors. Apart from the five top 
ranking elements in the Table, which have top-heavy bunching of responses, the other 
elements show a wide spread of response. 
The individual sample mean ratings of the five top ranking elements are high while 
the associated standard deviations are correspondingly low. This suggests a strong 
view among our respondents about the mitigating effects of these elements. 
Furthermore, the mean ratings of the five top ranking elements and a few others, as 
can be seen in the Table, are significant at the 99% confidence level. This result 
enables us to infer with 99% confidence that the mean rating of the negative effect of 
these elements on the level of management accountability is significantly higher than 
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the average on the rating scale. The mean rating of the effects of the elements that 
ranked ninth and tenth respectively are not significant at the 99% level, thus 
suggesting that their negative effect on the level of management accountability is not 
significantly high. 
The ways that the elements of this group affect the level of information disclosure and 
accountability is not institutional but personal. The elements affect largely the 
emotional psychology of the individual, which, in turn, influence the rationality of the 
person and, from there, the attitude and performance of the person. The individual's 
desire and ability to produce good work, including accounting for his/her 
responsibilities, are thus impaired leading to a low level of job performance and 
accountability. 
To explain the relative effects of the individual elements. we have grouped the three 
top ranking elements - 'culture of secrecy', 'fear of loss of job' and 'fear of blame' - 
because of the similarity of the effects they generate. Unlike in the UK public sector 
where there is great 'openness' and a democratic approach to duty; less fear of 
arbitrary loss of job and unsubstantiated castigation for work done. the UAE public 
services sector is burdened with the negative effects of the lack of 'openness and 
democratic approach to work'. The culture of secrecy restricts the desire and ability 
of accountors to reveal relevant information in the accounts they render to the 
accountees. Recalling the statement of the Acting Head of the Audit Office on the 
revelation of his Office of many corruption cases in the government sector which 
could not be disclosed due to 'confidentiality nature of the information', it is easy to 
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discern the role of the culture of secrecy in the society, it is easy to discern the role of 
the culture of secrecy in the society. This culture seems to give birth to 'fear of loss of 
job' and `fear of blame' among civil servants particularly the foreign personnel who 
must 'cooperate' to keep their jobs. The effect of this on performance and 
management accountability is obvious. The civil servants are guided by these 
informal but evidently strong constraints to disclose more generic rather than specific 
and sensitive information that might cost him his/her job. Some of these specific 
information relate to the requirements for good accountability such as financial 
dealings and other resource deployment but are often not disclosed to the public. This 
attitude and practice may have induced the Acting Head of the Audit Office to suggest 
the introduction of a new Law for accountability of ministers to prevent any utilization 
of their authorities by their subordinates to restrict disclosure of information especially 
financial information and to prevent ministers and their associates from blocking 
measures taken by the Audit Office (Al-Atihad , 14 Feb. 2000). Compared with the 
UK system, such a practice would itself constitute a criminal offence let alone 
tolerated within the ranks. Disclosure of information and accounting for all 
transactions including financial dealings in all public services organizations are 
mandatory requirements in the British system that has a legal status (Day and Klein, 
1987). 
The fourth element in the ranking - lack of delegation of responsibility and authority - 
relate to the structure and distribution of authority and power within the system. 
According to one of the senior civil servants we interviewed in the Ministry of 
Education: 
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"... authority and power in our system are concentrated at the top and even there, 
only a few are allowed to exercise them effectively. In the end only a few privileged 
individuals drive the system and these individuals get the privilege through patronage 
and family linage. As you see us here, we cannot make anv decision without referring 
to a higher authority, so how do you want us to give an account - of what? W ,e don't 
make the decisions so we are not responsible for what happens and therefore cannot 
account for what happens. " 
Indeed, there is a high level of centralization of decision-making within the UAE 
public services sector and, along with this, the authority and power to implement the 
decisions. This does not augur well for a high level of accountability, as civil servants 
without decision-making authority and power are unable to render an account over 
what they are legally not responsible or accountable. Most of them see themselves as 
`elevated clerks' meant to take instructions and act accordingly rather than decision 
makers who are accountable for the decisions take make and implement. 
Furthermore, the lack of delegation of authority derives also from the 'culture of 
secrecy' in the sense that top civil servants with decision-making powers hardly wish 
to share their authority and power lest information that are meant to be kept secret is 
let out under the premise of accounting for responsibilities and authority. The end 
product of these practices is the restriction of the very information required to provide 
a good and satisfactory management accountability leading to a low level of 
accountability. 
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The fifth, sixth and seventh ranking elements relate to personal qualities and their 
effect on the performance of civil servants in the discharge of their duties and 
responsibilities. Inadequate education for a particular job position generates self- 
sympathy and lack of confidence, which combine to build up fear of exposure of 
inadequacies in the individual which originate, in the first instance, from the 
inadequate level of education. The lack of appropriately qualified and experience 
indigenous manpower is a major problem in the UAE economy in general and the 
public services sector in particular. The reverse is the case in the UK system where 
across-the-board shortage of qualified and experienced manpower is uncommon 
though some specialized technical manpower such as in the field of Computer 
sciences are still in relative shortage. 
Though much effort is being made in the UAE to increase the pool of adequately 
qualified indigenous staff, through, for example, the establishment of Universities, 
Higher Colleges of Technology and sponsorship of citizens in courses Overseas, the 
shortage is still significant -a constraint that will certainly challenge the government 
Emiratization Policy that is currently on track. The effect of inadequate education 
and the concomitant lack of confidence and fear of exposure of inadequacies on the 
level of information disclosure and presentation of account of responsibilities ranges 
from poor logical format, shallow content and analysis to incomprehensive and 
unactionable management account. The end result is a low level of management 
accountability. 
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The eighth, ninth and tenth elements in the ranking relate to the ethical quality and 
behaviour of the individual civil servant. Corrupt behaviour of civil servants. 
inferiority complex vis-ä-vis others deemed to be superior and arrogance deriving 
from official position and authority affect the content of management account and the 
ability to present the account. There are evident cases of such constraints in the UAE 
public services sector as demonstrated by the recent and unusual revelations in Dubai 
Customs and Transport Department as well as the Ministry of Immigration. Some 
corrupt top officers of the Dubai Customs, including the Director-General of Customs 
and six other senior officials were found guilty of corruption by the Dubai Criminal 
Court (Gulf News, 19 April, 2001). They were sentenced to a varying number of 
years of prison terms as follows: the Director-General was sentenced to 27 years and 
ordered to return Dh. 2.1 million bribe money; Mr. Ali Hassan Foulath, 31 years and 
ordered to return Dh. 1.5 million of ill-gotten money; Mr. Khalifa All bin Ghilaita and 
Mr. Abdul Nabi Bankash Haji, 7 years each, Mr. Mohammed Igbal and Mr. Shaid 
Qadeer Khan had 5 years each while Mr. Ali Badr Kamali was given 3 years. Of 
course, the Court ordered Haji, Khan and Igbal, who are foreigners, to be deported 
after serving their jail terms (Ibid. ). Clearly, we would not expect these corrupt 
officials to present credible and reliable management account of their responsibilities 
and decisions. But the unusual decision taken by the Dubai Ruler to arrest, investigate 
and put on trial such top civil servants and 'power brokers' is not only encouraging in 
the sense of being a warning as well as a deterrent to other civil servants but it is also 
a right step in the right direction towards developing better management 
accountability culture in the public services sector of the UAE. 
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10.5 ACCOUNTABILITY BENCHMARK & THEIR EFFECTIVENESS IN UAE 
To underscore our findings and analysis, we designed and administered among our 
sample of thirty accountors and accountees a `Tick ((D ) Questionnaire' (Appendix E). 
In the questionnaire we requested the respondents to indicate whether the benchmarks 
listed are available in public services organizations and to assess their effectiveness by 
rating each of the benchmarks on a scale of: 
Very Effective 5 
Effective 4 
Average 3 
Ineffective 2 
Very Ineffective 1 
The result of the survey and an analysis of the results are presented in Table 10.4. As 
can be seen in the Table, our respondents indicated that 10 out of the 16 listed 
benchmarks are available in one form or another in the public services organizations 
of the UAE; the others are not formally identifiable hence they are not available. This 
finding is very interesting in the sense that the benchmarks that are not available in the 
organizations seem to be the main enhancers of high level of Management 
Accountability in other countries such as the UK and USA (Day and Klein, 1987). 
Decentralization and delegation of authority, democratic principles, transparency of 
administration, mandatory reporting, job appraisal system and judicial review of cases 
are the uncompromising stalwalks of the British and, indeed, the American public 
services systems of Management Accountability. 
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Table 10.4 
Accountability Benchmarks & Their Effectiveness In UAE Public Sector 
AVAILABLE EFFECTIVENESS 
IN UAE RATING EFFECTIVENESS 
Benchmark SYSTEM (SAMPLE MEANS) RANKING 
Informal 3.425** 
Communication Yes (0.171) 
Organizational 3.325** 2 
Objective Yes (0.168) 
Neutrality of civil 3.325** 2 
Servant Yes (0.292) 
Legal Regulation 3.225** 3 
Yes (0.193) 
Operating Procedure 3.200** 4 
Yes 0.204) 
Formal Communication 2.625 5 
Channel Yes (0.278) 
Internal Auditing 2.525 6 
Yes 0.269) 
Poor Performance 2.325 7 
Sanction Yes (0.240) 
Job Description 2.000 8 
Yes (0.249) 
Good Performance 1.875 9 
Reward Yes (0.291) 
External Ombudsman 1.800 10 
System (Audit Office) Yes (0.263) 
Decentralization and 
Delegation of authority No - - 
Democracy at Work 
No - - 
Mandatory Reporting 
No - - 
Judicial Review 
No - - 
Job Appraisal System 
No - - 
Transparency of 
Administration No - - 
** Significant at 95% level. 
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In fact, the reforms in the British public administration system in the Margaret 
Thatcher years of the 1970s and 1980s were meant largely to institutionalize these 
benchmarks that enhance a high level of accountability. John Major. for example. 
extended the democratic principle, during his period as prime minister with the 
introduction of "Consumer's Charter' in various aspects of public services provisions. 
Compared with the British system, therefore, our result goes to confirm the earlier 
findings that the level of management accountability in the public services sector in 
the UAE is less than average in similar organizations in the UK or USA. 
Our correspondents' assessment of the effectiveness of the available benchmarks 
indicate that only four out of the available ten have ratings that are significant at the 
95% level. The ratings of the effectiveness of the other benchmarks are below 
average, which underscores our conclusion from the research. In fact, the sample 
means that are significant at the 95% level are relatively low which suggest some wide 
variations in the individual ratings of the respondents and hence their individual 
opinion on the effectiveness of the relevant benchmarks. 
10.6 SUMMARY 
In this chapter we have attempted mainly to analyze the effects of the variables 
identified through regression analysis and respondents actual answers on the level of 
Management accountability in the public services sector in the UAE. The research 
findings and the subsequent analysis of the results indicate strongly that the level of 
Management accountability in the public services sector is lower than average in 
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similar organizations in countries such as the UK. The identified groups of causal 
factors include: 
" Social-cultural factors 
" Organisational factors 
" Personal factors. 
We examined the individual elements of each group of factors and discussed their 
individual effects on the level of management accountability in the system. It is 
indisputable that their collective and individual effects have been negative leading to 
the observed low level of accountability in the public sector. 
We also identified a list of benchmarks that may enhance a high level of management 
accountability and carried out a survey on their availability in the UAE system and 
their effectiveness in enhancing accountability. Compared with the UK system, our 
finding indicates that the benchmarks that are available in the UAE system are really 
not the stalwarts of good accountability and even their effectiveness in encouraging a 
high level of accountability is questionable. The essential benchmarks, drawing from 
the British example, are not established in the UAE system. This confirms not only 
our finding that the level of management accountability in the public services 
organizations in the UAE is below the average in similar organizations, for example in 
the UK, but also that the identified groups of factors and the benchmarks that are yet 
to be established in the UAE public services sector account for the low level of 
management accountability in the sector. 
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11.1 INTRODUCTION 
The main objective of this chapter is to sift through the findings, results and conclusions 
reached in the previous chapters and make appropriate recommendations. Our 
recommendation will be based upon a theoretical model deduced from a combination of 
the theoretical discussions in earlier chapters and the empirical findings of the study. 
This will constitute the main contribution of this study. 
The discussion in this chapter is based upon the following layout: 
i) A summary of results of the study; 
ii) A discussion on indicators of good management accountability; 
iii) A discussion of the theoretical model suggested for the UAE and its 
social-political system; 
iv) A discussion of how to implement the model through elimination of 
the mitigating factors identified in the previous chapters. 
v) An analysis of the recommendations of our sample respondents on 
how to improve the level and standard of management accountability 
in the public services sector in the UAE; 
The challenges that our model and recommendations will come up against are identified 
and discussed with a view to highlighting their potential effects. However, these 
challenges are not likely to distort the course of our recommendations significantly. 
414 
11.2 SUMMARY OF RESULTS OF THE STUDY 
The main contention of the study is that the level and standard of Management 
Accountability as presented by Accountors to Accountees in the public services 
organisations of the UAE is less than the average in similar organisations, particularly 
in the UK. A survey of a sample of the general public who consume the services of 
the public sector organisations coupled with empirical case-study of two public 
services enterprises provides the results that enabled us to reach a conclusion, even if 
tentative in nature because of the sample size. The findings of the study lead us to 
accept the contention of the study that the level of Management Accountability in the 
sector is lower than the average in similar organisations. Tests of hypothesis about the 
sample means confirm the findings leading to the conclusion that the level is 
significantly lower than average. 
Using Pearson's correlation co-efficient (r), we established strong association between 
the low level of Management Accountability in the public sector and three distinct 
groups of factors, which are: 
" Social-cultural factors; 
" Organisational factors, and, 
" Personal factors. 
With the help of regression analysis, we established a reasonable degree of cause-effect 
relationship with the low level of Management Accountability as dependent variable 
and the three groups of factors as independent variables. This result was collaborated 
by other survey and personal interview findings, which increased its validity and 
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reliability. Thus, we concluded that the low level of Management Accountability in the 
public services sector is largely a function of the three groups of factors listed above. 
The study has therefore emerged with two tentative conclusions: 
a) the level of Management Accountability is less than 
average in similar organisations; and, 
b) three groups of factors are strongly correlated with the low 
level and may account for a significant part of it. 
At this point, we may ask what are the indicators of good management accountability in 
the public services sector? 
11.3 INDICATORS OF GOOD MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTABILITY 
There is hardly any set of generic indicators of good management accountability that 
exists which can be applied to every case or situation when assessing accountability 
efficiency and effectiveness. Different societies have different typology of 
accountability with different measurement mechanisms depending on the social- 
political system and structure of the society. In developed democratic societies, for 
example, political accountability tends to be stronger than other types of 
accountability such as Financial, Legal, Management, Social, Moral, etc. largely 
because of the higher level of political awareness and election-orientation of those 
societies. In a developing country, such as the U. A. E., where the basic management 
of public resources for the benefit of the public is more important than politicking the 
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public interest, management accountability tends to be more emphasized than other 
types of accountability. It is, perhaps, for this reason and the lack of effective public 
interest in the management of public resources as our research results indicate that 
management accountability in those societies is less effective. 
There are, however, some major indicators that give a reasonable ground to expect a 
high level of management accountability in public organisations. The indicators 
include, among others, the following: 
" Clear organizational objectives and goals set up by a higher authority within 
the organization or the government. 
9 Well-defined hierarchical structure showing the managerial lines of 
responsibility and accountability. 
" Well-defined duties and responsibilities of both the organization and the 
individual working in it. 
" Establishment of performance measurement system that shows clearly the 
input, process and the outcome in addition to sanctions and rewards and the 
procedures for the employees and civil servants. 
" Establishment of a system and procedures for information transparency 
within the organization including the reporting requirement for internal and 
external usage. 
" Performance evaluation for individual staff and higher and middle 
management through personnel appraisal, value for money and performance 
audit. 
417 
" Establishment of formal and informal channels of communication within 
the organization that will aide/hinder accountability progress and growth. 
" The promotion of administrative culture and ethos within the organization 
through intensive training programme and seminars. 
" Establishment of civil servants neutrality rules by rewarding/protecting 
them adequately. 
" Establishment of internal and external system of supervision on the 
organization activities. 
" Promulgation of rules and procedures for control of accountability. 
" Decentralization and delegation of authority within the organization. 
" Encouragement of greater responsiveness of civil servants and officials 
when serving the public. 
" Establishment of a system of effective scrutiny of the government activities 
through more openness in government. 
The existence of these indicators in a public sector organisation may suggest that an 
appreciable level of management accountability is practised within the organisation. 
The legal and contractual nature of these indicators determines their implementation 
and effectiveness. The more legal. contractual and mandatory the establishment, 
implementation and control of these indicators, the higher and more effective is the 
level of management accountability. To achieve this, we require a framework within 
which the rights and obligations of the participants (Accountees and Acountors) will 
be clearly defined and regulated. 
418 
11.4 ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL FOR THE UAE. 
For the UAE and other societies with similar social-political structure and 
environment, we recommend our adapted version of the "Principal-Agent Model of 
Accountability". ' The UAE has a socio-political structure and environment that is 
significantly different from the environments, mainly Western Countries such as the 
UK and the USA, upon which the original "Principal-Agent model" was based. This 
is the main reason for the adaptation of the model to suit the circumstances of the 
UAE socio-political system. Using the UK for comparison, we have listed in Table 
11.1 some of the major areas of difference between the UAE socio-political system 
and that of the western countries. 
As can be seen in the Table, the differences range from democratic principles, to 
diverse and contradictory social-political interests in the societies. The main source of 
the differences, however, seems to emanate from the religious and cultural divide 
between the societies. The UAE is predominantly Islamic and Arabic in culture while 
plural christianism and a mix of culture prevail in the UK. But as the Table shows, 
there are also differences in secular areas. For example, while the UK has an elected 
parliamentary system with an elected Prime Minister and Cabinet, the UAE is not a 
parliamentary system and the Prime Minister and his Cabinet are not elected by a 
popular suffrage but nominated and appointed as provided by the Federation 
Constitution of 1971. The implication of this for accountability is that the UAE Prime 
Minister is directly accountable to the President of the country not the public while in 
See discussion of the Principal-Agent model in chapter 3. Our model was adapted from Gray, et el. (1996). 
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the UK the Prime Minister is directly accountable to the British public. Similarly. 
while the British public is very active in monitoring and seeking accountability from 
public servants for responsibilities entrusted on them, the UAE public is less active 
overtly though individuals or groups of individuals often pass comments on observed 
inappropriate behaviour of public servants through informal channels to the decision 
makers. 
Furthermore, the UK political system is a formal and active democracy, which the 
UAE system is not, and, in tandem, the Media and Press in the UK are very active in 
monitoring and reporting the activities of both politicians and civil servants which 
encourages effective accountability. In the UAE, the Media and Press are less openly 
active in monitoring and reporting the activities of decision-makers, Ministries and 
civil servants though recent trends show some significant departure from this 
inactivity. For example. the Minister of Culture and Information called on the Press in 
1999 to point out the short-comings of government departments for investigation and 
redress if necessary. This led to some press criticisms of Ministries and other 
government department in I999and. recently. the Press published cases of corrupt 
government officials in Dubai who were subsequently jailed for taking bribe and 
abusing their office and authorities (Gulf News, 19 April 2001). This is a measure of 
openness in the society but it is yet to be formalized as a legal practice. 
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Table 11.1 
Comparison of Elements of the Socio-Political Systems of the UK and the t1AE 
United Kingdom (UK) United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
Non Executive Head of State Executive Head of State 
(The Monarch) (The President) 
Formal and Active Democratic System Informal and inactive Democratic System 
Elected Parliamentary System with No Parliamentary System, Prime Minister 
elected Prime Minister and Cabinet. & Cabinet nominated as provided by 
Constitution. 
Active Public Opinion Inactive Public Opinion 
Clear definition of Accountability and No clear definition of Accountability and 
legal imperatives to implement it. no effective legal imperatives. 
Formal and effective procedures. Lack of clearly defined and effective 
regulations and standards for attaining procedures, regulations and standards for 
accountability in public sector. attaining accountability in public sector. 
Active Media and Press as "Watch-dos". Inactive Media and Press "Watch-dogs". 
High level and effective decentralization Low level and ineffective decentralization 
and delegation of authority. and dele ation of authority. 
Effective division of power between Concentrated legislative, executive and 
Legislative, Executive and Judicial judicial powers. 
branches of Government. 
Effective separation of religion, culture Effective combination of religion, culture 
and politics in the system. and politics in the system. 
Diverse and often contradictory social- Effectively harnessed 'cocktail' of social- 
political interests and groups in the political interests and groups in the 
s stem. s stem. 
Western Judicial System Mainly, Sharia (Islamic) Judicial System. 
471 
Given these differences, it may not be reasonable to expect very similar accountability 
environments in both societies. However, the basic principles and objectives of 
accountability are the same in all societies so the development of an accountability 
model for a particular situation involves, essentially, customisation of existing general 
models in the areas of regulations and practice. This is what our recommended model 
sets out to achieve. 
In Figure 11.1 we present our recommended model for developing an effective 
Management Accountability in the public services sector of the UAE. Adapted from 
Gray, et al. (1996), the model is customized to incorporate the peculiarities of the UAE 
public sector environment in order to encourage the practice of effective accountability. 
The model has three main actors, the Principal (Accountee), the Main Agent 
(Accountor) and the Sub-Agent (Subordinate) who operate in a social setting (Social 
Environment). 
There are five distinct relationships in the model: 
" Social environment relationship. 
" Principal-Agent contractual relationship. 
" Responsibility for Accountability relationship. 
" Accountability for Responsibility relationship. 
9 Main Agent-Subagent relationship. 
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Figure 11.1 
PRINCIPAL - AGENT MODEL OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
ACCOUNTEE 
(PRINCIPAL) 
Social Environment 
Responsibility for Contractual Accountability for 
Accountability Relationship Responsibility 
ACCOUNTOR 
(7 Ct NT) 
Social Environment 
SUBORDINATE 
(SUB-AGENT) 
Source: Gray et al, (1996) 
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The `Social Environment Relationship' provides the general setting including a 
definition of accountability, provision of the societal objectives, socially acceptable 
customization of culture and a system of societal monitoring and control system; 
while the `Contractual Relationship' sets up the legal imperatives and requirements 
for formalization and operationalizing the provisions of the social environment 
relationship. The 'Responsibility for Accountability' relationship provides a formal 
and precise description of the responsibilities and authorities of the Agent (Accountor) 
in the relationship between the Principal (Accountee) and the main Agent 
(Accountor); while the `Accountability for Responsibility' relationship sets out 
formally the accountability responsibilities and requirements in the relationship. The 
`Action Relationship', on the other hand, provides formally and in details 
comprehensive job description and the enabling delegation of authority for the Sub- 
agents to enable them carry out the 'practical jobs' from which the information and 
statistics for an effective accountability by the main agent emanates. 
Each of the 'relationships' in the model consists of operational elements, which must 
be specified and defined to avoid misinterpretation and confusion in execution. The 
major elements of each of the 'relationships' are indicated accordingly here below: 
11.4.1 Elements of the `Social Environment' Relationshin 
The wider society (public) must participate in one form or the other in the following 
activities 
" Participate in setting objectives of Organization. 
424 
" Customization of social-cultural element to suit accountability 
" Active participation in evaluating performance 
" Open criticism/commendation of performance, e. g. in Press 
9 Social sanction of inappropriate behaviour e. g. call to resign or be replaced 
" Membership of external Ombudsman. 
11.4.2 Elements of the `Principal-Agent Contractual' Relationship 
The following relationships and requirements must be formally and legally 
established: 
" Legal relationship 
" Formal contractual relationship 
" Regulatory relationship 
" External Audit Requirement 
" Mandatory Requirements (e. g. Reporting Requirements) 
" Judicial review provision 
" Neutrality of Accountor/Accountee 
" Monitoring and control regulations. 
11.4.3 Elements of the `Responsibility for Accountability' Relationshin 
The Principal (Accountee) should define the following for the Agent (Accountor): 
" Precise definition of Accountability 
9 Precise job description for the Accountor 
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" Authority Boundary 
9 Level of Openness of Report 
" Level of delegation of authority to Sub-Agents 
" Full information Disclosure 
" Objectivity/neutrality in reporting 
" Formal and Mandatory Reports 
" State Reporting Regularity & Format 
11.4.4 Elements of the `Accountability Responsibility' Relationship 
The Agent (Accountor) should be expected formally and legally to be accountable and 
present accounts in the following areas: 
" Financial Account 
" Legal Account 
" Social Account 
" Management Account 
" Political Account 
" Economic Account. 
11.4.5 Elements of the `Action Relationship' (Sub-Agent) 
The main Agent should indicate in details the job specifications and the enabling 
instruments/incentives for the sub-agent such as: 
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" Precise definition of Accountability 
" Conformity and compliance with rules, procedures, regulations and control 
" Financial propriety and accounting 
" Neutrality/objectivity in work 
" Professional handling and disclosure of information 
" Active and impartial participation in collecting information 
" Decentralization and delegation of authority 
" Appropriate Job Appraisal system 
" Reward/Sanction System. 
Effort should be made to specify and define these elements as clearly as possible to 
enable public servants to implement them effectively. The relevant procedures, 
evaluation and control mechanisms should be defined and put in place. The 
underlying objectives of each activity in the relationships should be stated and the 
legalisation and formalisation procedures set out unambiguously. These will lead to 
institutionalization of the relationships and the practice of effective accountability in 
organizations in the sector. 
As may be inferred from the description of the relationships in the model, the major 
operational instruments underlining the model are formalization, legalization and 
control of accountability principles, procedures and practice in the relevant 
organizations in the UAE. This constitutes the central pillar of our model that will 
lead to a successful and effective Management accountability. Thus, with a clear 
definition of the type of accountability required and a formal and legally enforceable 
set of accountability procedures, regulations, monitoring, reviewing and controlling 
mechanisms put in place, our recommended model will encourage the development of 
a very high level of Management accountability in the public services sector of the 
UAE and, indeed, other societies with similar societal attributes. 
11.5 RECOMMENDATIONS BY OUR RESPONDENTS 
We asked our sample respondents to recommend, by prioritizing their choices from a 
list of options provided using a grading scale of 1 to 5, where I represents 'lowest' 
priority and 5 as 'highest' priority, how the low level of Management Accountability 
could be improved. The result of the survey is presented in Table 11.2. 
In general, our respondents see a great urgency in improving the level of Management 
Accountability as their response profile indicates. It can be seen in the Table that the 
mean score of any of the recommendation options is above 4.60, which indicates that 
our respondents see virtually all the options as priority areas. This supports earlier 
conclusions that there is a noticeable lack of formal regulatory institutions in public 
sector organisations in the UAE to provide precise accountability guidelines and 
control. Among the recommendation options, our respondents give the highest 
priority, as the mean scores suggest, to the following: 
" Definition of accountability 
" Provision of strict guidelines for presenting accounts 
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Table 11.2 
Low Level Management Accountability: Recommended Solution by Respondents 
Prioritization Scale 
Sample Mean 
Recommendation Options 5 4 3 2 1 Total score 
Define accountability precisely. 30 - - - - 30 5.00 
Provide strict guidelines for 
presenting account. 30 - - - - 30 5.00 
State objectives of 
accountability precisely. 30 - - - - 30 5.00 
Educate civil servants on the 
need for accountability. 20 10 - - - 30 4.67 
State and enforce deadlines for 
submission of Accountability 19 10 1 - - 30 4.60 
Report 
Establish reward/sanction 
system for good/poor 30 - - - - 30 5.00 
accountability. 
Employ appropriately qualified 
persons. 20 9 1 - - 30 4.63 
Establish effective Ombudsman 
system to monitor 30 - - - - 30 5.00 
accountability 
Decentralization & delegation 
of authority 26 4 - - - 30 4.87 
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" Stating objectives of accountability precisely 
" Establishment of reward/sanction system for good/poor 
accountability 
" Establishment of effective Ombudsman system for monitoring and 
controlling accountability. 
These recommendations hinge on the basic pillars of our recommended model which 
are; formalisation, legalisation and control of the requirements for an effective 
accountability. Our respondents' views on how to improve the level of management 
accountability in the public sector of the UAE are thus tangential to the provisions of 
our adapted Principal-Agent model. 
A similar support for the tenets of our model comes from the Acting Head of the UAE 
Audit Office, His Excellency, Majid A1-Khazraji, who recommends with special 
reference to corruption in the public services that: 
i) "Members of the executive power should be subjected to elected 
legislative power before which all ministers, senior officials and 
government institutions should appear for accountability while the 
legislative power should consider highly reports raised by the Audit 
Office which would be the starting point for further investigations and 
hold sessions to discuss these reports; 
ii) introduction of a new Law for accountability of ministers to prevent any 
utilization of their authorities by their subordinates and to prevent 
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ministers from blocking measures taken by the Audit Office as well as 
establishing a permanent disciplinary board for financial and 
administrative offences; 
iii) review of organisation structure of all ministries and institutions 
specifying authorities and responsibilities from the ministers down to 
the lowest level which would enhance accountability and responsibility; 
iv) issue all administrative and financial systems at the time of 
establishment of new institutions" (A! -Ittihad Newspaper. Feb. 2000). 
These recommendations re-emphasize the lack of formal and institutionalized 
regulatory system that could develop effective accountability in the sector. Our model 
covers all these areas and provides a scheme, which, if implemented conscientiously, 
will inevitably enhance the development of a much higher level of Management 
Accountability than exist now in the sector. 
11.6 CONSTRAINTS ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS 
The ultimate success of our model and the other recommendations depends on many 
factors including the accountability constraining groups of factors that were identified 
and analysed in chapters 9 and 10 respectively. These factors and others need to be 
tackled to eliminate or, at least, minimize their negative effects on the level of 
accountability in the sector. We present a brief discussion of factors and the ways to 
eliminating them in order to reduce their negative effects: 
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11.6.1 The lack of will-power to Change 
Perhaps, one of the most constraining factors in a situation that calls for change is the 
lack of will-power and the weakness of the individual due to personal interests to 
accept let alone implement the change. It is common to hear people question the need 
for change by saying that; "we have been doing things in this way for decades and 
there has not been any disaster, why then do we need to change the way we have been 
living happily for something else? " Such comment and situation are common in 
many developing countries and the UAE is no exception. In fact, in 1985 when the 
government of Abu Dhabi engaged the Public Administrative Service to set up a 
proper structure for the Emirate's Departments, including job descriptions for senior 
management, overlapping responsibility of departments and merger of certain 
departmental activities and decentralization of certain services/activities, there a 
massive resistance to the project by both Accountees and Accountors. This was due 
largely to the fear of some influential civil servants and superiors that they may lose 
their power and authority even though the project was discussed and amended many 
times, and, in fact, part of it had been implemented already. 
There is need to recognize this attitude in the work place and research ways to 
eliminate it to encourage progress. One way of eliminating such negative attitude is to 
provide continuous education and training so as to expose staff to the changes in their 
field of work as well as other fields. Coupled with a good scheme of incentives that 
enhances not only the career opportunities of the individual but also his 
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compensations from doing efficient work including initiating and accepting change. 
The introduction of the principles of effective Management Accountability in the 
UAE public services sector, given it current less than average performance, will be a 
significant change and it needs to be tackled carefully but decisively. 
11.6.2 The Social-Cultural Factors 
The UAE society is basically a traditional society consisting of villagers and town 
men who are mutually dependant on each other for their living. Islam and Islamic law 
play dominant role in every aspect of life of the society and Islamic culture is 
influential in directing public administration work because any reform measure that 
might hamper the interest of Islamic religion will not succeed. In the UAE. Islam is a 
way of life and its rules and principles govern the relations of the citizens, employees 
and employers; and it acts as a focal point for the society and its culture; and its spirit 
permeates all aspects of life-private, political, social, and economic. However, the 
UAE society has its own distinct social system, which owes its origin to Arab 
traditions and cultures. Some of the elements of the social-cultural system such as ties 
of kinship, tribal solidarity, loyalty and obedience to leaders, respectfulness to 
superiors and social governance which is based mainly on 'Arab-ocray' (a governing 
system which blends democratic principles with Shiekdom principles; i. e. nationals 
have direct access to the Shiek's nzaflis-a place where the rulers can listen to 
complaints and grievances), among others, tend to affect adversely modern 
management accountability in the UAE public sector as our research results suggest. 
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To this extent, there is need to review these social-cultural factors with a view to 
reducing their effects on the level of accountability in the public sector. 
The following measures may be taken to redress the situation in order to enhance the 
development of effective management accountability: 
" Civil servants and public managers must be taught to focus on the 
organisation's objectives and targets as well as being innovative and 
creative member of society rather than following their superiors 
blindly so that productivity can be gauged and compared with others 
in the locality and adverse variations in results are accounted for by 
those responsible. 
0 Intensive management training in modern business ethics and code 
of conduct for civil servants, which prohibit nepotism and 
corruption. 
0 Even though no citizen lives below the poverty line as defined by the 
United Nations, wealth distribution should be smoothened out - i. e. 
flattening out the curve. 
" To bring social justice. Civil service rules and regulations must be 
reviewed in line with the scale of pay in the private sector especially 
for those grades, which attract special talents and skills. The current 
scale of salary for the nationals was reviewed in 1996 but the salaries 
of expatriates have not changed since 1977. Rules and regulations of 
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Civil service as well as the salary increase affect productivity and 
accountability because better caliber can be brought into these 
organizations and more social stability can be achieved for those 
employees' families. 
" To be more productive and performance-oriented, the social 
environment in public organizations/enterprises must be improved. 
The social environment would include facilities such as recreational 
centres, staff clubs and co-operative societies as well as social funds 
to help those in need in the organisation. 
These social benefits create a climate of confidence and loyalty within the 
organization thus enhancing efficiency, effectiveness and accountability as well as 
promoting a sense of loyalty to the organization and its objectives. 
11.6.3 The Organizational factors 
Like most Arab organizational model, the UAE governmental organisation model 
combines elements from both western model of bureaucracy with its emphasis on 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness and the traditional Arab culture with its 
emphasis on tribal solidarity, collective decision-making and communal welfare. The 
characteristics of the Arab model are as follows: 
.A moderate degree of vertical and horizontal specialization. 
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0A low degree of co-ordination stemming from the exercise of personal 
authority and extensive use of committees. 
0 Allow degree of formalization and highly "bendable" rules. 
" Personnel decisions (i. e. selection, placement, promotion. 
compensation) are based on flexible criteria that subject to wide 
personal preferences and judgments and leading to overstaffing and 
disincentives to work hard. 
0A high degree of centralization of decision-making. 
Despite the introduction of modern organization and methods within the public sector, 
the government system is still suffering from elements of Arabian bureaucracy 
represented by over centralization of authority, overstaffing, personalization, 
nepotism, secrecy, low performance and accountability. Consequent to these salient 
characteristics, senior and public managers in the UAE tend to display the following 
attitude in their jobs: 
0 resist innovation and change 
0 seek authority and like to display bossiness 
avoid responsibility and decision-making 
0 admire and respect their superiors 
0 hate to plan but like to control 
prefer security to high pay jobs 
motivate their subordinates by fear and blame. 
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These organisational factors and others encountered in our case studies have 
hampered organisational reforms towards performance-related measures and 
accountability within the public sector. The Arabian organisation model could operate 
adequately when the internal and external organizational environments are simple and 
stable. However, in today's complex and turbulent business and political 
environments, the model would be deficient to achieve modern organizational 
aspirations and targets. 
To reduce the impact of these negative organizational factors the following actions are 
recommended: 
" Decentralization of departmental operations and their decision- 
making process so that they become closer to the public and 
customers. 
Goods and services should be market-oriented and their costs, prices, 
quality and production/provision are measured in accordance with 
pre-determined set of standards/criteria so that managers/individuals 
become responsible and accountable to their actions to the public and 
the government. Currently budget allocation and spending are not 
tied to performance criteria or progress where the outcome would be 
assessed at the end the progress or event. 
. Traditional bureaucratic administration should be brought in line 
with the new paradigm of management i. e. setting up the 
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organizational system on a market driven mechanism specially in 
strategy formulation, home resources management and customers 
needs and requirements. 
0 To move to private sector style of management, new organizational 
culture should be created by training civil servants/managers in 
service delivery marketing, products and services innovation, cost 
consciousness and forward planning and control. 
0 Organizational system and procedures which deals with staff matters 
such as promotion, recruitment responsibility and performance 
measurement criteria and clear reporting system should be 
established and, updated frequently as events change or new 
environmental factors emerge. 
. Setting up a management system whereby civil servants/managers 
are encouraged to make decisions and suggestions on matters 
concerning their work, so that confidence can be created between 
themselves and their supervisors. This move should entail giving up 
some authorities and power from the top. 
. Reports of departmental heads to the cabinet of ministers/executive 
council should be transparent and documented so that ministerial 
responsibility and accountability cannot be avoided or pushed to 
some one else in the organisation. 
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" The Audit Office should be given more power and independence to 
enable its reports and recommendations to be more effective and 
credible. Currently the bureau reports and recommendations on 
departmental units and ministries are not taken up or received 
seriously by those who are supposed to take the action thus resulting 
in lack of attention and seriousness by those departments/ministries 
causing waste and uncontrollable expenditure. 
" Ombudsmen and watchdog committees should be appointed/set up to 
receive complaints from the public for matters concerning the public 
services. 
0A council or a committee of a higher authority should be established 
to modernise the work of ministries/departments so that public 
management in the UAE can be seen as capable of handling the 
changing and complex environment of today's business and 
organizational requirements. The council/committee could consist of 
members from the government, National Consultative Council, 
Consultants and experts who possess knowledge and experience in 
the relevant field. 
Professionals such as medical doctors should be allowed to 
participate in the management activity including administrative 
decision-making and financial matters. 
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0A regulatory agency should be set up to regulate and monitor 
monopolist firms that provide public services such as 
Telecommunications services, e. g. Etisalat. Currently the 
corporation enjoys monopolist status without having an independent 
regulatory body to check prices of services offered, quality of 
services supplied, cost incurred in providing such services and 
equipment and future services and technology of the company even 
though the corporation is profitable and has growth oriented strategy. 
0 Privatization of Health services should be considered as an option to 
the existing health care as many benefits could accrue to the treasury 
and the economy as a whole in the area of efficiency, effectiveness 
and public expenditure reduction. The privatization could take two 
forms: privatizing management only or privatizing the entire assets 
including hospitals. Alternatively the Ministry of Health can be split 
into two trusts: one as provider of services and the other as receiver, 
thus, creating internal market for the medical services as well as 
giving a choice of medical care to the citizens through comparing 
prices and costs of these services regionally as is the case in the UK. 
11.6.4 The Personal factors 
In the middle of the twentieth century many researchers and writers such as 
Hawthorne (1924-1932), Maslow (1943) Mcgregor (1960) Herzberg (1966) and 
Argyris (1957) tried to study the factors that influence productivity of workforce in 
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private sector firms. These writers used social sciences particularly sociology and 
psychology to advance their argument and theory. With the advent of New Public 
management paradigm, most of these theories that were developed in the twentieth 
century were drawn into the public organization thus linking directly or indirectly the 
theories to performance measurement, efficiency, effectiveness and public 
accountability in public sector organizations. 
Hawthorne's experiments at the Western Electric Company in U. S. between 1924 and 
1932 demonstrated that personal and social factors can have significant impact on 
performance productivity, responsibility towards the organization's goals and the 
acceptance of the positive and negative consequences of the individual or group 
behaviour relating to such responsibility. Besides formal relationship of the 
workforce within public organizations, Hawthorne found that informal group 
relationship within the company had some influence on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the services program especially when the workers are allowed to 
control their own work environment and choose their supervisor. However 
Hawthorne's findings had some bearing on public organization/enterprise 
performance, quality standard and accountability because it reduced alienation to stay 
in the work place and committed civil servants and employees to the organization's 
main objectives and policy. 
In developing countries like the UAE, which depends to a large extent, on foreign 
manpower to run the public organizations, high personal commitment to the goals of 
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the establishment is low due to differential in wages and salaries between foreign and 
national workforce. Employees of UAE nationality receive higher wages and salaries 
in government/quasi government agencies compared with their counterparts who are 
not UAE nationals except where the job requires special skills and experience. which 
are not available among nationals. In addition to pay differential, national employees 
enjoy many fringe benefits such as government pension benefit, social security and 
employment benefits as well as promotion and skill development training. These 
privileges are granted to encourage nationals to join the public sector so that 
dependence on foreign labour may be reduced. Not only are jobs and pay treated 
differently between nationals and expatriates who are not employed with special terms 
and conditions of contracts, but the nationals also receive special treatment of 
employment particularly where their relatives are in charge of that organization or 
enterprise. Civil service rules and regulations prohibit such practice within public 
sector establishment. Other obstacles to accountability include low level of awareness 
of civil servants of their entitlements under the Civil Service Commission rules and 
regulations. Hence it is difficult to design an effective system of accountability for 
civil servants by requiring them to be performance oriented and accountable for their 
actions when they are not fully aware of their rights under the Civil Service Code. 
The elimination of personal/social factors that constrain accountability regime in 
public sector organizations is not easy because the issues are sensitive and deeply 
rooted in the civil service code. However, the following measures may be taken with 
a view to reducing the negative effects of the personal factors: 
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0 New regulation is required to rectify the inequality between nationals 
and expatriates who have the same qualifications and experience by 
upgrading and promoting those who fall within the appropriate new 
civil service code of employment. 
0 Creating special grades for those nationals who do not meet the 
recruitment requirements; i. e. the necessary qualifications and 
experience in order to join government employment. 
" Establish overtime and performance related compensation scheme for 
those who exceed the target standards. Thus, without creating 
differential in pay, the hard working and dedicated employees would be 
rewarded in accordance with their achievements and the employees 
whose results fall below the required standard would be punished by the 
management. 
" Encourage informal relations within the organizations so that 
group/individual relationship can compliment the formal relationship, 
which binds the organization and its work force and the employee to his 
superior/manager. By creating such work environment accountability 
machinery would function smoothly and productivity/performance- 
oriented activities would be enhanced. 
0 Setting up a system whereby staff and workers in the organization can 
obtain all information relating to their entitlement and rules and 
regulations of Civil Service Commission so that awareness of job 
opportunities and benefits are properly communicated and disseminated. 
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Certainly, the elimination of the accountability constraining factors will enhance the 
implementation of our recommended model. It will clear the way for the various 
relationships in the model to be operated transparently and committed. Otherwise, the 
current problem of low level of Management accountability may continue with all the 
negative consequences on performance and efficiency in the public services sector. 
11.6 SUMMARY 
This chapter set out to make appropriate recommendations after a summary of the 
research findings, analyses and conclusions. The overall conclusion from the results 
of the study is that the level of management accountability in the UAE public services 
sector as represented by our case-study organizations is less than the average in 
similar organizations, particularly in the UK. This situation derives from certain 
mitigating factors, which, if remedied may lead to significant positive results with 
respect to improving accountability in the sector. 
An adapted version of the Principal-Agent model was recommended for the UAE, 
and, indeed, other societies in similar situation and similar social-political 
characteristics. The model has five main relationships including: 
" Social Environment relationship 
9 Principal-Agent relationship 
" Responsibility for Accountability relationship 
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" Accountability for Responsibility relationship, and, 
" Agent-subagent action relationship. 
Each of these relationships has a number of elements, which must be specified and 
defined unambiguously for all parties in the relationships to enable proper 
accountability to be rendered. Thus, the key pillars underlying the relationships of the 
model are formalisation, legalisation and control of the elements that are expected to 
enhance good accountability. 
Recommendations by our sample respondents and the Acting Head of the UAE Audit 
Office were presented as well. These recommendations provide additional support to 
our model that the essential variables for a higher level of management accountability 
in the public sector are the relationships and their constituent elements that are 
identified in our model. However, the successful implementation of the 
recommendations depends largely upon the ability and commitment to reduce the 
adverse effects of the constraining factors identified in the research. A brief 
discussion of the individual groups of factors led to recommendations on how to 
eliminate or reduce the factors in the sector. We concluded that a conscientious effort 
to the implementation of the recommendations made would inevitably lead to the 
development of a culture of providing good and effective Management accountability 
in the public services sector of the UAE. 
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CHAPTER 12 
CONCLUSION 
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12.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter concludes our study on the level of Management Accountability in the 
UAE public services sector. It threads together the main issues discussed and 
analyzed in the previous chapters with a view to giving a bird's eye view of the entire 
piece of work. It is therefore an overall summary of our research project. 
As a concept, accountability is not easy to define in a standard format and this has 
often led to a loose use of the concept with the inevitable consequence of confusion as 
to what exactly is meant in each situation (Day and Klein, 1987). In broad terms, 
however, accountability may be viewed as a process where a person or groups 
of people are required to render an account of their activities to the next higher level in 
the organisational hierarchy by showing the way in which they have discharged or 
failed charge their duties and responsibilities. The concept has many dimensions, 
including: 
" Financial accountability, 
" Political accountability, 
" Social accountability, 
" Legal accountability, and, 
" Management accountability. 
We have concentrated on the Management accountability concept in our study for the 
basic reason that it is more inclusive than any of the others. Furthermore, it constitutes 
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the main problematic area in the operations of the public services organizations in the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE). 
Essentially, Management accountability deals with issues such as the cost 
effectiveness of resource allocation and use. budgetary control. efficiency of 
operations, policy effectiveness and performance measurement. With these functional 
parameters, management accountability is. therefore, a process whereby the executive 
management of an organization (whether in public or private sector), referred to as 
`Accountor' or 'Agent'. gives an account of his/her stewardship to the 
shareholders/stakeholders. referred to as 'Accountee' or 'Principal', for scrutiny and 
action with the aim of controlling the activities and performance of the organization. 
Thus, the level of accountability achieved in an organization is a barometer of the 
state of discipline and efficiency in the organization. 
12.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
In the UAE public services sector, the barometer indicates a state indiscipline and 
inefficiency as a result of the low level of accountability in the sector. The situation 
led to some public concern and criticism, even though largely privately. In fact, this 
led, in the later part of 1998, to the Minister of Culture and Information encouraging 
the national media to raise issues with public sector organisations and, where 
necessary, criticize their services including accountability. Strong reservations were 
expressed about the effectiveness and performance of most of the public sector 
organisation in the country. The most repeated and emphasized issue was the level of 
448 
information disclosure and the accountability for the organisation's duties and 
responsibilities to the UAE public. 
Despite these criticisms, some of which are evident, the critics failed to provide 
concrete evidence of the issues, particularly those of poor management accountability. 
Arguably, the accountability problem is the most serious one considering the 
enormous amount of resources consumed and the public trust put in the public sector 
organisations. Some of the most searching and important questions raised include: 
why is management accountability in organizations/enterprises in the public services 
sector so much a concern of the general as well as specific publics such as the Media? 
Are the organizations/enterprises really inefficient and their level of management 
accountability very low? What are the factors that may be responsible for such 
problems particularly those of management accountability? What can be done to 
make public sector organisations in the UAE more accountable and efficient? The 
concerns of the UAE public and the questions raised triggered this study to find 
solution. 
12.3 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY' 
The main objectives of this study are to confirm or refute the observed performance 
and management accountability problems in the UAE Public Sector and identify and 
assess the factors that contribute to the situation with the aim of recommending 
appropriate solution. More specifically, the study focused on: 
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a) examining the performance of public sector organisations in the UAE in order to 
confirm or refute the public concerns about management accountability in the 
sector; 
b) identifying and evaluating the factors that are responsible for the problems of 
management accountability in the public sector organizations: 
c) developing and recommending an appropriate accountability model to solve the 
problem identified and suggest implementation strategy. 
Given the objectives, the usefulness of our study to the government of the UAE, the 
general public of the country and academics is obvious. The research results, analysis 
and recommendations will provide the government a basis to review the organization 
and performance of the public sector organizations in order to improve the level of 
accountability while the general public will have a better understanding of the reasons 
for the observed low level of accountability in the sector. For the academia, the 
findings provide additional empirical evidence of the phenomenon investigated while 
the model developed and recommended in the study suggests the approach for further 
research in this subject-area. 
12.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Both secondary and primary data were used extensively and intensively in this 
research. The study started with exploratory research aimed at identifying the 
research problem and focusing the issues for investigation. This was very helpful not 
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only in focusing the study but also in raising appropriate questions for investigation. 
Subsequent to this was the secondary and primary data research. 
12.4.1 Secondary Data Collection 
Secondary data research - the collection of data assembled. analyzed and documented 
by someone else - was used throughout the entire study. However, there was a 
concentrated use of secondary research and data in the first five chapters of the study. 
Most of the secondary data collected are from published materials including official 
sources such as: 
" UAE Central Bank reports and publications; 
" Reports and publications of relevant Ministries such as Finance, Economics & 
Planning, Health and Education; 
" IMF and World Bank documents and publications; 
" Etisalat Annual Report and Accounts; and 
" Other publications including documents and publications of private sector 
enterprises and relevant books and journals. 
Information collected from one source was compared with other relevant sources for 
accuracy and reliability. This has given us greater confidence in the secondary 
data used in the study and, thus, the analysis and results obtained from the use 
of the data 
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12.4.2 Primary Data Collection. 
Qualitative and quantitative primary data were researched and collected at four 
different stages as follows: 
Stage l: A general survey of a sample of 500 respondents drawn purposively 
from a sampling frame of 3000 persons in the public sector using an 
omini-bus or general questionnaire (see, Appendix A); 
Stage 2: A customized survey of 60 respondents (30 from each of the two 
case-study organizations - Etisalat and the Ministry of Health - 
using a customized questionnaire (see, Appendix B& C); 
Stage 3: A focused survey of 30 respondents drawn through purposive 
sampling approach from the 60 respondents in stage 2 using 
specialized questionnaire (see Appendix E); 
Stage 4: Personal interviews with 10 respondents (5 from each of the case- 
study organizations) selected purposively using semi-structure 
questionnaire (see, Appendix D). 
Each stage used a fairly different but re-enforcing questionnaire, which was pilot 
tested and corrected before administration. The sampling method used is purposive 
sampling. This is an appropriate sampling method for our study because of the nature 
and objective of the study, which required the inevitable inclusion of the Accountors 
and Accountees in the case-study organizations as well as other organizations in the 
public sector in our focused and general samples respectively. A response rate of 52% 
was obtained in the general survey and a 100% response and co-operation from 
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respondents of the focused samples and among the personal interview participants. 
The surveys and the personal interviews were conducted in 1999 and 2000. 
12.4.3 Analysis of Data 
We used mainly the 'Statistical Package for the Social Sciences' (SPSS) in our 
analysis of the research data. Various hypothesis test techniques were employed with 
very satisfactory results. which were assessed either on a 95% or 99% confidence 
level as the case may be. In most of the cases, our test results were significant at the 
99% confidence level, which covers automatically the 95% level as well. The test 
methods used are as follows: 
For hypothesis about a single mean 
The relevant hypothesis in this case is: M >_ 3; where M=sample mean and 3 =p 
(i. e. average on the grading scale) and the test is one-tail with a significance level of 
either 95% or 99%. The Z-test was used in this case because our sample size was 30. 
ii) For hypothesis about the independence of samples (test of multiple means) 
The relevant hypothesis here is to test whether all our three samples (the general 
public sample and the two case-study samples) are from the same population. 
ANOVA was used as the appropriate technique with F-test measure and 99% 
significance level. 
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iii) For test of Correlation or Association 
We used the Pearson Correlation Co-efficient (r) to estimate the correlation between 
the level of Accountability and the other group of variables (social-cultural. 
organizational and personal factors). 
iv) For Causation Analysis 
Regression analysis was used to assess the impact of the independent variables 
(social-cultural, organizational and personal factors) upon the dependent variable, the 
level of Accountability. The co-efficient of determination (R2) was used to evaluate 
the impact of the independent variables on the dependent variable. 
In using the various methods of the survey research approach and the different 
methods of analysis and test, we do appreciate the problems that are generally 
associated with these methods and techniques. For example, we do recognize that the 
purposive sampling method falls short of the requirements of random sampling, which 
is recognized as the most unbiased sampling method. Similarly. other problems, such 
as colinearity of variables in regression analysis, interviewer and interviewee biases as 
well as the effect of the limited size of our samples relative to the size of the public 
sector in the UAE, are recognized. These have not had significant adverse effect upon 
the results of our research because of the care taken in the conduct of the research to 
avoid such impact. However, it is generally accepted that the nature and objective of 
a research topic determines not only the sampling approach but also the content of the 
questionnaire, the interview method and the test instruments used (Cooper and 
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Schindler, 1998). This applies to our study in all aspects. To this extent, we have 
great confidence in our research findings, results and conclusions. 
12.5 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS - FACTORS 
The main findings of this study are as interesting as they are disturbing. Interesting in 
the sense that many people had thought that the public services sector in the UAE was 
coping with the requirements of the public in a regime of Oil wealth and excellent 
leadership of the President, His Highness Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan. 
Disturbing in the sense that our research reveals that the situation is far from rosy and 
that, in fact, the public services organizations have failed to satisfy the public, at least, 
in providing above average level of account of the allocation and use of the resources 
entrusted in their care on behalf of the people. The responses of our three groups of 
samples - the general public, the focused samples from Etisalat and the Ministry of 
Health - indicate very similar views and opinion in respect of the level of satisfaction 
with the general performance of the sector and, more importantly, the level of 
management accountability in the sector. 
12.5.1 Findings from the General Public Sample 
Chapter 6 presents the detail results of the responses of the general public sample with 
respect to the different questions asked in the general questionnaire, which was 
administered by post and hand delivery. With 52% response rate, we are satisfied 
with the response and hence the outcome of the survey. 
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In summary, the general public as represented by our sample indicates that: 
" The public services sector is too large in relation to the population of the 
country as of 1998 figures. This means a relative inefficiency in the use of 
resources particularly scarce manpower in the sector. However, it must be 
recognized that the country is also too rich in relation to its population and 
that one of the traditional roles of the public sector is to provide 
employment irrespective of efficiency considerations. To this extent, the 
views of our respondents has a question mark hanging over its head for 
failing to recognize the 'social objective' of public sector organizations. 
" The general performance of the public services sector with respect to 
financial, economic and, even some social objectives such as provision of 
high quality health and educational services, is less than average in similar 
organizations in the UK or other Western countries. On the basis of the 
principles of averages. this view is respectable otherwise there are some 
pockets of above average performance in the sector such as will be seen in 
one of our case studies. 
" There are mountains of constraints on the provision of account for 
stewardship, a low level of information disclosure, much secrecy in 
organizations, a lack of definition of accountability, poor performance 
standards and appraisal system, lack of effective external performance 
monitors and evaluators such as Ombudsmen, an abject lack of a fair 
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reward/sanction system and a lack effective delegation of authority, job 
description and sense of responsibility in public services organization. 
These impact very adversely on the level of management accountability in 
the sector. 
" The level of management accountability in the sector is much less than 
average in similar sectors in Western countries. 
The views of our general public sample are firm and solid. Their mean rating of the 
level of management accountability in the public sector is significantly less than the 
average rating in the grading scale leading us to reject the relevant hypothesis that M 
3 and accept the null hypothesis that M <_ 3. 
12.5.2 Findings from of Case-Study 1- ETISALT 
There are no great differences in the views of the Etisalat sample and those of the 
general public sample except in the area of financial performance of the enterprise. 
While presenting views very similar to those of the general public sample, the Etisalat 
sample differed in the following aspects: 
" Our respondents see the financial performance of the corporation as 
satisfactory. This is collaborated by the financial statistics obtained from 
the records of the corporation. However, it must be recognized that Etisalat 
is a legislative monopolist in the Communications Industry in the UAE and 
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therefore operates in a relatively protected rather than competitive market. 
If this is taken into proper account in assessing the financial performance of 
the corporation, especially under competitive conditions. the results might 
be radically different. 
" Our respondents also stated that Etisalat is technologically progressive and 
attempts to keep up-to-date with management developments. For example. 
Etisalat has on paper `Job Appraisal System', `Performance Evaluation 
Mechanisms'. 'Internal Control System' and written work procedures. 
However, the respondents also noted that these provisions are not 
effectively used and therefore fall short of expectations particularly in 
enhancing management accountability in the corporation. 
" The respondents indicated therefore that the level of management 
accountability in the corporation is less than the average level in similar 
organizations. for example. BT in the UK. 
Statistical tests of the view that the level of management accountability in the 
corporation is less than the average in our grading scale provided a similar result as in 
the case of the general public sample. At 95% confidence level, their mean rating of 
the level of management accountability in the corporation is significantly less than the 
average in similar organizations. 
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12.5.3 Findings of Case-Study 2 Sample - Ministry of Health 
Our sample of respondents from the Ministry of Health holds a very similar view to 
those of the general public sample. They have indicated that: 
" The general performance of the Ministry in terms achieving the 
expectations of the public is below the average in similar organizations such 
as the British National Health Services. 
" All the obstacles to a good and high level of accountability are present in 
the Ministry ranging from a high level of centralization, lack of external 
monitoring and evaluation mechanism, lack of job description to secrecy 
and low level of information disclosure. 
" Consequently, the level of management accountability is very low in the 
organization. 
Statistical tests of the mean rating of the sample at 99% confidence level confirm the 
finding that the level of management accountability in the Ministry is far less than the 
average in similar organizations such as the NHS in Britain. 
12.5.4 The Mitigating Factors 
The research findings indicate the following factors have negative and strongly 
correlated with the observed low level of management accountability in the public 
sector organizations: 
" Social"Cultural factors 
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" Organisational factors, and, 
" Personal factors. 
The correlation co-efficient (r) of each of these groups of factors is not only negative 
and high but also significant at the 99% confidence level as discussed in detail in 
chapter 10. These confirm that the association between the low level of management 
accountability and each of the factors is very strong suggesting the possibility of 
causal relationship. 
We tested this contention that there is a causal relationship between the low level of 
management accountability and the factors using regression analysis. The result 
indicates, through the co-efficient of determination (R2) that a causal relationship 
seems to exist between the low level of management accountability as the dependent 
variable and the three groups of factors as independent variables. The R2 = 0.88 
which means that about 88% of the variation in the rating of the level of management 
accountability is caused by variations in the independent variables. The results show 
that the Personal factors caused the most variation, about 0.50. in the dependent 
variable followed by the Organisational factors and then the Social-Cultural factors. 
It therefore follows that a significant reduction in the adverse effects of the Personal 
factors will increase the level of management accountability in the public sector 
organizations. This is also true for the other factors and so a combined attack of 
reduce the adverse effects of the three groups of factors will lead to a very significant 
increase (about 88%) in the rating of the level of management accountability among 
our sample respondents. However, this result showing a causal relationship should be 
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interpreted cautiously because it is often difficult to establish effective causation 
through regression analysis (Rowntree, 1987; Sekaran, 2000). Furthermore, some bias 
may be introduced by colinearity among the variable though we do not seem to have a 
serious problem from this direction. 
12.5.5 Analysis of Effects of Mitigating Factors 
Each of the three groups of mitigating factors comprises different elements with 
differential mitigating effect on the level of management accountability in the public 
sector. The sub-factors are shown in the Fish bone diagram in chapter 10 (see, Figure 
10.1). The sub-factors have differential effect on the level of accountability in the 
sector. The social-cultural factors (see, Table 9.4), for example, account for 0.248 of 
the variation in the dependent variable, which means that an increase by a unit in the 
rating of the collective effect of these groups of factors would lead to a decrease of 
0.248 in the rating of the level of management accountability. However, in examining 
the individual element in the group we note that four out of seven of the elements had 
ratings above the average (3) in the response grading scale. This shows the 
differential contribution of each of the sub-factors to the group's collective mitigating 
effect on the level of management accountability. 
A similar disaggregation of the elements of the organizational factors shows a diverse 
view about the effects of the individual elements (see, Table 10.2) compared with the 
elements of the social cultural factors. For example, while the mean ratings of seven of 
the eleven elements in this group are above the average of the rating scale (3), the 
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remaining four are below the average. The difference between the mean ratings of the 
individual elements and the average of the rating scale of this group of factors is 
significant at 99% confidence level. This indicates that all but four elements in this 
group are significant at this level thus underscoring the impression of the sample 
respondents that most of elements in this group are rated as having negative effect on 
the level of management accountability. The group of personal factors (see, Table 
10.3), also have such sub-factor differential effects. The implication of this analysis is 
that the mitigating factors should not be seen only in their collective effect but also the 
disaggregated differential effects of the individual sub-factors should be recognized in 
any scheme to reduce the negative effects of the constraining factors. 
12.6 SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATION 
Pulling together all the findings in this study and reviewing the theoretical background 
of the research, we developed a framework based on the `Principal - Agent' model 
of Gray, et al (1996) for improving the level of management accountability in the 
public sector of the UAE. The model has been customized to incorporate the 
peculiarities of the UAE public sector environment in order to encourage the practice 
of effective accountability. The model has three main actors, the Principal 
(Accountee), the Main Agent (Accountor) and the Sub-Agent (Subordinate) who 
operate in a social setting (Social Environment). There are five distinct relationships 
in the model: 
" Social environment relationship 
" Principal-Agent contractual relationship 
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" Responsibility for Accountability relationship 
" Accountability for Responsibility relationship 
" Main Agent-Subagent Action relationship. 
The `Social Environment Relationship' provides the general setting including a 
definition of accountability, provision of the societal objectives. socially acceptable 
customization of culture and a system of societal monitoring and control system: 
while the 'Contractual Relationship' sets up the legal imperatives and requirements 
for formalization and operationalizing the provisions of the social environment 
relationship. The 'Responsibility for Accountability' relationship provides a formal 
and precise description of the responsibilities and authorities of the Agent (Accountor) 
in the relationship between the Principal (Accountee) and the main Agent 
(Accountor); while the 'Accountability for Responsibility' relationship sets out 
formally the accountability responsibilities and requirements in the relationship. The 
'Action Relationship', on the other hand, provides formally and in details 
comprehensive job description and the enabling delegation of authority for the Sub- 
agents to enable them carry out the 'practical jobs' from which the information and 
statistics for an effective accountability by the main agent emanates. 
Each of the 'relationships' in the model consists of operational elements, which must 
be specified and defined to avoid misinterpretation and confusion in execution. Effort 
should be made to specify and define these elements as clearly as possible to enable 
public servants to implement them effectively. 
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The major operational instruments underlining the model are formalization. 
legalization and control of accountability principles, procedures and practice in the 
relevant organizations in the UAE. This constitutes the central pillar of our model that 
will lead to a successful and effective Management accountability. Thus. with a clear 
definition of the type of accountability required and a formal and legally enforceable 
set of accountability procedures. regulations, monitoring, reviewing and controlling 
mechanisms put in place, our recommended model will encourage the development of 
a very high level of Management accountability in the public services sector of the 
UAE and, indeed, other societies with similar societal attributes. 
A survey of our focused sample of respondents on what is to be done to improve 
management accountability in the public sector indicates that our respondents give 
priority to the resolution of the following problem areas: 
" Definition of accountability 
" Provision of strict guidelines for presenting accounts 
" Stating objectives of accountability precisely 
" Establishment of reward/sanction system for good/poor 
accountability 
" Establishment of effective Ombudsman system for monitoring and 
controlling accountability. 
These recommendations hinge on the basic pillars of our recommended model which 
are; formalisation, legalisation and control of the requirements for an effective 
accountability. Our respondents' views on how to improve the level of management 
464 
accountability in the public sector of the UAE are thus in line with the provisions of 
our Principal-Agent model. 
These recommendations re-emphasize the lack of formal and institutionalized 
regulatory system that could develop effective accountability in the sector. Our model 
covers all these areas and provides a scheme, which, if implemented conscientiously. 
will inevitably enhance the development of a much higher level of Management 
Accountability than exist now in the sector. However, the success of our model and 
the other recommendations depends on many factors including the accountability 
constraining groups of factors that were identified and analyzed in chapters 9 and 10 
respectively. These factors and others need to be tackled to eliminate or, at least, 
minimize their negative effects on the level of accountability in the sector. 
12.7 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Whatever system of management accountability in force, the expected result may not 
be achieved if there is no managerial and organizational commitment within the public 
sector. which must be followed up and evaluated by an independent body designated 
for that purpose. There must be the will-power, discipline and commitment from all 
persons concerned to carry out conscientious and efficiently the responsibilities for 
accountability and present to the principals accountability for the responsibilities. 
Without these. the expectation of the public with respect to the provision of a high 
level of accountability by those in whom they have reposed trust and confidence to 
deploy pubic resources efficiently will be frustrated. Moreover, management 
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accountability system would be worthwhile only when the cost of its introduction and 
implementation is less than the benefit derived otherwise the effort would be wasted. 
12.8 FURTHER AREAS OF RESEARCH 
The current research highlights many intellectually interesting issues that could be 
potential areas for further research. The research undertaken is restricted to one 
dimension of accountability (management accountability) within the public sector, the 
other dimensions of accountability such as financial, political and legal need to be 
researched to have a complete picture of accountability in the public sector of the 
UAE 
In connection with management accountability corporate governance had been a focus 
and debate of academics and \ Titers on organisation theory in recent years. Corporate 
governance plays an important role in facilitating the accountability mechanism and 
understanding. Our study has not dealt with the corporate governance issues. In the 
future an investigation of the relationship of management accountability and corporate 
governance in public sector organisations could highlight an important association that 
might enhance the accountability concept. Further more, the accountability criterion 
stated in this research can be extended to include quantifiable and measurable criteria 
in the future investigation so that a standard of accountability measure can be 
established for gauging good and poor accountability procedures as well as giving an 
insight into the problem of public sector accountability. 
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RVIsE. AR(EI O` ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE PUBLIC 
SERVICES OF UAE 
(; I: NI; RAE PUBLIC QUESTIONNAIRE 
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Dear Respondent. 
We are conducting a research on "Accountability in the Public Services of the 
United Arab Emirates (U. A. E. )" to write up a Ph. D thesis for the University of 
Hull, U. K. 
The study will be beneficial to the UAE public in general and the public services 
in particular by identifying the factors responsible for public services 
accountability problems and offering appropriate solutions. 
We need your co-operation in filling the attached questionnaire as sincerely and 
objectively as possible and to return it in the enclosed - addressed - stamped envelop. 
Any information supplied will be handled in strict confidence and used exclusively 
for writing up the Ph. D. thesis. 
Thank you in advance for your co-operation. 
Yours faithfully, 
Juan Salem 
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Questionnaire 
Dear Respondent, 
Please answer the questions below as objectively and sincerely as possible. 
Thank you 
GENERAL INFORMATION SECTION 
Which of the following professional categories best describes your current official position? 
(Please tick only one). 
Minister 
................................................................. .............. Q 
Member of National Council ................................ ............. Q 
Ex-Minister 
............................................................ ............. 
Chairman 
............................................................... ............. 
Director 
.................................................................. ............. 
[a 
Under-Secretary of Ministry .................................. ............. 
1: 1 
Assistant Under-Secretary of Ministry .................. ............. 
Q 
Senior Management in Private Sector ................... ............. 
Consultant 
.............................................................. ............. 
Senior Military/Police Officer ............................... ............. 
Others (please specify)........................................... 
.......................................................................... 
............ 
..... 
2. How long have you occupied your current official position? 
Less than I year ............................ ...................................... 
1-3 years ...................................... ...................................... C2, 
3-5 years ...................................... ...................................... 
Qj 
5- 10 years .................................... ...................................... 
g 
More than 10 years ....................... ...................................... 
470 
3. What is your Emirate of origin? 
Abu Dhabi ........................................................ .................. 
Q 
Dubai 
................................................................ .................. 
U 
Sharjah 
.............................................................. .................. 
Q 
Ajman 
............................................................... .................. 
Q 
Ras A] Khaima 
................................................. .................. Q 
Fujeirah 
............................................................. .................. Q 
Umm Al Quwain 
.............................................. .................. Q 
4. In which of the following sectors are you currently or were you employed? (Tick only one) 
Federal Public Service 
....................................... ................. 
Q 
State (Emirate) Public Service .......................... ................. 
Q 
Private Sector 
..................................................... ................. 
Q 
Quasi-Government Organization 
...................... ................. 
Q 
Non-Profit Organization .................................... ................. Q 
Others (please specify) ...................................... 
......................................................... 
................. Q 
.. 
Back Ground Information 
5. How would you consider the current size of the U. A. E. public service in relation to the 
population of the country, which is only 2.6 million people (1997 figures)? 
Too large ............................................................................. [a 
Large 
................................................................................... 
I 
Correct size ......................................................................... 
Q 
Small 
................................................................................... 
Q 
Too small ............................................................................ 
U 
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6. In your view, what should constitute the main objectives of the Ministries and other 
organizations in the Public Service of the UAE? (Please prioritize your choice using 5 as most 
important and I as least important). 
54321 
To provide good Social Services 00O00 
To provide comprehensive annual evaluation 
of Performance the sector QQQQQ 
To provide Employment for all nationals QQQQQ 
To provide good Health and Housing Services QQQQQ 
To provide a full and accurate account of the use of 
funds & resources allocated to it by the public QQQQQ 
To provideSecurity to all in the country QQQQQ 
To provide good Education Services QQQQQ 
To provide accurate information/data to the public QQQQQ 
To encourage socio-economic development of UAE QQQQQ 
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7. Please assess the performance of the UAE Public Service in the provision of each of the 
following the services? (Score as follows: 5=Much above average; 4=Above average; 
3=Average; 2=Less than average; 1=Much less than average. ) 
54321 
Provision of Social Services QQQQQ 
Annual evaluation of Performance 
Provision of Employment 
Provision of Health Services 
QQQQQ 
QQQQQ 
QQQQQ 
Annual account of the use of funds & resources QQQQQ 
Provision of Housing Services 
Provision of Education Services 
Provision of Security 
Provision of Information/Data to the public 
Annual account of income and expenditure. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q o 0 0 
0 0 Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
8 How would you define Accountability in the Public Services of the UAE? (please tick only 
one option) 
Provision of general annual account of the performance of the Ministry Q 
Provision of detail account of the performance and use of resources 
Q allocated to the Ministry 
Provision of detail annual budget of income and expenditure of the 
Q Ministry 
Provision of detail annual account of the use of resources allocated to the 
Ministry Q 
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9. Please assess the performance of the UAE Public Service in the provision of statistical 
information in each of the following areas: (Score as follows: 5=Much above average; 
4=Above average; 3=Average; 2=Less than average; 1=Much less than average. ) 
Annual Plan &Budget Details 
Financial Statistics 
Employment Statistics 
Objective of the Ministry 
Socio-economic Statistics 
Audit Report 
Decision making structure 
Resource allocation & utilization 
General Statistics 
Others (please specify 
5 4 3 _' 1 
D Q Q Q O 
Q Q Q O O 
Q Q Q D O 
Q Q Q Q O 
10. To what extent are you satisfied with the level of Accountability in the Public Services of the 
UAE? (tick only one). 
Very satisfied ..................................................... o 
Satisfied ............................................................. 
Indifferent .......................................................... o 
Dissatisfied ........................................................ o 
Very dissatisfied ................................................ 
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11. In your view, who should an Under-Secretary in a Ministry be directly accountable to for 
his/her duties and responsibilities? (Please rank your answer in descending order using 5 as 
most important and 1 as least important). 
The Prime Minister 
The Supreme Council 
The UAE general public 
The Minister 
The National Council 
The Chairman 
The Director 
Others (please specify) 
5 4 3 ? 1 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
12. Which of the following have you encountered in your dealings with Ministries or 
organizations in the UAE Public Service? (Please rank yo ur answer in de scending order 
using 5 as most encountered and I as least encountered) 
5 4 3 2 1 
Poor knowledge of responsibility Q Q Q Q D 
Limited information disclosure Q Q Q Q D 
Poor Management annual report Q Q Q D Q 
Lack of accountability Ombudsman 0 Q Q D Q 
Poor annual accounts report Q Q Q Q Q 
Lack of accountability guidelines Q Q Q D 0 
Exaggeration of success Q Q Q 0 Q 
Lack of report-writing guidelines D Q Q Q Q 
Poor definition of accountability O Q Q O Q 
Others (Specify) Q Q 0 Q D 
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" 'SPECIFIC INFORMATION: 
13. What are the topics you would expect to find in the annual report of Under-Secretaries in the 
Ministries? (Please rank your answer in descending order using 5 as most important and 1 as 
least important). 
5 4 3 21 
Policy & Objectives of the Ministry Q Q Q Q Q 
Funds and other resources allocated to Ministry Q Q Q Q Q 
Utilization of funds and other resources Q Q Q Q Q 
Evaluation of performance of the Ministry Q Q Q Q Q 
Strategy of operation of the Ministry Q Q Q Q Q 
Limitations of the Ministry Q Q Q Q Q 
Performance measurement & control mechanisms Q Q Q Q Q 
Projections for the future Q Q Q Q Q 
Other matters (please specify) Q Q Q Q Q 
14. In your view, what social cultural factors might hinder an Under-Secretary in a Ministry 
from giving a full and detail account of the performance and use of resources allocated to 
his/her Ministry? (Please rank your answer in descending order using 5 as most influential 
and 1 as least influential). 
5 4 3 2 1 
Culture of trust in the society Q Q Q Q Q 
Low level of public awareness Q Q O Q Q 
Attitude of indifference in the society Q Q Q O Q 
Tradition of respect for views of elders Q O Q O O 
Lack of interest of the public in such an account Q Q O Q Q 
Poor knowledge of responsibility Q O Q Q Q 
Low level of political awareness in the society Q O Q Q O 
Others (specify) Q Q 0 Q Q 
476 
15. In your view, what organizational factors might influence an Under-secretary in a Ministry to 
present a poor annual account of the performance and use of resources allocated to his/her 
Ministry. (Please rank your answer in descending order using 5 as most influential and I as 
least influential). 
5 4 3 2 1 
Lack of specific definition of Accountability Q 0 p 0 
Lack of accountability Culture in the Ministry p o ý} 
Lack of guideline for presenting account 
Lack appropriate reward system Ek Q Q 0 
Layback attitude of the Boss ................................................... Q 1: 1 1: 1 Q. Q 
Ineffective external Auditing Body ......................................... M 1 
Inappropriate structure of the Organization ............................ 
Lack of precise referral criteria ............................................... 
Corrupt ethical environment ................................................... [ [a [k ( 1: 1 
Lack of equal opportunity for all ............................................. Q Q Q Q 
Lack of accounts control mechanism ...................................... 0 12 U 0 
16. In your view, which of the following indicators would reflect good Accountability in the 
Public Services of the UAE? (Please rank your answer in descending order using 5 as best 
indicator and I as least indicator). 
Unrestricted public review of public service accounts.......... 
Total disclosure of information .............................................. 
Disclosure of all income and expenditure ............................. 
Reporting all government activities openly ........................... 
Press freedom to discuss public sector accountability .......... 
Limited report of government activity ................................... 
Comprehensive account of resource utilization ..................... 
Disclosure of personal interest of civil servants .................... 
Others (specify please) ........................................................... 
5 4 3 2 1 
Q Q Q O 
Q Q Q O 
e e e e 
Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q 
Q Q 0 O 
O Q Q 0 
Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q 0. 
Q 
Q, 
Q 
D. 
0 
0 
477 
17. In your view, what personal factors might hinder good Accountability in the public 
services? (Please rank your answer in descending order using 5 as most influential and 1 
as least influential). 
Fear of loss of job .................................................................... 
.......................................... Inferiority complex ........................ 
Inadequate education ............................................................... 
Lack of confidence .................................................................. 
Culture of secrecy .................................................................... 
Corrupt behaviour ................................................................... 
Fear of exposure of inadequacy ............................................... 
Fear of blame ........................................................................... 
Official arrogance .................................................................... 
Lack of definition of job responsibility ................................... 
Lack of delegation of responsibility & authority .................... 
Others (please specify) .............................................................. 
5 4 3 2 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
RECOMMENDATION '3 
18. What can be done to improve the level of Accountability in the public services of the UAE? 
(Please rank your answer in descending order using 5 as most important and 1 as least 
important) 
5 4 3 2 
Define accountability more precisely ..................................... [, ý ( Q [ Q 
Provide strict guidelines for presenting accounts ................... Q Q Q Q Q 
Penalize non-compliance with guidelines ............................. 
State objectives of accountability precisely ............................ Ca L3 [a QJ Q 
Educate Civil Servants on need for accountability ................. Ck 13 13 
U U 
State deadline for submission of accounts/report ................... [a (3 [k I: 1 Q 
Relate good accountability to appropriate reward Q Q Q Q Q 
Employ appropriately qualified persons ................................. Q Q Q Q Q 
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Establish Ombudsman to monitor accountability ................... 1o ED O0 
19. What other suggestions would you like to make to improve Accountability in the Public 
services of the UAE? (Please feel free to write as you may desire) 
........................................................................................................................................................ 
........................................................................................................................................................ 
........................................................................................................................................................ 
........................................................................................................................................................ 
........................................................................................................................................................ 
....................................................................................................................................................... 
........................................................................................................................................................ 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME 
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APPENDIX B 
ACCOUNTEE QUESTIONNAIRE ON MANAGEMENT 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
480 
RESEARCH ON ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE PUBLIC 
SERVICES OF UAE 
Questionnaire for Accountees. 
(Minister, etc. ) 
481 
Dear Respondent, 
We are conducting a research on "Accountability in the Public Services of the 
United Arab Emirates (U. A. E. )" to write up a Ph. D thesis for the University of 
Hull, U. K. 
The study will be beneficial to the UAE public in general and the public services 
in particular by identifying the factors responsible for public services 
accountability problems and offering appropriate solutions. 
We need your co-operation in filling the attached questionnaire as sincerely and 
objectively as possible and to return it in the enclosed - addressed - stamped envelop. 
Any information supplied will be handled in strict confidence and used exclusively 
for writing up the Ph. D. thesis. 
Thank you in advance for your co-operation. 
Yours faithfully, 
Juan Salem 
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QUESTIONNAIRE 
Dear Respondent, 
Please answer the questions below as objectively and sincerely as possible. 
Thank you. 
GENERAL INFORMATION SECTION 
In which of the following categories is your organizatio 
(Please tick as appropriate). 
Public Service 
Quasi - Public Service ..................................................... 
Private Sector Company 
.................................................... 
Non-Profit Organization .................................................... 
Others (please specify) ...................................................... 
n formally registered in the UAE? 
What is the official designation of your current position in your organization? (tick only 
one) 
Minister 
.............................................................................. Q 
Chairman ............................................................................ Q 
Director-General ................................................................. Q 
Chief Executive Officer ..................................................... Q 
Others (please specify) ....................................................... Q 
3. How long have you occupied your current official position? 
Less than 1 year .................................................................. Q 
1-3 years ........................................................................... Q 
3-5 years ........................................................................... Q 
5- 10 years ......................................................................... Q 
More than 10 years ............................................................. Q 
483 
4. Are you in Federal or Emirate Service employment? 
Federal Public Service Employment 
................................... Q Emirate Public Service Employment 
................................. Q Federal Private Sector Company 
........................................ Q Emirate Private Sector Company 
....................................... Q Federal/Emirate Service Employment 
............................... Q None of above ..................................................................... Q 
I BACK GROUND INFORMATION -1 
5. How would you consider the current size of the U. A. E. Public Service in relation to the 
population of the country, which is only 2.6 million people (1997 figures)? 
Too large 
............................................................................. Q Large 
................................................................................... Q Average size ....................................................................... Q Small 
................................................................................... Q Too small Q 
6. In your view, what should constitute the main objectives of the Ministries and other organizations 
in the Public Service of the UAE? (Please prioritize your choice using 5 as most important and 
1 as least important). 
5432l 
To provide good Social Services QQQQQ 
To provide comprehensive annual evaluation 
of Performance the sector 
To provide Employment for all nationals 
To provide good Health and Housing Services 
To provide a full and accurate account of the use of 
funds & resources allocated to it by the public 
To provideSecurity to all in the country 
To provide good Education Services 
To provide accurate information/data to the public 
To encourage socio-economic development of UAE 
Q Q a Q a 
Q a Q Q Q 
a Q Q Q a 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
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7. Please assess the performance of the UAE Public Service in the provision of each of the 
following the services? (Score as follows: 5=Much above average; 4=Above average; 
3=Average; 2=Less than average; 1=Much less than average. ) 
54321 
Provision of Social Services QQQQQ 
Annual evaluation of Performance QQQQQ 
Provision of Employment 
Provision of Health Services 
QQQQQ 
QQQQQ 
Annual account of the use of funds & resources QQQQQ 
Provision of Housing Services 
Provision of Education Services 
Provision of Security 
Provision of Information/Data to the public 
Annual account of income and expenditure 
QQQQQ 
QQQQQ 
QQQQQ 
QQQQQ 
QQQQQ 
8. Please indicate your level of involvement in the following functions in your 
Ministry/Organization. (Please rank your answers, using 5 as highest level of involvement 
and I as lowest level). 
54 3 2 1 
Policy Making .................................................... Q Q Q Q Q 
Strategic Planning .......................................... Q Q Q Q Q 
Annual Planning ................................................ Q Q Q Q Q 
Budgeting and allocation of Resources ............ Q Q Q Q Q 
Executive Implementation of Plans .................. Q Q Q Q Q 
Evaluation of Performance & resource use ...... Q Q Q Q Q 
Others (Please specify) ...................................... Q Q Q Q Q 
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9. Please assess the performance of the UAE Public Service in the provision of statistical 
information in each of the following areas: (Score as follows: 5=Much above average; 
4=Above average; 3=Average; 2=Less than average; l=Much less than average. ) 
Annual Plan &Budget Details 
Financial Statistics 
Employment Statistics 
Objective of the Ministry 
Socio-economic Statistics 
Audit Report 
Decision making structure 
Resource allocation & utilization 
General Statistics 
Others (please specify) 
5 4 3 2 1 
Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q 13 Q Q Q 
10. In general, to what extent are you satisfied with the performance of the Public Sector departments 
or organizations in the UAE? 
Very. satisfied .................................................... Q 
Satisfied ............................................................. Q 
Indifferent (average) .......................................... Q 
Dissatisfied ........................................................ Q 
Very dissatisfied Q 
11. a) Does your Ministry or Company set performance standards for the services or 
products it provides to ensure value-for-money? 
Yes - always ............................... Q 
Yes - sometimes ......................... Q 
No ................................................ Q 
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b) If "Yes", what types of performance standards are available in your organization or company to 
ensure value-for-money in the services/products you provide. (please rank your answer in 
descending order using 5 as most important and I as least important) 
54321 
ISO 9000 performance standards .................. QQQQQ 
Internal performance standards ...................... QQQQQ 
Quality assurance Procedures ........................ QQQQQ 
Consumer Requirement ................................. QQQQQ 
Other (please specify) .................................... QQQQQ 
12. a) Does your Organization (Ministry) engage external professional Bodies, such as Auditors, 
Accountants and Consultants, to evaluate performance and use of resources allocated to the 
organization? 
Yes - always ............................... o 
Yes - sometimes ......................... Q 
No ................................................ Q 
b) if "Yes", in which areas of the activity of your organization do the external Bodies 
provide advice? (Please state precisely) 
13. What type of professional Bodies does your organization or company engage to evaluate 
performance? (Please rank your answer in descending order, using 5 as most used and I as 
least used) 
Auditors ....................................................... 
Management Consultants ............................ 
Quality Assurance Consultants ................... 
Accountants ................................................. 
Political Consultants ................................... 
None ............................................................. 
Others (specify) ........................................ 
5 4 3 2 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q o Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
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ýý' SPECIFIC INFORMATIW'`, `"ý'ýý'' 
14. How would you define Accountability in the Public Services of the UAE? (please tick only one 
option) 
Provision of general annual account of the performance of the Ministry Q 
Provision of detail account of the performance and use of resources 
Q allocated to the Ministry 
Provision of detail annual budget of income and expenditure of the 
Ministry Q 
Provision of detail annual account of the use of resources allocated to the 
Ministry ....................................................... Q 
15. To what extent are you satisfied with the level of accountability in the Public Services of the 
UAE? (tick only one). 
Very satisfied ..................................................... Q 
Satisfied .................................... 4..................... Q 
Indifferent (average) .......................................... Q 
Dissatisfied ........................................................ Q 
Very dissatisfied ................................................ Q 
16. In your view, who should an Under-Secretary in a Ministry be directly accountable to for 
his/her duties and responsibilities? (Please rank your answer in descending order using 5 as 
most important and 1 as least important). 
5 4 3 2 
The Prime Minister Q Q Q Q Q 
The Supreme Council Q Q Q Q Q 
The UAE general public Q Q Q Q Q 
The Minister Q Q Q Q Q 
The National Council Q Q Q Q Q 
The Chairman Q Q Q Q Q 
The Director Q Q Q Q Q 
Others (please specify) Q Q Q Q Q 
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17. Which of the following have you encountered in your dealings with Ministries or 
organizations in the UAE Public Service? (Please rank your answer in descending order 
using 5 as most encountered and I as least encountered) 
Poor knowledge of responsibility 
Limited information disclosure 
Poor Management annual report 
Lack of accountability Ombudsman 
Poor annual accounts report 
Lack of accountability guidelines 
Exaggeration of success 
Lack of report-writing guidelines 
Poor definition of accountability 
Others (Specify) 
5 4 3 2 
Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
18. What are the topics you would expect to find in the annual report of Under-Secretaries in 
the Ministries" (Please rank your answer using 5 as highest priority and I as lowest 
priority). 
5 4 3 2 1 
Policy & Objectives of the Ministry 0 Q Q Q Q 
Funds and other resources allocated to Ministry Q Q Q. Q Q 
Utilization of funds and other resources Q Q Q Q Q 
Evaluation of performance of the Ministry Q Q Q Q Q 
Strategy of operation of the Ministry Q Q Q Q, Q 
Limitations of the Ministry Q Q Q Q Q 
Performance measurement & control mechanisms Q Q Q Q Q 
Projections for the future Q Q Q Q Q 
Other matters (please specify) 
.......................................................................... 
Q 
.................... 
Q 
............ 
Q 
............. 
Q, 
............. 
Q 
.... 
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19. In your view, what social cultural factors might hinder a Senior Civil Servant in a Ministry 
from giving a full and detail account of the performance and use of resources allocated to 
his/her Ministry? (Tick 5=Highest negative effect; 4=Higher negat ive effect; 3=Avera"e 
effect; 2=Lower negative effect; I=Lowest n egative effect). 
5 4 3 21 
Culture of trust in the society Q Q Q QQ 
Low level of public awareness Q Q Q QQ 
Attitude of indifference in the society Q Q Q QQ 
Tradition of respect for views of elders Q Q Q QQ 
Lack of interest of the public in such an account Q Q Q QQ 
Poor knowledge of responsibility Q Q Q QQ 
Low level of political awareness in the society Q Q Q QQ 
Others (specify) Q Q Q QQ 
20. In your view, what organizational factors might influence a Senior Civil Servant in a Ministry to 
present a poor annual account of the performance and use of resources allocated to his/her 
Ministry. (Tick S=Highest negative effect; 4=Higher negative effect; 3=Average effect; 
2=Lower negative effect, I=Lowest negative effect). 
5 4 3 ? 1 
Lack of specific definition of Accountability Q q Q Q 
Lack of accountability Culture in the Ministry [ý [] p Q Q 
Lack of guideline for presenting account Q Q Q Q Q 
Lack appropriate reward system Q Q Q Q Q 
Layback attitude of the Boss ................................................... Q Q Q Q, Q 
Ineffective external Auditing Bod} .......................................... Q Q Q Q Q, 
Inappropriate structure of the Organization ............................ Q Q Q Q Q 
Lack of precise referral criteria ............................................... 
Q Q Q Q 
Corrupt ethical environment ................................................... Q Q Q Q Q 
Lack of equal opportunity for al I ............................................. Q Q Q Q. Q 
Lack of accounts control mechanism ...................................... Q Q Q o Q 
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21. In your view, which of the following indicators would reflect good accountability in the Public 
Services of the UAE? (Please rank your answer in descendi ng order using 5 as mos t important 
and I as least important). 
5 43 2 1 
Unrestricted public review of public service accounts........... Q (ý Q Q p 
Total disclosure of information ............................................... Q Q Q Q Q 
Disclosure of all income and expenditure .............................. (] Q Q Q Q 
Reporting all government activities openly ............................ Q Q Q 1: 1. Q 
Press freedom to discuss public sector accountability ........... Q Q Q Q Q 
Limited report of government activity .................................... Q Q Q Q ß 
Comprehensive account of resource utilization ...................... Q Q Q 
Disclosure of personal interest of civil servants ..................... Q Q Q 
Others (specify please) ............................................................ Ck Cý Q Q Cý 
22. In your view, what personal factors might hinder good Accountability in the public 
services" (Tick 5=Highest negative effect, 4=Higher negative effect. 3=Average effect, 
2=Lower negative effect, I =Lowest negative effect). 
5 4 3 2 1 
Fear of loss of job .................................................................... Q Q Q. Q Q 
Inferiority complex .................................................................. Q Q Q Q Q 
Inadequate education ............................................................... Q. Q Q Q Q 
Lack of confidence .................................................................. Q Q Q Q Q 
Culture of secrecy .................................................................... Q Q Q Q Q 
Corrupt behaviour ................................................................... Q Q Q Q Q 
Fear of exposure of inadequacy ............................................... Q Q Q Q Q 
Fear of blame ........................................................................... Q Q Q Q Q, 
Official arrogance .................................................................... Q Q Q Q. Q. 
Lack of definition of job responsibility ................................... Q Q Q Q 
Lack of delegation of responsibility & authority .................... Q Q Q q 
Others (please specify) .............................................................. Q Q Q Q Q. 
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RECOMMENDATION, 
23. What can be done to improve the level of Accountability in the public services of the UAE? 
(tick as appropriate) 
5 4 3 2 1 
Define accountability more precisely ..................................... Q Q Q Q Q 
Provide strict guidelines for presenting accounts ................... Q Q Q Q Q 
Penalize non-compliance with guidelines ............................. Q Q Q Q Q 
State objectives of accountability precisely ............................ Q Q Q Q 
Educate Civil Servants on need for accountability ................. Q Ck 0 Q Q 
State deadline for submission of accounts/report ................... Q Q Q Q Q 
Relate good accountability to appropriate reward Q Q Q Q Q 
Employ appropriately qualified persons ................................. Q Q Q Q Q 
Establish Ombudsman to monitor accountability ................... Q Q Q Q Q 
24. What other suggestions would you like to make to improve Accountability in the Public 
services of the UAE? (Please feel free to write as you may desire) 
........................................................................................................................................................ 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME 
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AC'COUNTOR QUESTIONNAIRE ON MANAGEMENT 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
493 
RESEARCH ON ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE PUBLIC 
SERVICES OF UAE 
Questionnaire for Accountors (Under-Secretaries, Directors, etc. ) 
494 
Dear Respondent, 
We are conducting a research on "Accountability in the Public Services of the 
United Arab Emirates (U. A. E. )" to write up a Ph. D thesis for the University of 
Hull, U. K. 
The study will be beneficial to the UAE public in general and the public services 
in particular by identifying the factors responsible for public services 
accountability problems and offering appropriate solutions. 
We need your co-operation in filling the attached questionnaire as sincerely and 
objectively as possible and to return it in the enclosed - addressed - stamped envelop. 
Any information supplied will be handled in strict confidence and used exclusively 
for writing up the Ph. D. thesis. 
Thank you in advance for your co-operation. 
Yours faithfully, 
Juan Salem 
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Questionnaire 
Dear Respondent, 
Please answer the questions below as objectively and sincerely as possible. 
Thank you. 
GENERAL INFORMATION SECTION 
I. In which of the followaing categories is your organization formally registered in the 
UAE? 
(Please tick as appropriate). 
Public Service .............. 
Quasi - Public Service ..... 
Private Sector Company.... 
Non-Profit Organization.... 
Others (please specify)...... 
............................. Q 
.......................................... Q 
.......................................... Q 
.......................................... Q 
......................................... Q 
2. What is the official designation of your current position in your organization? (tick only one). 
Under-Secretary .................................................................. Q 
Director-General ................................................................. Q 
Director ............................................................................... Q 
Manager .............................................................................. Q 
Others (please specify) ....................................................... Q 
3. How long have you occupied your current official position? 
Less than 1 year .................................................................. Q 
1-3 years ........................................................................... Q 
3-5 years ........................................................................... Q 
5- 10 years ......................................................................... Q 
More than 10 years ............................................................. Q 
496 
4. Are you in Federal or Emirate Service employment? 
Federal Public Service Employment 
.................................. Q 
Emirate Public Service Employment 
................................. Q 
Federal Private Sector Company 
........................................ Q 
Emirate Private Sector Company 
....................................... Q 
Federal/Emirate Service Employment 
............................... Q 
None of above ..................................................................... Q 
BACK GROUND INFORNIATIO\ 
5. How would you consider the current size of the U. A. E. Public Service in relation to the 
population of the country, which is only 2.6 million people (1997 figures)? 
Too large 
............................................................................. Q Large 
................................................................................... Q Average size ....................................................................... Q Small 
................................................................................... Q Too small Q 
6. In your view, what should constitute the main objectives of the Ministries and other organizations 
in the Public Service of the UAE? (Please prioritize your choice using 5 as most important and 
1 as least important). 
To provide good Social Services 
To provide comprehensive annual evaluation 
of Performance the sector 
To provide Employment for all nationals 
To provide good Health and Housing Services 
To provide a full and accurate account of the use of 
funds & resources allocated to it by the public 
To provideSecurity to all in the country 
To provide good Education Services 
To provide accurate information/data to the public 
54321 
QQQQQ 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
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To encourage socio-economic development of UAE QQQQQ 
7. Please assess the performance of the UAE Public Service in the provision of each of the 
following the services? (Score as follows: 5=Much above average; 4=Above average; 
3=Average; 2=Less than average; 1=Much less than average. ) 
54321 
Provision of Social Services QQQQQ 
Annual evaluation of Performance QQQO0 
Provision of Employment 
Provision of Health Services 
QQQQQ 
QQQQQ 
Annual account of the use of funds & resources Q Q Q Q Q 
Provision of Housing Services Q Q O Q Q 
Provision of Education Services O Q Q Q Q 
Provision of Security Q Q Q Q Q 
Provision of Information/Data to the public O 0 Q O Q 
Annual account of income and expenditure. Q Q Q Q O 
8. Please indicate your level of involvement in the following functions in your 
MinistrylOrganization. (Please rank your answers, using 5 as highest level of involvement 
and I as lowest level). 
5 4 3 2 
Policy Making .................................................... Q Q Q Q Q 
Strategic Planning.. g .......................................... Q Q Q Q Q 
Annual Planning ................................................ Q Q Q Q Q 
Budgeting and allocation of Resources ............ Q Q Q Q Q 
Executive Implementation of Plans .................. Q Q Q Q Q 
Evaluation of Performance & resource use ...... Q Q Q Q Q 
Others (Please specify) ...................................... Q Q Q Q Q 
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9. Please assess the performance of the UAE Public Service in the provision of statistical 
information in each of the following areas: (Score as follows: 5=Much above average; 
4=Above average; 3=Average; 2=Less than average; 1=Much less than average. ) 
Annual Plan &Budget Details 
Financial Statistics 
Employment Statistics 
Objective of the Ministry 
Socio-economic Statistics 
Audit Report 
Decision making structure 
Resource allocation & utilization 
General Statistics 
Others (please specify) 
5 4 3 ? 1 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
0 0 Q Q Q 
Q Q Q 0 O 
Q Q Q 0 O 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q O o 0 
o Q Q Q Q 
10. In general, to what extent are you satisfied with the general performance of the Public Sector 
departments or organizations in the UAE in terms of achieving expected objectives? 
Very, satisfied .......................... 
Satisfied ................................... 
Indifferent (average) ................ 
Dissatisfied .............................. 
Very dissatisfied 
.......................... Q 
.......................... Q 
.......................... Q 
.......................... Q 
13 
11. a) Does your Ministry or Company set performance standards for the services or products it 
provides to ensure value-for-money? 
Yes - always ............................... Q 
Yes - sometimes ......................... Q 
No 
................................................ Q 
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c) If "Yes", what types of performance standards are available in your organization or 
company to ensure value-for-money in the services/products you provide. (please rank 
your answer in descending order using 5 as most important and I as least important) 
ISO 9000 performance standards .................. 
Internal performance standards ...................... 
Quality assurance Procedures ........................ 
Consumer Requirement ................................. 
Other (please specify) .................................... 
5 4 3 2 1 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q O Q 
O Q Q Q O 
O O Q Q Q 
Q 13 Q 0 Q 
12. a) Does your Organization (Ministry) engage external professional Bodies, such as Auditors, 
Accountants and Consultants, to evaluate performance and use of resources allocated to the 
organization? 
Yes - always ............................... Q 
Yes - sometimes ......................... Q 
No ................................................ Q 
C) If "Yes", in which areas of the activity of your organization do the external Bodies 
provide 
advice? (Please state precisely) 
500 
13. What type of professional Bodies does your organization or company engage to evaluate 
performance? (Please rank your answer in descending order, using 5 as most used and 1 as 
least used) 
5 4 3 2 1 
Auditors ....................................................... Q Q Q Q Q 
Management Consultants ............................ Q Q Q Q Q 
Quality Assurance Consultants ................... Q Q Q Q Q 
Accountants ................................................. Q Q Q Q Q 
Political Consultants ................................... Q Q Q Q Q 
None ............................................................. Q Q Q Q Q 
Others (specify) ........................................ 
.......................................................................... 
Q 
.............. 
Q 
................. 
Q 
................. 
Q 
................ 
Q 
........... 
I ': =";; : SPECIFIC INFORMATION ; y; ' ' "ý 
14. How would you define Accountability in the Public Services of the UAE? (please tick only one 
option) 
Q Provision of general annual account of the performance of the Ministry 
Provision of detail account of the performance and use of resources 
allocated to the Ministry Q 
Provision of detail annual budget of income and expenditure of the 
Ministry Q 
Provision of detail annual account of the use of resources allocated to the 
Ministry ........................................................ 
Q 
15. To what extent are you satisfied with the level of accountability in the Public Services of the 
UAE? (tick only one). 
Very satisfied ..................................................... o 
Satisfied ............................................................. Q 
Indifferent (average) .......................................... Q 
Dissatisfied ........................................................ Q 
Very dissatisfied ................................................ Q 
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16. In your view, whom should an Under-Secretary in a Ministry be directly accountable to for 
his/her duties and responsibilities? (Please rank your answer in descending order using 5 as 
highest priority and 1 as lowest priority). 
The Prime Minister 
The Supreme Council 
The UAE general public 
The Minister 
The National Council 
The Chairman 
The Director 
Others (please specify) 
5 4 3 2 1 
Q Q Q Q 
Q O O Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q O 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q 0 Q Q 
17. Which of the following have you encountered in your dealings with Ministries or 
organizations in the UAE Public Service? (Please rank your answer in descending order 
using 5 as most encountered and I as least encountered) 
Poor knowledge of responsibility 
Limited information disclosure 
Poor Management annual report 
Lack of accountability Ombudsman 
Poor annual accounts report 
Lack of accountability guidelines 
Exaggeration of success 
Lack of report-writing guidelines 
Poor definition of accountability 
Others (Specify) 
5 4 3 3 1 
Q Q O O O 
0 Q 0 Q O 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q 0 Q Q 0 
Q O Q 0 Q 
Q Q Q Q 0 
Q Q Q 0 0 
Q Q Q O Q 
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18. What are the topics you would expect to find in the annual report of Under-Secretaries in the 
Ministries? (Please rank your answer scoring 5 as highest priority and I as lowest 
priority). 
Policy & Objectives of the Ministry 
Funds and other resources allocated to Ministry 
Utilization of funds and other resources 
Evaluation of performance of the Ministry 
Strategy of operation of the Ministry 
Limitations of the Ministry 
Performance measurement & control mechanisms 
Projections for the future 
Other matters (please specify) 
5 4 3 2 1 
Q C1 U Q Q 
Q [a Q 12 Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Cx Q 
Q Q Q cl Q 
Ck Q Q a U 
Q Q Q Q Q 
19. In your view, what social cultural factors might hinder a Senior Civil Servant in a Ministry 
from giving a full and detail account of the performance and use of resources allocated to 
his/her Ministry? (Tick 5=Highest negative effect; 4=Highe r neg ative effect; 3=Average 
effect; 3=Lower negative effect; I =Lowest n egative effect). 
5 4 3 2 1 
Culture of trust in the society Q Q 0 Q Q 
Low level of public awareness Q Q 0 Q Q 
Attitude of indifference in the society Q Q Q Q Q 
Tradition of respect for views of elders Q Q Q Q 0 
Lack of interest of the public in such an account O O Q Q Q 
Poor knowledge of responsibility Q Q Q Q Q 
Low level of political awareness in the society Q Q Q Q Q 
Others (specify) 0 Q Q O Q 
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20. In your view, what organizational factors might influence a Senior Civil Servant in a Ministrv to 
present a poor annual account of the performance and use of resources allocated to his her 
Ministry. (Tick 5=Highest negative effect, 4=Higher negative effect: 3=Average effect; 
2=Lower negative effect; l=Lowest negative effect). 
5 4 3 2 1 
Lack of specific definition of Accountability 1 a 13 13 O 
Lack of accountability Culture in the Ministry 13 Q U Q 13 
Lack of guideline for presenting account a 
Lack appropriate reward system 0 Q Q C1 0 
Layback attitude of the Boss ................................................... D a. ß a Q 
Ineffective external Auditing Body ......................................... 12 
Inappropriate structure of the Organization ............................ 1 
Lack of precise referral criteria ............................................... 
ý7 Cý Q a 
Corrupt ethical environment ................................................... 
Lack of equal opportunity for all ............................................. a Q O Cý Iý 
Lack of accounts control mechanism ...................................... 12 12 
21. In your view, which of the following indicators would reflect good accountability in the Public 
Services of the UAE? (Please rank your answer in descending order using 5= most important 
indicator and 1= least important indicator). 
5 4 3 2 1 
Unrestricted public review of public service accounts........... Q Q Q Q Q 
Total disclosure of information ............................................... Q Q Q Q. M 
Disclosure of all income and expenditure .............................. 
Q Q O Q Q 
Reporting all government activities openly ............................ Q Q Q Q 
Press freedom to discuss public sector accountability ........... Q Q Q Q Q 
Limited report of government activity .................................... Q Q Q Q Q. 
Comprehensive account of resource utilization ...................... Q Q El q. Q 
Disclosure of personal interest of civil servants ..................... Q Q Q Q Q 
Others (specify please) ....................................... Q Q 
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22. In your view, what personal factors might hinder good Accountability in the public 
services? (Tick 5=Highest negative effect; 4=Higher negative effect; 3=Average effect; 
2=Lower negative effect; 1=Lowest negative effect). 
Fear of loss of job .................................................................... 
Inferiority complex ............................... ................................... 
Inadequate education ............................................................... 
Lack of confidence .................................................................. 
Culture of secrecy .................................................................... 
Corrupt behaviour ................................................................... 
Fear of exposure of inadequacy ............................................... 
Fear of blame ........................................................................... 
Official arrogance .................................................................... 
Lack of definition of job responsibility ................................... 
Lack of delegation of responsibility & authority .................... 
Others (please specify) .............................................................. 
5 4 3 2 1 
Q C Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
Q Q Q Q Q 
RECOMMENDATION, 
23. What can be done to improve the level of Accountability in the public services of the UAE? 
(tick as appropriate) 
5 4 3 2 1 
Define accountability more precisely ..................................... Q Q Q Q Q 
Provide strict guidelines for presenting accounts ................... U Q Q U Q 
Penalize non-compliance with guidelines ............................. 
State objectives of accountability precisely ............................ Q [ Q Q 
Educate Civil Servants on need for accountability ................. Q 13 13 13 
State deadline for submission of accounts/report ................... [ý Q U Q U 
Relate good accountability to appropriate reward Q Q Q Q Q 
Employ appropriately qualified persons ................................. Q Q Q Q Q 
Establish Ombudsman to monitor accountability ................... [, ý Q lý Q Q 
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24. What other suggestions would you like to make to improve Accountability in the Public 
services of the UAE? (Please feel free to write as you may desire) 
........................................................................................................................................................ 
........................................................................................................................................................ 
........................................................................................................................................................ 
........................................................................................................................................................ 
........................................................................................................................................................ 
........................................................................................................................................................ 
........................................................................................................................................................ 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME 
506 
13ERSONAL INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE ON 
MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTABILITY 
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PERSONAL INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. (a) Str. ýýhat i ý, the evict title of sour current position in this Ministry? 
(b) Ho%% Ion, -, hale'. ou 
been in your current position? 
(c) Would it he right to consider you as a policy-maker or policy-executor? 
OBJECTIVES OF X11\ISTRI 
hat are the main uhl«tt\es of your Ministrv? 
(b) Would you. please, discuss how the objectives are set and who are involved in the 
process 
(c) What is 'our exact role in achieving the objectives of your Ministry? 
(d) who is accountable for achieving the objectives of the Ministry? 
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'-ý 
ý'. 
(e) Please explain how this is done in your Ministry. 
(f) Are you satisfied with the method of accounting for the achievement of the objectives? 
(g) Why are you satisfied unsatisfied with the method? 
3. (a) Sir, I assume that you are conversant with the term "Accountability". How would you 
define the term? 
(b) Please explain how the actual practice of accountability in your Ministry fits the definition 
you have given. 
(c) Would you say that accountability in your Ministry is satisfactory? Why? 
(d) If unsatisfactory, what are the possible factors that are responsible for this? 
Organizational Factor? 
Personal Factors? 
Social Factors? 
= Cultural Factors? 
Political Factors? 
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Other Factors' 
ACCOUNTABILITY PROCEDURES & REGULATIONS 
4. (a) Does your Ministry have accountability procedures and regulations to guide those 
Executives who are accountable for the use of resources to achieve the objectives of the 
Ministry' Please explain how the procedure and regulations work. 
(b) How does sour Ministry ensure that the procedures and regulations are followed 
effectively? 
(c) Does your Ministry use advice provided by outside Bodies such as Auditors and 
Inspectorates? Please explain how this is used. 
(d) Has your Ministry an Ombudsman or other types of "watch dogs" to monitor or check 
accountability. Explain how they operate. 
[_ACCOUNTOR/ACCOUNTEE RELATIONSHIP 
5. (a) To whom are Executives (like you) see themselves accountable for the resources entrusted 
into their care? 
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(b) How often do Executives in your Ministry give account of their services? 
(e) To what extent are the accounts satisfactory? Please explain. 
6. (a) In s our ' ic'N _ %ý 
hach of the following "Accountability" types is of greatest concern in the 
Ministries of the UAE government? 
(a) Management Accountability Q 
(b) Political Accountability Q 
(c) Financial Accountability Q 
(d) Legal Accountability Q 
(e) Social Accountability Q 
(b) What should be done to improve Accountability in general and the type Accountability you 
identified in 6(a) in particular, in your Ministry? 
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TICK (\) QUESTIONNAIRE ON MANAGEMENT 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
512 
TICK Z QUESTIONNAIRE 
ON 
INDICATORS OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
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Dear Respondent: 
You are kindly requested to fill in this questionnaire by simply ticking the appropriate box. The 
information collected will be used solely to write up a PhD thesis and all information supplied will be 
handled with the utmost confidentiality. 
Thank you for your co-operation. 
Juan Salem 
How EFFECTIVE IS THE CRITERION IN 
CRITERIA FOR ASSESSING DOES CRITERIA 
ACHIEVING A HIGH LEVEL OF 
S/N LEVEL OF EXIST IN YOUR MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTABILITY IN YOUR 
ACCOUNTABILITY ORGANIZATION? 
ORGANIZATION? 
(Please Grade Answers from I to 5; 1 
Very Ineffective; 2= Ineffective; 
3=Average; 4=Effective; 
5=Very Effective) 
Yes Q 1 2345 
1 Legal Regulations No. Q Q QQQQ 
Yes Q 1 2345 
2 
Standard Operating No. Q Q QQQQ Procedure 
Yes Q 1 2345 
3 Legal (Law) Standards No. Q Q QQQQ 
Yes Q 1 2345 
4 Delegation of Authority No. Q Q QQQQ 
Yes Q 1 2345 
5 Organizational Objectives No. Q Q QQQQ 
Yes Q 1 2345 
6 Job Description No. Q Q QQQQ 
Yes Q 1 2345 
7 Internet Auditing system No. Q Q QQQQ 
Yes Q 1 2345 
8 External Ombudsman No. Q Q QQQQ 
System 
Yes Q 1 2345 
9 Mandatory Reporting No. Q Q QQQQ 
Yes Q 1 2345 
10 Job Appraisal system No. Q Q QQQQ 
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Yes Q 1 2 3 4 5 
11 Good Performance 
Reward System No. Q Q Q Q Q Q 
Yes Q 1 2 3 4 5 
12 Poor Performance Sanction 
System No. Q 11 13 13 11 13 
Yes Q 1 2 3 4 5 
13 Judicial Review System & 
Procedure No. Q Q Q Q Q E3 
Yes Q 1 2 3 4 5 
14 Neutrality of Civil 
Servants No. Q Q Q Q Q Q 
Yes Q 1 2 3 4 5 
15 Decentralization of 
Activities No. Q 13 1: 1 Q 13 Q 
Yes Q 1 2 3 4 5 
16 Company Policy 
No. Q Q Q Q Q Q 
Yes El 1 2 3 4 5 
17 Formal Channel of 
Communication No. Q 13 13 13 Q 13 
Yes Q 1 2 3 4 5 
18 Informal Channel of 
Communication No. Q 13 Q 11 11 Q 
Yes Q 1 2 3 4 5 
19 Transparency/Openness of 
Administration No. Q 11 13 11 11 11 
Yes Q 1 2 3 4 5 
20 Democratic Administration No. Q Q Q Q Q Q 
Yes Q 1 2 3 4 5 
21 Others (Please specify) No. Q Q 13 Q Q Q 
B, Please rate the level of negative effect of the following factors on Management Accountability in the 
Public Sector (Use 5=Very high negative effect; 4=high negative effect; 3=average negative effect; 2 
low negative effect; 1=very low negative effect. ) 
5432 
Social-Cultural Factors p 11 0 13 
Organizational Factors 13 11 1: 1 El 
Personal Factors 11 00 11 
1 
Q 
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C. Using the rating scale provided, indicate whether the effects of the factors in (B) above encourage or 
limit the level of Management Accountability in the Public Sector. 
Q5= Much higher than average level of Accountability 
Q4= Higher than average level of Accountability. 
Q3= Average Level 
Q2= Lower than average level of Accountability. 
Q1= Much lower than average level of Accountability. 
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APPENDIX 
.F 
PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT FORM 
Period: 
Name: ................................ 
FFNo ................................... 
JcbTltle :......... . .............. 
6 ranch ; -: C-- t ............. 
From // to // 
ETISALAT 
Performance Appraisal Period: 
(Grade 3& above ) 
Name. ' PFNo ............... .............................................. 
Job Title: 
............................................ 
Job No:........... 
Date of joining: .......... 
/......... /.......... 
Current position held since: ...... """/......... 
/....... "" 
Direct supervisor: Name: ....................................................... 
From // to // 
Grade: ................... 
Branch / HO Dept. : ................................... 
Nationality: 
................................................ 
Cost Center: 
............................................. 
Job Title: ..................... 
Overall appraisal score 
Appraisal of Performance, competence development and extent to which objectives were achieved. Enter the total score and 
tick the appropriate box. Overall Score =a+b+c= 
Unacceptable Needs to Improve Standard/Good Very Good Excellent 
n Q n P 0 
0- 79 80 - 99 100 39 140 159 16 200 
Overall appraisal in words (incl. particular strengths and / or weaknesses) 
I Counselling Report 
Recommendation: 
On the basis of the performance review please give your recommendation: 
Probationary Staff Established Staff 
0 Appointment confirmed w. e. f. ----»--»»- 0 Increment recommended. ... »»...... 
%0 Ready for promotion 
o Probation extended until ...... "»-»"»"»"»»-" 0 Increment deferred »»»»». » months 
Employee 
Signature' & Date: 
(') In signing I confine the meeting look place and I am aware of my appraisal and my future work objectives and development objectives 
Supervisor/ Assessor Next-highest supervisor 
Signature & Date: Signature & Date: 
BM/HOD 
Signature, Date & 
comments as required: 
AUTHORITY FOR PAYMENT: 
A.. Day to day work performance 
1. Quantity of work 
2. Quality of work 
3. Customer service attitude 
4. Teamworking attitude 
5. Attendance & punctuality 
6. Reliability 
7. Cares for and Develops subordinates 
8. Initiative & Creativity ( value added) 
9. Supervision 
10. Safety 
Each item is to be weighted according to the specific job situation. The overall 
day-to-day score is estimated keeping in mind all the relevant factors. 
Wnte in box 'a' the overall day-to-day value from within the range shown for the 
rating category that best reflects your estimate of performance. 
12345 
i 
i 
{ Iý 
iý 
. I. 1 213 4I5 
0 39 +o-49 50 . 94 i3"79.80"100 
Z 
Overall day-to-day performance score: a 
Comments (these are required when ratings of "Excellent", 'Needs to Improve' or "Unacceptable' are given and may 
include external factors influencing performance ) 
B. Agreed self development objectives: 
(to be set with weights at the start of the assessment period) 
1 
Weight I Score 
1 ......................................................................................................................................... 
......................................................................................................................................... 
......................................................................................................................................... 
2 ............................................................ 
............................................................... 
............................................................... 
3 ............................................................................................................... 
.................................................................................................................. 
.................................................................................................................. 
Each development objective is weighted, 
Total weights added together equals 20. 
verall self development score: 
.......................... 
....................... 
....................... 
20 /20 
b= 1 
C. Agreed objectives 
f May also be based upon the main Job Description tasks. 
f Number of objectives should be from 3 to 5 only. 
To be completed at the start of the period. To be completed at the end of the period. 
Specific Objective Weight Assessment and Justification Score 
80 /80 
Overall self development score: 
C 
Agreement of Objectives set. 
Fmolovee's initials ............................... 
Supervisor/Assessor's initials ................. 
IU. -Assessment of current competence. 
This is not considered in assessing overall performance! 
lt is for development and potential assessment. 
Competence Level Achievement 
Required 
Comments 
( actual skill, knowledge or behaviour) 
N Good work attitude U 
) Initiative 
c 
Reliable 
ä 
Co Adaptable 
V 
I 
Creative 
Professional Competence 
C 
0 P. C. skills 
CO 
CL Project Management 
O Financial procedures 
Etisalat knowledge 
(n Customer Care skills 
Cn 
a) 
Arabic language 
m English language 
Commercial awareness 
Leadership 
cv 
L- ccn Planning/organizing 
CD 
CO ) Communication skills 
CZ 
2 U) Staff care 
II 
.. _. .., Rating ' ý.. .., .... ... __ 
1= Minima[ competence 2= Developing 3= Competent 4= Advanced 5= Expert Z= Not assessed 
E. Development Plan 
Competency requiring How you plan this to be achieved, . e. g. coaching, job rotation, training Expected Date of improvement etc. Completion 
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APPENDIX 
REPORTING SYSTEMS: FORMS & OBJECTIVES 
üYtý! ýIýýYI., g, 
b. ýýytll u1ý1ý. ýY1 ýl_. u 
EMIRATES TELECOMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION 
CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF INCOME 
FOR THE YEAR ENDED 
19 
Full Year 
Dh. '000 
Revenue 
Operating profit cJ: `ýi C --j 
Other income (interest only) (JZILZU11) ýsy( X11. 
Profit for the year A *. -a CL j 
Unappropriated profit r-Lý jl 
brought forward al-y. 
Appropriations 
Dividends CL-4) 
Transfer to development reserve y11Y Jýý+ 
Transfer to asset replacement reserve J-1--Yl WL; 1-1Y 
Transfer to general reserve tLj L; ", &-J-z 
Unappropriated profit 1, c =-4 
carried forward W i6, y. 
ACCOUnu / fame P&L. xls / Cons P&L 
i 
ASSETS EMPLOYED 
FIXED ASSETS 
INVESTMENTS 
6L'iL--.. aZU 
EMIRATES TELECOMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION 
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET AT 
CURRENT ASSETS 
Stores 
Debtors and prepayments 
Loan to an associated company 
Amounts due from other telecom- 
munications administrations 
Bank and cash balances 
CURRENT LIABILITIES 
Creditors and accruals 
Amounts due to other telecom- 
munications administrations 
Proposed dividend 
ý; tý, ý. ý ,ý -Yý 
i:, ý4n J, -.., 1 ý 
c9YJ Yt.. a : JJ 4 it r_- -- ý" 
V. -11--bi t! -k-, )B 
JLJ 4. *&t+. 
CL-tJY1 
NET CURRENT (LIABILITIES)/ ASSETS LJ J: --ý'v%/(ý4 "u) V 
LONG TERM LIABILITIES 
Provision for staff 
terminal benefits 
FINANCED BY 
Share Capital 
Development reserve 
Assets replacement reserve 
General reserve 
Unappropriated profit 
SHAREHOLDERS' FUNDS 
J_31 4LL1* ZL4 
tý; ; hits. . 
Jr_Yl 
, kcQ &I Fam$ 
P&L Xi$ 18$ 
jay 
I4 
ßi,. 11 4L. ýU 
EMIRATES TELECOMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION 
CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF CASH FLOWS 
FOR THE YEAR ENDED 
CASH FLOWS FROM OPERATING ACTIVITIES 
Operating profit 
djustrnents for: 
Depreciation 
Net transfer to terminal benefits 
Provision for diminution in value of investments 
LLý= QL" &. ;ý CaW 
rL-j 
. sCý. i. syl 
(Increase) / decrease in working capital : 
Stores CJl _;.. D 
Debtors and Prepayments LD ýt. iJlj ýy y,. ll 
Amount due from subsidiary companies ýy. Z-,.,,, gip,. 
Due to/from other telecommunication administrations JAI : "-iI : J). l : AA Z -' - 
Creditors and Accruals .,. Q j Lýy; dj 
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Net cash used in investing activities 
CASH FLOWS FROM FINANCING ACTIVITIES 
Proceeds from issue of shares 
Dividends Paid 
NET CASH USED IN FINANCING ACTIVITIES 
NET (DECREASE)/INCREASE IN CASH 
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TRAFFIC STATTSTTCS SUMMARY - FIRST QUARTER 2000. 
S. No. Category of Traffic 
Qtr. under Review Percentage Increase or Last Qtr. Last Year 
Decrease 
0/0 International 
1 Operator Traffic Minutes 
2 O/G [DD Minutes 
Total O/G Int'l Minutes 
3 (1+2) 
4 National Traffic Minutes 
0/G Telex Minutes (Int'l 
s 
+ Nat'l) 
6 TO Messages Forwarded 
Bureaufax Traffic No. of T Pages Transmitted 
Total 0/G Emdan Paid 
8 Traffic in Minutes 
TV Minutes Received dt 
9 
transmitted by Satellite 
Emnet (Paid) Traffic 
10 No-of Messages 
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Scope and Objective 
Financial reporting relates to the provision of information to management for 
the purpose of planning, controlling and decision-making. The main 
purposes of financial reporting are: 
a) Internal reporting to' management for use in planning and 
controlling routine operations; 
b) Internal reporting to management for use in making non- 
routine decisions and in formulating major plans and policies; 
and 
C) External reporting to shareholders and Government on the 
financial performance of the Corporation. 
The financial information available to management may be presented in 
alternative formats from those required for external reporting or for the 
purpose of decision making and planning. Management reporting is not 
constrained in any way by legislative requirements or by the International 
Accounting Standards. Management will decide what assumptions, 
concepts and presentation techniques are appropriate for a particular 
purpose. Information will be provided to management for the following 
purposes: 
d) Formulation of policies and strategies; 
e) Planning and controlling the activities of Etisalat; 
0 Decision taking on alternative courses of action; and 
g) Safeguarding assets. 
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